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ABSTRACT

The importance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore for the global shipping industry and
world trade can’t be underestimated. In 2010, these routes were navigated by more than 74,000
vessels of various types. If the Straits were to be closed to navigation, global trade would be
adversely affected, thus, injuring the world’s economy. Issues relating to the marine environment
of these Straits have always been contentious. The littoral States may enforce marine
environmental protection measures to protect the straits under the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC), but their powers are limited by the application of
internationally accepted regulations. The national laws of the littoral States governing safety of
navigation and control of vessel-source pollution must correspond to the LOSC and other
International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions that the littoral States have ratified. This
situation makes it difficult for them to effectively manage the marine environment of these
shipping routes. Issues relating to vessel-source marine pollution are endemic in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore and with the projected increase of shipping traffic in future years, current
protective measures may not be entirely sufficient to safeguard the marine environment of these
waterways. This Thesis examines the potential environmental protective measures that the
littoral States may, either collectively or individually, adopt in the future. Current and future
alternative routes to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore for shipping traffic to use are also
identified. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are collectively a priceless maritime heritage
and steps must be taken to ensure the marine environment of these waterways is protected from
pollution and degradation.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1

BACKGROUND

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are two of the most important shipping lanes in the world.1
These straits were significant in the past as a maritime connector between the two great Asian
civilisations at that time, namely India and China, and gave rise to many port-kingdoms in
Southeast Asia. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore serve as the shortest route connecting East
Asia and the West, facilitating global international trade.2 Consequently, these waterways are the
preferred sea lines of communication and this is justified by the fact that they were traversed by
more than 74,000 vessels in 2010.3 If current trends continue, it is predicted that by 2020 the
Straits will be navigated by approximately 150,000 vessels annually; double the current transit
rate.4

Oil spills are typical with shipping activities, either through operational or accidental discharges,
particularly in constricted and congested shipping routes like the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.5 Due to heavy shipping activities and the associated marine pollution, it has been
estimated that coral reef development in the Strait of Malacca is amongst the lowest in this
region.6 The mangrove ecosystem along the Strait of Malacca, especially in the south-western
corner of the Malaysian state of Johor, is being threatened by constant soil erosion as a result of

1

Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008), 16-17; See Map 2-1 of
Chapter 2 of this Thesis.
2

Mat Taib Yasin, ‘Security of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCS) through the Straits of Malacca: The Need to
Secure the Northern Approaches’ in Dennis Rumley, Sanjay Chaturvedi and Mat Taib Yasin (eds), The Security of
Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean Region (Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2007), 225.
3

H.M. Ibrahim and Mansoureh Sh, ‘Analysis of Carrying Capacity and Critical Governance Strategies for the Straits
of Malacca’ (Paper presented at the 6th MIMA International Conference on the Straits of Malacca “Chartering the
Future”, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2009), 5.
4

Robert Beckman, ‘The Establishment of Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore under
Article 43 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ in Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman and Susan
J. Rolston (eds), The Future of Ocean Regime-Building-Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2009), 234-235.
5

Mohd Nizam Basiron, ‘Anatomy of an Oil Spill’ (2010) 17(3) MIMA Bulletin, 39.

6

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Attempts to Seek Alternative Routes to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’
(2010) 1(1) Journal of Maritime Geopolitics and Culture, 1-2.

1

the increasing density of ships plying this waterway.7 Besides oil spills, shipping activities
discharge other types of harmful and noxious wastes such as marine debris, sewage, hazardous
and noxious substances and greenhouse gases that are sources of atmospheric pollution.8 This is
further aggravated by the fact that the littoral States’ powers to impose environmental protection
measures in these waterways are limited to the application of accepted international regulations
as enumerated in Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC).9
The littoral States are constrained because they cannot act unilaterally on matters related to
maritime traffic regulation and protection of the marine environment of the Straits.10

With the steady increase in shipping traffic each year, the current environmental protection
regime may not be sufficient to protect the marine environment of these waterways. 11 As more
vessels ply the Straits, safety and environmental concerns will become more acute for the littoral
States bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.12 This Thesis examines this situation and
proposes possible legal measures for the littoral States to enhance their regulatory and
enforcement powers that have been constrained by the application of Part III of the LOSC. The
proposed legal measures provide a platform for the littoral States to enhance their regulatory
powers to ensure that the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be
protected from vessel-source pollution.

7

Mohd Nizam Basiron, ‘Sea-Based Sources of Marine Pollution’ in H.M. Ibrahim and Hairil Anuar Husin (eds),
Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective (Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008), 120-125.
8

Alexander P. Burgel, ‘Air Pollution from Ships: Recent Developments’ (2007) 6(2) WMU Journal of Maritime
Affairs, 217-219.
9

Robert Beckman, ‘Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for Consideration’ (Paper presented at
the Building A Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004), 244-249.
10

The littoral States can take appropriate enforcement measures against recalcitrant vessels that have violated
regulations formulated under Article 42(1) (a) & 42 (1) (b) where this violation has caused or is threatening to cause
major damage to the marine environment of the straits. This is further reiterated in Article 233 (Part XII) of the
LOSC.
11

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Shipping Controls in Critical Straits: A Study of the Legal Feasibility of the
Designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area’ (Paper presented at the
International Conference on Environment 2010, Penang, Malaysia, 2010).
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presented at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008), 77-83.
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1.2

OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The primary objective of this research is to show that the current international legal framework
on marine environmental protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has placed the
littoral States in a disadvantaged position, as far as the enforcement jurisdiction is concerned.
The current environmental protection measures provided in the LOSC, International Maritime
Organization (IMO) and other related international conventions are not sufficient to mitigate the
marine pollution and damage to the marine environment which will result from the increasing
density of navigational traffic each year. This research is also designed to demonstrate that the
provisions of Part III of the LOSC places the protection of the marine environment of straits used
for international navigation in a subordinate position to that of navigational rights, and that this
balance needs to be altered to enable enhanced protection of the marine environment of such
straits.

The third objective of the research is to propose potential legal and policy measures for
improving the protection of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

1.3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research is based on a mixture of library study and field work. The library study involved
literature reviews of academic writing, official government reports and other related documents,
international conventions, case studies and conference papers. Reference was also made to
relevant internet sources. The field work component included attending and presenting papers in
relevant workshops, seminars, symposiums and conferences relating to maritime matters,
especially those involving the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Figures, data and any related
information from relevant government bodies such as the Marine Department of Malaysia, the
Survey and Mapping Department of Malaysia and the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA)
that are pertinent to this study were gathered in the course of the research.

The approach applied involved an analysis of the existing national and international laws,
regulations and co-operations on the protection of the marine environment of the Straits of
3

Malacca and Singapore. It included an examination of relevant provisions of the LOSC,
Resolutions of the IMO and other related IMO international conventions such as the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1973) as modified by the
Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), case studies from State practice as well as
an examination of the relevant domestic legislation of the three littoral States in regulating safety
of navigation and protection of the marine environment of the Straits. An evaluation was carried
out to determine if the existing environmental protection measures balance the tension between
navigational rights and protection of the marine environment in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.

1.4

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THESIS

The significance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as two of the world’s most important
shipping routes has not only prompted many scholars to produce literature on them, but also
prompted many national and international organisations to conduct conferences, seminars and
symposiums to discuss issues pertaining to these waterways. This shows that issues and
developments surrounding the Straits, particularly on the protection of the marine environment
of the Straits and safety of navigation, are ongoing. Therefore, research and writing on the
Straits’ issues should be conducted to continually address new developments on the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore.

This research is significant in realising the vision of promoting sustainable development in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore. It is a work that will supplement existing literature relating to
legal policies governing the safety of navigation and the protection of the marine environment of
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. It identifies issues that have not yet been addressed and
suggests solutions for unresolved issues. Furthermore, this study fills certain of the gaps in the
existing knowledge through the contribution of new scholarship and ideas by extending previous
research pursued by other scholars in this field.

The issues pertaining to the Straits are perennial and virtually inexhaustible in nature. There is an
extensive literature on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, either in the form of scholarly
4

books, journal articles, conference proceedings and papers, newspaper articles and online
journals. This literature primarily discusses the issues pertaining to the protection of the marine
environment and the safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Nevertheless,
the existing literature has not comprehensively discussed new and/or ongoing developments
concerning these Straits, which may include:

(a)

The possibility of ships and global trade using new and future alternative routes to the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore, such as through Indonesian archipelagic waters, the
Northeast Arctic Passage (NAP), the proposed plans for the Thai Canal and the TransPeninsula Pipeline Plan (TPP);

(b)

Proposed future environmental protection measures in the Straits, such as the potential
designation of the Straits as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) with the proposed
Associated Protective Measures (APM) and the possible legal and political effects arising
out of their implementation;

(c)

The potential unilateral measures to regulate shipping traffic through the Straits that the
littoral States could resort to should measures provided by the IMO not prove sufficient;
and

(d)

Discussion on the application of transit passage relating to the potential beginning and
terminating points of this navigational regime for all vessels in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.

As such, this research is different from other existing literature as it discusses matters that have
yet to be considered; or should these new issues have been previously discussed, it further
elaborates them from a legal viewpoint. This study examines developments surrounding the
Straits to determine solutions and ways to further improve navigational safety and thereby
enhance the protection of the marine environment of these important waterways.

The research is groundbreaking, as evidenced by the fact that several Chapters have been
published in international peer-reviewed journals.13
13

(i) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Attempts to Seek Alternative Routes to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’
(2010) 1(1) Journal of Maritime Geopolitics and Culture, 1-21;
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1.5

THESIS STRUCTURE

This Thesis is organised into 11 Chapters, including Chapter 1. This introductory Chapter is
followed by Chapter 2 which provides a historical background and a current profile of the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore. Chapter 2 discusses the history of the Straits, particularly the history
of trade and shipping in these vital shipping routes from the earliest kingdoms through colonial
times and up until the modern era. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are jointly bordered by
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. Therefore, this Chapter briefly examines the
associated maritime boundary delimitation issues, and also discusses the role of the Straits as
economic lifelines for the littoral States, the region and for global shipping.

The focal point of Chapter 3 is on Part III of the LOSC, where it outlines the history of
establishing the legal status of straits used for international navigation. Chapter 3 discusses the
evolution of this navigational regime that was mooted from the time United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea I (UNCLOS I) was convened until it was finally codified in Part III of the

(ii) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Legal Feasibility of the Imposition of a Traffic Limitation Scheme in Straits
Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 1(6) International
Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 122-130;
(iii) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Balancing the Tensions between Shipping and Marine Environmental Protection
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Have the Straits Reached an Environmental Tipping Point’ (2011) 7(2) The
International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability, 39-50;
(iv) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Ensuring Safe Navigation’ (2011) (131/2011)
RSIS Commentaries, 1-2;
(v) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for International
Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 3(4) Asian Politics & Policy, 501-526;
(vi) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Legal Feasibility of Imposing Shipping Controls in Straits Used for
International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 2(9) OIDA International Journal
of Sustainable Development, 69-82;
(vii) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Protecting Vital Sea Lines of Communication: A Study of the Proposed
Designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area’ (2012) 57 Ocean and
Coastal Management, 79-94;
(viii) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits’ (2012) (24/2012)
RSIS Commentaries, 1-2;
(ix) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Transit Passage Regime in Straits Used for International
Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2012) Asian Politics & Policy (imprint);
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LOSC. This Chapter concludes by discussing whether or not the transit passage regime can be
considered as part of customary international law.

Chapter 4 elucidates the special features of the transit passage regime. This Chapter evaluates
and appraises the other two navigation regimes available to foreign vessels in navigating through
straits, namely non-suspendable innocent passage and freedom of navigation in the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) by comparing and contrasting their features and characteristics. This
Chapter concludes by summarising the navigation regimes that are applicable in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore.

Chapter 5 discusses the pollution issues that the Straits are currently facing. Relevant data and
statistics are given to illustrate the increasing pollution problem, mainly those relating to vesselsource pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. This Chapter also discusses the
navigational hazards that are generally responsible for enhancing the risks of accidents and
maritime casualties in the Straits.

Chapter 6 elaborates the application of the international legal regime on straits used for
international navigation to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, particularly Part III and Part XII
of the LOSC. It focuses on the different types of jurisdictions of States; namely the port State,
the flag State, the coastal State as well as the jurisdiction of States bordering straits. Chapter 5
also discusses the related IMO Conventions on safety of navigation and control of vessel-source
of marine pollution. It further reiterates that Article 233 of Part XII of the LOSC has limited the
enforcement jurisdiction of States bordering straits, so much so that the provisions of the related
IMO Convention can only be effectively enforced through the port and flag States jurisdiction.

Due to the limited enforcement jurisdiction of States bordering straits, Chapter 7 explains the
importance of littoral States and user States co-operating both regionally and internationally for
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels in straits used for international
navigation under Article 43 of the LOSC. The main conclusion derived from both Chapters 6 and
7 is that the LOSC has provided an uneven balance between navigational rights and the
protection of the marine environment of straits, in favour of the former.
7

Chapters 8 and 9 discuss the potential future measures that could be taken by the littoral States in
regulating shipping, safety of navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore; the former ventures into the possible IMO
measures while the latter focuses on the potential unilateral means. The IMO measures discussed
include the potential designation of the Straits as a Special Area under MARPOL 73/78 or as a
PSSA under IMO Guidelines with its ensuing APMs. This Chapter concludes by discussing the
possible legal and political ramifications arising from such designations.

Given the fact that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are busy waterways and will continue to
accommodate more shipping traffic in the future, there is a need to seek new and potential
alternative routes to the Straits. Chapter 10 discusses the potential alternative shipping routes to
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore including the routes through Indonesian archipelagic
waters, the NAP and the proposed Thai Canal as well as the proposed TPP. This Chapter
concludes by examining routes that are likely to be preferred by the shipping industry in the
future and to what extent the use of particular routes will reduce the amount of shipping traffic
that plies the Straits of Malacca and Singapore each year.

1.6

CONCLUSION

The overall conclusion drawn from this Thesis is that the current laws, regulations and measures
on safety of navigation and the control of vessel-source pollution applicable in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are not sufficient to protect and preserve the marine environment of the
Straits. This conclusion is based on the fact that the traffic density in the Straits is predicted to
grow steadily in coming years and will have adverse impacts on the marine environment of the
Straits. The littoral States of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are parties to the LOSC and
therefore they are bound by the provisions of the LOSC to regulate shipping and the safety of
navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in accordance with its provisions. They
cannot unilaterally formulate laws that could have the effect of hampering and impeding the
transit of ships through the Straits or that are of a more stringent nature than those prescribed by
the competent international organisation.

8

One option available to the littoral States is to propose additional protective measures within the
competence of the IMO such as designating the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as Special
Areas under MARPOL 73/78 or as PSSAs. It is also recommended that efforts should be made to
further stimulate the development of the co-operative mechanisms that exist between the littoral
States and the user States in protecting and preserving the marine environment of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. The burden of maintaining the Straits from a safety and environmental
perspective should not be borne by the littoral States only, as the Straits are jointly used by the
littoral States and the user States.

Given that both the Straits are now indispensible for shipping activities, particularly in linking
the oil producing States of the Middle East and the oil consumer States of Southeast Asia and
East Asia, the proposed future measures will not be entirely viable unless alternative routes can
be created to mitigate the shipping dependency on the Straits. Therefore, it is crucial for the
littoral and user States to continue supporting the existing plans to create alternative routes so
that the traffic density in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore can be relieved. This would
ultimately promote a situation which maintains a better balance between navigational rights and
the protection and preservation of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.
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CHAPTER 2.
PRICELESS MARITIME HERITAGE
2.1

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter provides an introduction to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and is divided into
two parts. The first part focuses on the historical background of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore; from the third century AD to the modern day Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The
first part of this Chapter also includes a brief explanation on the maritime boundary delimitation
issues pertaining to the Straits. The second part discusses the significance of these waterways as
economic lifelines for the large coastal population as well as for international shipping activities.
This Chapter concludes that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were not only important
waterways of the past, as they still are significant at present and in the future.

2.2

A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

The entrance to the Strait1 of Malacca is located between Ujung Baka at the northernmost tip of
Sumatra, Indonesia to Lem Voalan in Phuket Island in Thailand.2 The Strait is very wide at its
gateway to the Andaman Sea, which is about 200 nautical miles in breadth.3 It separates
mainland Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, forming a funnel-shaped
waterway as it narrows to the south. From One Fathom Bank (Permatang Sedepa) the breadth of
the Strait of Malacca on either shore is less than 50 nautical miles and it narrows to only 8.4
nautical miles where it ends between Malaysia’s Tanjung Piai and Indonesia’s Pulau Karimun
Kecil and subsequently joins the Strait of Singapore, which is located between Singapore, the

1

A strait has never been legally defined in any international legal instrument. However, in geographic terms, a strait
is defined as a ‘natural passage or arm of water connecting two larger bodies of water’. See Julian Roberts,
‘Compulsory Pilotage in International Straits: The Torres Strait PSSA Proposal’ (2006) 37(1) Ocean Development
& International Law, 98; Robert W. Smith, ‘An Analysis of the Strategic Attributes of International Straits: A
Geographical Perspective’ (1974) 2 Maritime Studies and Management, 88-89.
2

Maritime Institute of Malaysia, ‘Executive Summary’ in H. M. Ibrahim and Hairil Anuar Husin (eds), Profile of
the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective (Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008), xiii-xvi.
3

Amelia Emran, The Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Master of
Maritime Studies (Research) Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2007), 9.
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south coast of Eastern Johor and Riau Islands in Indonesia.4 The Strait of Singapore is
approximately 60.8 nautical miles in length with a width of not more than 8.6 nautical miles. It
opens up to the South China Sea, acting as a connector to the Pacific Ocean.5

Map 2-1: Map of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
(Modified from Google Maps)
The International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) regards the Strait of Malacca and the Strait
of Singapore, hydrographically, as separate straits.6 The Straits of Malacca and Singapore have
been vital shipping routes for international trade for hundreds of years.

The region around the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is steeped in a long and continuous
history of trade, shipping, colonisation and the race towards attaining political and economic
4

H. M. Ibrahim, Hairil Anuar Husin and Deneswari Sivaguru, ‘The Straits of Malacca: Setting the Scene’ in H. M.
Ibrahim and Hairil Anuar Husin (eds), Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective (Maritime Institute
of Malaysia, 2008), 32-33; J. Ashley Roach, ‘Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’
(2005) 59 Journal of International Affairs, 97.
5

Michael Leifer, ‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 58-60; M. I. Bird, W. C. Pang and K. Lambeck, ‘The Age and Origin of the Strait of
Singapore’ (2006) 241 Paleogeography, Paleoclimatology, Palaecology, 531; I. M. Andi Arsana and Farid Yuniar
Sumaryo, ‘Geospatial Aspects of Maritime Boundary Delimitations in the Singapore Strait involving Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore’ (Paper presented at the FIG Congress 2010: Facing the Challenges - Building the Capacity,
Sydney, 2010), 8.
6

International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), ‘Limits of Oceans and Seas’ (150-XII-1971, IHO, 1953), 23.
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supremacy, both before and during the age of European dominion. The Strait of Malacca was
initially known as the ‘Sea of Malayu’. The first reference to the ‘Sea of Malayu’ was from a
ninth century AD Arabic document, noting the Malay influence in the region.7 This assertion was
also supported by Godinho De Eredia, a prominent Portuguese historian who believed that the
‘Sea of Malayu’ referred to that of the Strait of Malacca.8 Both the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore were largely responsible for the emergence and downfall of various kingdoms along
their length, some of which did develop into regional maritime Empires and important trading
centres.9 The history of this region can be divided into two eras, the pre-European colonial age
and the epoch of European imperialism.

2.2.1

Strait of Malacca Region in the Pre-Colonial Period

The geographical characteristics of the Malay Peninsula as a natural barrier separating the Indian
Ocean and the South China Sea, encouraged early ports to flourish along its coasts. 10 These early
ports provided convenient transit havens for vessels waiting for the change of the monsoon
current to navigate through the Strait of Malacca to continue their voyage to the other side of the
ocean or wishing to connect with the overland passage route through the Malay Peninsula.11

On the basis of archaeological findings, the earliest Malay port in the region of the Strait of
Malacca was Takuapa, or Langkasuka, which emerged sometime in the third century AD. 12 By
the fifth century AD, the Jiecha Kingdom, otherwise known as the Old Kedah was established in

7

Leonard Y. Andaya, Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka (University of Hawai’i
Press, 2008), 22-29.
8

Ibid.

9

Nordin Hussin, ‘Historical Development of Coastal Ports and Towns in the Straits of Malacca’ in H. M. Ibrahim
and Hairil Anuar Husin (eds), Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective (Maritime Institute of
Malaysia, 2008), 8.
10

Pierre-Yves Manguin, ‘The Archaeology of Early Maritime Polities of Southeast Asia’ in Ian Glover and Peter
Bellwood (eds), Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 294-296.
11

Ibid., 294.

12

William A. Southworth, ‘Langkasuka’ in Ooi Keat Gin (ed), Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, From
Angkor Wat to East Timor (ABC-CLIO, 2004), 764-765.
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areas south of the modern-day Malaysian state of Kedah.13 Jiecha was once a prosperous transit
port for ships from Arabia, Persia and India, before continuing their voyage to the East. 14 The
people of Jiecha were actively engaged in trade with these foreign merchants. 15

By the seventh century AD, however, Pan-Pan, Langkasuka and Jiecha were subjugated to the
dominance of the powerful Malay kingdom of Srivijaya.16 With Palembang as its capital,
situated almost equidistant from the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Sunda, this was the first
empire that managed to control these two maritime choke points in Southeast Asia. The Srivijaya
Kingdom controlled the trade activities that took place along the length of these waterways, 17 by
compelling passing vessels to call at Srivijayan ports and levying port dues and taxes upon
them.18 Srivijaya, benefiting from its role as the ‘Master of the Strait of Malacca’ participated
actively in a growing world economy at that time and prospered well by engaging in extensive
commerce in camphor, cloves, sandalwood, nutmegs and other valuable commodities with
traders and merchants from different parts of Asia.19

In about 1293 AD, the core economic and political power in maritime Southeast Asia shifted
from Sumatra to the island of Java.20 The territories of the Majapahit Kingdom expanded through
various conquering expeditions carried out by its charismatic Prime Minister, Gajah Mada.21
Majapahit ruled much of the Malay World which includes several states in Sumatra, the Malay
Peninsula, Borneo, Celebes, Moluccas and some parts of the Philippine archipelago.22 Thus, it

13

Pierre-Yves Manguin, ‘The Archaeology of Early Maritime Polities of Southeast Asia’ in Ian Glover and Peter
Bellwood (eds), Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 294.
14

Ibid.

15

Dougald J. W. O’Reilly, Early Civilizations of Southeast Asia (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 54-56.

16

Lea E. Williams, Southeast Asia: A History (Oxford University Press, 1976), 26-35.

17

D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (MacMillan, 1960), 38.

18

B. R. Pearn, An Introduction to the History of South-East Asia (Longmans, 1965), 24.

19

Ibid.

20

D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (MacMillan, 1960), 72-84.

21

B. R. Pearn, An Introduction to the History of South-East Asia (Longmans, 1965), 27-28.

22

D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (MacMillan, 1960), 77.
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became the next political power after Srivijaya that managed to take command of the Straits of
Malacca and Sunda.

Majapahit generated wealth through agricultural produce, particularly rice production and also
through maritime trade that went through the Straits of Malacca and Sunda.23 With such large
territories, Majapahit traders accumulated raw materials from its hinterland to be traded in its
ports.24 These included pepper, salt and coconut oil from Java, spices from the Moluccas, ivory
from Sumatra, tin and lead from the Malay Peninsula to be exchanged with textiles from India
and porcelain products from China.25 Between the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, Majapahit
replaced Srivijaya and became a major centre of commerce in the Strait of Malacca region. 26
Majapahit’s preeminence did not last long. With Islam gaining influence in Java in the fifteenth
century, Majapahit was finally abolished by the Java-based Sultanate of Demak.

Malacca was the next kingdom to take command of the Strait of Malacca after the fall of
Majapahit. The profound influence of the Malacca Sultanate, which dominated the Strait for over
a century, is evident with the name that the Strait of Malacca carries up to this day.27 In the late
fourteenth century, Malacca began to increase in influence and importance, especially in the
maritime arena. This was due to its strategic location nestled comfortably along the length of the
Strait of Malacca with the advantage of being sheltered from the strong monsoonal currents.28 It
consequently had a safe harbour, which made it a perfect haven for seafarers waiting for the
change of monsoonal winds to travel eastward or to the west. 29 Malacca grew not only into a
prosperous international port, but also a regional maritime empire. Possessing strong command
over the Strait of Malacca, Malacca controlled all trade passing through this waterway and

23

M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 2000 (Stanford University Press, 2001), 20-22.

24

B. R. Pearn, An Introduction to the History of South-East Asia (Longmans, 1965), 27-28.

25

Ibid.

26

Ibid.

27

Politecnico Di Milano, The History of Malacca (2007) Polo Territoriale di Lecco, Politecnico Di Milano
<http://www.lecco.polimi.it/premiolecco/premiolecco2007/MalaccaHistory.pdf>.
28

Sarnia Hayes Hoyt, Old Malacca (Oxford University Press, 1993), 11.

29

Ibid.
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compelled merchant vessels to call at the port of Malacca when passing through. 30 As stated by
Pearn:

Malacca replaced Majapahit as the principal market at which
goods from the archipelago and farther east were traded against
goods from India and the farther west; and in this trade the spices
of the Moluccas were a major item.31
In the mid-fifteenth century, Malaccan territory expanded significantly to cover territories on the
Malay Peninsula and the eastern seaboard of Sumatra, commanding over the Strait of Malacca,32
as shown in Map 2-2:

Map 2-2: The Malacca Sultanate Empire in the Fifteenth Century33
(Modified from Google Maps)

30

Nicholas Tarling, The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: From Early Times to c. 1800 (Cambridge University
Press, 1992), 175.
31

B. R. Pearn, An Introduction to the History of South-East Asia (Longmans, 1965), 35.

32

Richard Allen, A Short Introduction to the History and Politics of Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 1970),
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Malacca prospered until 1511 as a crucial link in world trade.34 The population of the port of
Malacca before the fall of the Sultanate was estimated to be around 100,000. Thus, it was as
large as other European cities at that time such as Naples and Paris.35 Malacca’s glorious
moments were short-lived with the arrival of the Portuguese in the region in the early sixteenth
century.36

2.2.2

Strait of Malacca Region in the Colonial Age

The Portuguese were the first European power ever to set foot in Malacca. In the fifteenth
century, they made voyages to the Indian Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope not only with the
intention of crushing the economic monopoly of Muslim traders, but also to expand
Christianity.37 They were initially well-received by the Sultan of Malacca, and were granted
permission to land and to conduct trade.38 However, the Muslim traders of Gujarat were
suspicious of the Portuguese and persuaded the Malay authorities to launch a surprise attack on
the Portuguese.39 This angered the Portuguese authorities and war was waged against Malacca.40
Malacca itself was weakening at that time as there were quarrels within the royal family and
corruption was rampant in its administration.41 After two attacks on Malacca, the Sultanate was
overthrown and the Portuguese established a fort in the new Portuguese-Malacca.42 The
Portuguese had high hopes that with this new colony, they could establish a stronghold on the
Strait of Malacca. By means of their naval power, they managed to gain significant control over
the Strait of Malacca and compelled ships to call at Malacca and pay taxes.43 However, the
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taking of Malacca by the Portuguese did not mean that the Portuguese were free from any
opposition from other Malay powers in that region.44

The fall of Malacca to the Portuguese, led to the founding of the Johor Sultanate, established by
the prince of the ousted Sultan of Malacca. Johor inherited much of the area that used to be under
the influence of the Malacca Sultanate, particularly in the southern regions of the Strait of
Malacca.45 The fall of Malacca also gave rise to the Aceh Sultanate in north Sumatra. The
Portuguese anti-Muslim policy in Malacca benefited the Muslim port of Aceh as Muslim traders
preferred to call at Aceh over Malacca.46 By the mid sixteenth century, Aceh’s power grew
significantly and it attempted to bring the Strait of Malacca under its influence.47 At this time, the
tripartite war between Portuguese-Malacca, Aceh and Johor to control the Strait of Malacca
erupted and this continued for the next hundred years.48 Aceh did launch several attacks on
Malacca which managed to weaken the Portuguese, but these ended in vain.49 With the demise of
Aceh’s influential ruler, Sultan Iskandar Thani, the Aceh Empire started to disintegrate.50
Johor also made several unsuccessful attempts to re-capture Malacca.51 The arrival of the Dutch
in the seventeenth century in the Malay World gave Johor the opportunity to rise as a supreme
local kingdom in the Strait of Malacca region.52 Johor started to engage long and friendly
relations with the Dutch when Admiral Jacob Heemskerck visited the capital of Johor, Batu
Sawar in 1602.53 Both the Dutch and Johorese sought each other’s friendship as a counterweight
against the Portuguese and the Acehnese. Subsequently, these two powers collaborated in their
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plan to oust the Portuguese from Malacca. Finally, in 1640-1641, the Portuguese ceased to have
control on the Strait of Malacca region permanently.54

Before colonising Malacca, the Dutch had established their foothold in Southeast Asia in 1600
by establishing a trading post in Bantam, East Java.55 With the capture of Malacca, the Dutch
gained control of both the Straits of Malacca and Sunda.56 This put them in a good position to
monopolise the trade of the archipelago with the West.57 The Dutch did not interfere with Johor
in exercising its powers to expand its territory over other Malay centres in the Peninsula as they
were too pre-occupied with trade.58 The Dutch maintained good ties with the Johor Kingdom and
engaged in trade with them, as stated by Andaya:

Dutch missions to the various cities on the Johor River and on Riau
marveled at the trading activity they found there. Some of the
things traded were gold, eaglewood, kelembak, pedro porco,
birdsnest, ivory, camphor, tin, rattan, wax, pepper, salt, rice,
copper, spiauter, white Chinese silk, porcelain, iron Chinese pans,
cloth, red cloth, Japanese gold thread and opium.59
During the Dutch era, most trading activities were carried out via the Sunda Strait as it was
nearer to the Dutch East Indies Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) headquarters
of Batavia in Java.60 As a result, Malacca and the Strait of Malacca declined in importance in the
maritime trade industry in Southeast Asia at this time. 61 Malacca in the eighteenth century was
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overshadowed in importance by Batavia.62 Trade was focused principally on monopolising the
export of pepper, spices and sugar, and the import of cloth and opium. 63

The British were the next European power to expand their influence over the Strait of Malacca
region. One of the earliest British trading posts was in Bengkulu, formerly called Bencoolen, but
it was not generating profits for the British.64 In 1786, the British settled on the island of Penang
(Pulau Pinang), an island that straddles the northern part of the Strait of Malacca.65 In 1819, they
occupied the island of Singapore (Singapura) near the southern end of the Malay Peninsula, with
the permission of the Sultan of Johor.66 The Strait of Singapore was named after this island. The
presence of the Dutch in the Malay Peninsula was considered by the British authorities to be
detrimental to the British policy of maintaining good relations with the Dutch government in
Europe.67 Consequently, the British and the Dutch entered into the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of
London in 182468 under which the Dutch gave up all their territories in mainland Asia to the
British, which included Malacca,69 and in return the British agreed not to spread its dominions
into the Malay Archipelago, south of Singapore.70 Map 2-3 shows the spheres of dominance of
the British and Dutch in the Strait of Malacca region:
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Map 2-3: The Effect of Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 182471
(Modified from Google Maps)
Under this Treaty, the Dutch were free to exercise their authority in Sumatra and other
Indonesian islands and it also enabled the British to expand their influence over Malaya. 72 This
Treaty thus divided the Strait of Malacca region into two spheres which have lasted even until
the present.73

The efforts of the British to establish trading posts in Penang in 1786, Malacca in 1824, and
Singapore in 1819, were quite timely, as the Suez Canal was opened 5 decades after that in
1869.74 The Suez Canal allowed vessels from East Asia to sail to Europe through the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore toward the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea and gain access to the
Mediterranean Sea without having to sail around the African continent.75 The opening of the
71

Note: For illustrative purposes only. The line does not depict the exact boundary demarcation line between the
two territories.
72

John Anderson, Acheen and the Ports on the North and East Coasts of Sumatra (Oxford University Press, 1971),

2.
73
74

Brian Harrison, South-East Asia: A Short History (Macmillan, 1966), 176-177.

Suez
Canal
Authority,
Canal
<http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=8>.

History

75

Suez Canal Authority, Saving in Distance
<http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=11>.

20

via

(1975)
SC

Suez
(2008)

Suez

Canal
Canal

Authority
Authority

Suez Canal on 17 November 1869 meant that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore route again
became the shortest route connecting Europe and East Asia.76 Hence, the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore were revived and regained their position as important waterways for international
trade and shipping.77

Penang, Malacca and Singapore became British Crown Colonies and other Malay states along
the Strait of Malacca, namely Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Selangor and Negeri Sembilan became
British protectorates.78 While the rest of the Malay states had been colonised, Johor was the only
Malay State that remained independent at least until 1914 when the Sultan of Johor eventually
accepted a British advisor.79 These Malay States were rich in tin deposits, which at that time, was
a crucial mineral to support British industrial activities.80 In the nineteenth century, British
Malaya was also one of the biggest rubber producers in the world.81 Tin and rubber were among
the important commodities being transported through the Strait of Malacca during the British
rule in Malaya.82 On the other side of the Strait, Sumatra was also eventually colonised by the
Dutch. After waging war against the Dutch forces for forty years, the Aceh Sultanate was
ultimately annexed as a colony of the Netherlands East Indies in 1913.83

During World War II, the Japanese forces occupied the Strait of Malacca region for a brief
period of three years from 1942 to 1945, when Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula were
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consolidated under a single administration.84 After the end of World War II, the de-colonisation
of this region began gradually. This begun with the consolidation of the island of Sumatra into
Indonesia (formerly Dutch East Indies) after it gained independence in 1945.85 Indonesia as a
nation was officially established on 27 December 1949.86 Malaya followed suit in 1957.87 Upon
independence, both Malaya and Indonesia resumed the rights and obligations that Britain and the
Netherlands held respectively over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore during the colonial
era.88 Malaya then merged with Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak to form the Federation of
Malaysia in 1963.89 On 9 August 1965, Singapore became an independent island republic,
subsequent to its separation from the Malaysian Federation.90

This historical background shows that the Strait of Malacca played a significant role in shaping
the character of this region. The political will to seize dominion over the Strait of Malacca, has
always been motivated by the desire to control and monopolise the trade that goes through it. 91
The historical significance of the Strait of Malacca has resulted in Malacca and Georgetown in
Penang, two former British Strait Settlements, to be designated as World Heritage Sites by the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2008.92 At
present, both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore remain important for international trade, as
discussed in subsequent parts of this Chapter.

84

John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development (McGraw-Hill, 1964), 566-574.

85

Bruce Grant, Indonesia (Melbourne University Press, 1964), 24-25.

86

A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia 1954-1949 (W. van Hoeve, 1955), 337-342.

87

N. J. Ryan, The Making of Modern Malaysia: A History from Earliest Times to 1966 (Oxford University Press,
1967), 228-235.
88

Lee Jae-hyung, China and the Asia-Pacific Region (iUniverse, 2003), 112-113.

89

N. J. Ryan, The Making of Modern Malaysia: A History from Earliest Times to 1966 (Oxford University Press,
1967), 242-243.
90

K. G. Tregonning, Malaysia and Singapore (F. W. Cheshire, 1966), 98.

91

D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (MacMillan, 1960), 197-198.

92

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Melaka and George Town, Historic
Cities of the Straits of Malacca (2011) UNESCO <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1223>.

22

In the modern setting, the imperial ambitions of distant States have receded to be replaced by the
nationalist aspirations of the littoral States.93 The Straits of Malacca and Singapore belong to the
three main littoral States of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Thailand borders a small fraction
of the northern part of the Strait of Malacca. Under international law, the littoral States have
sovereignty and sovereign rights over the waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and this
must be respected by other States. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter provides:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.94
As the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are bordered by Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and
Thailand, it is important to briefly examine to what extent these States have resolved maritime
boundary delimitation issues among themselves.

2.3

MARITIME BOUNDARY ISSUES

The history of maritime boundary delimitation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore goes back
to colonial times.95 The earliest agreement can be traced to the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty which
divided maritime Southeast Asia into two parts: Singapore and the Malay Peninsula were placed
under British dominion; while the areas of the Malay Archipelago south of the Strait of
Singapore were placed under Dutch control.96 However, there was no precise boundary
delimitation that divided the Strait of Malacca into the British and the Dutch dominions. The
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Treaty merely explained the spheres of influence of the Dutch and the British in the Malay
World.
As far as Malaysia’s northern land and maritime frontiers were concerned, the boundary
delimitation was based on the agreement made between the Kingdom of Siam and the British
Government in the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909.97 Under this treaty, the Kingdom of Siam
relinquished its suzerainty over the northern Malay states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and
Terengganu to the British.98 The present Malaysia-Thailand boundary reflects the delimitation
concluded in this Treaty which is still enforced. The boundary extends for 314 miles from the
Strait of Malacca across the Peninsula to the Gulf of Siam on the east. On maritime boundaries
of the two areas, the 1909 Treaty stated:

The island known as Pulo Langkawi, together with all the islets
south of the midchannel between Terutau and Langkawi, and all
the islands south of Langkawi shall become British. Terutau and
the islets to the north of mid-channel shall remain to Siam.
With regard to the islands close to the west coast, those lying to the
north of the parallel of latitude where the most seaward point of the
north bank of the estuary of the Perlis River touches the sea shall
remain to Siam, and those lying to the south of the parallel shall
become British.99
Upon independence, Malaysia signed a treaty to delimit its northern territorial boundaries in the
Strait of Malacca with Thailand in 1979.100 This treaty reiterated the colonial treaty concluded in
1909 where straight lines were drawn from the point situated in mid-channel between Ko
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Tarutao, an island of the ‘Butang Group’ and Pulau Langkawi, separating the territorial seas of
the two States.101

Thailand and Indonesia entered an agreement to delimit their continental shelf boundary on 17
December 1971 in the northern part of the Strait of Malacca.102 This agreement came into force
on 16 July 1973.103 Both Indonesia and Thailand applied the equidistance method in drawing the
line to delimit their continental shelf boundary in the Strait of Malacca towards the opening to
the Andaman Sea.104 Four days later, an agreement between Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand
was concluded to establish a common point, where their tri-junction claims would meet.105 The
common point was agreed as being in a maritime area nearest to Indonesia, thus securing its full
entitlement over the North Sumatra Basin which is said to be rich in oil reserves, and furthest
from Thailand.106 With this common point established, the shares of Malaysia, Indonesia and
Thailand over the seabed boundary in the northern region of the Strait of Malacca were settled.
This trilateral agreement came into force on 16 July 1973.107

The length of the Strait of Malacca runs mostly between the Malaysian and Indonesian waters. In
consideration of this, Malaysia and Indonesia concluded an agreement on 17 March 1970,
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drawing a boundary between the territorial seas of both countries in the Strait of Malacca.108
Prior to this, an agreement was signed between both nations which delineated the continental
shelf boundaries in the Strait of Malacca in 1969.109 The seabed boundary line between the two
nations coincides with the territorial sea boundary line in most sections of the waterway. 110 It
continues in a northerly direction to converge with the common point between Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand.111 To the south, the territorial sea boundary line slightly deviates from
the seabed boundary limits in favour of Malaysia.112 The existing agreements only delimit the
continental shelf and the territorial sea boundaries between the two States covering the southern
end of the Strait of Malacca.113 There is yet to be an agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia
on the delimitation of their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundary in the northern part of the
Strait of Malacca.114 Negotiations on the maritime delimitation of their EEZ in the Strait is still
ongoing.115

108

Choon-Ho Park, ‘Indonesia-Malaysia (Territorial Sea)’ in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander (eds),
International Maritime Boundaries: The American Society of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) vol 1,
1029-1038.
109

Choon-Ho Park, ‘Indonesia-Malaysia (Continental Shelf)’ in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander (eds),
International Maritime Boundaries: The American Society of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) vol 1,
1019-1028.
110

Choon-Ho Park, ‘Agreement Between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of Indonesia on the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelves Between the Two Countries’ in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M.
Alexander (eds), International Maritime Boundaries: The American Society of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff,
1993) vol 1, 1025-1027.
111

Ibid.

112

Choon-Ho Park, ‘Treaty Between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia Relating to the Delimitation of the
Territorial Sea of the Two Countries in the Strait of Malacca’ in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander (eds),
International Maritime Boundaries: The American Society of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) vol 1,
1029-1034.
113

Mak Joon Num, ‘Pirates, Barter Traders, and Fishers: Whose Rights, Whose Security? User Conflicts and
Maritime Nontraditional Security in Malaysian Waters’ (2009) The Indian Ocean: Resource and Governance
Challenges <http://www.stimson.org/rv/pdf/Indian_Ocean(PDF)/Indian_Ocean-Chapter_2_Mak.pdf>, 21.
114

M. J. Valencia, ‘Validity of Malaysia’s Baselines and Territorial Sea Claim in the Northern Malacca Strait’
(2003) 27 Marine Policy, 367-373; Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional (BAKOSURTANAL), ‘Peta
Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia’ (BAKOSURTANAL, 2009); Max Herriman and Raja Petra Mohamed, ‘A
Malacca Strait Boundary: Factors for Consideration’ in M. Shariff et al (eds), Towards Sustainable Management of
the Straits of Malacca (Malacca Straits Research and Development Centre, 2000), 755-764.
115

The Star, ‘Shock over Jail Sentence: Malaysia Protests Against Indonesian Court’s Decision on Fishermen’, The
Star (Kuala Lumpur), 2011.

26

Map 2-4 illustrates the unresolved EEZ boundary delimitation between Malaysia and Indonesia
in the Strait of Malacca.

Map 2-4: The Potential EEZ Boundary Lines in the Strait of Malacca
(Modified from Google Maps)
At the southern sector of the Strait of Malacca, the earliest maritime boundary delimitation
agreement related to the division of the Johor Strait was concluded between the British
Government and the Sultan of Johor in the Straits Settlements and Johor Territorial Waters
Agreement of 1927.116

The present maritime boundary between Malaysia and Singapore in the Johor Strait is based on
this 1927 Agreement, under which all the islets within the Johor Strait belong to Singapore. With
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the consolidation of Johor into Malaysia upon independence in 1957 and the separation of
Singapore in 1965, both governments entered into another agreement relating to the territorial
sea limits in the Strait of Johor in 1995. The 1995 Agreement intended to revise the territorial sea
boundary previously made between the two States made previously in the 1927 Treaty. 117

The maritime boundary delimitation in the Strait of Singapore between Indonesia and Singapore
has been defined in the ‘Agreement Stipulating the Territorial Sea Boundary Lines between
Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore in the Strait of Singapore’,118 which was signed in 1973
and entered into force in 1974.119 The following Table 2-1 summarises the maritime boundary
agreements among the littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:

Parties
IndonesiaMalaysia
IndonesiaMalaysia
IndonesiaSingapore
IndonesiaMalaysiaThailand
IndonesiaThailand
MalaysiaSingapore
IndonesiaSingapore

Type of
Boundary
Continental
Shelf
Territorial Sea

Date Signed

Entry into force

Regional Sea

27 October 1969

7 November 1969

17 March 1970

8 October 1971

Strait of Malacca and South
China Sea
Strait of Malacca

Territorial Sea

25 May 1973

29 August 1974

Strait of Singapore

Continental
Shelf

21 December 1971

16 July 1973

Strait of Malacca

Continental
Shelf
Territorial Sea

17 December 1971

16 July 1973

Strait of Malacca

7 August 1995

7 August 1995

Strait of Johor

Territorial Sea

20 May 2009

NIL

Western approaches to the
Strait of Singapore

Table 2-1: Summary of Maritime Boundary Agreements
on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
(Source: MIMA)120
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Notwithstanding the agreements already described, there are many unsettled matters relating to
boundary delimitation in the Strait of Malacca. Besides the unresolved EEZ boundary
delimitation in the Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia, Malaysia has also yet to finalise and
submit a map specifying its straight baselines defining its internal waters and territorial sea on its
side of the Strait of Malacca to the United Nations (UN).121 In the two maps officially released in
1979 by Malaysia’s Directorate of National Mapping, entitled Territorial Waters and Continental
Shelf Boundaries, Malaysia did not make a formal declaration or publicly identify the exact
coordinates of its straight baselines from which these claims are measured, as required by Article
4(6) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 122 and
Article 16 (2) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). Article 16
(2) of LOSC reads:

The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of
geographical coordinates (on the drawings of baselines) and shall
deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
In addition, Malaysia and Indonesia have yet to delimit their territorial seas in the waters of the
Strait of Singapore.123

The Malaysia-Singapore dispute on sovereignty over Pedra Branca and the small rock islets of
Batuan Tengah (Middle Rocks) and South Ledge was decided by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in 2008.124 The court awarded sovereignty over Pedra Branca to Singapore while
Batuan Tengah was awarded to Malaysia. The ICJ left the question of South Ledge to be settled
amicably by the two countries.125 Consequently, the three littoral States now have their
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respective maritime areas in the eastern opening of the Strait of Singapore towards the South
China Sea.126 Negotiations between Malaysia and Singapore on this issue are still ongoing. Once
sovereignty over the islands/rocks is established, maritime delimitation can proceed among
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.127

The problems of maritime boundary delimitation, as the discussions above clearly show, have
not been entirely settled among Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore as far as the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are concerned. This issue is critical for important maritime chokepoints
such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, especially with respect to ongoing cooperative
activities between the littoral States. The absence of territorial sea delimitations in the Strait of
Singapore between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore and the unresolved EEZ boundary
between Malaysia and Indonesia in the Strait of Malacca would make it complicated,
jurisdictional-wise, for these littoral States to exercise their sovereignty and/or sovereign rights
over the disputed or overlapping maritime areas. It is also expected that legal difficulties may
also arise in determining the appropriate types of navigational rights applicable to vessels
navigating through the different areas of the Strait of Malacca. This matter will be further
discussed in Chapter 4.128 The issue of overlapping maritime claims in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore could only be resolved with the eventual conclusion of maritime boundary
delimitation agreements negotiated amicably among the three littoral States.

2.4

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

The west coast of Peninsular Malaysia is highly urbanised with large cities such as Kuala
Lumpur and the Klang Valley, Georgetown, Malacca and Johor Bahru scattered along the coastal
areas of the Strait of Malacca. The population of the west coast states of Peninsular Malaysia
126
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increased from 9.19 million in 1980 to 15.0 million in 2000.129 It is projected that by 2020, 80.32
per cent of the Malaysian population will be living in the urban areas of Malaysia.130

The population of Indonesian provinces located along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is
also relatively high. These provinces are Aceh, Riau, Riau Islands, and North Sumatra. Medan,
Dumai, Lhokseumawe and Tanjung Pinang are among the major cities and ports that are located
on the Indonesian side of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The population of the Indonesian
provinces that border the Straits is summarised in Table 2-2:

Provinces (Coastal Districts)
North Sumatra (Langkat, Medan, Deli
Serdang, Asahan, Labuhan Batu, Tanjung
Balai, Tebing Tinggi)
Aceh (Aceh Besar, Pidie, Bireuen, Aceh
Utara, Aceh Timur, Aceh Tamiang)
Riau Islands (Tanjung Pinang, Batam, Bintan,
Karimun, Lingga)
Riau (Rokan Hilir, Dumai, Bengkalis,
Pelalawan, Inderagiri Hilir)

Population
6, 904, 290 (2008)131
2, 416, 805 (2009)132
1, 226, 676 (2006)133
2, 410, 715 (2007)134

Table 2-2: Population of Indonesian Provinces along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
(Source: The Indonesian Government)
Despite its small land area of 710 square kilometers (km2), Singapore has a population density of
6,814 per km2 which is one of the highest in Asia.135 The population of Singapore has increased
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Pemerintah

Provinsi

Riau

from around 2 million in 1970 to approximately 5.1 million in 2010. 136 Singapore aims to have a
population of about 6.5 million in decades to come.137

2.5

ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND
SINGAPORE

The preceding facts show that the coastal areas along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,
particularly northern Sumatra, the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia as well as Singapore, are
densely populated. The main reason for this is that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are
important economic lifelines for the coastal populations who engage in economic activities such
as fisheries, marine tourism and oil and gas mining.

2.5.1 The Fishing Industry

The western coastline of Peninsular Malaysia and the eastern seaboard of Sumatra facing the
Strait of Malacca are, predominantly made up of mangroves and mudflats.138 Mangroves have a
diverse group of vegetation including trees, shrubs, palms and ground ferns which have adapted
to the extreme salinity of the coastal environment.139 They are breeding grounds and feeding
habitats for many commercially important fishes, prawns, crabs and other fish and seafood
species.140 The waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are part of the Sunda Continental
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Plate.141 As such, the Straits are shallow in depth which allows the rays of the sun to penetrate
the waters, generating the growth of plankton, a natural diet for many types of fish.142 The
temperature of these waterways is relatively warm, recorded to be around 29.8 ºC with an
average salinity of 31.17 per cent.143 These hospitable features enhance the waters of the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore; making these waters conducive to various types of marine life, which
are important sources of food and nutrition especially for the three littoral States.144

The marine fisheries industry in Malaysia contributes considerably to the national economy in
terms of income, foreign exchange and employment. 145 Fish represents the main source of
animal protein and supplies up to 60 per cent of total protein consumption in Malaysia.146 In
2005, almost 44 per cent of the total fish landings in Malaysia, valued at RM 1,745.55 million,
came from the Strait of Malacca.147 Between 2001 and 2005, the number of fish landings in West
Coast Peninsular Malaysia increased from 489,026 tonnes to 525,906 tonnes.148 In 2007, the
fisheries industries contributed about 1.4 million metric tonnes valued at RM 6.298 billion or
roughly 1 per cent of Malaysia’s GDP in 2007.149 In the same year, the total number of fish
landings in Peninsular Malaysia’s West Coast states was around 692,985 tonnes valued at RM
141
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2.263 billion, a significant increase from the total fish catch in 2005.150 The number of fish
landings in fishing ports along the Malaysian side of the Strait of Malacca was even bigger in
2009, as shown in the following Table 2-3:

State

Fish Landings (Tonnes)
178,247
106,486
42,790
258,086
131,350
610
1,691
10, 298
729, 558

Perlis
Kedah
Pulau Pinang
Perak
Selangor
Negeri Sembilan
Malacca
West Johor
TOTAL

Table 2-3: Number of Fish Landings in Malaysian States
Bordering the Strait of Malacca in 2009
(Source: Department of Fisheries, Malaysia)151
Fisheries industries are also booming on the other side of the Strait. The three main Indonesian
provinces bordering the Strait of Malacca, namely Riau, Aceh and North Sumatra depend
heavily on this vital waterway to support their fishery industries.152 An Indonesian study
conducted in 2001 revealed that fisheries exploitation in the Indonesian segment of the Strait had
reached 389,280 tonnes per annum, more than its sustainable potential of 276,030 tonnes per
year.153 This raised concerns of overfishing and the depletion of resources.154 Despite this,
fisheries industries continue to be one of the main economic activities for the population of the
three main Strait of Malacca provinces of Sumatra as illustrated in the following Table 2-4:
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Strait of Malacca Provinces of
Sumatra
Aceh
North Sumatra
Riau
Riau Islands

2009 Fish Catch
(unit)
19,547
67,215
14,326
26,647

Table 2-4: Number of Fish Catch in the Strait of Malacca Provinces of Sumatra in 2009
(Source: Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan, Indonesia)155
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore form just a fraction of Indonesia’s huge fisheries
potential.156 The fishery potential for all the waters under Indonesian jurisdiction has been
estimated at 6.4 million tonnes per year.157 As far as the Indonesian side of the Strait of Malacca
is concerned, it is approximately 276,030 tonnes per year.158 Indonesia is the ninth largest
producer of fish in the world and exports fisheries products to more than 210 countries.159 In
2003, fisheries and aquaculture generated foreign exchange earnings of over US$1.6 billion for
the economy of Indonesia.160

Singapore relies on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to supply its populations with their
protein needs. Possessing a coastline of only 268km, a limited territorial sea and lacking an EEZ,
Singapore does not participate in the fisheries industries as actively as its neighbours.161 The
Jurong Fishery Port is the main fish landing and distribution point in Singapore and it has
handled about 64,209 tonnes of fish in 2009, most of which were imported. In the Southeast
Asian region, Singapore has always been regarded as a major consumer State with respect to fish
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and relies heavily on fish imported from Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand for local
consumption.162
Based on these facts, it is clear that both Straits of Malacca and Singapore are important fishing
grounds for the coastal population of the three littoral States of Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore. The increasing number of fish catch as shown in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 indicate
that the fisheries industries in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore region are thriving and
developing.

2.5.2

Coastal Environment and Eco-tourism Industry

The coastal beaches and islands along the length of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have
considerable natural beauty; possessing pristine white sandy beaches, coral reefs teeming with
marine life and vast mangrove forests, mudflats and other natural attractions.163

The Malaysian coastline is about 4,809 km. in length, with muddy coast dominating the western
shoreline and sandy beaches on the east.164 The Malaysian islands of Langkawi, Payar, Penang,
Pangkor and Besar are considered significant to the country’s tourism industry.165 Despite the
limited distribution of coral reef in the Strait, Pulau Payar, which is located in the northern part
of the Strait, is nevertheless rich in coral reef concentration.166 In 1994, Pulau Payar was
designated as a Marine Park. It has attracted an increasing number of local and foreign tourists
from only 1,373 visitors in 1988 to 112, 648 visitors in 2006.167
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Coastal beaches like those in Port Dickson, Tanjung Tuan, Tanjung Bidara and Lumut have
many natural features and possess sensitive marine environments. 168 Pulau Langkawi is one of
the islands along the Strait of Malacca that is rich in biodiversity, as it has numerous sandy
beaches, mangrove forests, tropical rainforests and natural caves which are habitats for many
species of flora and fauna. Because of these characteriestics, UNESCO designated Pulau
Langkawi as a Global Geopark in 2007.169 The following three areas within the island are
considered to possess geological significance: Gunung Mat Chincang, Kilim and Pulau Dayang
Bunting.170 As a result of this designation, Langkawi continues to be a prime tourist destination
in Malaysia, receiving more than 2 million tourists each year.171

The coastal areas of the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia are rich in mangrove vegetation, peat
swamp forests and mudflats. Malaysia’s mangroves are among the richest, rarest and most
diverse in the world.172 There is a high concentration of mangrove forests in areas such as
Matang, Kukup Island, Tanjung Piai and Sungai Pulai,173 which have been designated as
RAMSAR sites.174 Mangrove ecosystems provide habitats for many rare and endangered animal
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species such as migratory birds, monkeys, fruit bats, estuarine crocodiles and many others.175
These unique flora and fauna have contributed to the tourism economy of Malaysia.176

Some areas of the Malaysian coast facing the Strait of Malacca possess extensive areas of
mudflats. These mudflats form natural habitats for shellfishes, residential and migratory
waterbirds and also act as important cockle breeding grounds. 177 The prominent mudflat sites
along the Peninsula are Kuala Gula, Kuala Merbok, Kuala Selangor, Pontian and Tanjung
Piai.178 These sites attract local as well as international tourists and nature lovers from all around
the world, supporting the local eco-tourism industry.179 The following Map 2-5 shows the coastal
areas along the Strait of Malacca having high cultural, economic and historical importance:
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Map 2-5: Areas along the Strait of Malacca with High Cultural,
Economic and Historical Importance180
(Modified from Google Maps)
The tourism industry is considered a lucrative business in Malaysia. In 2007, the contribution of
the entire tourism industry to the Malaysian economy amounted to US$14.37 billion.181 It was
the sector with the second highest contribution to the Malaysian economy for that year.182
Tourist arrivals in Malaysia increased from 20 million in 2007 to 22 million in 2008.183 Based on
data collected in 2010, Malaysia is the ninth most visited country in the world and the most
visited country in Southeast Asia.184

The Indonesian provinces that border the Straits of Malacca and Singapore also depend on these
waterways for tourism. The eastern coast of Sumatra is rich in concentrations of sandy
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beaches,185 mangrove swamps186 and tropical rainforests,187 with one of the most diverse
examples of flora and fauna in the world.188 The islands of Batam and Bintan in the Strait of
Singapore are among Indonesia’s most popular tourist destinations in this region.189 These
islands have been successful in generating the tourism industry in the Riau Islands province,
recording more than 1.5 million tourist arrivals each year.190

There are also many tourist attractions in the other Strait of Malacca provinces of Indonesia. For
example, the province of Riau has beautiful beaches in Dumai191 and Aceh has pristine islands
and scenic beaches in the Sabang district, at the northern tip of Sumatra.192 In 2008, the tourism
industry in Indonesia contributed around Rp 80 trillion (US$7.1 billion) to the national
economy.193
Singapore’s coastal areas have diverse features, including cliffs, steep coasts, sandy beaches,
stony coasts, mangrove swamps, coral and artificial coasts.194 Sentosa Island, an islet off the
Strait of Singapore, is renowned for various attractions, including natural environmental
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attributes.195 According to the Singapore Tourism Board, between July 2010 to February 2011,
Singapore received an average of 1 million visitors every month, who come mainly from
Indonesia, Australia, China, India and Malaysia.196 The tourism industry contributes three per
cent to Singapore’s GDP.197 By 2015, it is anticipated that Singapore’s tourism receipts will be
around S$30 billion, generating an additional 100,000 employment opportunities in the services
sector.198

2.5.3

Oil and Gas Mining

The northwestern corner of the Strait of Malacca is rich in oil and gas reserves. Oil was
discovered as early as 1885 in Telaga Said in the North Sumatran village of Pengkalan Brandan
and was exploited even before the formation of Indonesia.199 Just after World War II, Indonesia’s
most important oil fields, the Duri and Minas fields in Riau were discovered by Caltex.200 By
1963, these fields, which are located adjacent to the town of Dumai, accounted for 50 per cent of
the national oil production.201 Aceh also has extensive oil fields. Since 1980, the province has
contributed 30 per cent to the national oil and gas production of Indonesia.202 Sumatra’s offshore
oilfields produce up to 55,000 barrels of oil per day. Arun field in Aceh is rich in concentrations
of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and reputed to be the biggest producer of LNG in Southeast
Asia.203 Indonesia’s national petroleum company, Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara
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(PERTAMINA) has established four main oil refineries along the Strait of Malacca, namely
Musi, Dumai, Sungai Pakning and Pengkalan Brandan Refineries.204 In 2007, it was estimated
that Indonesia had 4.3 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. However, since 1996, Indonesia’s oil
production output has dropped by 32 per cent owing to declines in production and unsuccessful
exploration activities.205

Oil refineries have been built in coastal areas of Malaysia and Singapore along the length of the
waterway. Malaysia’s national oil company, Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) owns oil
refineries in Tangga Batu, Malacca while both Shell and ExxonMobil operate oil refineries in
Port Dickson in Negeri Sembilan.206 Singapore currently has three oil refineries. Singapore
Refining Company Private Limited operates a refinery on Jurong Island capable of processing
290,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil.207 The other two refineries, operated by ExxonMobil,
are located on Jurong Island which is capable of processing 605,000 bpd; and the Pulau Bukum
Refinery, owned and managed by Royal Dutch Shell, capable of refining 500,000 bpd. 208 At
present, there is a plan to build another refinery in Singapore with the capacity to process up to
500,000 bpd of crude oil.209

2.5.4

Shipping in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

In the eyes of the international shipping community, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are
seen as strategic sea lines of communication that facilitate global trade. The Straits form the
shortest route connecting the oil suppliers from the Middle East with the East Asian economies
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Singapore’s

4th

Refinery

(2010)

Reuters

of China, Japan and South Korea.210 In 2000, an average of 399 vessels passed through the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore every day which translates to one vessel every 3.6 minutes.211
In 2004, it was reported that more than 900 ships sail the Strait of Singapore every day, which
means that one ship passes the Strait of Singapore every 1.6 minutes.212 In 2010, the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News reported that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
accommodate almost six times the volume of navigational traffic that goes through the Suez
Canal every year.213

In terms of navigational traffic, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore come second only to the
Dover Strait, a crucial European chokepoint bordered by the United Kingdom, France and
Belgium.214 It is estimated that 11 million barrels of oil pass through the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore daily.215 Tankers and bulk carriers transport vast quantities of oil, coal, iron ore and
minerals to the economic centres of Southeast and Northeast Asia; while on the other direction,
millions of containers are carried to consumer markets from all over the globe.216 Oil tankers
constitute the second biggest type of vessel plying the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, after
container vessels, as shown in Table 2-5:
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Type
VLCC/
Deep Draft CR
Oil Tanker Vessel
LNG/ LPG
Carrier
Cargo Vessel
Container Vessel
Bulk Carrier
Others
Total

2005
3, 788

2006
3, 851

2007
3, 753

2008
4, 040

2009
4, 221

2010
4, 329

14, 759
3, 099

14, 784
3, 297

14, 391
3, 413

15, 894
3, 726

16, 398
3, 330

16, 250
3, 581

63, 40
20, 818
7, 394
6, 423
62, 621

6, 477
22, 615
8, 129
6, 496
65, 649

8, 467
23, 736
9, 684
6, 734
70, 178

8, 794
26, 359
10, 256
7, 312
76, 381

8, 560
22, 310
11, 186
5, 354
71, 359

8, 444
24, 805
11, 639
5, 085
74, 133

Table 2-5: Traffic Scenario in the Strait of Malacca
(Source: VTS Port Klang & MIMA)217
Despite the dip in shipping traffic in 2009, the number of transiting tankers remained steady,
indicating the importance of the Straits for oil transportation. The vessels that ply the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore fly various flags from numerous countries. This is illustrated in the
following Table 2-6 and 2-7:

Country
Japan
Germany
Greece
Singapore
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Taiwan
Hong Kong
South Korea

Number of Transits (Approximate)
12, 000
9, 000
7, 000
4, 500
4, 500
4, 300
4, 200
3, 000
2, 000
1, 800

DWT (Mil) (Approximate)
900
400
600
150
300
100
120
150
250
220

Table 2-6: Top 10 Transits by Owner Nationality (2007)218
(Source: Lloyd’s MIU)219
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Country
Panama
Liberia
Singapore
Indonesia
Malaysia
Hong Kong
Marshall Islands
Bahamas
Germany
Malta

Number of Transits (Approximate)
19, 000
7, 000
6, 500
5, 000
4, 500
3, 000
2, 500
2, 000
1, 000
1, 000

DWT (Mil) (Approximate)
1, 400
600
350
50
120
300
200
180
100
100

Table 2-7: Top 10 Transits by Flag (2007)
(Source: Lloyd’s MIU)220
The following Tables 2-8 and 2-9 show the types of commodities carried by vessels that ply the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore both eastbound and westbound:

Commodities

Tonnes (Mil)
679
278
79
30
29
27
22
21
15
10

Crude Oil
Ores
Petroleum Products
Grain
LNG
Organic/ Inorganic Chemicals
Iron and Steel
LPG
Forest Products
Miscellaneous

Table 2-8: Top 10 Eastbound Commodities by Volume (2007)
(Source: Lloyd’s MIU)221
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Commodities
Electronic/ Electric Goods
Consumer Goods
Office/ Computing Materials
Machinery
Motor Vehicles
Miscellaneous Liner
Wearing Apparels
Organic/Inorganic Chemicals
Iron and Steel
Semi-conductors

Value US$ (bil)
136
112
94
86
62
52
40
36
29
28

Table 2-9: Top 10 Westbound Commodities by Value (2007)
(Source: Lloyd’s MIU)222
These Tables confirm that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are indispensible to global
shipping given the wide range of commodities shipped through these routes. As indicated in
Table 2-6, with the exception of Singapore, the littoral States are not the main users of the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore; but rather industrialised States with large economies, such as Japan,
Germany and China, are the key users. Nevertheless, as three of the largest economies in East
Asia, the littoral States do rely on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore for their trade
activities.223
Alongside the US, China is now one of the world’s largest consumers of oil.224 With the rise of
China as the world’s new economic power, it is predicted that transiting traffic in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore will continue to increase at an average rate of 9 per cent annually.225 This
represents an increase of about 150,000 annual ship movements by the year 2020.226 Besides
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China, the other East Asian economies of Japan and South Korea rely heavily on the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore for their oil needs which come from their Middle Eastern suppliers.227
According to an international study, nearly 20 million barrels of oil are expected to pass through
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore by the year 2020.228 Statistical data have shown that most
of the world’s busiest ports are located in East Asian countries including China and South Korea,
with Singapore ranked as the busiest, as shown in the following Table 2-10:

Rank
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Container Traffic (TEU- Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units) 2009
Port
Country
Singapore
Singapore
Shanghai
China
Hong Kong
China
Shenzhen
China
Busan
South Korea
Guangzhou
China
Dubai Ports
United Arab Emirates
Ningbo
China
Qingdao
China
Rotterdam
Netherlands
Tianjin
China
Kaohsiung
Taiwan
Port Kelang
Malaysia
Antwerp
Belgium
Hamburg
Germany
Los Angeles
US
Tanjung Pelepas
Malaysia
Long Beach
US
Xiamen
China
Bremen/ Bremerhaven
Germany

TEUs
25, 866, 600
25, 002, 000
21, 040, 096
18, 250, 100
11, 954, 861
11, 190, 000
11, 124, 082
10, 502, 800
10, 280, 000
9, 743, 290
8, 700, 000
8, 581, 273
7, 309, 779
7, 309, 639
7, 007, 704
6, 748, 994
5, 835, 085
5, 067, 597
4, 680, 355
4, 578, 642

Table 2-10: World’s Busiest Ports 2009
Note: Ports in bold are those located along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
(Source: American Association Port Authorities)229
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AAPA

These waterways bear strategic importance to countries in Southeast Asia and the surrounding
sub-regions, based on their dominant role as the main sea lines of communication in this part of
the world.230 Due to the maritime geographical features of Southeast Asia, shipping provides the
most convenient way to conduct trade across the vast expanse of the region. 231 If these Straits
were closed to navigation, ships will be forced to traverse the longer Lombok and Makassar
routes through Indonesian archipelagic waters, inevitably increasing shipping costs.232 In this
scenario, the navigational distance for ships would be extended by 1000 nautical miles. 233 After
the 2008 spikes in crude oil prices, this would mean an additional shipping cost of US$500,000.
per ship per transit for a large vessel such as a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC). 234 Thus, the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore are important for reducing transportation costs. 235 In effect, any
interference with the free flow of maritime traffic through these waterways would be detrimental
for international trade and the global economy.236

2.6

CONCLUSION

This Chapter discussed the historical significance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Their
importance as strategic sea lines of communication can be traced as early as the third century
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AD, and continues to the present. The discussion in Part One of this Chapter showed that before
the era of Western colonisation, the Straits were dominated by a succession of Empires,
beginning with Srivijaya, followed by Majapahit and finally, by Malacca, upon which the Strait
of Malacca took its name. The region around the Straits survived, thrived and flourised by
regulating and exploiting trade flows within the Malay Archipelago itself, and more importantly,
between the East and the West. In 1511, after the fall of the Malacca Sultanate, the competition
for supremacy in the Strait of Malacca continued between the regional Empires and the Western
colonisers until eventually, the latter emerged victorious.

At present, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are jointly shared by Malaysia, Indonesia,
Singapore, and Thailand. This Chapter in Section 2.3 discussed in detail the issue of maritime
boundary delimitation in the Straits. It traced the various maritime boundary agreements
negotiated among the littoral States with respect to the waters of the Straits, as well as ongoing
negotiations that seek to delimit unresolved maritime jurisdictional zones among the littoral
States. While maritime boundary delimitation issues still exist, substantial progress has been
made in this area, with most of the potential maritime boundaries settled amicably by the
countries that share the Straits.

The second part of this Chapter focused on the role of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
highlighted the economic importance of the Straits, in particular by providing employment
opportunities to millions of people through fisheries industries, tourism activities and oil and gas
enterprises. However, to the international maritime community, the greatest significance of the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore to the global economy lies in their role in facilitating
international shipping activities. The designation of several areas along the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore as RAMSAR and World Heritage Sites demonstrates that these Straits are more
than just important shipping routes. Indeed, these waterways possess invaluable cultural,
historical and socio-economic significance. Thus, it is clear that collectively, the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are undeniably a priceless maritime heritage.
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CHAPTER 3.
THE LEGAL STATUS OF STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION
3.1

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter examines the legal status of straits used for international navigation under
international law. The discussion of the legal status of straits originated from the question on
whether or not freedom of navigation should apply to vessels navigating through straits. The first
part of this Chapter discusses the debate between freedom of the sea vis-à-vis closed sea. The
latter part of this Chapter discusses the efforts of the global community to formulate an
acceptable legal status of straits. This section considers arguments put forward by jurists in early
seventeenth century until the transit passage regime was officially accepted as the navigational
regime applicable in straits used for international navigation in 1982. This Chapter concludes by
observing whether or not the transit passage regime has achieved the status of customary
international law.

3.2

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS VIS-À-VIS CLOSED SEAS

Since time immemorial, the ocean has been inseparable from human civilisations and
traditionally exploited for its abundance of wealth, opportunities and resources.1 The word
‘ocean’ originated from the Greek word ‘okeanos’, which refers to the whole body of salt water
covering nearly three-fourths of the earth’s surface.2 In ancient Rome, the sea was described as
‘commune omnium,’ or property common to all.3 The doctrine of the freedom of the seas was
accepted as a binding principle under Roman Law. It was also one of the earliest concepts in

1

Jack N. Barkenbus, ‘The Politics of Ocean Resource Exploitation’ (1977) 21(4) International Studies Quarterly,
675-677;
Iskandar
Sazlan,
Lautan
Masa
Depan
Kita:
Laporan
Suruhanjaya
Bebas
Kelautan
Dunia
(Maritime
Institute
of
Malaysia,
2000),
17;
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Overview of Shipping and Navigation History (1998) IMO
<http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D21794/Overviewofshippingandnavigationhistory.pdf>
2

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Ocean (2009) Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary <http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ocean>.
3

Ram P. Anand, ‘Freedom of the Seas: Past, Present and Future’ in Hugo Caminos (ed), Law of the Sea (Dartmouth,
2001), 216; R. P. Anand, ‘Changing Concepts of Freedom of the Seas: A Historical Perspective’ in Jon M. Van
Dyke, Durwood Zaelke and Grant Hewison (eds), Freedom of the Seas in the 21st Century: Ocean Governance and
Environmental Harmony (Greenpeace, 1993), 72.

50

international law. While the doctrine of freedom of the seas disappeared in Europe after the
disintegration of the Roman Empire,4 it is now accepted as a fundamental principle of ocean
governance.5
The Portuguese and the Spanish were the great maritime superpowers in the sixteenth century.6
Both powers were enthusiastic to expand their influence through trade and colonisation.7 In order
to avoid disputes and clashes between these two powers, Pope Alexander VI divided the world
into two spheres via the Papal Bull of Demarcation of 1493.8 The Papal Bull drew a line 483 km
west of Azores and Cape Verde Islands dividing the Atlantic Ocean and the New World. All new
lands to the East of this line were allocated to Portugal while lands to the West of the line were
placed under Spanish dominion.9 In 1494, both powers negotiated the Treaty of Tordesillas,
which shifted the delineation line 1,185 miles westward of Cape Verde Islands.10 The Treaty was
sanctioned by Pope Julius II in 1506 but was not well received by other European sovereigns
such as the British and the French.11
The Treaty of Tordesillas propagated the concept of ‘ownership of the seas’ as opposed to
‘freedom of the seas’. The advent of the great period of maritime exploration in the seventeenth
century by other European powers particularly the British and the Dutch sparked criticism
4
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against the concept of ‘ownership of the seas’.12 The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius was the leading
proponent of the concept of the ‘freedom of the seas’. In his treatise, Mare Liberum (literally
meaning, ‘The Freedom of the Seas’) published in 1609, he advocated that no ocean can be the
property of a nation.13 Grotius asserted that “…the subjects of the United Netherlands- have the
right to sail to the East Indies, as they are now doing, and to engage in trade with the people
there…Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.”14

Grotius argued that vessels of all flags should be allowed to enter the territorial waters of any
State for purposes of trade and transportation.15 This concept of ‘free seas’ advocated by Grotius
provided a suitable ideological justification for the Dutch to challenge Portugal and Spain’s
naval monopolies.16 Despite advocating freedom of the seas, Grotius recognised a nation’s
jurisdiction over coastal waters nearest to its shores.17
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The Europeans were not the only ones who pioneered the development of the concept of freedom
of the seas. In fact, this concept has been practiced in the Strait of Malacca region as early as the
third century AD when the kingdom of Langkasuka was established.18 As previously explained
in Chapter 2, after the fall of Langkasuka, Srivijaya emerged as the biggest maritime empire in
Southeast Asia in the seventh century AD. The Srivijaya Empire was replaced by Majapahit,
which was succeeded by the Malacca Empire.19 The succession of Kingdoms which ruled
Southeast Asia did not disrupt trading activities among these kingdoms and other Asian
territories.20 The active trading activities within this region show that besides the Europeans, the
Asians, namely the Chinese, Indians, Arabs and the Malays, also practiced the concept of
freedom of the seas.21 When the Dutch penetrated into the East Indies and tried to monopolise
the spice trade in the Spice Islands in the seventeenth century, the Ruler of Makassar is reported
to have said that the sea is open to all and that there was no such concept as anyone being
forbidden to sail the seas.22

During the colonial age, many States in Africa, Asia, America and Australasia were colonised by
Europe.23 With fewer independent sovereign States, there were less conflicting interests between
18
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nations during the colonial period.24 The gradual but constant process of decolonisation
especially after World War II initiated more disagreements among States over many issues
relating to the law of the sea particularly between the developed and the developing nations.25 In
the years following World War II, international society was transformed and was no longer
centred on European States or States of European origin.26 Most maritime States wanted to
secure navigational freedoms for their large naval fleets. On the other hand, their developing
counterparts, remembering the dark history of colonisation, were more enthusiastic about
safeguarding their territorial sovereignty and the natural resources off their coasts. 27 These
conflicting and multifaceted interests created a complex new situation for the law of the sea.28 A
former United Nations (UN) chief legal counsel, Constantin A. Stavropoulos commented,

24
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Because of the manifold and complex problems which it confronts,
the law of the sea is now one of the most interesting and
challenging areas of growth in the body of international law. 29
The concepts of freedom of the seas and closed seas were much deliberated when it came to the
legal status of straits used for international navigation. As most straits in the world are important
maritime waterways, creating a legal definition of a strait was a timely effort in balancing the
needs of the developing and developed States as discussed in subsequent parts of this Chapter.

3.3

STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION

A strait, from a geographical point of view, is a narrow stretch of sea connecting two extensive
areas of seas.30 The legal definition of a strait is ‘any passage whose minimum breadth is equal to
or less than, the combined territorial sea claim of the bordering State or States’.31 However, the
term ‘strait’ is not defined in any conventions or treaties of the UN.

3.3.1 The Development towards Creating a Legal Definition of a Strait

Establishing the legal definition of straits was one of the most important subject matter of
discussion during the development of the modern law of the sea.32 This section will examine the
development of the legal definition of straits prior to 1958 when the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) was convened, until the adoption of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC) in 1982.
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3.3.1.1

The Period before UNCLOS I

The recognition of the international community of the importance of straits, especially for
maritime communications and trade,33 resulted in a number of multilateral and bilateral treaties
on matters relating to straits. Some examples include the Montreux Convention Regarding the
Regime of the Turkish Straits of 1936,34 a multilateral treaty governing matters relating to
navigation through the Sea of Marmara, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Strait, 35 and the
Copenhagen Convention on the Sound and the Belts of 1857 between Denmark and other
European nations and the United States of America (US) which governs matters pertaining to toll
collection for foreign vessels sailing through the Danish Straits.36 These treaties are further
discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis.37 There were very few treaties regulating straits. There have
never been any bilateral or multilateral treaty that specifically govern navigation in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Tiran and the Torres Strait.
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The issue of freedom of navigation through straits has been a matter of debate since the
seventeenth century. Pufendorf, a renowned German jurist in international law, supported the
Grotian notion of freedom of the seas. In his words:

From what we have observed, it is clear that to sail the Ocean in a
peaceful manner both is and ought to be free Privilege of all
Nations. It is, because no one people have attained such a right
over the Ocean, as will justify them in shutting out all others from
the same benefit.38
Pufendorf also stressed the importance of the coastal States to enforce control over the part of the
straits nearest to their coasts.39

Vattel, one of the most influential writers in the eighteenth century, argued that navigation
through straits connecting two seas cannot be hampered.40 In addition, unlike Pufendorf and
Grotius, Vattel did assert that the coastal State has the right to impose moderate toll payments on
vessels that sail through the straits.41

Godey on the other hand, opined that straits are part of the territorial sea, but as far as navigation
is concerned, they are to be regarded as high seas.42 Godey argued that States were permitted to
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regulate the passage of ships but not to prohibit such passage. 43 Oppenheim, who is regarded by
many as the father of the modern discipline of international law, agreed with Vattel that foreign
merchants cannot be excluded from passage through territorial straits only when the straits
connect two parts of the open sea.44 However, the passage of foreign vessels may be excluded in
a territorial strait that connects one area of the open sea bordering a State to a land-locked sea
belonging to that same State.45 One similar point that could be derived from these scholarly
views is that straits that connect one ocean to another ocean have to remain open for navigation.

These views later formed the foundation of subsequent attempts in defining the legal status of
straits. The Institut de Droit International attempted to formulate an autonomous legal regime of
passage through straits as early as 1894.46 It recognised that straits could be part of the territorial
waters of the coastal States. However, coastal States do not necessarily possess jurisdiction over
straits to the extent of hampering or impeding passage therein. In its view, passage can never be
refused and transiting traffic must always be free to sail through straits.47 In addition, in contrast
to the territorial sea, straits possess a sui generis legal position.48 Thus,, as far as maritime
navigation is concerned, navigational regimes in straits should be treated separately from the law
of innocent passage through the territorial sea.49 As straits may fall within the territorial sea of a
coastal State, it is imperative to examine the development of international law governing the
regime of innocent passage.
43
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3.3.1.1.1

The 1930 Hague Conference

Innocent passage has always been regarded by many as part of customary international law even
prior to the 1930 Hague Conference on the progressive Codification of International Law.
Innocent passage obliges coastal States to allow ships of all countries to sail through their
territorial sea in times of peace.50 The legal regimes of passage through straits were discussed in
detail during the 1930 Hague Conference, along with interpretation of the meaning of ‘innocent
passage’.
In understanding the term innocent passage, the meanings of the words ‘passage’ and ‘innocent’
have to be ascertained first. The earliest attempt to define the term ‘passage’ was made by the
Supreme Court of New Brunswick, Canada where the Court stated that a foreign vessel is not
said to practice ‘passage’ through the territorial waters of a coastal State if it is navigating
towards a port or anchoring or cruising in such waters.51 The term passage is defined by Nathan
Shaw as:
‘Navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of crossing
that sea without entering internal waters or of proceeding to or
from that sea without entering internal waters or of proceeding to
or from internal waters. It may include temporary stoppages, but
only if they are incidental to ordinary navigation or necessitated by
distress or force majeure.’52
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Prior to the Hague Conference, the term ‘innocent’ did not have a proper meaning, except that it
was referred to as ‘inoffensive’.53 Britain filled this gap by asserting that ‘passage is not innocent
when a vessel makes use of the territorial sea of a coastal State for the purpose of doing any act
prejudicial to the security, public policy or to the fiscal interests of that State’.54 This definition
was advocated by Britain during the Hague Conference.55
The legal definition or legal concept of ‘straits’ was clarified by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the Corfu Channel Case decided in 1949.56

3.3.1.1.2

The Corfu Channel Case

Corfu is an island in the Mediterranean Sea under the sovereignty of Greece. The Corfu Channel
lies between the island of Corfu and the European mainland and is bordered by Albania and
Greece. On 22 October 1946, two British military vessels, Saumarez and Volage struck mines in
the Corfu Channel within the territorial waters of Albania resulting in the death and injuries of
British naval officers onboard the vessels.57 Subsequently, Britain sent a diplomatic Note asking
Albania to remove the mines within its side of the channel.58 The Albanian Government refused
to remove the mines but the British forces continued with their military arrangements to sweep
the mine-stricken waters through an operation they named ‘Operation Retail’ on 12 and 13
November 1946.59
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In addition, the British Government demanded reparation from Albania to compensate for its
losses in the incident amounting to £875,000, which Albania refused to provide.60 Albania, on
the other hand, claimed that the passage of British vessels constituted a breach of international
law as it was exercised without previous authorisation.61 Consequently, both countries agreed to
settle their dispute in the ICJ. In delivering its judgments, the ICJ inter alia considered the
following matters:

(a)

Whether the Albanian government was responsible for the explosion that took place on
22 October 1946?62

(b)

Whether or not British military activities in clearing mines within Albanian waters
constituted a breach of Albania’s sovereignty; 63

(c)

Whether or not the military vessels of a foreign country may traverse through a strait
connecting two larger bodies of water without prior authorisation from the State
bordering the strait;64

On the first issue, due to Albania’s omission in publicising the danger that lay beneath the waters
of the Corfu Channel to the British warships, the ICJ decided that the Albanian Government to
pay reparation to the British Government.65
On the second issue, the ICJ decided that Britain had violated Albania’s sovereignty by sweeping
the mines in Albanian waters during the commencement of ‘Operation Retail’ without prior
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permission from Albania.66 Even though the Corfu Channel was a strait used for international
navigation, Albania still had the right to exercise sovereignty over it.67

Finally, on the third issue, the ICJ contended that States in times of peace, have the right to send
their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas
without the prior authorisation of the coastal States, as long as the passage is innocent. 68 The ICJ
rejected the notion submitted by Albania that the Corfu Channel was a waterway of secondary
importance and, hence not subject to the regime of innocent passage. 69 The ICJ did not refer to
the volume of traffic as the yardstick to determine whether a certain waterway is a strait used for
international navigation or otherwise.70 Instead, the ICJ relied on the geographical location of the
strait and reiterated that as long as the waterway connects two areas of the high seas, it will be
regarded as a strait that is used for international navigation. 71

The Corfu Channel Case established the nature of the legal status of straits used for international
navigation in customary international law. It expounded that the right of innocent passage cannot
be prohibited by a coastal State in times of peace.72 The subsequent endeavour to establish the
legal status of straits was pursued by the International Law Commission.
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3.3.1.1.3

The International Law Commission

The 1930 Hague Codification Conference failed to formulate the regime of the territorial sea
including the regime of straits largely because of disagreement over the question of the breadth
of the territorial sea.73 Up until 1946, a major part of international law was still to be found in the
practice of States, mostly uncollated.74 This situation prompted the UN to establish the
International Law Commission (ILC) in 1947 to promote the progressive development and
codification of international law.75
In 1954, the ILC commenced its discussion on the articles relating to the question of straits.76
There were two draft articles relevant to straits: Article 14 on the delimitation of the territorial
sea and paragraph 4 of Article 26 on the passage of warships in straits used for international
navigation.77 In 1956, the ILC during its eighth session presented to the UN General Assembly
‘Draft Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea’ (Draft Articles) together with commentaries. On
the question of passage of vessels through straits, the ILC restated the decision of the ICJ in the
Corfu Channel Case, as evident in Article 17(4) and Article 24 of the Draft Articles. Article
17(4) reads:

There must be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign
ships through straits normally used for international navigation
between two parts of the High Seas.78
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The word ‘normally’ was inserted before the word ‘used’ in Article 17(4) to make it consistent
with the decision of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case.79 In addition, the word ‘foreign ships’ in
Article 17(4) also includes warships. Therefore, the innocent passage of warships through straits
used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas cannot be suspended. 80 The
ILC contended that this was the principle formulated by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case.81
Article 2482 of the Draft Articles suggests that, even though the State may require passage of
warships through the territorial sea to be subjected to previous authorisation or notification,
Article 24 has to be read together with Article 1783 and Article 1884 of the Draft Articles. These
articles, when read together, suggest that a coastal State has the option to make the passage of
warships through its territorial sea subject to prior authorisation or notification. 85
79
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This effort on creating a legal regime for vessels navigating through territorial seas could be
regarded as a starting point of defining the legal status of straits used for international navigation,
initiated by the ILC.86 In its report to the UN General Assembly in 1956, the ILC recommended
that the Assembly convene an international conference for the global community to work
together in establishing the law of the sea which would be applicable universally. 87

3.3.1.2

The Legal Status of Straits under UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II

UNCLOS I was initiated pursuant to the recommendation by the ILC and by the UN General
Assembly in its Resolution 1105 (XI) which states:
The General Assembly…that an international conference of
plenipotentiaries should be convoked to examine the law of the
sea…88
When UNCLOS I was convened in 1958, it had before it the text of a Convention which had
been previously drafted by the ILC89 and the comments of various governments on the Draft
Articles prepared by the ILC.90 At that time, two of the States bordering the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore had achieved independence, Malaya (now Malaysia), and Indonesia. Singapore
was still a British colony at that time.91
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The First Committee of the Conference examined and evaluated the articles dealing with the
territorial sea and contiguous zone. One of the articles that were critically discussed was Article
17(4) of the Draft Articles relating to the right of foreign ships to sail through straits used for
international navigation. There were five amendments submitted to revise the text of this article
drafted by the ILC. The amendments by Chile92 and the US93 were subsequently withdrawn.
Meanwhile, the amendments submitted by the United Kingdom (UK), Portugal and the
Netherlands were combined and received support from the US, which suggested modification to
Article 17(4) of the Draft Articles as follows:

4. There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign
ships through straits or other sea lanes which are used for
international navigation between a part of the high seas and
another part of the high seas or the territorial waters of a foreign
State.94
This amendment proposal provoked various reactions from participating States at UNCLOS I.
The representatives of Saudi Arabia and the United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) raised
concerns over the use of the phrase ‘sea lanes’. The reason behind this was that there has never
been a clear definition of the phrase ‘sea lanes’ and the insertion of such a phrase may give rise
to controversy in the future.95 The representative from the Netherlands commented that there was
a need to include such a phrase, as the term ‘straits’ connotes a narrow meaning, which may not
take into account sea lanes other than straits which are used for international navigation. 96 The
insertion of the word ‘normally’ after the word ‘straits’ in Article 17(4) of the Draft Articles was
opposed by the Netherlands and the UK. They contended that such a word had vague meanings
and may incite future arguments between States especially when it comes to legal interpretation.
92

Chile suggested that the word ‘and channels’ to be included after the word ‘straits’ in Article 17(4) of the Draft
Articles. In addition, the Chilean delegation proposed that the phrase ‘except when the safety of navigation so
requires’ to be added after the end of the paragraph of Article 17(4) of the Draft Articles. See United Nations (UN),
The Law of the Sea: Straits Used for International Navigation: Legislative History of Part III of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea Volume I (United Nations, 1992), 15.
93

The amendment of the US reads ‘The coastal State must not prohibit innocent passage through straits used for
international navigation between two parts of the high seas’. See Ibid.
94

Ibid., 15-18.

95

Ibid.

96

Ibid.

66

Saudi Arabia and the USSR, on the other hand, supported the retention of the word ‘normally’ to
ensure that the right of innocent passage can only be exercised in recognised international
seaways.97

In addition, the Indonesian and the Saudi Arabian representatives contested the insertion of the
words ‘or the territorial waters of a foreign State’ in Article 17(4) of the Draft Articles as
proposed by the Netherlands, Portugal and UK.98 They asserted that international law only
provides for innocent passage in straits that connect two parts of the high seas and not in straits
that link the high seas and the territorial waters of a coastal State.99 Ultimately, the joint proposal
for amendment of Article 17(4) was accepted with modification, where the term ‘other sea lanes’
was deleted and the phrase ‘territorial waters’ was replaced with ‘territorial sea’.100

Article 24 of the Draft Articles was also discussed in UNCLOS I. The issue of the right of
passage of warships through straits used for international navigation was highlighted. The UK
proposed the addition of a new paragraph 2 to Article 24, stipulating the following:

2. The right of warships to innocent passage through straits used
for international navigation between two parts of the high seas may
not be made subject to previous authorisation or notification.101
This proposal was welcomed by various participating States but ultimately rejected. Having
failed to obtain a two-thirds majority, Article 24 was omitted from the Draft Articles prepared by
the ILC.102 UNCLOS I led to the adoption of the first codification of the law of the sea the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958 TSC) in 1958. Article 16(4) of
the 1958 TSC deals with the issue of passage of foreign vessels through straits used for
international navigation and reads:
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There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign
ships through straits which are used for international navigation
between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas
or the territorial sea of a foreign State.103
The 1958 TSC did not have any specific provisions pertaining to the passage rights of warships
through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas. 104
Nevertheless, it reaffirmed the ruling laid out by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case that the
passage rights of warships and merchant vessels through such a strait should be dealt with
collectively.105 Article 16(4) was described as a ‘universally recognised’ rule of international
law.106 The question of passage through straits was assumed as an incidental aspect of the right
of innocent passage through the territorial sea.107

In 1960, the Second Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) was convened to deal with
unresolved matters from the previous Conference.108 Due to many disagreements, UNCLOS II
failed to resolve the outstanding issues from UNCLOS I including issues pertaining to the legal
status of straits used for international navigation.109
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3.3.1.3

The Issue of Straits in UNCLOS III

The world had high hopes on UNCLOS III when it commenced in 1974 in Caracas, Venezuela.
UNCLOS III was held in the era where the world was heavily influenced by the ‘New
International Economic Order’, which called for a fairer distribution of wealth between the
developed and the developing nations.110 Among other things, it was convened with a view to
balancing the needs of the developed and the developing countries in matters relating to ocean
governance.111 The preparatory work for UNCLOS III was undertaken by the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
(otherwise referred to as the Seabed Committee) which had three subcommittees.112 In 1973, the
Conference decided to form three main committees to handle matters covered by the three
subcommittees under the Seabed Committee. The Second Committee was mandated to discuss
questions relating to straits used for international navigation. 113 The decision of the ICJ in the
Corfu Channel Case and the 1958 TSC had previously clarified a number of rules governing
passage through straits, but there were still discrepancies in the activities qualified as ‘innocent’
and the question of the applicability of the innocent passage regime to warships.114

Prior to LOSC, 3 nautical miles was the generally accepted maximum breadth of the territorial
sea. When applied, the three-nautical mile territorial sea limit will create high seas corridors in
more than 100 straits across the world.115 Through these high seas corridors within the straits,
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ships and aircraft of all States had the unqualified freedom of passage. This would apply to
critical chokepoints such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Strait of Hormuz and the
Strait of Dover through the high seas corridors within the straits.116

The issue of passage of vessels through straits used for international navigation became more
apparent at UNCLOS III, primarily because of the wider acceptance of the twelve nautical mile
limit for the territorial sea.117 This new territorial sea limit would mean that many high seas
routes within some of the world’s important maritime chokepoints would be subsumed into the
territorial seas of the coastal State, resulting in passage through such straits being dependent on
the discretion of States bordering straits.118 The anticipation of the global community was that
UNCLOS III could amicably resolve the shortcomings of UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II. As noted
by Moore:
…one of the greatest shortcomings of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone is that
with the exception of a single clause providing for ‘no suspension’
of innocent passage in the straits; it fails to differentiate
meaningfully between passage through the territorial sea in general
and transit of straits.119
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On the issue relating to the twelve nautical miles limit for the territorial sea, the US reiterated in
1970 that:
The US supports the twelve nautical mile limit…only if a treaty
can be negotiated which…will provide for freedom of navigation
through and over international straits.120
At UNCLOS III, there were three rival proposals presented. The first proposal, put forward by a
bloc of maritime nations, particularly the US and the USSR, wanted nothing less than freedom of
navigation and overflight in the straits.121 They considered that their navigational interests would
be at stake if the regime of innocent passage was to be applied in straits used for international
navigation.122 However, this proposal had a few provisions relating to the obligations of the
transiting vessels and aircraft that have caused pollution in the straits to pay compensation for
damage caused to States bordering straits as a consequence of their transits.123

The second group of delegations led by Malaysia, supported by Indonesia, Cyprus, Greece,
Morocco, the Philippines, Spain and Yemen, proposed that straits be dealt as one entity with the
territorial sea,124 subject to certain modifications to the right of innocent passage applicable to
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foreign ships.125 This group of States opposed any attempts to ‘internationalise’ the straits, as this
would compromise the environmental well-being and security interests of their territorial
waters.126

The third proposal, submitted by the UK, was a compromise formula between the other two,
treating straits separately from the territorial sea.127 The navigational regime of transit passage
was put forward in the UK proposal,128 which was not the same as the high seas freedom of
navigation and overflight as propounded by the bloc of maritime States.129 Fiji’s proposal was
almost similar to that of the UK, except on the aspects of the right of submarines to pass
submerged through straits used for international navigation and on the legislative powers of
States bordering straits.130 Due to the similarities between the UK and Fiji proposals, it was
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decided in 1975 that a ‘Private Working Group on Straits used for International Navigation’ or
the ‘The Group’ would be established.131

The Group was co-chaired by the representatives from Fiji and the UK, aiming towards creating
a moderate group to compromise the extreme positions between the two conflicting blocs.132 In
discussing the navigational regimes for straits used for international navigation, the Group made
close contacts with Indonesia and Malaysia and the major maritime powers. 133 The group of
States bordering straits, particularly Malaysia, Indonesia and Spain were not content and
criticised the UK’s position in the Group, contending that it was more biased towards satisfying
the desires of the two major maritime nations, the US and the USSR. 134

The Group proposed a draft, which was largely based on the draft earlier prepared by the UK. It
was entitled ‘Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea and Straits’ combining together all conflicting
elements of freedom of navigation and overflight in straits used for international navigation as
well as appropriate measures on safeguarding the marine environment and security interests of
the coastal State.135 The UK and Fiji proposal attempted to ‘internationalise’ straits without
having to ‘internationalise’ them in a true sense.136 The position of Malaysia and Indonesia
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gradually changed with the tabling of Draft Articles by the Fiji/UK group. 137 This draft was
eventually inserted as Part III in the LOSC.138

Nevertheless, Malaysia and Indonesia were still apprehensive that the adoption of transit passage
would aggravate the already intricate environmental problems caused by vessel-source pollution
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.139 Singapore was not totally in agreement with its two
neighbours, but reiterated its support over the problem of pollution from vessels in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore.140 Eventually, Malaysia managed to persuade other delegations to agree
to a specific provision on enforcement and Article 233 LOSC was drafted to accommodate this
matter.141 With the insertion of Article 233 in Part XII of the LOSC, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore voted in support of the adoption of the LOSC. 142 Article 233 deals with environmental
safeguards with respect to straits used for international navigation and is further discussed in
Chapter 6 of this Thesis.143

The guarantee of free transit right for vessels of all flags through straits constitutes a major
victory for maritime States.144 The regime of transit passage does not affect the sovereignty of
137

United Nations (UN), The Law of the Sea: Straits Used for International Navigation: Legislative History of Part
III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Volume II (United Nations, 1992), 117-119.
138

Ibid., 125-129.

139

Michael Leifer, ‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the
World (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 3-5; Yaacov Vertzberger, ‘The Malacca/Singapore Straits’ (1982) 22(7) Asian
Survey, 609-613.
140

Yaacov Vertzberger, ‘The Malacca/Singapore Straits’ (1982) 22(7) Asian Survey, 609-613.

141

Article 233 of the LOSC reads ‘…if a foreign ship other than those referred to in section 10 has committed a
violation of the laws and regulations referred to in article 42, paragraph 1(a) and (b), causing or threatening major
damage to the marine environment of the straits, the States bordering the straits may take appropriate enforcement
measures and if so shall respect mutatis mutandis the provisions of this section’.
142

Malaysia sent a letter to the President of UNCLOS III explaining that the application of traffic separation scheme
and under keel clearance requirement of 3.5m were within the scope of Article 42(1) (a) and Article 233 of the
LOSC. See United Nations (UN), ‘DOCUMENT A/CONF.62/L.145: Letter dated 28 April from the representative
of Malaysia to the President of the Conference’ (A/CONF.62/L.145, UN, 1982), 251; United Nations (UN),
DOCUMENT A/CONF.62/L.145/ADD.1, United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea Official Records
(William S. Hein, 2000); United Nations (UN), DOCUMENT A/CONF.62/L.145/ADD.2, United Nations
Conferences on the Law of the Sea: Official Records (William S. Hein, 2000); Erik Jaap Molenaar, Coastal State
Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, Utrecht University, 1965), 295-298.
143

See Section 6.3.6 of Chapter 6 of this Thesis.

144

Ana G. Lopez Martin, International Straits: Concept, Classification and Rules of Passage (Springer-Verlag,
2010), 39.

74

States bordering straits over their territorial straits and their capacity to interfere with navigation
is much diminished and their jurisdiction over affirmative conduct affecting the environment is
greatly restricted.145 In this regard, many States considered Part III of the LOSC as ‘a balanced
solution to the problem’. In the words of Nandan and Anderson:

Although the precise balance proposed during the first part
of the Conference was resisted by several States bordering
straits, the term Part III – which resulted from long debates
– eventually achieved consensus.146
On 30 April 1982, the LOSC was adopted by the plenary of UNCLOS III and came into force in
1994. The LOSC is in fact a codification of customary international rule on ocean governance as
reflected in a number of its provisions. This is shared by Oxman who opined that the LOSC ‘is
both widely ratified and widely regarded as generally declaratory of the customary international
law of the sea.’147 As such, these provisions are considered binding even upon those who are not
parties to the LOSC.148

3.3.1.4

Transit Passage and Customary International Law

The critical question posed after the conclusion of UNCLOS III was whether transit passage is
an innovation of UNCLOS III or is it considered customary international law? Most maritime
States such as the UK and the US regard transit passage as customary international law.

In 1988, before the LOSC entered into force, France and Britain issued a Joint Declaration on the
application of transit passage regime in the Strait of Dover (which is within the British and
French territories) which confirmed the British position that the regime of transit passage
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reflected existing international law.149 Langdon supported this assertion by contending that based
on current State practice, transit passage has always been regulated by customary international
law. Consequently, it is not entirely the creation of UNCLOS III.150 In 1992, the then UN
Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali explained that:

The regime of transit passage has been widely accepted in general
terms by the international community and has become part of the
practices of States both of States bordering straits as well as
shipping States.151
Customary international law, Treves contended, has moved away from the concept of nonsuspendable innocent passage as referred to in 1958 TSC. Instead, it is moving towards a dual
regime, i.e., non-suspendable innocent passage for straits of minor importance and transit
passage for straits of great navigational importance.152 There is also an assertion that even though
transit passage is a newly created regime of UNCLOS III, its creation has an inherent link with
the twelve-nautical mile territorial sea regime which admittedly has attained the status of
customary international law.153 This fact could be considered as the decisive factor which
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enables one to contend that transit passage is in fact sanctioned by customary international
law.154

On the other hand, there are also views that the transit passage regime is not customary
international law and that it is a new creation of UNCLOS III. The Secretariat of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) said that UNCLOS III has coined a new term
in international law that is the right of transit passage which is a compromise between ‘free
transit’ and ‘right of innocent passage’.155 How could a new navigational regime created by
UNCLOS III become accepted as part of customary international law? 156 Churchill and Lowe
argued that, despite the fact that most maritime States have exercised unimpeded right of transit
through a number of straits around the globe, it has yet to become one:

The conclusion which emerges is that a general right of transit
passage has not yet become established in customary international
law.157
The same view was also shared by Boczek:

The United Kingdom (UK), which recognized such right with
regard to the Dover Straits in a joint UK-France declaration in
1988, had regarded the right of unimpeded transit passage through
international straits as reflecting customary law…but on the whole,
most commentators believe that, a general right of transit passage
through international straits does not form part of customary
international law.158
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Another commentator, Nihan Unlu opined that unlike the innocent passage regime which has
been accepted as customary international law, transit passage on the other hand, has not. 159 This
view is also shared by Bing Bing Jia.160

It has now been almost two decades since the LOSC came into force. The US, despite not being
a State party to the LOSC, claim rights and obligations laid down in the LOSC which are in the
nature of customary international law.161 Indeed, some commentators, as discussed above, have
asserted that the regime of transit passage is not customary international law. However, given the
fact that the transit passage regime has been practiced by States around the world for almost two
decades now since the LOSC came into force in 1994, it may not be entirely impossible for it to
eventually be accepted as part of customary international law in the future.162

3.4

CONCLUSION

This Chapter discussed the historical development of the legal regime governing straits. From the
time the doctrine of the freedom of the seas was fashioned until the concept of ‘closed seas’ was
introduced, the law of the sea continued to develop to become a complex legal regime, evolving
alongside the advancement of human civilisations. Undeniably, the law of the sea today
represents the mixture of both the doctrines of Grotius and Selden harmoniously. The LOSC,
which emerged from UNCLOS III, was a milestone accomplishment in which the global
community came together to create a set of rules governing the oceans that would be applicable
to all. After long and intense negotiations between countries that participated in UNCLOS III,
the LOSC was adopted, aspiring to promote sustainable ocean governance.
159
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The LOSC did not acknowledge straits to be ‘international’, since most States bordering straits
are apprehensive that they may lose their sovereignty over their territorial sea forming a strait if
such a description was adopted. Instead, UNCLOS III adopted the term ‘strait used for
international navigation’ rather than ‘international straits’, as provided in Part III of the LOSC.
Transit passage was accepted as the main navigational regime applicable in straits used for
international navigation expounded in the LOSC.

Some academic commentators have regarded transit passage as part of customary international
law while others have not. Despite these conflicting views, based on the earlier arguments in this
Chapter, it is not too excessive to contend that the transit passage regime was in fact a creation of
UNCLOS III. Nevertheless, given that it has been 18 years since the LOSC entered into force, it
may eventually be possible for transit passage to be considered as part of customary international
law.

Having discussed the legal status of straits used for international navigation in this Chapter, the
following Chapter 4 explains the features and the applications of the navigational regimes
applicable to all vessels navigating through straits used for international navigation, focusing
mainly on the transit passage regime.
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CHAPTER 4.
NAVIGATIONAL REGIMES THROUGH STRAITS
USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION
4.1

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter discusses the navigational regimes applicable to vessels transiting straits used for
international navigation. In the first part of this chapter, the types and features of the navigational
regimes applicable in straits used for international navigation, are explained. The second part of
this chapter discusses the types of straits in which these navigational regimes shall apply. This
chapter concludes by reiterating that transit passage is the accepted navigational regime under
international law for vessels transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

4.2

TYPES OF NAVIGATIONAL RIGHTS

The regulatory powers and sovereignty of the coastal State are at their fullest in maritime zones
close to the shore and diminish as the zones move seaward.1 The coastal State exercises absolute
sovereignty over its internal waters,2 where it may apply its national laws and determine
prerequisites for the entry of foreign ships into its ports.3 The close proximity of the State’s
internal waters to its land territory justifies the exercise of full jurisdictional and enforcement
powers of the coastal State over this maritime zone.4

The coastal State exercises sovereignty in its territorial sea subject to the exercise of the right of
innocent passage by foreign vessels.5 In the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), instead of
sovereignty, the coastal State exercises sovereign rights for the exploration and exploitation,
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conservation and management of living and non-living natural resources therein as prescribed in
the LOSC.6 The rights of a coastal State over a strait7 depend on whether such is part of its
internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic waters8 or the EEZ.9 There are also straits used for
international navigation wide enough to have a high seas10 corridor within them.

There are several navigational regimes applicable to straits. The LOSC in Part II, Part III, Part V
and Part VII prescribe the navigational regimes applicable depending on the particular
characteristics of the straits. These navigational regimes are innocent passage, transit passage,
and freedom of navigation in the EEZ and on the high seas.

4.2.1

Innocent Passage and Non-Suspendable Innocent Passage

The regime of innocent passage is categorised into two forms: the right of innocent passage and
the right of non-suspendable innocent passage. The first category of innocent passage is
exercisable by foreign vessels in the territorial sea of a coastal State. The right of innocent
passage is regarded as customary international law as reflected in the Corfu Channel Case. In
this case, the ICJ held that navigation of warships in time of peace through straits used for
international navigation connecting two parts of the high seas without previous authorisation of
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the coastal State, provided the passage is innocent, it is permissible.11 The navigational regime of
innocent passage is defined in Article 17 of the LOSC, which states that “ships of all States,
whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.”12
The LOSC prescribes that for passage to be considered ‘innocent’ shall be continuous and
expeditious.13 Any acts committed by the vessel that could compromise the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State would remove the ‘innocent’ status of that vessel.14 Submarines and
other underwater vessels are required to surface while navigating through the territorial sea of
States other than the State whose flag they are carrying. 15 The right of innocent passage applies
only to maritime navigation. It does not include the right of a foreign aircraft to fly in the
airspace of the territorial sea belonging to another country. 16 The right of overflight was not
mentioned in Article 18(1) (a) and (b) of the LOSC, which reads:

Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the
purpose of (a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters
or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal waters; or
(b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead
or port facility.
The coastal State, on the other hand, has the duty not to hamper innocent passage of any vessel
unless the passage ceases to be innocent or the coastal State fears that the passage would
undermine its security interests.17 In addition, tolls and charges cannot be levied upon foreign
ships by reason only of their passage but may be levied for other specific services rendered to the
ship.18 It is not clear whether general services such as the maintenance of navigational aids fall
11
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within the scope of Article 26(2) of the LOSC.19 In enhancing navigational safety in its territorial
sea, the coastal State may designate sea lanes and Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS) for
navigating vessels. The sea lane designation must be based on recommendations of the
competent international organisation, in this case, generally regarded as the International
Maritime Organization (IMO).20
The coastal State’s regulatory powers in its own territorial sea are extensive. It has the right to
enact laws within this maritime zone which must be complied with by foreign vessels transiting
its territorial sea. This is illustrated in the Malaysian case of PP v Narongne Sookpavit,21 decided
in 1987, 9 years before Malaysia ratified the LOSC. This case involved the arrest of Thai
fishermen within the 3-nautical mile territorial sea of Malaysia. The fishermen claimed that they
were exercising innocent passage. Nevertheless, the police discovered that they were in
possession of fishing appliances in contravention of Section 11(1) of the Fisheries Act 1963.22
The Malaysian court ruled that the passage by the accused persons could not be regarded as
innocent as it contravened Malaysian domestic legislation as well as the meaning of innocent
passage as recognised under customary international law. 23

The second catergory of innocent passage is the right of non-suspendable innocent passage that
applies in straits of the type prescribed in Article 45(1) (a) and (b) of the LOSC.24 Unlike the
right of innocent passage which may be temporarily suspended as provided in Article 25(3) of
the LOSC, vessels that exercise the non-suspendable form of innocent passage may not have
19
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their passage suspended by the coastal State.25 The non-suspendable innocent passage regime is
similar to the right of innocent passage governed by Part II, Section 3 of the LOSC. Therefore,
the right of non-suspendable innocent passage applies only to ships and does not include
overflight rights of foreign aircraft. In addition, foreign-flagged submarines and other underwater
vehicles must surface while exercising this right.

4.2.2

Transit Passage

The navigational regime of transit passage is covered by Part III of the LOSC. The transit
passage regime is applicable in straits used for international navigation connecting one part of
the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ.26 This type of strait has
have been completely amalgamated into the territorial seas of the bordering States with the result
that there is no EEZ or high seas corridor through them.27

The transit passage regime applies to ensure the smooth navigation of all ships, vessels and
aircraft and does not in any way affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits and the
coastal State’s exercise of sovereignty over the straits.28 Unlike the regimes of innocent passage
and non-suspendable innocent passage, this regime applies on all types of foreign ships or
aircraft to navigate or to fly above straits used for international navigation, even though the

25
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straits may form part of the territorial sea of another State.29 Submarines and other underwater
vehicles can transit in their normal submerged mode.30

States bordering straits may also prescribe sea lanes and TSS in straits used for international
navigation to facilitate safe shipping. However, unlike the regime of innocent passage, the
designation of the said sea lanes and TSS in straits must be referred to the competent
international organisation, generally accepted as being the IMO, for endorsement. 31 In exercising
the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, ships and aircraft
must proceed without delay and refrain from activities that may compromise the security of the
coastal State.32 States bordering straits are neither permitted to hamper such a passage 33 nor to
formulate any laws or regulations that will have the practical effect of impeding the right of
transit passage.34
The LOSC does not provide the exact meaning of the phrase ‘proceed without delay’.35
Nevertheless, it is generally understood that vessels should transit a strait at a reasonable speed
depending on the weather, traffic and the existence of navigational hazards along the waterways,
without loitering or stopping, unless by force majeure or distress.36 Navigating vessels are
required to comply with internationally accepted regulations relating to safe navigation and
29

See LOSC Art 38(1); Myron H. Nordquist, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A
Commentary (Volume II)’ in Satya N. Nandan, Shabtai Rosenne and Neal R. Grandy (eds), Second Committee:
Articles 1 to 85, Annexes I and II and Final Act, Annex II (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) vol II, 317-320; Sam Bateman,
‘The Regime of Straits Transit Passage in the Asia Pacific: Political and Strategic Issues’ in Donald R. Rothwell and
Sam Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea (Kluwer, 2000), 97.
30

S. N. Nandan and D. H. Anderson, ‘Straits Used for International Navigation: A Commentary on Part III of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982’ in Hugo Caminos (ed), Law of the Sea (Dartmouth, 2001),
77.
31

See LOSC Art 41(1), (3) and (4).
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See LOSC Art 39(1) (a) and (b).
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See LOSC Art 44.
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See LOSC Art 42(2).
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Myron H. Nordquist, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (Volume II)’ in
Satya N. Nandan, Shabtai Rosenne and Neal R. Grandy (eds), Second Committee: Articles 1 to 85, Annexes I and II
and Final Act, Annex II (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) vol II, 341.
36

S. N. Nandan and D. H. Anderson, ‘Straits Used for International Navigation: A Commentary on Part III of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982’ in Hugo Caminos (ed), Law of the Sea (Dartmouth, 2001),
77-78.
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prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships endorsed by the IMO.37 Aircraft are
similarly bound by international rules on safety, while flying over straits used for international
navigation.38 Nordquist contends that the language used in Article 38(2) of the LOSC
corresponds to Articles 58(1) and 87(1) (a) and (b) of the LOSC, implying that the ‘right of
transit passage’ is comparable with the ‘freedom of navigation and overflight’ in the EEZ and the
high seas.39 Beckman describes transit passage as the exercise of a freedom rather than a right, as
aircrafts and vessels have the freedom to traverse and fly over straits.40 Nevertheless, these
contentions may not be entirely accurate.

As stated earlier, while vessels and aircraft have the freedom to navigate or fly over straits used
for international navigation, they also have the corresponding obligation to follow the rules and
regulations prescribed by States bordering straits which are based on the provisions of the LOSC
while exercising transit passage. This is not comparable to the freedom of navigation regime on
the high seas or to the freedom of navigation which may be exercised by vessels in the EEZ. For
example, on the high seas, vessels may transit without having to do so expeditiously or without
having to follow a designated traffic lane. Article 38(2) of the LOSC stipulates that transit
passage may operate in the form of freedom of navigation and overflight.41 Nevertheless,
Articles 38(1)42 and 38(3)43 clearly describes that transit passage is in fact a right. In addition, the
word ‘right’ and not ‘freedom’ indicates the distinction between Article 38 of the LOSC with

37

See LOSC Art 39(2) (a) and (b).

38

See LOSC Art 39(3) (a) and (b).

39

Myron H. Nordquist, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (Volume II)’ in
Satya N. Nandan, Shabtai Rosenne and Neal R. Grandy (eds), Second Committee: Articles 1 to 85, Annexes I and II
and Final Act, Annex II (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) vol II, 329-330.
40

Robert Beckman, ‘Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for Consideration’ (Paper presented
at the Building A Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004), 245-246.
41

Article 38(2) of the LOSC reads ‘Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom
of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit…’.
42

Article 38(1) of the LOSC reads ‘In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit
passage…’.
43

Article 38(3) of the LOSC states ‘Any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit passage through a
strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this Convention…’.
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that of Articles 5844 and 8745 of the LOSC, the two articles that deal with the application of
freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ and the high seas, respectively.

States bordering straits are permitted to impose applicable international rules and regulations
relating to the above matters in order to ensure that the marine environment of their coasts is
protected from vessel-source marine pollution.46 Many States designate sea lanes within the
straits for transit purposes by submitting a proposal of a TSS designation to the IMO for
approval.47 These regulations must be observed by vessels48 and the designated sea lanes must be
respected by ships exercising transit passage in the strait.49 States bordering straits are also
permitted to foster co-operation with the user States of the strait to improve navigational safety
and to control pollution from vessels sailing through the strait.50 The regulatory powers of States
bordering straits over shipping in straits used for international navigation are very restricted, so
much so that they can only interfere with the passage of vessels if they have committed major
damage to the marine environment of the straits.51 In the words of Beckman:

44

Article 58(1) of the LOSC stipulates that ‘In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of
navigation and overflight…’.
45

Article 87(1) of the LOSC reads: ‘The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law.
It comprises, inter alia both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of
overflight…’.
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See LOSC Art 42(1) (a) and (b); Plant is of the view that the word ‘applicable’ in the context of Article 42(1) (b)
should be taken to mean as ‘applicable’ by virtue of the rules of international law, or in other words, the standards
must represent the standards of customary law adhered to by most States. See G. Plant, ‘International Legal Aspects
of Vessel Traffic Services’ (1990) 14(1) Marine Policy, 75-76.
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Policy, 74-77.
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If a vessel exercising the right of transit passage violates
obligations under Article 39(2), but the vessel in question does not
come into port, and the violation in question does not cause or
threaten major damage to the marine environment of the straits, the
rights of the littoral State are more limited. The littoral State would
not have a right to interfere with the passage of the vessel or a right
to arrest it.52
To date, what constitutes ‘major damage’ has yet to be judicially interpreted and still remains
vague.53 This issue will be dealt with more extensively in Chapter 5 of this Thesis. In addition,
Part III of the LOSC does not mention in clear terms that transit passage can be suspended in the
interest of the preservation of the good order of the marine environment of straits. 54

4.3

CATEGORIES OF STRAITS UNDER THE LOSC

For navigational purposes, the LOSC has divided straits used for international navigation into a
number of categories. The two main categories are straits where transit passage applies and
straits where transit passage does not apply.

4.3.1

Straits Used for International Navigation Where Transit Passage Applies

Foreign vessels may exercise transit passage in straits used for international navigation in straits
that connect one part of the high seas or EEZ to another part of the high seas or EEZ that have
breadths of 24 nautical miles or less, as mentioned in Articles 37(1) and 38 of the LOSC.
Examples of straits under this category include the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Strait of
Gibraltar, Bab-el-Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, Torres Strait and the Dover Strait.55 The second
type of strait where transit passage applies to foreign ships is a strait used for international
navigation that connects one part of the high seas or EEZ to another part of the high seas or EEZ
52

Robert Beckman, ‘Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for Consideration’ (Paper presented at
the Building A Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004), 249-250.
53

Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008), 73-84.
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Ibid., 283-289.
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Jon M. Van Dyke, ‘Transit Passage Through International Straits’ in Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman and Susan
J. Rolston (eds), The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2009), 177-232.
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exceeding 24 nautical miles in breadth, but the EEZ or high seas corridors running through them
are too dangerous for navigation, as stipulated in Article 36 of the LOSC. 56 An example of this
type of strait is the Bass Strait that separates the continental land mass of Australia from the
Australian island state of Tasmania, particularly in areas between King Island and the Australian
mainland state of Victoria.57 The eastern side of the Bass Strait, despite having an EEZ or high
seas corridor within it, is dotted with small islands, islets and rocks, which make it unsafe to be
used for international navigation.58 Thus, transit passage is applicable on this part of the Bass
Strait.59

4.3.2

Straits Used for International Navigation Where Transit Passage Does Not Apply

There are also a few straits used for international navigation where transit passage is not
exercisable by navigating foreign vessels and ships. They include:

(a)

Straits used for international navigation that are governed by separate treaties

There are no specific list of straits used for international navigation that are governed by separate
treaties. However, the Baltic or Danish Strait, the Turkish Strait and Magellan Strait are among
those that fit into this category.60 Article 35(c) of the LOSC exempts straits of this kind from the
application of the transit passage regime. Instead, the navigational regimes that apply in these
straits may be contained in long standing conventions negotiated specifically for them. The
56

Article 36 of the LOSC states that transit passage would not apply in a strait used for international navigation if
there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or through an EEZ of similar convenience with respect to
navigational and hydrographical characteristics.
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Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008), 47; Donald R.
Rothwell, ‘International Straits and UNCLOS: An Australian Case Study’ (1992) 23(3) Journal of Maritime Law
and Commerce, 479.
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J. Rolston (eds), The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2009), 196-197; Hugo Caminos, ‘Categories of International Straits Excluded From the Transit Passage
Regime Under Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ in Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and
Rudiger Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge
Thomas A. Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 583-585.
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Danish or Baltic Strait and the Turkish Strait are governed by the Copenhagen Convention on the
Sound and the Belts of 185761 and the Montreux Convention of 1936, 62 respectively.

Passage through the Strait of Magellan is regulated by the 1881 Boundary Treaty between Chile
and Argentina (1881 Treaty) which conferred sovereignty over the Strait of Magellan to Chile.63
Article V of the 1881 Treaty grants vessels of all flags the freedom to navigate through the Strait
of Magellan.64 In reaffirming the application of Article V of the 1881 Treaty, Chile and
Argentina have entered into another treaty called the ‘Treaty of Peace and Friendship’ in 1984
which stated:
…both States reaffirmed the validity of article V of the Boundary
Treaty of 1881 whereby the Strait of Magellan (Estrecho de
Magallanes) is neutralized forever with free navigation assured for
the flags of all nations.65
It can be concluded that the LOSC has not altered the longstanding legal regime of the Strait of
Magellan. The 1881 Treaty is clearly compatible with the LOSC which acknowledged the
special status of the navigational regime of vessels sailing through straits used for international
navigation.

61

The Consolidated Treaty Series, ‘Treaty for the Redemption of Sound Dues between Austria, Belgium, France,
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1997), 197-202.
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Practices’ (Paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008), 47-48.
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in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World (Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), 205-207.
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(b)

Straits used for international navigation that connect one part of the high seas or EEZ to
the territorial sea of a foreign State

Instead of transit passage, Article 45(1) (b) of the LOSC provides that non-suspendable innocent
passage is exercisable by foreign vessels in a strait that connects one part of the high seas or EEZ
to the territorial sea of a foreign State.66 The navigational features of non-suspendable innocent
passage were discussed in Section 4.2.1. Some examples of straits of this nature are the Strait of
Georgia that connects the North Pacific Ocean which is partly within the American EEZ to the
Canadian state of British Columbia; and the Strait of Tiran that connects the Red Sea and the
Gulf of Aqaba.67 The Strait of Tiran links the Red Sea, which is under the territorial waters of
Egypt and Saudi Arabia to the shores of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Israel.68

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are generally considered as straits that connect one high
seas or EEZ to another high seas or EEZ. However, if they are considered as separate straits, the
Strait of Malacca may also fall under this category as it connects the Malaysian and Indonesian
EEZ in the Strait of Malacca to the territorial sea of Singapore when it joins the Strait of
Singapore at the southern end of the Malay Peninsula.69 Chapter 9 of this Thesis will discuss this
issue in further detail.70
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(c)

Straits used for international navigation which were previously territorial sea, but have
become internal waters because of the drawing of straight baselines enclosing that
maritime area

The right of transit passage would not apply in straits used for international navigation forming
the internal waters of the coastal State as provided for in Article 35(a) of the LOSC.71
Nevertheless, this exception will not apply if the waters of the strait were territorial sea before
the drawing of a straight baseline that enclosed them making them internal waters under Article
7 of the LOSC. A good example to illustrate this situation is the waters of the Strait of Malacca.
Once Malaysia publicises its straight baselines in the Strait of Malacca, most northern Malaysian
waters of the Strait of Malacca which are now territorial sea would be enclosed as internal
waters.72 The use of the word ‘except’ in Article 35(a) of the LOSC shows that transit passage
will still be applicable in internal waters areas of the strait that used to be territorial sea before
the drawing of such straight baselines.

(d)

Straits used for international navigation that have EEZ or High seas corridors within
them

Article 36 of the LOSC states clearly that transit passage is not applicable in straits used for
international navigation that have EEZ or high seas corridors running through them. The
navigational regime applicable in these straits would be freedom of navigation and overflight as
provided for in Article 58(1)73 and Article 87(1) (a) and (b)74 of the LOSC respectively. Straits
may have EEZ or high seas corridors in them if the bordering States opt not to extend their
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Article 35(a) of the LOSC states ‘Nothing in this Part affects any areas of internal waters within a strait, except
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territorial sea limits to 12 nautical miles, as Japan and Korea have done in the Korea Strait,75 or if
the strait is really wide enough to have a maximum breadth of more than 24 nautical miles from
one shore to the other, such as the northern part of the Strait of Malacca towards the Andaman
Sea.76 Other examples would be Florida Strait that separates Florida and Cuba; and Formosa
Strait between mainland China and Taiwan.77 If the vessel ceases to transit in the EEZ or high
seas corridor within the straits, and enters parts of the straits that form the territorial sea of the
bordering States, the vessel is deemed to be exercising the right of innocent passage and the
passage may be suspended by the bordering State for reasons essential for the protection of the
State’s security.78 In the case of the Strait of Malacca,79 since the breadth at its opening to the
Andaman Sea stretches for more than 200 nautical miles in length, foreign vessels can sail
through that part of the Strait of Malacca under the regime of freedom of navigation in the EEZ.
However, the Strait of Malacca gets constricted in size as it flows south.

Earlier in Chapter 2, it was noted that Malaysia and Indonesia have not officially delimited their
EEZ boundaries in the waters of the Strait of Malacca.80 As shown in Map 2-4 in Chapter 2,
Malaysia claims that the EEZ boundary line in the Strait of Malacca should follow the same
boundary line set in the Continental Shelf Boundary Agreement signed by Malaysia and
75

Joseph R. Morgan, ‘Large Marine Ecosystem of the Pacific Rim’ in Kenneth Sherman, Lewis M. Alexander and
Barry D. Gold (eds), Large Marine Ecosystems: Stress, Mitigation and Sustainability (American Association for the
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Indonesia in 1969.81 On the other hand, Indonesia contends that the EEZ boundary line in the
Strait of Malacca should be drawn based on the principle of equitable solution. 82 The maritime
boundary line should be measured from the median line between Sumatra and Peninsula
Malaysia.83

It has also been earlier mentioned in Chapter 2 that Malaysia has yet to finalise and submit a map
specifying its straight baselines defining its internal waters and territorial sea on its side of the
Strait of Malacca to the UN.84 This drawing of straight baseline is important in determining the
extent of the territorial Sea and EEZ areas that Malaysia could claim in the Strait of Malacca.
Theoretically, if the drawing of this straight baseline causes some maritime areas along the
western coast of Peninsula Malaysia to be enclosed as internal waters, the Malaysian territorial
Sea and EEZ limits will be pushed seaward, resulting in the EEZ corridor within the Malaysian
side of the Strait of Malacca to get smaller in area85.

The breadth of the Strait of Malacca, from a geographic and hydrographic perspective, is wide
enough to have an EEZ corridor. However, due to the straight baselines drawn on the Strait,
transit passage may be exercised by foreign ships in that part of the Strait as the EEZ corridor
may no longer be available.86 These scenarios are illustrated in the following Map 4-1 and Map
4-2. For the purpose of these illustrations, it is assumed that the EEZ boundary between Malaysia
and Indonesia is similar to that of the Continental Shelf Boundary concluded by the two
countries in 1969. The lines drawn on the map, however, do not indicate the precise borders and
baselines, as this is done solely for the purpose of illustration.
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Map 4-1: The projected beginning/terminating points of transit passage on the
Malaysian side of the Strait of Malacca measured from Malaysia’s implied normal baseline.
(Modified from Google Maps)

Map 4-2: The projected beginning/terminating points of transit passage on the
Malaysian side of the Strait of Malacca measured from Malaysia’s proposed straight baselines.
(Modified from Google Maps)
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Map 4-1 and Map 4-2 demonstrate that the starting and terminating points of transit passage in
the Strait of Malacca may vary based on the size of an EEZ corridor that may exist in the Strait.
Nevertheless, due to Malaysia’s straight baseline, areas that used to be territorial sea in the Strait
of Malacca have been enclosed as internal waters of Malaysia, transit passage would still be
applicable in those waters as prescribed by Article 35 (a) of the LOSC. 87 However, this may only
be the case if there is no longer an equally convenient EEZ or high seas corridor that runs within
that maritime area of the Strait of Malacca.

Furthermore, this situation is also made difficult in the absence of a proper EEZ boundary
between Malaysia and Indonesia in the Strait of Malacca. Otherwise, the EEZ corridor in the
Strait could be ascertained and transit passage may be deemed to be exercisable by foreign
vessels when they sail in areas where the EEZ corridor ends. Malaysia and Indonesia have yet to
formally declare the starting or terminating points of transit passage within their maritime areas
in the Strait of Malacca. It is important for both States to determine these points to properly
ascertain the regulatory powers that they possess over shipping traffic that goes through different
parts of the Strait of Malacca. If the vessel sails in areas within the EEZ corridor of the Strait,
then the regulatory powers of the littoral States would not be governed by Part III of the LOSC
but rather by Part V of the LOSC, which covers the matter on freedom of navigation in the EEZ.
Likewise, if the vessel swerves away from the EEZ corridor and enters maritime areas within the
Strait which are part of the territorial sea of the littoral States, the innocent passage regime in
Part II of the LOSC would then apply. Nevertheless, if the vessel subsequently enters maritime
areas within the Strait where transit passage applies, Malaysia and Indonesia may exercise their
regulatory powers based on the provisions of Part III of the LOSC.

In the Strait of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have yet to finalise their common
maritime boundaries, particularly areas around Pedra Branca. The issue on the determination of
beginning and terminating points of transit passage may not crop up in the Strait of Singapore.
Unlike the Strait of Malacca, the breadth of the Strait of Singapore does not exceed 24 nautical
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miles.88 Hence, transit passage is deemed to begin when a vessel sails into the waters of the Strait
of Singapore as defined by the IHO.89

(e)

Straits used for international navigation which are formed by an island of the coastal
State but there is a similarly convenient high seas route with respect to navigational
and hydrographical characteristics seaward of the island

A strait that is formed by an island of the coastal State but there is a similarly convenient high
seas route with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics seaward of the island is
often referred to the ‘Messina Exception’ or ‘Island Exception’, expounded in Article 38(1) of
the LOSC and exempted from the application of transit passage. 90 Non-suspendable innocent
passage applies in such straits, the features of which were earlier explained in Section 4.2.1,
above. This exception was to accommodate the concerns of the Italian delegation during
UNCLOS III about the strait between Sicily and the Italian mainland. 91 Tullio Treves has
suggested that the ‘island exception’ signifies the concept that transit passage is reserved only for
primary straits and not for straits of secondary importance.92 A good example of this would be a
strait that separates Scotland and the Orkney Islands. Even though the strait can be used for
international navigation, there is also a route seaward of the Orkney Islands, called the Fair Isle
Gap which is similarly convenient for shipping. 93 Other waterways that may fall into this
category could include Foveaux Strait between New Zealand’s South Island and Stewart Island
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and Cheju Island between the southwestern coast of the Korean Peninsula and Cheju Island.94
However, Langdon argued that the existence of a large patch of shoal water extending from the
island out into the sea would justify the application of transit passage in the strait that separates
the island and the mainland.95 The shallow shoalwater seawards of the island would render the
passage seaward of the island inconvenient for navigation.

Palk Strait, which separates Sri Lanka and the Indian subcontinent, may also be considered an
example of this type of strait, but with a slight difference from the other examples described
above. The route seawards of Sri Lanka is more navigationally convenient than the Palk Strait as
the Strait is not navigationally a preferred sea route.96 The Palk Strait is narrow, shallow and
dotted with many islets and sandy shoals that make it navigationally difficult. 97 As such,
navigating vessels would prefer to bypass Palk Strait by sailing around Sri Lanka.98
Nevertheless, the Indian Government is working on the Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project
(SSCP), a project to deepen the Palk Strait so that it would be more navigable for vessels. 99 The
SSCP was first proposed in 1860 to shorten the distance from one side of India to the other.100
Once this project is completed, the Palk Strait would be opened and viable for international
navigation and the route would also be a shorter route for vessels compared to the present route
of going around Sri Lanka.101
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Map 4-3: The SSCP Route
(Modified from Google Maps)
However the question of whether or not transit passage would be applicable to the Palk Strait is
still open for deliberation until the SSCP is entirely completed. This is because Palk Strait has
never been regarded in the past as a strait that is used for international navigation as it is not a
navigationally convenient sea route.

(f)

Vessels sailing between ports situated within the strait itself

Some straits possess many seaports along its length. For example, there are many ports along the
coast of the Strait of Malacca on both shores. As illustrated in Map 4-4, if a foreign vessel sails
from the Malaysian port of Melaka to the Sumatran port of Dumai, Indonesia, such passage is
not an exercise of transit passage as provided in Article 37102 and Article 38(1) of the LOSC.103

102

Article 37 of the LOSC explains that transit passage applies in straits which are used for international navigation
between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ.
103

Article 38(1) of the LOSC provides that all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage when transiting
through straits as explained in Article 37 of the LOSC.
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Map 4-4: Melaka and Dumai are two important regional ports along the Strait of Malacca
(Modified from GoogleMaps)
In this instance, transit passage would not be applicable because the vessel is not traversing the
strait in order to travel from an area of EEZ or high seas to another area of EEZ or high seas. The
ship is navigating across the strait to get into a port that is situated on the other side of the
waterway. Instead of transit passage, the right of non-suspendable innocent passage will apply as
described in Article 37 and Article 45 (1) (a) of the LOSC.104

4.4

CONCLUSION

This chapter addressed the key issue of the navigational regime applicable in straits used for
international navigation. There are four types of passage rights through straits used for
international navigation: the right of innocent passage, the right of non-suspendable innocent
passage, transit passage, and freedom of navigation in the EEZ or on the high seas, all of which
are codified in the LOSC. Among all these navigational regimes, freedom of navigation in the
104

S. N. Nandan and D. H. Anderson, ‘Straits Used for International Navigation: A Commentary on Part III of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982’ in Hugo Caminos (ed), Law of the Sea (Dartmouth, 2001),
109; Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008), 46-50; See Notes 24
and 102.
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EEZ or the high seas is the most liberal, followed by transit passage regime and the nonsuspendable innocent passage regime that applies to straits described in Article 45(1) (b) of the
LOSC. Unlike other navigational regimes which cannot be hampered, impeded or suspended by
the coastal State, the innocent passage regime is the strictest form of navigational regime as it
could be suspended for security purposes.

The transit passage regime is the navigational regime that applies most frequently to straits used
for international navigation. The transit passage regime confers very liberal rights of navigation
and overflight to all vessels and aircrafts exercising passage through or over straits used for
international navigation. The transit passage regime applies in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore as they link one part of the high seas or an EEZ to another part of the high seas or an
EEZ. Nevertheless, the littoral States of Malaysia and Indonesia have yet to determine the
beginning and terminating points of transit passage in the Strait of Malacca. From an
enforcement jurisdiction point of view, the determination of these points are important as it will
assist the littoral States to exercise their enforcement powers within the limits allowed by the
LOSC.

As transit passage is a liberal navigational regime, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are
therefore expected to accommodate unlimited number of shipping traffic. This is based on the
fact that passage of vessels exercising transit passage may not be hampered, impaired or
impeded. The increasing number of shipping traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has
raised environmental concerns. There is apprehension that congestion may increase the risks of
maritime accidents, which may threaten the sensitive marine environment of the Straits. The
subsequent chapter discusses pollution issues that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are
currently facing arising from heavy shipping activities.
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CHAPTER 5.
MARINE POLLUTION ISSUES IN THE STRAITS OF
MALACCA AND SINGAPORE
5.1

INTRODUCTION

International law under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC)
requires the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to accommodate an unlimited volume of shipping
traffic. The heavy shipping activity occurring in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may
enhance the likelihood of maritime collisions in the Straits. Maritime collisions could result in oil
or hazardous or noxious substances spilling into the waters of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. This Chapter examines the types of pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,
focusing more on vessel-source pollution. This Chapter concludes by stating that vessel-source
pollution problem is a serious issue as it may affect the sensitive marine environment of the
Straits and disrupt the socio-economic well-being of the littoral States of Malaysia, Indonesia
and Singapore.

5.2

TYPES OF POLLUTION IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE

The coastal areas along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have a high population density as
major cities and ports are concentrated on the coast. With active human-based activities, the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore face pressures associated with marine pollution, mainly caused
by land-based human activities, vessel sources of marine pollution,1 and atmospheric pollution.2
However, the issue of atmospheric pollution is not discussed in this Chapter.
*This Chapter has been published (wholly or in part) in the following peer-reviewed journals:
(a) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Ensuring Safe Navigation’ (2011)
(131/2011) RSIS Commentaries, 1-2;
(b) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for International
Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 3(4) Asian Politics & Policy, 501526;
(c) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Legal Feasibility of Imposing Shipping Controls in Straits Used for
International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 2(9) OIDA International
Journal of Sustainable Development, 69-82;
(d) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Protecting Vital Sea Lines of Communication: A Study of the Proposed
Designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area’ (2012) 57 Ocean
& Coastal Management, 79-94;
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Realising the adverse impact of marine pollution on the marine environment, the United Nations
LOSC has addressed the problem of land-based3 and vessel-source marine pollution4 on the
marine environment and as parties to the LOSC, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are expected
to address these problems effectively. It is therefore imperative to examine the problems of
marine pollution in areas within and around the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

5.2.1 Land-Based Sources of Pollution

Land-based pollution has always been considered to be the most persistent and rampant problem
for urban and industrialised areas situated along the length of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.5 As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the coastal regions of Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore facing the Straits are heavily populated.6 The constant process of development has
increased land-based pollution problems, through generation of domestic discharge and
municipal solid waste, sewage (including animal wastes), industrial and agricultural effluents as
well as marine litter that may pose hazards to the environment. 7 If this waste is not managed
1

Kirstin Dow, ‘An Overview of Pollution Issues in the Straits of Malacca’ in Hamzah Ahmad (ed), The Straits of
Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding and Navigational Safety (Pelanduk, 1998), 61-98;
Mohamad Pauzi Zakaria et al, ‘Oil Pollution in the Straits of Malacca, Malaysia: Application of Molecular Markers
for Source Identification’ (2000) 34 Environmental, Science and Technology, 1189-1190; Abdul Rani Abdullah et
al, ‘The GEF/UNDP/IMO Malacca Straits Demonstration Project: Sources of Pollution’ (1999) 39 Marine Pollution
Bulletin, 229.
2

Veronika Eyring et al, ‘Transport Impacts on Atmosphere and Climate: Shipping’ (2010) 44 Atmospheric
Environment, 4761; Cheryl Rita Kaur, ‘IMO’s Role in Addressing Harmful Air Emissions from Ships: The Road
Ahead’ (2009) (16 (1) 2009) MIMA Bulletin, 13-16; Rachel Oliver, Shipping’s Impact on the Air (2008) CNN.com
<http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/01/20/eco.about.ships/index.html>.
3

Articles 207(1) & (2) of the LOSC prescribe that States to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and
control marine pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources and also to enforce other measures to
prevent, reduce and control such pollution.
4

The LOSC has also addressed problems relating to pollution from vessels. Article 211(1) reads ‘States, acting
through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference, shall establish international rules
and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from vessels…’.
5

Cheryl Rita Kaur, ‘Pollution From Land-Based Sources’ in H.M. Ibrahim and Hairil Anuar Husin (eds), Profile of
the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective (Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA), 2008), 128. Due to rapid
urbanisation and industrialisation of areas along the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, land-based oil pollutants
contributes to pollution in coastal areas of States bordering the Strait of Malacca. See Mohamad Pauzi Zakaria et al,
‘Oil Pollution in the Straits of Malacca, Malaysia: Application of Molecular Markers for Source Identification’
(2000) 34 Environmental, Science and Technology, 1189-1190.
6

See Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 of this Thesis.

7

P.S Choo,
Ismail I.
and H. Rosly,
‘The West Coast
of
Peninsular Malaysia’
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/ad894e/AD894E02.pdf>; United Nations (UN), ‘Statement by the Honourable
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systematically, these various wastes may be disposed of in landfill sites or may also be
discharged into rivers or canals that feed into the sea. It is an established fact that over 80 per
cent of marine pollution comes from land-based sources of pollution.8 Therefore, it is important
to briefly examine the laws and regulations of the littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore on the management of land-based waste. For the purpose of this Chapter, the focus is
on the management of municipal solid waste in the three States of Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore.

5.2.1.1

Land-based Source of Pollution in Malaysia’s Strait of Malacca States

The total land mass of the eight Malaysian states bordering the Strait of Malacca is
approximately 0.67 million hectares, out of the total Malaysian land area of 33 million hectares.9
Since the 1980s, the Malaysian economy has experienced gradual but significant changes as
Malaysia has shifted from an agricultural-based economy to manufacturing.10 This development
was more focused on the western coast of Peninsular Malaysia where major cities, settlements
and conurbations are located such as the Klang Valley in Selangor, Georgetown and Seberang
Prai in Pulau Pinang, Port Dickson in Negeri Sembilan and Muar and Pontian Kecil in Johor. 11
Johor Bahru is the biggest city in the south of Peninsular Malaysia bordering the Tebrau Strait
Datuk Faizah Mohd Tahir, Head of Delegation and Secretary General, Ministry of Women, Family and Community
Development, Malaysia on Item 4: Population Distribution, Urbanisation, Internal Migration and Development at
the 41st Session of the Commission on Population and Development, United Nations, New York’ (UN, 2008).
8

World
Wildlife
Fund
(WWF),
Problems:
Ocean
<http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/blue_planet/problems/pollution/>.

Pollution

(2010)

WWF

9

Global Environment Facility/United Nations Development Programme/International Maritime Organization,
‘Physical, Ecological and Demographic Characteristics’ in Chua Thia-Eng, S. Adrian Ross and Huming Yu (eds),
Malacca Straits Environmental Profile (GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional Programme for the Prevention and Management
of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 1998), 31.
10

Lee Boon Thong, ‘Emerging Urban Trends and the Globalizing Economy in Malaysia’ in Fu-chen Lo and Yueman Yeung (eds), Emerging World Cities in Pacific Asia (United Nations University Press, 1996), 335-336; United
Nations (UN), ‘Statement by the Honourable Datuk Faizah Mohd Tahir, Head of Delegation and Secretary General,
Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, Malaysia on Item 4: Population Distribution,
Urbanisation, Internal Migration and Development at the 41st Session of the Commission on Population and
Development, United Nations, New York’ (UN, 2008).
11

Global Environment Facility/United Nations Development Programme/International Maritime Organization,
‘Physical, Ecological and Demographic Characteristics’ in Chua Thia-Eng, S. Adrian Ross and Huming Yu (eds),
Malacca Straits Environmental Profile (GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional Programme for the Prevention and Management
of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 1998), 31; Abdul Rani Abdullah et al, ‘The GEF/UNDP/IMO Malacca
Straits Demonstration Project: Sources of Pollution’ (1999) 39 Marine Pollution Bulletin, 229-232.

104

that feeds into the Strait of Malacca. These towns and cities have experienced rapid development
and urbanisation; modern buildings, factories and infrastructure have been built, and the
population density has increased in this part of the country.12

Most major rivers in the west coast states of Peninsular Malaysia run through major cities such
as Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Melaka, Klang and Johor Bahru before flowing into the Strait of
Malacca.13 In 2007, the Department of Environment in Malaysia monitored 143 river basins with
1,064 monitoring stations.14 Out of these 1,064 rivers, 638 (60 per cent) were classified as clean,
376 (35 per cent) as slightly polluted and 50 (5 per cent) as polluted.15 The west coast states of
Peninsular Malaysia possess the most polluted rivers, which include Sungai Pinang and Sungai
Juru in Pulau Pinang, Sungai Merlimau in Melaka and Sungai Danga, Sungai Segget and Sungai
Tebrau in Johor.16
In addition, municipal solid waste generation in Malaysia has also gradually increased from
1990–2006, as illustrated in Table 5-1.

12

Lee Boon Thong, ‘Emerging Urban Trends and the Globalizing Economy in Malaysia’ in Fu-chen Lo and Yueman Yeung (eds), Emerging World Cities in Pacific Asia (United Nations University Press, 1996), 336-341.
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Global Environment Facility/United Nations Development Programme/International Maritime Organization,
‘Physical, Ecological and Demographic Characteristics’ in Chua Thia-Eng, S. Adrian Ross and Huming Yu (eds),
Malacca Straits Environmental Profile (GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional Programme for the Prevention and Management
of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 1998), 11.
14

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Department of Environment, ‘Malaysia Environmental Quality
Report 2007’ (Department of Environment, Malaysia, 2007), 28-30.
15
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16
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Urban Centre
Kuala Lumpur
Johor Bahru (Johor)
Ipoh (Perak)
Georgetown (Pulau
Pinang)
Klang (Selangor)
Kuala Terengganu
(Terengganu)
Kota Bharu
(Kelantan)
Kuantan (Pahang)
Seremban (Negeri
Sembilan)
Melaka

Municipal Solid Waste Generation (tonnes/day)
1990
2002
2006
586.8
2,754
3,100
174.8
215
242
162.2
208
234
137.2
221
249
122.8
121.0

478
137

538
154

102.9

129.5

146

85.3
85.2

174
165

196
186

46.8

562

632

Table 5-1: Municipal Solid Waste Generation in Malaysian Urban Centres (1990–2006)
(Source: Periathamby, 2009)17
Each day Peninsular Malaysia generates over 19,000 tonnes of municipal solid waste, which is
expected to reach 30,000 tonnes per day by the year 2020,18 with organic waste constituting the
largest type of waste being disposed of.19 Currently, it is estimated that around 75 per cent of all
waste collected is disposed of in 130 landfill and dump sites, with a small proportion of waste
being subject to intermediate treatment or recycled.20 Landfilling has until now been Malaysia’s
main method of disposing waste.21
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Agamuthu Periathamby, Fauziah Shahul Hamid and Kahlil Khidzir, ‘Evolution of Solid Waste Management in
Malaysia: Impacts and Implications of the Solid Waste Bill 2007’ (2009) 11 Journal of Material Cycles and Waste
Management, 97; Nadzri Yahaya, ‘Overview of Solid Waste Management in Malaysia’ (Paper presented at the
Workshop on Carbon Finance and Municipal Solid Waste Management in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 2008).
18

Agamuthu Periathamby, Fauziah Shahul Hamid and Kahlil Khidzir, ‘Evolution of Solid Waste Management in
Malaysia: Impacts and Implications of the Solid Waste Bill 2007’ (2009) 11 Journal of Material Cycles and Waste
Management, 98.
19

Latifah Abd Manaf, Mohd Armi Abu Samah and Nur Ilyana Mohd Zukki, ‘Municipal Solid Waste Management
in Malaysia: Practices and Challenges’ (2009) 29 Waste Management, 2903.
20

Ibid.

21
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The landfill method of disposal has been proven to have negative ramifications as it may pollute
rivers, toxify soil and contaminate drinking water.22 Hence, landfill is the least favoured option
from the perspective of the environment and efficient use of resources.23 Municipal solid waste
management in Malaysia is relatively poor and haphazard.24 As such, Malaysia has worked
towards improving its system of disposing municipal solid waste. Under the 8th and 9th Malaysia
Plan, the government of Malaysia is working towards developing a sustainable waste
management system.25 Recycling is still at an infant stage in Malaysia but its usage is increasing
steadily.26 By the year 2020, the Malaysian Government target is to reduce the landfill method of
disposal of waste with intermediate processing and recycling applying to the remainder, as
shown in Table 5-2.

Treatment
Recycling
Composting
Incineration
Inert landfill
Sanitary landfill
Other disposal sites
Total

2002
5.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.0
90.0
100.0

Percentage of Waste Disposed
2006
Target 2020
5.5
22.0
1.0
8.0
0.0
16.8
3.2
9.1
30.9
44.1
49.4
0.0
100.0
100.0

Table 5-2: Methods of Waste Disposal in Malaysia
(Source: Periathamby, 2009)27
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Malaysia is also importing technologies from Japan and some European countries for improving
its waste management system.28 Plans have been undertaken to dispose of municipal solid waste
by incineration as research findings show that incineration would give high returns on energy
with minimal adverse impacts on the environment.29

Malaysia has also put forward the Solid Waste and Public Cleansing Management Act 2007
(Solid Waste Act) and the Solid Waste and Public Cleansing Management Corporation Act 2007
which are expected to bring considerable positive changes in waste management in Peninsular
Malaysia.30 Part X of the Solid Waste Act 2007 promotes the 3Rs (reduce, reuse and recycle) and
this will be one of the bases of the future development of municipal solid waste management in
Malaysia.31 The Solid Waste and Public Cleansing Management Corporation Act 2007 which
came into force on 1 June 2008 established a body that deals specifically with matters of solid
waste management and public cleansing.32 To complement the Solid Waste and Public Cleansing
Management Corporation Act 2007, the Solid Waste Act 2007 was initially scheduled to come
into force on 30 April 2011.33 However, due to technical issues, the implementation of the Solid
Waste Act 2007 was postponed to a later date to be announced by the Malaysian Government.34
28
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29

Sivapalan Kathirvale et al, ‘Energy Potential From Municipal Solid Waste in Malaysia’ (2003) 29 Renewable
Energy, 565-566. The Malaysian government did make plans to construct an incinerator plant in Broga, but due to
overwhelming cost of construction, the plan was called off in 2007. See The Star,
DPM: Broga Incinerator Project Stopped Because it Was Too Expensive (2007) The Star
<http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/7/7/nation/20070707141216&sec=nation>.
30

Agamuthu Periathamby, Fauziah Shahul Hamid and Kahlil Khidzir, ‘Evolution of Solid Waste Management in
Malaysia: Impacts and Implications of the Solid Waste Bill 2007’ (2009) 11 Journal of Material Cycles and Waste
Management, 98.
31
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Postponed

(2011)

Bernama.com

5.2.1.2

Land-based Sources of Pollution in Indonesia’s Strait of Malacca Provinces

On the opposite side of the Strait of Malacca, Sumatra’s east coast land use and development is
generally influenced by agricultural activities with urban and industrial centres located in the
main cities of Banda Aceh, Medan and Dumai.35 About 75 per cent of Indonesian cities with
populations over 100,000 are coastal towns, including those along the length of the Strait of
Malacca.36 In 2007, it was estimated that the population of Indonesian provinces facing the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore was around 12,780,308.37 This high population concentration
may increase land-based sources of pollution in that Indonesian region.

Rivers in Indonesia are also plagued with problems of pollution that are mainly caused by the
dumping of untreated liquid industrial waste and municipal solid waste, particularly in
Indonesia’s highly industrialised areas such as the Jakarta Bay region in Western Java and the
Medan region in Northern Sumatra.38 Two of the most polluted rivers in Sumatra are the Asahan
and Deli Rivers, both located in North Sumatra.39 These rivers run through major industrial
areas, and discharges from factories and industrial plants have degraded the water quality of
these rivers40 to the extent that their water is no longer fit for domestic consumption. 41 Pollution

35
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36

Global Environment Facility/United Nations Development Programme/International Maritime Organization,
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Environmental Profile (GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional Programme for the Prevention and Management of Marine
Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 1997), 139.
37

See Table 2-2 of Chapter 2 of this Thesis.
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of the Asahan River has also compromised the fishing industry along this river.42 The Riau
Province in Sumatra has been exploited for its oil resources and as a result, heavy metals have
been found in sediment samples of the Pakning River in Bengkalis.43
On average, an Indonesian generates 0.76 kg of municipal solid waste daily. 44 Hence, with a
population of almost 250 million people, Indonesia would produce 187,366 tonnes of municipal
solid waste each day.45 Waste from traditional markets in Indonesia constitutes the second largest
stream of municipal solid waste, coming second to household waste.46 Overall, the system of
disposal of municipal solid waste in Indonesia is not integrated,47 with the management of
municipal solid waste in cities outside the island of Java less controlled and monitored due to the
shortage of waste disposal infrastructure and facilities.48 Table 5-3 illustrates the amount of
waste generated and collected in major cities in Indonesia.
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City
Jakarta
Surabaya
Bandung
Medan
Semarang
Makassar
Padang
Yogyakarta
Total

Waste Generated
(tonnes/day)
5,802
1,689
1,757
1,384
961
872
709
399
13,676

Waste Collected
(tonnes/day)
5,228
1,556
1,596
1,205
844
918
655
372
12,378

Table 5-3: Waste generated and collected in major Indonesian cities in 2006
(Source: Chaerul, Tanaka and Shekdar, 2007)49
Currently, like Malaysia, Indonesia is still developing its municipal solid waste management
system. Usually, the collected municipal solid waste would be disposed of by way of landfilling,
composting or through on-site burning. Its landfill sites are not entirely well-managed.50
The case of the city of Batam illustrates Indonesia’s problems with land-based sources of
pollution.51 Batam is situated at the crossroads of international trade and is considered a major
centre of economic development in Indonesia’s Strait of Singapore region. 52 Over the years,
Batam has experienced a considerable increase in investment across all sectors, particularly in
commerce, industry, tourism, and real estate as a consequence of its proximity to Singapore.53
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This has resulted in negative impacts on its marine environment and resources which eventually
have led to the increase of domestic and industrial wastes, and physical destruction of coastal
habitats.54 The major land-based pollution problem in coastal waters adjacent to Batam City is
contamination from heavy metals and nutrients.55 Batam also has problems with municipal solid
waste management; more often than not, municipal solid waste from markets and the settlements
in Batam are dumped in temporary sites prior to composting, burial or, burning. 56

Nevertheless, the government of Indonesia has attempted to improve the municipal solid waste
management system by passing regulations on waste management, waste minimisation and
pollution prevention,57 cleaner production, as well as increased production efficiency to
encourage more environmentally-friendly practices in daily business and industrial activities.58

5.2.1.3

Land-based Source of Pollution in Singapore

Over the last three to four decades, Singapore has been transformed from a relatively rural
community into a highly urbanised community and an industrialised State.59 The population of
Singapore has grown rapidly over the years, increasing from 1,886,900 in 1965 to 4,987,600 in
2009.60 This has led to a rising trend in waste output.61 Singapore produces a considerable
54
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amount of waste which can be categorised into three groups: domestic and trade refuse,
industrial refuse and institutional refuse.62 The first category refers to waste discharges from
domestic activities like households, markets and food centres.63 The second comes from
industries, while the third category relates to discharges from government institutions such as
hospitals, schools and public parks.64 Due to its small geographical size, Singapore cannot afford
to dispose of the majority of its waste through the conventional method of landfilling. 65 Hence,
the National Environment Agency has adopted strategies to sustainably manage the growth in
municipal solid waste generation.66

The management of municipal solid waste in Singapore is governed by the Environmental
Pollution Control Act that came into force in May 1999, and the Environmental Public Health
Act, which is a consolidation of the current legislation on the control of air, water and waste.67
Today, Singapore has in place an integrated municipal solid waste management system. Under
this system, waste that is not recycled is collected and disposed of safely, either at waste-to-
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energy plants for incinerable waste68, or at the Pulau Semakau sanitary landfill for nonincinerable waste.69

More than a quarter of the drains in Singapore run from the southern coast into the Strait of
Singapore via the Kallang, Geylang and Singapore rivers.70 The Singapore River and the Kallang
Basin catchment area, which cover a fifth of Singapore’s overall landmass and are heavily
populated, used to be seriously polluted by waste generated from squatter settlements, cottage
industries, farms, market activities and unsewered premises.71 This prompted the Singapore
government to introduce the River Clean-up Project, launched in 1977, with the objective of
restoring the Kallang Basin and Singapore River to a level at which marine life could thrive in
their waters.72 The S$200 million clean-up project took 10 years to complete and in 1987,
Singaporeans celebrated the achievement with an event called ‘Clear Rivers Commemoration’. 73
Currently, Singapore has been successful in sustainably managing its waste generation and
protecting its rivers from unwarranted pollution.

These facts demonstrate that the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is
under considerable pressure from land-based sources of pollution, particularly from pollutants
stemming from rivers in Peninsular Malaysia and from the eastern coast of Sumatra that feed
68
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into the Straits. As explained in Section 4.2.2 and Section 6.3.6 of this Thesis, the management
of vessel-source pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is subjected to the restrictions
imposed by the LOSC.74 The littoral States however, have absolute power in dealing with
matters pertaining to land-based source of pollution in their respective States.

Singapore has been successful in developing a state-of-the-art waste management system, while
Indonesia and Malaysia are still working towards that end. It is anticipated that in the future both
Malaysia and Indonesia will develop their waste management systems to ease the effect of landbased sources of pollution that the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
is facing now, although the challenges they face are substantial.

5.2.2 Vessel-Source Pollution
Shipping plays an important role in facilitating the world’s economy. 75 About 90 per cent of
global trade is transported by sea, as it provides the safest, most rapid, inexpensive and reliable
way of moving bulk cargoes from one place to another.76 With the advent of supertankers
carrying oil and other hazardous materials, fuel spills and discharge of wastes have been typical
of shipping activities, either through operational or accidental discharges.77 Operational pollution
is that which originates from the ordinary operation of a vessel.78 Operational discharges may
account for more pollution than accidental oil spills.79 Though operational discharges from bilge
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pumping, tank cleaning or deballasting of vessels while passing through coastal waters are
constant,80 accidental spills are given more attention due to their dramatic character.81

For the purpose of this Chapter, the focal point of discussion is more on accidental discharges of
oil and hazardous and noxious substances in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Conflicts are
triggered when shipping and environmental protection collides. Since it was established in 1948,
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has attempted to equitably balance the interests
of the shipping industry with protection and preservation of the marine environment through
relevant international instruments and policies. The 10 largest spills in shipping history are
summarised in Table 5-4.
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Position
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
35
-

Vessel
Atlantic Empress
ABT Summer
Castillo de Bellver
Amoco Cadiz
Haven
Odyssey
Torrey Canyon
Sea Star
Irenes Serenade
Urquiola
Tadotsu
Exxon Valdez
Nagasaki Spirit

Year
1979
1991
1983
1978
1991
1988
1967
1972
1980
1976
1978
1989
1992

Location
Off Tobago, West Indies
700 nautical miles off Angola
Off Saldanha Bay, South Africa
Off Brittany, France
Genoa, Italy
700 nautical miles off Nova Scotia, Canada
Scilly Isles, UK
Gulf of Oman
Navarino Bay, Greece
La Coruna, Spain
Dumai, Strait of Malacca
Prince William Sound, Alaska
Strait of Malacca

Spill Size (tonnes)
287,000
260,000
252,000
223,000
144,000
132,000
119,000
115,000
100,000
100,000
43,000
37,000
12,000

Table 5-4: List of the Largest Spills in Maritime History82
(Source: ITOPF83 and AEI)84
Table 5-4 shows that the most damaging oil spill incidents in the Strait of Malacca were not
comparable to those that have taken place elsewhere. However, it is significant that the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are semi-enclosed seas which are constricted, and therefore any oil spill
incidents would be disastrous to not only the marine environment of the Straits, but also the
livelihood of the coastal population as well as the safe navigation of transiting vessels.

There is also a higher risk of maritime accidents involving accidental spills of oil and other
hazardous substances occurring in difficult, constricted and busy shipping lanes such as the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore,85 as noted by Kamaruzaman:

Traffic in many parts of the Strait can best be described as
congested. With congestion, the Strait has become prone to
accidents.86
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Note: Incidents in bold represent oil spill incidents in the Strait of Malacca.
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Maritime accidents involving oil spills began to occur in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as
early as the 1920s.87 The existence of a number of navigational hazards in the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore has made navigation difficult through the Straits. These difficulties may result in
maritime accidents, which may then compromise the well-being of the marine environment of
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. For this reason it became critical to identify the types of
navigational hazards that posed threats to mariners in the Straits.

5.2.2.1

Navigational Hazards in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

On average, the region around the Straits of Malacca and Singapore experiences high humidity
and considerable rainfall, and the wind velocity is relatively light. 88 Given that the Straits and
their environs are located in a tropical zone, these areas are subject to torrential rain and squalls
almost every day.89 A system of squalls originating from the Indian Ocean, described as the
Sumatras, brings thunderstorms, heavy rain and winds in the pre-dawn and early mornings in the
Strait of Malacca region.90

The water currents at the northern entrance to the Strait of Malacca from where it meets the
Andaman Sea are strong. In the north, the Andaman Sea waters enter the Strait from the bottom.
Meanwhile in the south, the Strait of Malacca receives currents from the South China Sea, Johor
Strait and Rupat Strait. The movement of currents in the southern part of the Strait of Malacca is
unstable compared to the northern segment of the waterway as the southern end of the Strait is
narrower and more confined.91 The currents in this part of the Strait form large sand waves, sand
banks and shallow shoals along the waterway.92
87

Amriah Buang, ‘Selat Melaka 1992-2006: Iktibar Beberapa Aspek Permasalahan Dalam Mengurus Kesejahteraan
Sumber Sekitaran Serantau’ (2006) Malaysian Journal of Society and Space, 58-71.
88

H.M. Ibrahim, Hairil Anuar Husin and Deneswari Sivaguru, ‘Physical, Ecological and Demographic
Characteristics’ in H.M. Ibrahim and Hairil Anuar Husin (eds), Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s
Perspective (Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008), 40.
89

Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008), 7.

90

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Ensuring Safe Navigation’ (2011) (131/2011)
RSIS Commentaries, 1-2.
91

Ibid.

92

Ibid.

118

These characteristics can impact adversely on smooth navigation. During squalls, visibility can
decrease considerably and these conditions can make it difficult for mariners to navigate their
vessels through the Straits. In addition, the existence of numerous shoals and sand banks in the
Straits are also dangerous for seafarers.93 Other navigational hazards in the Straits can take at
least one of four forms. These include:

(a)

Shipwrecks that may impede navigation;94

(b)

Small islands, isles and shoals in the south-eastern exit to the Strait of Singapore;95

(c)

Unreliable aids to navigation equipment, especially in the waters of Indonesia.96

(d)

The high navigational traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore coupled with the
narrowness of the Straits;97 the narrowest breadth in the Strait of Singapore is off the
southern tip of Singapore Island at Phillips Channel, where the breadth is only about
1.956 nautical miles.98

The most difficult stretch for navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is in the areas
spanned by the traffic separation scheme: between One Fathom Bank off Port Klang in the west
and Horsburgh Lighthouse in the east.99 The TSS extends to about 250 nautical miles and has
about six chokepoints with an average depth of about 23.35 metres.100 The chokepoints are One
93

Ibid.

94

As of 2010, there are 11 identified ship wrecks along the TSS area of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. See
Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG), ‘3rd Co-operation Forum under the Co-operative Mechanism on the
Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (CF 3/REPORT, 2010),
5.
95

Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008), 6-7.

96

Ibid.

97

The Strait of Malacca is relatively shallow waterway with depth of only 21.8 meters, particularly at its southern
end where it subsequently joins the Strait of Singapore. See Zubir Abdul Karim, ‘The Strategic Significance of the
Straits of Malacca’ (2007) (172) Australian Defence Force Journal, 33-34.
98

Parry Oei, ‘Review of Recent Significant Technologies and Initiatives Implemented to Enhance Navigational
Safety and Protect the Marine Environment in the Straits of Singapore and Malacca’ in Andrew Forbes (ed), The
Strategic Importance of Seaborne Trade and Shipping (Sea Power Centre, RAAF Fairbairn, 2003), 141.
99

Maritime Information Centre, Straits Traffic Sustainable for Next 15 to 20 Years (2009) Maritime Information
Centre
<http://www.micportal.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2585%3Astraits-trafficsustainable-for-next-15-to-20-years&Itemid=66>.
100

US Energy Information Administration, Malacca: World Oil Transit Chokepoints (2011) US Energy Information
Administration <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html>.

119

Fathom Bank, the deepwater route diversion at Pulau Rupat and the western entrance to the Strait
of Singapore in the Strait of Malacca and Buffalo Rock, Phillips Channel as well as Batu
Berhanti in the Strait of Singapore, as shown in Map 5-1:

Map 5-1: Critical areas for navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
(Source: MIMA)101
Despite continuous dredging, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have continued to become
shallow because of siltation, eventually making navigation more difficult.102 Haze caused by
forest and bush fires in Sumatra has also compromised safe navigation through these waterways
and this remains a threat to mariners.103 To date, the haze crisis in 1997 was the worst to hit
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore; to the extent that the Port Klang Authority considered
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closing night shipping in South Port as visibility fell below 0.5 nautical miles. 104 In 2005, the
haze problem forced Malaysia to declare a state of emergency in the coastal cities of Port Klang
and Kuala Selangor, both located on the shores of the Strait of Malacca.105 Later in July 2009,
the haze, which was caused by forest and plantation fires after a long drought season, had
blanketed the airspace of the Riau province of Sumatra, affecting shipping near the Port of
Dumai, where visibility was down to less than 0.2 nautical miles.106 In 2010, hazy conditions
caused by illegal forest clearing in Sumatra has reduced visibility down to less than 2 nautical
miles, forcing Malaysia to issue a hazard warning for ships sailing in the Strait of Malacca.107
With low visibility, the risks of maritime collision increase. Fortunately for the littoral States,
maritime accidents have yet to take place in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore due to poor
visibility caused by hazy conditions.108

There are areas in the Straits, particularly in the Strait of Johor and the Strait of Singapore, which
are off-limits for vessels as they have been designated as Live Firing Areas by the Singapore
Armed Forces. These areas include three islets in the Strait of Singapore: Pulau Sudong, Pulau
Pawai and Pulau Senang.109 The other Live Firing Area in Singapore is Sarimbun, which is
located along the Strait of Johor.110 However, these Live Firing Areas are generally outside the
critical shipping ways within the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and do not normally obstruct
the smooth movements of ships transiting the Straits.
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Human error is also a form of navigational hazard that must be considered in assessing risks to
the marine environment of the Straits.111 The promotion of regulations relating safety and good
seamanship through the IMO is also important in avoiding vessel groundings and collisions in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.112

Other navigational hazards in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore include the cross traffic by
small vessels in the Straits, piracy and sea robbery attacks as well as the proposed plan to build a
bridge across the Strait of Malacca.113 These hazards may make navigation through the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore more challenging and thus increase the likelihood of the occurrence of
maritime accidents that may result in pollution of the marine environment of the Straits.

5.2.2.1.1

The Cross Traffic or Coastal Traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

The issue of cross traffic or coastal traffic shipping in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has
been controversial. It was one of the matters discussed during the International Symposium on
Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
convened by the Nippon Foundation in 2008.114 Cross traffic shipping may pose hazards to the
smooth and safe navigation of vessels transiting through the Straits.115 Most cross traffic ships
are vessels less than 300 Gross Register Tonnage (GRT), hence it is not compulsory for these
ships to follow the safety navigation rules enforced in these waterways.116
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Cross traffic in the Strait of Malacca includes barter trade vessels, fishing boats and passenger
ferries.117 A tightly-knit network of trade relations, both formal and informal, spans the
waterway.118 Barter trade activities in the Strait refer to the trade activities between the people
who are living on opposite shores of the Strait of Malacca.119 Most of these cross traffic vessels
call at the Malaysian ports of Port Dickson, Malacca, Muar and Kukup, all located at the
southern end of the Strait of Malacca.120 These ports have connections with various Indonesian
ports on the opposite shore, including Pelabuhan Belawan, Tanjung Balai, Dumai, Bengkalis,
Karimun, Batam and Tanjung Pinang. Recent numbers show that the regional cross-strait traffic
is decreasing. Between the years 2004–2009, barter traffic in the Strait of Malacca has decreased,
as shown in Table 5-5.

Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total

Approximate Number of Vessels
25,000
26,000
25,000
27,000
22,000
10,000
135,000

Table 5-5: Approximate Numbers of Barter Traffic Vessels in the Strait of Malacca, 2004–2009
(Source: MIMA)121
Even though the barter traffic density in the Strait of Malacca has decreased, the volume of
transiting traffic will still increase over the next few years.122 Therefore, the safety of transiting
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ships in the Strait of Malacca could be compromised by the existence of cross-strait traffic, as
most of the cross-strait traffic routes overlap with the TSS in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.123 High risk areas include Undan Zone, Segenting Zone and Piai Zone, all of which
are located at the southern portion of the Strait of Malacca.124 Map 5-2 shows the cross traffic
movements in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Map 5-2: Cross Traffic Movements in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
(Source: Redrawn after Evers & Gerke, 2008)125
To date, there have never been any rules established in regulating cross-strait traffic, which, as
stated earlier, is exempted from the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’s mandatory ship reporting
system, the STRAITREP rule. To avoid future accidents, it would assist if the three littoral States
of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia could devise solutions to this problem by designating
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proper lanes for cross-strait traffic in these busy waterways. 126 Even though efforts may have
been made to do this, they have never been realised in full because trilateral agreement has been
difficult to achieve. Singapore has objected to the idea of establishing a cross traffic route near
its waters as this could impede the navigation of through traffic.127 Nevertheless, this issue
should be considered in evaluating the shipping risks in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. A
proper designation of traffic lanes could be established, at least on the Malaysian and Indonesian
sides of the Strait of Malacca, to reduce the risk of accidents in this important shipping lane. In
enhancing cross traffic safety of navigation, these suggestions have been made inter alia:

(a)

To improve communications between barter boats and transiting vessels128

(b)

To improve the monitoring, surveillance, and the visibility of barter boats by equipping
them with AIS type-B transponders which would allow them to be tracked by the Vessel
Traffic Management System129

(c)

Enhancing the sea-worthiness of cross-strait vessels130

(d)

The introduction of compulsory insurance for cross-strait boats131

Even though there has never been a major maritime disaster involving a collision between crossstrait traffic and transiting traffic, cross-strait traffic is a hazard that must be considered in
improving safety for the navigation of vessels transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
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5.2.2.1.2

The Threats of Piracy and Sea Robbery on the Safety of Navigation in the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore

Due to the busy nature of the Straits and ships carrying a variety of valuable commodities, some
of which are valued up to US $136 billion annually, namely electric and electronic goods, 132 and
the presence of shallow reefs and innumerable small islands that compel ships to transit at
greatly reduced speed, pirate attacks on merchant ships along the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore have been common in the past.133 Piracy is defined in the LOSC as:

Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a
private ship or a private aircraft, and directed on the high seas,
against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on
board such ships or aircraft.134
Since most parts of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have been incorporated as territorial
Straits of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, any attacks on ships sailing the Straits, with the
exception of the northern part of the Strait of Malacca that has a High Seas/EEZ Corridor, would
not be deemed as acts of piracy under the LOSC definition. Pirate attacks in the Straits would
nevertheless be regarded as sea robberies.

In 2004, there were a total of 38 attacks in the Strait; with approximately 50,000 ships sailing the
Strait that year, the probability of an attack was 0.07 per cent.135 This situation prompted the
Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd’s Market Association to declare the Strait of Malacca as a
war risk area beginning in July 2005; a declaration that put the Strait on a par with other wellknown war zones such as the waters off the war-stricken countries of Somalia, Iraq and
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Lebanon.136 These attacks posed hazards to the safety of navigation of vessels as well as a threat
to the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Reports by the International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) revealed that the ships that were attacked were usually left without
anyone in command. 137 This increased the possibility of the ship running aground or colliding
with other vessels, especially in the constricted areas of the Straits.138

If a fully laden oil tanker were to be sunk in these circumstances, the resultant environmental
consequences to the coastal communities and the fishing industries would be devastating.139
Passage of ships through the Straits would also be interrupted if there was a closure of the Strait
as a result of an incident of this type.140 This was clearly demonstrated in the 1992 collision
between the Nagasaki Spirit and the Oceans Blessings. The Nagasaki Spirit was carrying oil and
sailing eastbound via the Strait of Malacca when it was boarded by pirates.141 The vessel was
looted and the crew was thrown overboard.142 The Oceans Blessings met with the same fate,
where some of its crew was locked up in a hold.143 This left both vessels not under control and
ultimately they collided and spilled a considerable amount of crude oil into the waters of the
Strait of Malacca.144

Realising the adverse effects these attacks may have caused to the marine environment and the
traffic flow of transiting ships, the three littoral States of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have
136
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introduced a number of collaborative measures such as the Tripartite Technical Expert Group
(TTEG), Trilateral Coordinated Patrols Malacca Straits (MALSINDO), Eyes in the Sky (EIS)
and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)145 to combat piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits.146 These joint
measures to suppress piracy and sea robberies by the Singaporean, Malaysian and Indonesian
authorities, with some cooperation from Thailand, have significantly improved security and
reduced the risks to the marine environment in the Straits.147
From 2004, the local armed forces organised coordinated sea patrols.148 Each party polices its
own territorial waters, but they correspond with one another on possible pirate activity, and this
has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the patrols. 149 In 2005, aerial surveillance flights were
conducted to monitor the Strait of Malacca for pirates. The flights are undertaken by crews with
nationals from different States so information can be more effectively shared.150 As a result,
there was a dip in pirate attacks from 2005, and by 2006 the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
were removed from the war-risk zone list by the JWC of Lloyd’s Market Association.151 Table 56 shows the number of piracy/sea robbery incidents in the waters of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore between the years 2000 and 2008.
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Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total

Attacks
24
23
30
46
19
16
11
12
181

Table 5-6: Piracy/ Sea Robbery in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Actual and Attempted
Attacks (Source: IMB)152
Fortunately for the littoral States and the shipping community, a maritime terrorism incident has
yet to take place in the waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. However, with the quite
recent 2005 and 2009 Bali153 and Jakarta154 bombing incidents, there is still a risk that such an
incident could happen in the Straits. Any occurrence of piracy or sea robbery attacks or acts of
terrorism in the Straits would undoubtedly result in a traffic hold-up for transiting ships.155 Such
an incident may also cause oil or chemical spills to take place and ultimately could compromise
the well-being of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.156 Indeed,
piracy/sea-robbery activities are still happening in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.157
Consequently, the most effective remedy is for the littoral States to work collaboratively to
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suppress these crimes as they pose hazards not only to the security of the waterways, but also to
the safety of transiting vessels and the marine environment of the Straits.

5.2.2.1.3

The Proposed Strait of Malacca Bridge

Recently, a plan was proposed by the Straits of Malacca Partners Sdn. Bhd. (SOMP) to build a
bridge to link the Indonesian port city of Dumai in the Sumatran province of Riau with the
Malaysian city of Malacca.158 The groundwork for the project started in 2006 and studies show
that the bridge project is technically feasible.159 If the project is carried out, the bridge has been
estimated to cost US $12.5 billion. The Import-Export Bank of China has agreed to finance 85
per cent of the total cost of the bridge project.160

This proposed 127.92 km long bridge is said to be capable of fostering new economic
opportunities between the two countries, particularly in stimulating trade and the tourism
industry by enhancing ASEAN’s connectivity when ready. 161 Malaysia will undertake to build
48.68km of the bridge while Indonesia will construct the remaining 79.24km.162
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Map 5-3: The Proposed Strait of Malacca Bridge Project
(Source: Strait of Malacca Partners Sdn. Bhd.)
However, the Indonesian government has announced that they would give priority to the
construction of Strait of Sunda Bridge over the Strait of Malacca Bridge. 163 The Indonesian
government intends to first integrate Java-Sumatra as a centre of economic development with the
Sunda Strait Bridge project.164 The proposed 127.92 km Strait of Malacca Bridge is likely to
resemble the Oresund Bridge that connects the Danish capital of Copenhagen in Denmark and
Malmo in Sweden.165 The 16 km combined bridge and tunnel stands over the Oresund Sound and
connects both nations by road and rail, and was officially opened to public in June 2000.166
When the construction of the bridge over Oresund Sound was proposed, it received adverse
criticism from the shipping community as it was thought that it would hamper shipping flow in
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the Oresund Sound. As a result, Germany submitted a proposal to the IMO to suspend the
construction of the bridge.167 As a compromise, Sweden suggested that the bridge should be
designed in two features; half as a bridge and half as a tunnel.168 This compromise was
advocated to allow larger ships to navigate across the Oresund Sound. It resulted in an increase
of the construction expenditure of the bridge to three times more than the cost that had been
budgeted for in the original plan.169 Currently the Oresund Bridge carries 6 million vehicles per
year, with the railway link transporting 8 million people annually across the Oresund Sound. 170
Besides the Oresund Bridge, the proposed Strait of Malacca Bridge will also resemble the
proposed 18 km Fehmarn Belt Bridge that will connect Germany and Denmark and cut journey
times between Copenhagen and Hamburg.171 This project, which has received opposition from
environmentalists and local authorities in Germany who consider it to be unnecessary, is
expected to be completed in 2018.172

Given the busy nature of the Strait of Malacca, it is likely that similar impacts to those seen
during the Oresund Bridge experience would occur if the Strait of Malacca Bridge plan were to
be implemented, and it is likely that any proposed modifications to the plan would also
substantially increase the price of the construction of the bridge.173

It is anticipated that such a huge project would not only adversely affect the coastal ecosystems
on both shores of the bridge; it would also affect the Strait as a whole, from hydrological,
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environmental and economic perspectives.174 In addition, the construction would have the effect
of closing down a large portion of the TSS areas of the Strait of Malacca, which would result in
potential navigational hazards for ships and thus hamper traffic flow through the waterway. 175
The construction and presence of the bridge with its many concrete pillars would not only reduce
the speed of vessels sailing through the Strait but would also cause difficulty for large container
vessels and oil tankers navigating through this area.176 Slower movement of shipping traffic
would cause congestion in the Strait and this may eventually lead to maritime accidents.177 Spills
of oil, chemical and noxious substances from such accidents could jeopardise the sensitive
marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. It would also mean that transits by
shipping traffic would take longer, resulting in higher shipping costs and increases in prices for
products sold in markets worldwide.178

Upon completion, the bridge would connect the Malay Peninsula with the Indonesian island of
Sumatra. The Malay Peninsula is located on a stable continent which is outside the Pacific Ring
of Fire.179 Sumatra, however, is located within the Pacific Ring of Fire, an area with major
seismic activities, and is exposed to the threat of earthquakes and tsunamis. 180 The 2004 tsunami
incident that ravaged Aceh manifestly demonstrated that the region is exposed to these natural
174
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calamities.181 Should the bridge take a direct hit from a tremor or a tsunami, it is likely to be
badly damaged.182 The economies of both Malaysia and Indonesia would suffer should the
bridge collapse entirely or in part.183 Shipping transits in the Strait would be hampered, with the
debris from the shattered bridge being dispersed through the Strait, and economic activities such
as fisheries and tourism would be heavily impacted.184 However, the proponent of the project,
the Strait of Malacca Partners Sdn. Bhd. contends that the site of the bridge is located on a
Eurasian plate outside any fault line.185 Though there is an unfavourable seismic zone
approximately 100 km away from the project site, there has been no known record of active or
frequent seismic activities in the last ten thousand years.186

Taking these considerations into account, this proposed bridge connection between Malacca and
Dumai may be seen as a potential major navigational hazard for international shipping traffic
transiting the Strait of Malacca by raising the likelihood of maritime accidents and marine
pollution.

5.2.2.2

Effects of Vessel-Source Marine Pollution

Shipping is an inherently risky activity in which maritime accidents or casualties are common.187
Thirty-nine accidents were reported in the TSS area within the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
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in the 10-year period from 2000–2010.188 These accidents can be categorised as shown in Table
5-7.

Types of Casualty
Collision
Sinking
Grounding
Fire
Total

Percentage
59
9
10
22
100

Table 5-7: Casualty Breakdown in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (2000–2010)
(Source: Marine Department of Malaysia)189
The major oil and hazardous and noxious substance spills in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore are shown in the Table 5-8.

Year

Vessel Name

Type of Oil and
Chemicals

Quantity of
Spillage
(tonnes)

1975

Showa Maru

Crude

4,000

1976

Diego Silang

Crude

5,500

1978

Tadotsu

Crude

43,000

1987

MV Stolt ADV

Crude

2,000

1992

Nagasaki Spirit and Oceans
Blessings

Crude

12,000

1997

Evoikos and Orapin Global

Crude

29,000

2000

Natuna Sea

Crude

7,000

2001

Indah Lestari
MV Waily and MT Bunga
Kelana 3

Phenol

630

2010

Light Crude Oil

2,000

Location and Cause
Singapore
Strait/Grounding
Malacca Strait/Collision
Malacca Strait
(Dumai)/Unknown
Singapore
Strait/Grounding
Malacca Strait/Collision
Singapore
Strait/Collision
Singapore
Strait/Grounding
Johor Strait/Sinking
Singapore
Strait/Collision

Table 5-8: Selected Oil and Chemical Spill Incidents
(Source: Basiron & Hooi)190
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Oil spill incidents inevitably entail adverse impacts on the marine environment. 191 They may
deteriorate the well-being of marine and coastal ecosystems through destruction of marine
species and their natural habitats.192 An oil slick has devastating effects on everything that it
touches, either in the open sea or in the coastal areas.193

In 1993, an oil spill caused by a collision between the Singapore-registered oil tanker, Slimy, and
a liquefied petroleum and gas carrier, Explode, took place in the narrow waterway near
Singapore’s resort island of Sentosa in the Strait of Singapore.194 About 5,000 tonnes of oil,
valued at US $7.5 million, was discharged from Slimy and it also spilled all of its bunker oil into
the sea.195 The marine ecosystem around Sentosa Island was severely affected by the oil spill and
tourism operators suffered losses estimated at US $1.5 million.196

The harmful effects of an accidental oil spill are also illustrated by the 1997 MT Evoikos and
MT Orapin Global collision in the Strait of Singapore. At that time, this was the biggest oil spill
ever to have taken place in the waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 197 The Cypriot
tanker Evoikos ran over a Thai tanker Orapin Global while navigating through the Strait of
Singapore on 15 October 1997.198 The Evoikos, which was transporting approximately 130,000
tonnes of heavy fuel oil, sustained damage to its three cargo tanks spilling an estimated 29,000
tonnes of heavy fuel oil into the sea.199 The spill affected about a dozen of the southern islands
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and islets off Singapore.200 Subsequently, by 19 October 1997, the oil slicks drifted into the
Malaysian and Indonesian waters of the Strait of Malacca in a north-westerly direction.201 On 23
December 1997, oil came ashore in places along the 40 km length of the Selangor coastline,
including several short sandy beaches, a 1 kilometre stretch of rocks, a concrete breakwater and
two separate areas of mangroves.202 This oil slick posed hazards to whole of the marine
environment of the Strait, including the mangrove swamps and jungles and fish and prawn farms
in coastal areas.203 Oil pollution in the sea may pollute the mangrove swamps which form
valuable breeding and nursery grounds for fish and prawns, which would then considerably
affect the well-being of the fishing industry that thrives along the coastal area bordering the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore.204 This spill also disrupted the tourism industries on the southwestern coast of the state of Johor.205

The costs of cleaning up of these major pollution incidents are very high. The Evoikos oil spill
clean-up took three weeks at a cost of US $7,500,000 while the 1976 Diego Silang oil spill
clean-up cost US $1,086,421.206 The 1993 Nagasaki Spirit oil spill incident incurred a clean-up
expenditure amounting to US $1,506,160.207 These costs do not take into consideration
environmental damage in terms of loss of critical habitat for coastal and marine animals and
living resources, as well as the economic losses suffered by fishermen tourism operators.208
200
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Port Dickson in Malaysia is a good example to illustrate this scenario. Port Dickson is a
renowned holiday beach retreat facing the Strait of Malacca. It is located only about 40 km from
international waters of the Strait of Malacca, thereby exposing it to numerous transboundary
environmental pollutants such as oil slicks and ballast water discharge from ships. 209 Research
has shown that due to the effects of heavy shipping activities and the numerous maritime
accidents that have occurred off the waters of Port Dickson, and aggravated by the existing
pressure of land-based marine pollution, the waters around Port Dickson have been contaminated
by hydrocarbons210 and sewage.211 If this pollution continues to occur, the sensitive marine
environment near Port Dickson will be subjected to long-term damage, which will then affect the
thriving tourism and fisheries activities in that area.212

Due to the increasing volume of shipping traffic, maritime accidents and casualties are still
common in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.213 One of the most recent accidents that
occurred in the Strait of Malacca involved a collision between a Liberian registered tanker, MT
Formosa Product Brick, and an Isle of Man-registered tanker, MV Ostende Max, on 19 August
2009 in waters off Port Dickson, Malaysia.214 Fortunately, after extensive monitoring work, the
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Bernama.com

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) confirmed that neither naphtha nor oil spills
had taken place.215

In 2010, a tanker identified as the MT Bunga Kelana 3 collided with a bulk carrier, MV Waily,
in Malaysian waters off the coast of Singapore, resulting in an oil spill.216 The Malaysianregistered tanker MT Bunga Kelana 3, which was ferrying 63,054 tonnes of light crude oil from
Bintulu to Malacca, suffered damage to one of its cargo tanks and spilled an estimated 2,000
tonnes of oil into the Strait of Singapore.217 Despite assurances by the local authorities that the
utmost efforts were being taken to contain the spill, some oil did reach the shores of Johor and
Singapore and this prompted a public outcry and claims of loss of livelihood by fishermen. 218 As
stated by Basiron:

The environmental and ecological impact of oil spills must be
considered. Besides wildlife, dirty beaches and ecosystems such as
mangroves could also be affected. While the long term effect of oil
spills on mangroves is yet to be ascertained, the sight of mangrove
roots covered in oil is reason for concern. A spill in ecosystems
such as coral reefs could be disastrous to the fishing and tourism
industry not to mention the livelihood of coastal communities.219
These biological assets are suffering from on-going environmental pressure as the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore become busier each year with increasing maritime traffic.220 Vesselsource pollution may also affect the development of coral reefs.221 This is evidenced by the fact
that the coral reef population development in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was recorded
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as amongst the lowest in this region.222 In comparison to the coral development in South China
Sea, the coral reefs in the Strait of Malacca are less diverse, which has been attributed to higher
stress conditions due to fishing, coral mining and heavy shipping activities.223
The well-being of mangrove ecosystems is also threatened due to constant soil erosion. 224 The
total mangrove areas bordering the Strait of Malacca on both shores is 498,109 hectares; 111,409
on the Malaysian side and 386,100 on the Sumatran side.225 Though shipping pollution is not the
only cause of soil erosion, it has played a role in causing this unwanted phenomenon. About 29
per cent of the total Malaysian shoreline, including that bordering the Strait of Malacca, has
suffered from coastal erosion.226

The waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are also polluted by other sources, such as
land-based sources of marine pollution, marine litter and excessive coastal development
projects.227 Marine litter is also generated by ships and vessels plying the seas.228 Marine litter is
defined as objects that are discarded, disposed of or abandoned which end up in the coastal and
marine environment, including plastics, dilapidated vessels, glass, metals and rubber.229 Refuse

222

Amelia Emran, The Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Master of
Maritime Studies (Research) Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2007), 15-16. Reefs are deteriorating on the
Malaysian side of the Strait of Malacca and reefs in Singapore are severely stressed due to heavy shipping activities.
See Chua Thia-Eng et al, ‘The Malacca Straits’ (2000) 41 Marine Pollution Bulletin, 163-164.
223

F.M. Yusoff, M. Shariff and N Gopinath, ‘Diversity of Malaysian Aquatic Ecosystems and Resources’ (2006)
9(2) Aquatic Ecosystem Health & Management, 121-122; Angela Dikou and Robert van Woesik, ‘Survival Under
Chronic Stress From Sediment Load: Spatial Patterns of Hard Coral Communities in the Southern Islands of
Singapore’ (2006) 52 Marine Pollution Bulletin, 8-9.
224

Mohd Nizam Basiron, ‘Sea-Based Sources of Marine Pollution’ in H.M. Ibrahim and Hairil Anuar Husin (eds),
Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective (2008), 120-123.
225

Mohd Nizam Basiron and Tan Kim Hooi, ‘The Environmental Impact of Increased Vessel Traffic in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore’ (2007) 14(1) MIMA Bulletin, 16.
226

Keizrul Abdullah, Tan King Seng and Nor Hisham Mohd Ghazali, ‘Protecting Coastal and Marine Tourism
Assets’ (2007) 14(3) MIMA Bulletin, 42.
227

BERNAMA, Usaha Peringkat Negara Diperlukan Atasi Masalah Ekosistem di Selat Melaka (2006) BERNAMA
<http://web10.bernama.com/maritime/news.php?id=211775&lang=my>.
228

International Maritime Organization (IMO), Prevention
<http://www.imo.org/environment/mainframe.asp?topic_id=231>.
229

of

Pollution

by

Oil

(2002)

IMO

Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA), Marine Litter Management in Malaysia (2009)
COBSEA <http://www.cobsea.org/documents/Meeting_Documents/Marine%20Litter/Annex%2011_Malaysia.pdf>.

140

from vessels can be just as lethal to marine life as oil or chemicals.230 The greatest threat to
marine animals comes from plastic, which is not biodegradable and can float in the oceans for
years.231 Fish and marine mammals may in some cases consume plastics which they mistake for
food, and they can also become trapped and entangled in plastic ropes, nets, bags and other
items.232 Other types of pollutants may be in the form of ballast water exchange 233 and from the
use of anti-fouling paints on ships’ hulls.234

5.3

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has pointed out that pollution issues are endemic in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. These waterways are polluted by substances that originate not only from land-based
230

International Maritime Organization (IMO), Prevention
<http://www.imo.org/environment/mainframe.asp?topic_id=231>.
231

Ibid.

232

Ibid.

of

Pollution

by

Oil

(2002)

IMO

233

To maintain stability and to keep stress loads of the ship within acceptable limits, ballast water is used for
shipping activities. Globally, it is estimated that 3.7 billion tonnes of ballast water are transferred each year. See I.
Eames et al, ‘Continous Flushing of Contaminants from Ballast Water Tanks’ (2008) 56 Marine Pollution Bulletin,
250. Ballast water exchange could injure the marine environment through the introduction of harmful invasive
species. These invasive species may disrupt the food chain, fouling beaches and damaging coastal infrastructures.
Realising the threats of the invasive species that may be present in ballast water, the IMO has adopted the
International Convention for the Control and Management of Ship’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM) on 13
February 2004. Under the Convention, ships are required to implement a Ballast Water and Sediments Management
Plan and to carry out ballast water management procedures based on the standards provided by the BWM. It has yet
to come into force and will only do so 12 months after ratification by 30 States that represents 35 per cent of world
merchant shipping tonnage. See International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Convention for the
Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM) (2010) IMO
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Control-andManagement-of-Ships%27-Ballast-Water-and-Sediments-(BWM).aspx>.
234

The IMO has adopted the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships
(AFS) on 5 October 2001 and it entered into force on 17 September 2008. The AFS proscribes the use of harmful
organotins in anti-fouling paints used on ships and undertakes to prohibit the potential future use of other harmful
substances in ships’ anti-fouling systems. State-parties to the AFS are required to prohibit and/or restrict the
application of anti-fouling systems which are harmful on ships flying their flag and ships that operate under their
authority as well as on all ships that call at any of the State-parties’ ports. As at 17 September 2007, the AFS has
been ratified by 25 States, representing 38.11 per cent of world’s merchant shipping tonnage. See International
Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Adoption of the Final Act of the Conference and Any Instruments,
Recommendations and Resolutions Resulting From the Work of the Conference: Final Act of the International
Conference on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems for Ships, 2001 (AFS/CONF/25)’ (IMO, 2001);
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Anti-Fouling Systems: International Convention on the Control of
Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships (2005 edition) (IMO, 2005), 1-12; International Maritime Organization
(IMO), International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships (2010) IMO
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-the-Control-ofHarmful-Anti-fouling-Systems-on-Ships-(AFS).aspx>.

141

human activities, but also vessel-based sources of marine pollution. Considering the high density
of the coastal populations in areas along the Straits, the littoral States of the Straits, particularly
Malaysia and Indonesia, should further develop their waste management systems in order to
lessen the amount of land-based waste discharged into the waters of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. Singapore on the other hand, has a well-developed waste management system that
minimises the impact of land-based pollution on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

The latter part of this Chapter has primarily discussed the issue of vessel-source pollution,
focusing more on accidental discharges. Vessel-source waste and discharges may affect the
sensitive marine environment of the Straits, especially when the pollution is substantial. It is true
that in comparison with vessel-source pollution, land-based pollutants pose more threat as over
80 per cent of marine pollution comes from land-based sources. However, as far as the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are concerned, the littoral States’ powers to regulate shipping traffic are
subjected to the limitations imposed by the LOSC under the transit passage regime. As such, this
Chapter concludes that vessel-source pollution cannot be as strictly regulated and therefore
remain as issue of concern, as does land-based sources of pollution. The subsequent Chapter
examines the international legal framework governing the control of vessel-source pollution in
straits used for international navigation regulated by the LOSC and other related IMO
conventions.
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CHAPTER 6.
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
6.1

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter is structured into five parts, including this introductory section. The second part
briefly discusses the historical development of international laws and regulations concerning
vessel-source pollution. The third part of this Chapter elaborates on Part XII of the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention (LOSC) and other related International Maritime Organization (IMO)
conventions on protection of the marine environment of straits used for international navigation.
The fourth part briefly explains the incorporation of these international regulations into the
domestic laws of the littoral States. The fifth part of this Chapter concludes by reiterating that
international law governing the control of vessel-source pollution in straits used for international
navigation has favoured shipping over the protection of the marine environment of straits.

6.2

A BRIEF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The world’s first oil tankers began to ply the seas in the late 19th century when they initially
carried kerosene for lighting.1 The invention of the motor car fuelled demand for oil and as a
result, oil transportation grew steadily in volume from the 1950s onwards. 2 By 1970, about 5
gallons of oil were transited around the world by sea for every human on Earth.3 Tanker size had
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(b) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for
International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 3(4) Asian Politics
& Policy, 501-526;
(c) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Protecting Vital Sea Lines of Communication: A Study of the Proposed
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Ocean & Coastal Management, 79-94.
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The world’s population in 1970 was about 3.6 billion. See George Gray Molina and Mark Purser, ‘Human
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grown 30-fold since their introduction in 1945.4 Global oil production has increased considerably
from 450 million metric tonnes in 1950 to 2.7 billion metric tonnes in 1996, and indeed, oil spills
incidents have risen alongside with production.5

The rapid development of the shipping industry around the world has sparked concerns over
environmental pollution caused by operational discharges from vessels. Operational discharges
pose discernible and apparent threats to the marine environment, as described by Mitchell:

...the waste oil traditionally generated during normal oil transport
has posed a more diffuse but ubiquitous threat…By the 1970s, the
intentional discharges made on thousands of tanker voyages were
putting an estimated million tonnes of oil into the oceans
annually.6
As a result, the United Kingdom (UK) government was the first to convene a conference that
initiated the negotiations that culminated in the adoption of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (OILPOL). The purpose of OILPOL was to
devise measures for the prevention and reduction of marine pollution by oil discharged from
ships.7 However, the issue of marine pollution caused by accidental discharges of oil and other
noxious chemicals was not a focus of the international community until the Torrey Canyon
tragedy took place in 1967.8
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The Torrey Canyon was the first major oil spill at sea that occurred entirely due to human error
to capture the world’s attention.9 The Torrey Canyon incident occurred at a time when political
consciousness of the fundamental need to safeguard the marine environment was just emerging
and demonstrated the failure of the international community to sufficiently anticipate and prevent
the negative impacts of oil pollution on the marine environment. 10 Before this incident, rules and
regulations pertaining to the marine environment were not as developed as they are today. 11 In
1967, the Torrey Canyon ran aground on the Seven Stones reef between the Scilly Isles and
Land’s End on the British mainland, spilling over 119,000 tonnes of crude oil that eventually
formed thick oil slicks 35 miles long in the English Channel and on the UK foreshore.12

As a result of the Torrey Canyon disaster, the international community realised that protection of
the marine environment was not a trivial issue and began to place more importance on marine
environmental protection.13 One of the earliest global efforts towards the protection of the marine
environment was reflected in Principle 7 of the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment 1972 (Stockholm Conference) which provides that:

States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas
by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to
harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.14
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the
UNEP

The Stockholm Conference recognised the responsibilities of States to protect and preserve the
marine environment.15 Recommendations of the Stockholm Conference led to the negotiation of
other important marine environmental protection instruments such as the 1972 Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters (London
Convention)16 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973,
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78).17 Hence, it is not too simplistic to state
that the principles of international environmental law stemming from marine pollution have
developed quite significantly over the past few decades, as contended by Kbaier and Sebek:

Development of international environmental law over the last
quarter of a century demonstrates that one of its most dynamic
branches has been the law of marine pollution: scores of global and
regional conventions have been adopted, and most technical rules
rightly concentrated on pollution prevention and control. 18
The provision on the protection of the marine environment was ultimately crystallised in Part XII
of the LOSC which entered into force in 16 November 1994. The LOSC is the fundamental
international instrument governing activities at sea. The Preamble of the LOSC states that its
basic objective is to establish:

15

Ibid.
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The Inter-Governmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea convened a meeting in
London in November 1972 and it finally led towards the introduction of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (London Convention) which came into force on 30 August
1975. Unlike MARPOL 73/78 that prohibits pollution from ships, the London Convention prohibits the dumping of
certain hazardous materials and requires the party or parties intending to do so to seek a prior special permit for the
dumping of a number of other identified materials and a prior general permit for other wastes or matter.
See
International
Maritime
Organization,
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Prevention
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Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (International Maritime Organization
<http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic_id=258&doc_id=681>. For the purpose of this Chapter, focus
is on the prevention and control of vessel-source pollution and not on the issue of ocean dumping as regulated by the
London Convention.
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...a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate
international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses
of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilisation of
their resources, the conservation of their living resources and the
study, protection and preservation of the marine environment
(Emphasis added).19
The LOSC, particularly its Part XII, provides a framework for the protection and preservation of
the marine environment which emphasises the prevention, reduction and control of marine
pollution. Most of the provisions on the protection and preservation of the marine environment
are customary laws and they bind all States including those that are not State-parties to the
LOSC,20 as mentioned by Wolfrum:

The general prohibition on polluting marine areas drawn from the
Convention on the Law of the Sea can also be considered a part of
customary international law.21
Despite the ongoing development of international laws and regulations on marine environmental
protection, maritime accidents are still occurring and the world has witnessed other large-scale
oil spills incidents from oil tankers, including the Amoco Cadiz in 1978,22 the Atlantic Empress
in 1979,23 the Exxon Valdez in 198924 and the Braer in 1993.25 In addition, the risks of maritime
19
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Rüdriger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Springer-Verlag, 2003), 37-39.
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The grounding of Amoco Cadiz off the coast of Brittany, France on 16 March 1978 spilled 221 000 tonnes of light
crude oil into the waters of the English Channel. About 300kms of north-west coastline in the French regions of
Finisterre and Côtes du Nord were oiled, causing extensive environmental damage in and around that area. See
Edward S. Gilfillan et al, ‘Use of Remote Sensing to Document Changes in Marsh Vegetation Following the Amoco
Cadiz Oil Spill (Brittany, France, 1978)’ (1995) 30(12) Marine Pollution Bulletin, 780.
23

The Atlantic Empress was a Greek oil tanker that involved in two large spills off the coast of Trinidad and
Tobago. The incident happened on 19 July 1979 during a tropical rainstorm when the Atlantic Empress collided
with the Aegean Captain, spilling 287, 000 metric tonnes of oil into the Atlantic Ocean. This was regarded as the
largest maritime oil spill in the history of shipping. However, in contrast with other maritime disasters, fortunately
for this, the oil never came ashore and the tragedy did not cause a major environmental disaster. See
Sara Philips, No Expense Spared on Oil Clean-up (2010) Australian Broadcasting Corporation
<http://www.abc.net.au/environment/articles/2010/05/04//2890320.htm>.
24

The tanker Exxon Valdez was bound for Long Beach, California when it struck Prince William Sound’s Bligh
Reef eventually spilling approximately 35, 500 tonnes of crude oil into Prince William Sound in Alaska. This
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accidents are much higher in navigationally difficult and constricted waters such as the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. The environmental pollution caused by oil spill incidents is particularly
apparent in narrow and enclosed or semi-enclosed seas like the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
as the spill is concentrated and therefore increases the degree of environmental damage. The
most recent maritime accident in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore took place on July 2011
near the south-western end of the Strait of Malacca.26 Since these incidents are still occurring, it
is crucial to examine the existing international legal framework on the protection of the marine
environment of straits used for international navigation from vessel-source pollution that may be
caused by both operational and accidental discharges of oil and wastes. These international rules
and regulations are embedded in the LOSC as well as in the related IMO Conventions, as
explained in subsequent parts of this Chapter.

6.3

PART XII OF THE LOSC

Part XII of the LOSC relates to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. The
first article of Part XII of the LOSC provides that all States have a general obligation to protect
and preserve the marine environment.27 Article 192 of the LOSC is further supported by Article

incident took place on 24 March 1989 and most of the spilled oil spread southwest to the shores of many islands
within the Sound and into the Gulf of Alaska killing an estimated 300,000 seabirds that breed all over North and
South Atlantic. See Howard M. Feder and Arny Blanchard, ‘The Deep Benthos of Prince William Sound, Alaska, 16
Months After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill’ (1998) 36(2) Marine Pollution Bulletin, 118; Francis Wiese, ‘Seabirds
and Atlantic Canada’s Ship-Source Oil Pollution: Impacts, Trends and Solutions’ (World Wildlife Fund Canada,
2002), 45-46.
25

The Braer oil spill happened on 5 January 1993 where, as a result of bad weather, it ran aground on the southern
tip of the Shetland Isles in Scotland, spilling 84, 500 tonnes of light crude oil into Scottish waters. See Kevin T.
Pickering and Lewis A. Owen, An Introduction to Global Environmental Issues (Routledge, 1997), 206-208; Francis
Wiese, ‘Seabirds and Atlantic Canada’s Ship-Source Oil Pollution: Impacts, Trends and Solutions’ (World Wildlife
Fund Canada, 2002), 8-11.
26

See Section 5.2.2.2 of Chapter 5 of this Thesis.
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Article 192 of the LOSC reads ‘States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment’.
Article 192 of the LOSC is an important component of the comprehensive approach of Part XII of the LOSC on
safeguards on the marine environment and this provision reiterates the preamble of the LOSC and Principle 7 of the
Stockholm Conference that all States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment. The term
‘States’ in Article 192 refers to all States and does not only refer to State-parties to the LOSC. See Myron H.
Nordquist, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (Volume IV) (Martinus Nijhoff,
1991), 36-40.
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194(1) that provides:

States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all
measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment
from any source…
The employment of the terms ‘obligation’ and ‘shall’ in both Articles 192 and 194 respectively
shows that the duty relating to protection of the marine environment is an important
responsibility and that all States must be committed to achieving this end.28 Even though the
LOSC has provided a legal framework, nevertheless, the rules provided are largely general in
application and as such, it requires States to devise more detailed international rules and
regulations, as enumerated in Article 197 of the LOSC:

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a
regional basis, directly or through competent international
organisations, in formulating and elaborating international rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the
marine environment…’
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the LOSC has a provision on the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution of the marine environment from vessels as enumerated in Article 211.29 Like Article
197, Article 211 also stipulates that States have duties in establishing international rules and
standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution that results from shipping activities. 30 Article
211 elucidates three types of State jurisdictions on the regulation of marine pollution and the
standards of ships; namely, the coastal State,31 the port State32 and the flag State jurisdictions.33
28

Norquist contended that even though Articles 192, 194 and 197 employ the word ‘shall’, the scope of the possible
obligation is qualified and never absolute. See Myron H. Nordquist, United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea 1982: A Commentary (Volume IV) (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 36.
29

See Section 5.2 of Chapter 5 of this Thesis.

30

Article 211(1) reads ‘States, acting through the competent international organization or general diplomatic
conference, shall establish international rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from vessels…’.
31

Article 211(4) of the LOSC states that ‘Coastal States may, in the exercise of their sovereignty within their
territorial sea, adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from foreign
vessels…Such laws and regulations shall, not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels’.
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Theoretically, a port State could have the status of a coastal State as well, but a coastal State may
not necessarily possess the status of a port State unless ships voluntarily come into its port.
Therefore, the concept of port State jurisdiction is only relevant when the coastal State exercises
jurisdiction in relation to its port.34 The former President of the International Tribunal on the Law
of the Sea, Judge Thomas Mensah, contended that the difference between the jurisdictions of
port States and coastal States is in the scope of their jurisdictions; while port State jurisdiction is
essentially a right to control, coastal State jurisdiction is a right to regulate.35 It is therefore
crucial to examine the different jurisdictions possessed by the port State, the coastal State and the
flag State in determining the extent of enforcement powers that the littoral States of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore have in regulating shipping traffic transiting the Straits.

6.3.1 Port State Jurisdiction

International law dictates that the internal waters of a coastal State are regarded as part of the
territory of that State and unlike the territorial sea, vessels generally have no right of innocent
passage to sail through that part of the maritime zone.36 Ships are subject to the territorial
jurisdiction and control of the port State when they enter the internal waters or ports of that
State,37 as enumerated in Article 25(2) of the LOSC. 38 The port State has the power to take
32

Article 211 (3) of the LOSC prescribes States to ‘establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution of the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or
internal waters…’; A port State is defined as ‘a sheltered place where ships may load or discharge cargo and embark
or disembark passengers, which makes use of both natural conditions and artificial installations, and which offers
facilities for the movement of passengers and goods by water and land, subject to a special administration to secure
this traffic functions’. See Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008),
359.
33

Article 211(2) specifies the jurisdiction of flag States where it mentions that ‘States shall adopt laws and
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment from vessels flying their
flag or of their registry’.
34

Øystein Jensen, ‘Coastal State Jurisdiction and Vessel Source Pollution: The International Law of the Sea
Framework for Norwegian Legislation’ (The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2006), 14.
35

Erik Franckx, Vessel-source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction: The Work of the ILA Committee on Coastal
State Jurisdiction Relating to Marine Pollution (1991-2000) (Kluwer, 2001), 71.
36

R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 1999), 61-65.

37

The internal waters of a State refer to the landward side of the baselines from which a territorial sea is measured.
The internal waters are considered as part of that State’s territory, where it has the right to exercise its full
sovereignty and jurisdictions over these waters. See Øystein Jensen, ‘Coastal State Jurisdiction and Vessel Source
Pollution: The International Law of the Sea Framework for Norwegian Legislation’ (The Fridtjof Nansen Institute,
2006), 15; John Warren Kindt, Marine Pollution and the Law of the Sea (William S. Hein & Co., 1986), 1188-1189.
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necessary actions against any offending ships that have caused marine pollution in its territorial
waters or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) should the offending ship subsequently enter its
internal waters to call at its port.39

The 2010 Pacific Adventurer oil spill incident off the coast of Queensland, Australia, is a good
example to explain the enforcement powers of a port State.40 This 23,737 DWT general cargo
vessel suffered damage while plying through rough waters generated by Cyclone Hamish. 41 The
ship had been holed during turbulence, which resulted in a spill of 270,000 litres of bunker oil
into the Moreton Bay area, not far from the port of Brisbane.42 When the Pacific Adventurer was
towed into the port of Brisbane, an investigation was conducted on board the ship and a civil suit
was instituted against the four shipping companies and the ship’s Master, with each facing a
count of discharging oil into the ocean.43 This case is an excellent example of port State
jurisdiction to take legal action against a polluting ship.

In principle, the port State has unrestricted jurisdiction to enforce its laws against any ships and
those on board within its own internal waters based on the fact that the internal waters fall
exclusively within the territorial sovereignty of the port State.44 Enforcement measures that a
port State can take include the inspection of vessels visiting its ports to ensure that they meet
IMO requirements regarding safety and marine pollution prevention standards.45 If the vessels do
38

Article 25(2) of the LOSC reads ‘In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or call at a port facility outside
internal waters, the coastal (port) State also has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of the
conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or such a call is subject’.
39

See LOSC Art. 218.

40

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), ‘Loss of Containers from Pacific Adventurer of Cape Moreton,
Queensland’ (ATSB, 2009), 1-5.
41

Ibid.
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Sam Collyer, Pacific Adventurer Spill: Four Companies and Master to Stand Trial (2010) Lloyd’s List DCN
<http://www.lloydslistdcn.com.au/archive/2010/july/07/swire-captain-to-stand-trial-for-pacific-adventurer-spill>.
43
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44

Øystein Jensen, ‘Coastal State Jurisdiction and Vessel Source Pollution: The International Law of the Sea
Framework for Norwegian Legislation’ (The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2006), 15; Brian F. Fitzgerald, ‘Port State
Jurisdiction and Marine Pollution Under UNCLOS III’ (1995) 11 Maritime Law Association of Australia and New
Zealand Journal, 31; R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 1999), 6165.
45

The Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, International Organizations and The Law of the Sea (Kluwer,
2000), 41-42.
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not meet these requirements, the port State may allow or deny access to any vessels that seek to
gain entry into its port. The Prestige oil spill in 2002 is a good example to illustrate this. The
tanker Prestige, loaded with 77, 000 tonnes of fuel oil, was navigating through stormy waters and
suffered an accident about 45 miles off the Spanish coast of Galicia.46 In distress, the tanker
approached Galicia, but due to fear that it would cause severe pollution of the marine
environment the Spanish authorities denied its entry to a safe harbour and sent it off-shore in a
north-westerly direction.47 This incident shows that the port State has the power to deny access to
any vessel at risk of entailing adverse environmental consequences should that vessel be allowed
entry into the port.

The port State also possesses jurisdiction to take enforcement action against any vessel calling
into its with regard to offences against international rules and standards committed beyond the
port State’s national jurisdiction.48 This can be illustrated by the Evoikos and Orapin Global
collision in the Singaporean waters of the Strait of Singapore on 15 October 1997, 3 years after
the LOSC came into force. This collision affected the marine environment of Singapore’s south
coast as well as the south-western coast of Peninsular Malaysia.49 The Evoikos was anchored in
the Port of Singapore at Pulau Bukom and the Orapin Global was anchored off south-western
Johor.50 Following the incident, on 20 October 1997, the Singaporean Police arrested both
Masters of the two vessels.51 As an affected coastal State, under the LOSC, Malaysia may make
a request to Singapore, as a port State, to take appropriate legal action against the Masters of
both vessels. The Masters of the Orapin Global and the Evoikos were tried and sentenced under
46

Eduardo L. Giménez, ‘The Prestige Catastrophe: Political Decisions, Scientific Counsel, Missin Markets and the
Need for an International Maritime Protocol’ (Universidade de Vigo, 2003), 7-8.
47

Ibid.
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George C. Kasoulides, ‘Global and Regional Port State Regimes’ in Henrik Ringbom (ed), Competing Norms in
the Law of Marine Environmental Protection: Focus on Ship Safety and Pollution Prevention (Kluwer, 1997), 122.
This is provided for in the LOSC in its Article 218(3). It reads ‘When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an
off-shore terminal of a State, that State shall…comply with request from any State for investigation of a discharge
violation...believed to have occurred in, caused, or threatened damage to the internal waters, territorial sea or
exclusive economic zone of the requesting State’.
49

See Section 5.2.2.2 of Chapter 5 of this Thesis.
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Mark Heah Eng Siang, ‘Prevention and Combat of Oil Pollution in Singapore and the “Evoikos” Oil Spill Incident
on 15 October 1998’ (Paper presented at the PAJ Oil Spill Symposium ‘98, Tokyo, 1998).
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Federation of Shipmasters’ Association, 2000), 7-8.
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Singaporean laws, and were charged for negligent navigation. 52 Ultimately, the Master of the
Orapin Global was sentenced to two months in jail, and to fines totalling S$11,000 while the
Master of the Evoikos was sentenced to three months in jail and fined S$60,000.53

Furthermore, while international law restricts the powers of a coastal State to regulate ships that
pass through its territorial waters, that State however may, in its capacity as a port State, make
requirements of ships that voluntarily enter its port.54 For instance, the Port Klang Authority has
made it a mandatory requirement for vessels to employ pilots when navigating within the port’s
pilotage district.55 Unless otherwise authorised or exempted, all vessels within Port Klang’s limit
must be piloted and the passage of a vessel may be denied if this requirement is not fulfilled by
the Master of the vessel.56

In view of these facts, port State enforcement jurisdiction as enumerated in Article 218 of the
LOSC has been seen as an innovative expansion of jurisdiction in international law that extends
the enforcement powers of the regulation of prevention and the penalties for marine pollution
incidents to the port State, where this had traditionally been left exclusively to the discretion of
the flag State.57
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6.3.2 Coastal State Jurisdiction

When a ship passes through the territorial waters of a State and subsequently enters any of its
ports, that State possesses the status of a port State. If a ship merely navigates through the
territorial waters of a State without entering any of its ports, that State is regarded as a coastal
State. The coastal State has jurisdiction over its territorial sea, which is subject to the right of
innocent passage,58 a passage regime where the coastal State has the power to regulate but not to
control.59 The LOSC does provide enforcement jurisdiction60 for a coastal State to take action
against polluting ships at sea, which can be in the form of inspection, detention or by instituting a
legal proceeding.61 The powers in this respect are stronger in the territorial sea and more limited
in the EEZ of that coastal State.62 Nevertheless, the powers of coastal State to take action against
recalcitrant vessels are subject to the jurisdictional balance, which, based on the practice of
international law, leans heavily in favour of navigational interests.63 This means that coastal
States cannot hamper innocent passage unless the vessel has conducted an act which could be
deemed as a threat and thereby ceases to exercise the right of innocent passage. 64 In that case,
based on Article 25(3) of the LOSC, the coastal State may temporarily suspend the right of

58

For more discussion on the innocent passage regime, see Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4 of this Thesis.

59

Richard A. Legatski, ‘Port State Jurisdiction Over Vessel-Source Marine Pollution’ (1977) 2 Harvard
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innocent passage for such a vessel.65 This situation also applies to States bordering straits.
Nevertheless, based on the discussion of the transit passage regime in Chapter 4, unlike the
innocent passage regime which can be temporarily suspended, States bordering straits possess
more limited powers as they legally have no right under the international law to impede
navigation unless if this is done under the ambit of Article 233 of the LOSC.66 The provision of
Article 233 is discussed in detail in the following sections of this Chapter.

6.3.3 Flag State Jurisdiction
A flag State refers to the State whose flag a ship is flying.67 The principle of customary
international law, as embodied in the LOSC, indicates that ships are bound by the laws of the
State whose flag they bear.68 The earliest effort to codify the principle of flag State jurisdiction
was undertaken by the International Law Commission through the Draft Articles Concerning the
Law of the Sea 1956, and now it is governed by Part VII of the LOSC.69 Every State is required
to take such measures for ships flying their flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea.70 This
system of flag State jurisdiction developed from the concept that vessels were considered a part
of the State’s territory and that there exists a factual link between the ship and the State in which
it is registered,71 even if the ship is navigating the high seas.72 The absence of any international
body capable of ensuring effective regulatory enforcement of ships on the high seas has resulted
65
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in ships being subjected to the law of a State where they are registered.73 This is provided for in
Article 92 of the LOSC, which reads:
Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and…shall be
subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.
On matters pertaining to enforcement jurisdiction, the flag State has the power to ensure that
vessels flying their flag or on their registry comply with any international laws adopted in
accordance with the LOSC on the prevention, reduction and control of vessel-source of pollution
of the marine environment.74 Furthermore, the flag State also has the power to conduct an
investigation of any vessel that has violated any applicable international rules or standards on the
control of vessel-source pollution, irrespective of where the violations occurred, and thereafter to
institute legal proceedings against such a vessel.75 The rights of flag States have remained largely
unchanged, but their responsibilities have grown considerably,76 encompassing areas including
ship safety standards and crew training77 as well as the control of vessel-source of marine
pollution.
Despite being widely acknowledged, this principle remains one of the most frequently debated.78
This is due to the weaknesses of flag State jurisdiction itself. This weakness stems from the fact
that it is decentralised in nature, and lacks sanctions under international law to take action against
73
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recalcitrant flag States.79 Furthermore, the competitive nature of the shipping industry has
directly or indirectly compelled shipping companies to seek to reduce operating costs and
increase returns, which ultimately resulted in them resorting to ‘open registers’ or ‘flags of
convenience’.80 Generally, this ‘flags of convenience’ registration system is preferred as it has a
relaxed enforcement of international regulations that allows shipowners to register ships cheaply
without having to meet the conditions for registration set by stricter administrations. 81 Therefore,
ships may be registered in a State whether or not that State has any national or economic
connection to the ship concerned. As stated by Goodman:
…Shipowners are able to move vessels between registries, so if a
ship becomes unable to meet the registration requirements of its
flag State…it can be re-flagged to a less stringent register that does
not take such a responsible attitude toward its international
obligations. The ability for vessels to consistently re-flag with less
and less vigilant registers further undermines the effective
operation of flag State jurisdiction.82
The practice of this ‘open register’ or ‘flags of convenience’ regime has made it difficult to find
a genuine link83 between the vessel and the State where it was registered, which causes further
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and Contemporary Issues (Springer-Verlag, 2009), 5-6; Camille Goodman, ‘The Regime for Flag State
Responsibility in International Fisheries Law-Effective Fact, Creative Fiction, or Further Work Required?’ (2009)
23 Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, 159-161; Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008), 246-247; Maritime International Secretariat Services Limited
(MARISEC), ‘Shipping Industry Guidelines on Flag State Performance’ (MARISEC, 2003), 4-5.
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complications for flag State enforcement jurisdiction.84 This is because under the ‘flags of
convenience regime’, the company that manages the ship may be different from the flag of a
State which the ship is entitled to fly.85 In 2001, most open registries; namely, Panama, Liberia,
the Marshall Islands and the Bahamas were categorised under the ‘modest category’ in terms of
their capacity to regulate the ships on their registers.86 In the same year, about 63 per cent of all
reported ship losses at sea (measured by tonnage) were accounted for by just 13 flags of
convenience registers with the five worst performers being Panama, Cyprus, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Cambodia and Malta.87 Table 6-1 below categorises States into their levels of
regulatory capacity:

Regulatory Capacity
High

Good

Modest
Poor

Flag
Danish Second Register, German Second Register, Kerguelen Islands,
Netherlands, Norwegian Second Register, Norway, Philippines, United
Kingdom
Bermuda, Canary Islands, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Estonia, Hong
Kong, Isle of Man, Latvia, Madeira, Netherlands, Antilles, Russia,
Singapore, Turkey, Ukraine
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Equatorial
Guinea, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Panama, Vanuatu
Cambodia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Table 6-1: Grouped Flag State Rankings based on Regulatory Capacity88
(Flag State Audit, 2003)89
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87

Ibid.

88

Note: States in bold are among the largest open registries in the world.

89
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Nevertheless, the recent flag State performance index, issued in 2010, has shown an
improvement in the regulatory capacities of the four largest open registries in the world: Panama,
Liberia, Barbados and the Marshall Islands.90 The 2010 index indicated that these four States
have generally ratified key IMO Conventions pertaining to safety of navigation and control of
vessel-source of marine pollution and have performed relatively well in ensuring that ships
flying their flags comply with global IMO standards of safe shipping.91

It is an undeniable fact that the enforcement of international maritime instruments is more often
than not reliant upon the jurisdiction of flag and port States.92 Certain of these international
regulations preceded the LOSC. Nevertheless, through Part XII, the LOSC has acknowledged the
application of these important international regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the marine environment from vessel-based sources.93 These international rules act as
supplements to the LOSC as they provide more detailed rules and regulations than are generally
established by the LOSC.94 The international rules on the protection and preservation of the
marine environment developed almost concurrently with those regarding the safety of navigation
at sea. Undeniably, the protection of the marine environment could be promoted through the
promotion of the safety of navigation of vessels plying the seas.95

6.3.4 IMO Conventions on Control of Vessel-Source Marine Pollution

The Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), now under its current
name, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), was established in 1948 and has been
active in developing and maintaining a comprehensive legal framework to regulate international
90
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shipping activities.96 The IMO now has 60 international conventions created under its umbrella
and these can be categorised as the following:

(a)

Prevention of accidents and marine pollution, including standards for ship designs,
construction, equipment, operation and manning;97

(b)

Maritime safety, which includes distress and safety communications, search and rescue,
and oil pollution preparedness, response and co-operation;98

(c)

Compensation and liability regimes.99

For the purpose of this discussion, the focus will be on the first category of these IMO
conventions; namely, on the prevention of accidents and marine pollution. As already noted,
intentional oil discharges from operational discharges of vessels were one of earliest issues
discussed by the maritime community and also the first to be internationally regulated.100
Subsequently, other pollutants followed suit including hazardous and noxious substances (HNS),
ballast water and dangerous chemicals. International rules and regulations on control of vesselsources of marine pollution have developed since 1954, beginning with OILPOL and extending
to other related IMO conventions as explained briefly here.

6.3.4.1

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, as
Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto (MARPOL 73/78)

MARPOL 73/78 has its origins from OILPOL 1954, a pioneer convention in controlling vesselsource of marine pollution.101 OILPOL 1954 recognised that operational discharges from ships
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are the main contributors to oil pollution,102 and formulated regulations to limit the oil content of
discharges made near shore.103 MARPOL 73/78 superseded OILPOL 1954 when it came into
force on 2 October 1983, and comprises six annexes. MARPOL 73/78 is the main convention
covering the prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or
accidental causes,104 and relies on flag and port State jurisdiction.105 The key objectives of
MARPOL 73/78 Annex I and II is to reduce the volumes of harmful substances generated from
the routine operations of vessels to be discharged into the sea, which could be in the form of
inter alia, oily waste, garbage and sewage.106 Annex I deals with the control of pollution from
oil107 while Annex II relates to noxious liquid substances carried in bulk.108
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of the mixture and that the discharge is made as far as practicable from land. See Socioeconomic Data and
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(2009) SEDAC <http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/pollution.of.sea.by.oil.1954.html>.
104

Nazery Khalid and Cheryl Rita Kaur, ‘Status of Ratification of IMO Conventions by Malaysia’ (2010) 18(1)
MIMA Bulletin, 25-29.
105

The flag and port States play an important role in implementing the MARPOL 73/78. Mattson argued that
‘Parties to MARPOL 73/78 may enforce the convention in three ways: through vessel inspections to ensure vessels
meet minimum technical standards; by monitoring vessel compliance with discharge standards; and by punishing
vessels that violate standards. MARPOL 73/78 relies on the Port State/Flag State dichotomy to implement its terms’.
See Gini Mattson, ‘MARPOL 73/78 and Annex I: An Assessment of its Effectiveness’ (2006) 9 Journal of
International Wildlife Law and Policy, 181.
106

John R. Lethbridge, ‘MARPOL 73/78 (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships)’
(The World Bank, 1991), 1-4.
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MARPOL Annex II has introduced the new four-category categorisation system for noxious and liquid
substances that have further improved the regulatory system pertaining to the control of pollution from noxious
liquid substances in bulk namely Category X (major hazard), Y, (hazardous), Z (minor hazard) and other hazardous
substances which are recognisable hazard to either marine resources or human health, causing minimal harm to
amenities or other legitimate uses of the sea. MARPOL Annex II allows the discharge of the substances of
categories X, Y and Z if the ship is proceeding en route at a speed of at least 7 knots (for self-propelled ships) or at
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Annex III of MARPOL 73/78 regulates and provides general requirements for the issuing of
detailed standards on packing, marking, labelling, documentation, stowage, quantity limitations
and exceptions as well as notifications for preventing pollution by harmful substances. 109 Annex
III comprises regulations aimed at the prevention of pollution by harmful substances transported
in packaged form such as packages, freight containers, portable tanks, or tanks for rail or road
transport and normally is enforced through flag and port State jurisdiction.110

The main objective of Annex IV of MARPOL 73/78 is to regulate the discharge of sewage from
ships into the sea. It administers ships’ equipment and systems for the control of sewage
discharge and contains provisions on the regulation of facilities at off-shore terminals and ports
for the reception of sewage.111 Annex V of MARPOL 73/78 regulates the discharge of garbage
from vessels into the sea and is intended to reduce solid waste pollution from ships. 112 MARPOL
Annex V has categorised garbage into four categories; namely, plastic, operational garbage, food
waste and ground food waste.113

least 4 knots (in the case of ships which are not self-propelled). It also allows discharged to be made below the
waterline through the underwater discharge outlet(s) not exceeding the maximum rate for which the underwater
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Organization (IMO), ‘Revised Annex II of MARPOL 73/78: Resolution MEPC. 188 (52)’ (MEPC 52/24/Add.1,
IMO, 2004), 1-67; P.G. Wells, T. Höfer and M. Nauke, ‘Evaluating the Hazards of Harmful Substances Carried by
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334-346.
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The final annex, Annex VI, is the newest addition to MARPOL 73/78 and came into force on 19
May 2005. Annex VI was introduced to regulate the emission of greenhouse gasses from
shipping operations by setting limits on NOx, SOx and Non-Methane Volatile Organic
Compounds (NMVOC) emissions from ship exhausts and prohibits the deliberate emissions of
ozone-depleting substances.114

6.3.4.2

The International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on
Ships 2001

The IMO adopted the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems
on Ships 2001 (AFS), which prohibits the use of harmful organotins in anti-fouling paints used
on ships and at the same time prevents the potential future use of other harmful substances in
anti-fouling systems, in October 2001.115 Under the terms of the AFS, which came into force in
September 2008, State-parties are required to prohibit and/or restrict the use of harmful antifouling systems on ships flying their flags.116 This prohibition also applies to ships not entitled to
fly their flags which operate under their authority117 and all ships that enter a port or offshore
terminal of a State-party.118

6.3.4.3

The International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast
Water and Sediments 2004

In 2004 the IMO adopted the International Convention for the Control and Management of
Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments 2004 (BWM) to prevent the potentially adverse effects of
114
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the spread of harmful aquatic organisms carried by ships’ ballast water from one place to
another.119 For now, the BWM is still pending enforcement and will only enter into force 12
months after ratification by 30 States, representing 35 per cent of the world’s merchant shipping
tonnage.

6.3.5 IMO Conventions on the Safety of Navigation

In addition to providing international rules and regulations on the control of vessel-sources of
marine pollution, the IMO has also formulated international rules and regulations on the safety of
navigation of vessels. If safe navigation can be promoted, maritime accidents will be avoided,
thereby protecting the marine environment from accidental oil and HNS spills. Since 1960, the
IMO has adopted the Collision Regulation and this has been followed by the creation of other
conventions including the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea 1972 (COLREGs), as amended. COLREGs was introduced to regulate shipping traffic,
particularly in busy waterways like the Dover Strait and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,
and came into force on 15 July 1977.120 Unlike other IMO Conventions that rely heavily on the
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jurisdictions of port and flag States, COLREGs confers regulatory powers upon coastal regions
and States bordering straits through the implementation and designation of the Traffic Separation
Scheme (TSS) that must be followed by navigating vessels.121

Besides COLREGs, the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 (STCW) is also a convention related to ensuring the safety of
navigation at sea. STCW prescribes minimum standards relating to training, certification and
watchkeeping for seafarers which States are obliged to meet or exceed.122 The enforcement of
the provisions of the STCW depends substantially on flag and port States jurisdictions.123 Flag
States must ensure that ships flying their flags meet the prescribed requirements and port States
must forbid ships that have not followed the standards laid down by the STCW to embark upon
subsequent voyages.124 The STCW came into force on 28 April 1984 and currently has 155
State-parties, representing 98.9 percent of the world’s shipping tonnage.

The other convention relating to this matter is the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea 1974 (SOLAS), an international convention that relates to the safety of navigation.125
SOLAS was formulated with the main objective of stipulating minimum standards for the
construction, equipment and operation of ships to facilitate the safe navigation of vessels at
sea.126 SOLAS relies heavily on flag and port State jurisdiction for its enforcement.
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165

The abovementioned conventions provide rules and regulations on the protection of the marine
environment from vessel-source pollution. Nevertheless, the provisions of these conventions are
not exclusively related to straits used for international navigation. The provision governing
environmental safeguards of straits used for international navigation is specifically governed by
Article 233 of the LOSC. This particular article is a special provision that underlines the
enforcement powers of States bordering straits in regulating shipping transit through territorial
straits, which is characteristically different from that of the regime governing the territorial seas.
Hence, it is important to appraise and evaluate the effect of the application of Article 233 on the
protection and preservation of the marine environment of straits.

6.3.6 Article 233 of the LOSC

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3 of this Thesis, Article 233 was inserted into the LOSC as a
compromise between maritime States and States bordering straits to ensure that the marine
environment of straits that form imperative sea lines of communication could be protected from
vessel-source pollution. It reads:

Nothing in sections 5, 6 and 7 affects the legal regime of straits
used for international navigation. However, if a foreign ship…has
committed a violation of the laws and regulations referred to in
Article 42, paragraph 1(a) and (b), causing or threatening major
damage to the marine environment of the straits, the States
bordering the straits may take appropriate enforcement measures...
(Emphasis added).127
As the only legal provision that relates specifically to environmental safeguards with respect to
straits used for international navigation, it is therefore crucial to examine the legal effect of
Article 233 of the LOSC on the application of the transit passage regime.

accordingly not to sail until they are fit to proceed to sea. See International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Articles
of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974’ in SOLAS Consolidated Edition, 2004 (IMO,
2004), 1-20.
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Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas: The IMO’s Role in Protecting Vulnerable Marine Areas (Springer-Verlag, 2008),
75-78.
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6.3.6.1

The Legal Effect of Article 233 of the LOSC on the Transit Passage Regime

Part III of the LOSC relates specifically to straits used for international navigation. Article 42(1)
(a) & (b) of the LOSC allows States bordering straits used for international navigation to pass
domestic laws and regulations on the protection of the marine environment which apply to
foreign ships transiting such straits. Article 42(1) of the LOSC provides:

Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits
may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage through
straits, in respect of all or any of the following: (a) the safety of
navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, as provided in
Article 41; (b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution,
by giving effect to applicable international regulations regarding
the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in
the strait.
If Article 233 of the LOSC is read together with Article 42(1) (a) & (b), it may imply that in the
event of a pollution incident, States bordering straits may carry out a physical inspection on the
polluting ship to establish the violation,128 an act that could be perceived as impeding or
hampering navigation.129 Nevertheless, this is not as uncomplicated as it may seem to be. Article
233 too must be read together with Article 42(2) of the LOSC that provides:

Such laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact
among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect
of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage…
Part III is also silent on procedural and enforcement matters and does not provide any guidelines
for States bordering straits on how to enforce their safety of navigation and marine pollution
laws against offending vessels.130 In some ways, the collective readings of the provisions of
128

Article 220(2) of the LOSC provides ‘Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the
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Articles 42(1) (a) & (b), Article 42(2) and Article 233 of the LOSC imply that the right of transit
passage through straits is inviolable and that the bordering States have no enforcement powers
against vessels which breach their safety of navigation and marine pollution laws.131 Article 233
of the LOSC further imposes a limit on the limits that have been set by Article 42(1) (a) & (b)
and Article 42(2).132 On this, Kindt explained that:

These provisions basically mean that States bordering narrow
straits may enforce the IMO’s standard regarding vessel-source
pollution. These States may not interfere with the right of transit
passage by utilising a claim of protection the marine environment.
In any conflict between the rights…of transit passage and the right
to protect the marine environment, the freedoms of navigation
must prevail.133
This indicates that Article 233 has confirmed the notion that transit passage is non-suspendable
and thus reiterates the position of the LOSC in favouring the right of transit passage over the
protection of the marine environment of straits.

6.3.6.2

Interpretation of Article 233

Even though Article 233 is a specific provision in the LOSC on environmental safeguards of
straits, it has deficiencies in this regard. Firstly, the initial sentence of Article 233 provides that
Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Part XII of the LOSC do not affect the legal regime of straits used for
international navigation. Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Part XII of the LOSC contain provisions relating
to pollution control and matters on the procedural and enforcement measures respectively for
States to take action against recalcitrant ships. Therefore the exception of Sections 5, 6 and 7
leave States bordering straits without any procedural and enforcement guidelines to be
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followed.134 The second part of Article 233 provides that a State bordering a strait may only take
appropriate enforcement measures if:

(a)

A ship has committed a violation of the laws and regulations referred to in Article 42,
paragraph 1(a) and (b);135

(b)

A ship is causing or threatening to cause major damage to the marine environment of the
straits.

Section 5 of Part XII covers the types of pollution that are dealt with by the LOSC, however,
Article 233 has expressly excluded the application of Section 5 of Part XII to straits used for
international navigation. This leaves a gap in the regulatory regime for protecting and preserving
the marine environment of these straits, particularly in relation to the kinds of pollution covered
by Article 233. Articles 42(1) (a) & (b) do not appear to be compatible with Article 42(2) which
provides that laws and regulations passed by States bordering straits shall not hamper or impair
the right of transit passage of navigating vessels. George argues that:

When strait States through their laws and regulations are required
to promote safe navigation without correlative powers vested in
them to detain ships that violate these laws, such actions could be
interpreted as falling within the terms of Article 42(2). It seems
therefore that Article 42(1) is nullified by Article 42(2).136
In other words, how can States bordering straits take enforcement measures against recalcitrant
ships if they are forbidden to hamper or impede the smooth navigation of vessels? It is
impractical to take enforcement action against such ships if the option to suspend their transit is
unavailable. However, Caminos asserts that States bordering straits do have enforcement
safeguards, but that they are only available in certain circumstances. He observes that:
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this provision (i.e. Article 233) confirms the general rule that
States bordering straits are not granted enforcement jurisdiction
within straits under any circumstances, or in relation to any matter
over which they may have regulatory authority, except where a
violation of article 42-1(a) and (b) occurs. The specific crossreference to article 42 limits the applicability of pollutionenforcement safeguards in section 7 of Part XII only to violations
of laws and regulations in respect of ‘safety of navigation and
regulation of maritime traffic’ and ‘prevention, reduction and
control of pollution’.137
Caminos’ observation implies that States bordering a strait cannot unilaterally enforce measures
to protect the marine environment of the strait per se; the environmental protection measures
must instead be related to providing or ensuring the safety of navigation of transiting vessels.
The second limb of Article 233 emphasises that only pollution to a degree that could cause major
damage would allow States bordering straits to take appropriate enforcement action against the
offending ship. Reading both limbs together would mean that a strait State can only take
enforcement measures under Article 233 when the vessel in question has committed an act or
acts in violation of Articles 42(1) (a) & (b) that has caused, or threatens to cause, major damage
to the marine environment of the strait.138 The question then is what is meant by the terms
‘appropriate enforcement measures’ and ‘major damage’. Does the term ‘appropriate
enforcement measures’ connote that States bordering straits could hamper or intercept the
passage of vessels?

Before answering this, it is vital to examine what the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
1969 (Vienna Convention) provides. The LOSC is a multilateral treaty and therefore, it should be
interpreted in accordance with Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, which provides:

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.139
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(UN,

2005)

The term ‘good faith’ has been commented on in several cases by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). In the Nuclear Tests Case (Australia-France), the court reiterated that one of the
basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their
source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international cooperation, in particular in an age when co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly
essential.140 In the Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary-Slovakia), the
ICJ commented that the principle of good faith obliges the parties to apply a treaty in a
reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realised. 141 Taking the ICJ’s
definition of good faith in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, the reasonable way to apply Article
233 in such a manner that its purpose can be realised is by allowing States bordering straits to
intercept or hamper the passage of recalcitrant vessels. This is based on the fact that the reason
Article 233 was introduced in the first place is to protect and preserve the marine environment of
straits used for international navigation.142 As Caminos observes:

One of the major concerns of States bordering straits has always
been the potential danger to their coastlines presented by various
forms of vessel source pollution, particularly oil from tankers, as
well as noxious chemicals and other substances…Article 233 of
the same Part (Part XII) speaks of pollution control safeguards
with respect to straits used for international navigation…
The term ‘good faith’ does carry legal significance as Article 300 of the LOSC provides that
‘State parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall
exercise the right, jurisdiction and freedoms recognised in this Convention in a manner which
would not constitute an abuse of right’.143 However, as far as in justifying States bordering straits
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intercepting the transit of recalcitrant ships is concerned, Article 300 of the LOSC may not carry
as much weight as Articles 42(1) (a) & (b), 42(2) and 233 that have explicitly limited the
enforcement powers of the States bordering straits in this regard.144

Furthermore, Article 233 is silent on whether or not the transit passage of such vessels can be
terminated or suspended should the vessel commit an act or acts in violation of Articles 233,
42(1) (a) & (b). This omission prompted the Spanish delegation to UNCLOS III to comment on
Article 233:

Article 233 has to be considered discriminatory against States
bordering straits, inasmuch as it is precisely their geographical
narrowness that creates greater risks of accident which could cause
damage to the marine environment. Apart from being unjust, this
provision is poorly drafted…145
With regard to the definition of the term ‘major damage’, Nordquist contends that even though
the term is not clearly defined, the term can be seen as referring to major maritime calamities in
the history of shipping such as Amoco Cadiz and other similar incidents.146 In addition, Koh
suggests that two factors must be considered:

(a)

The occurrence of accidents in the concerned strait as a result of a breach of a navigation
rule;147

(b)

The extent of the damage that occurred depending upon the type of ships and goods
carried.148
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Any maritime casualties that occur in straits may cause pollution that would be detrimental to the
economic survival of the States bordering them. Therefore, if the views by Nordquist and Koh
are put together, the term major damage could be defined and interpreted as ‘any forms of
pollution caused by navigating vessels that may socio-economically affect the well-being of the
coastal population that benefits directly or indirectly from the economic activities generated from
the usage of the straits’. Beckman comments on the effect of the phrase ‘major damage’ to the
enforcement powers of States bordering straits as follows:

If a vessel exercising the right of transit passage violates
obligations under Article 39(2)149, but the vessel in question does
not come into port, and the violation in question does not cause or
threaten major damage to the marine environment of the straits, the
rights of the littoral State are more limited. The littoral State would
not have the right to interfere with the passage of the vessel or a
right to arrest it. However, the littoral State would not be without a
remedy. It could make a formal complaint to the flag State of the
offending vessel, alleging violation of the 1982 UNCLOS.150
Beckman’s interpretation is that until the term ‘major damage’ is clearly defined, the powers of
States bordering straits to intercept the passage of vessels in straits used for international
navigation remains limited.

Given the ambiguous wording of Article 233, consultations were held among delegations from
the States bordering straits during the UNCLOS III negotiations to reach a common
understanding regarding the purpose and meaning of Article 233 of the LOSC in its application
to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.151 A letter was sent by the representative of Malaysia,
Z.B.M. Yatim, to the President of UNCLOS III containing an annex which indicated the
understandings reached and the statement made relating to Article 233 of the draft convention on
149
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the Law of the Sea in its application to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.152 The
understandings were:

(a)

Laws and regulations enacted by States bordering straits under Article 42(1) (a) refer to
laws and regulations on TSS and the determination of under keel clearance;153

(b)

Any violation on the limitation of under keel clearance would be deemed to be a violation
of Article 233, and States bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may take
appropriate enforcement measures as provided by Article 233 to prevent the passage of
the vessel. Such an act cannot be deemed as hampering, denying and impairing transit
passage as enumerated in Article 42 of the LOSC;154

(c)

States bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may take appropriate enforcement
measures against ships that have caused or are threatening to cause major pollution to the
marine environment of the Straits;155

(d)

Although the wording of Article 233 has excepted the application of Sections 5, 6 and 7
of Part XII, States bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may observe the
provisions on safeguards in Section 7 of Part XII in taking appropriate enforcement
measures as provided in Article 233 against recalcitrant ships;156

(e)

Article 42 and 233 do not affect the rights of States bordering straits to take action against
ships which are not in the exercise of transit passage;157

(f)

Anything contained in the letter regarding Article 233 is not intended to impair the
sovereign immunity of ships enumerated in Article 236 and the duties of ships and
aircraft during transit passage in Article 39.158
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Letters signed by both Indonesia’s M. Kusumaatmadja159 and Singapore’s T.T.B. Koh160 confirm
the statement and the contents of the letter sent by Malaysia’s representative. These
understandings were subsequently acknowledged by the main user States of the Straits; namely,
Australia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.161 As
a result, Article 233 was attributed to Malaysia.162 By way of these understandings, the
determination of under keel clearance is brought within the scope of Articles 41 and 42(1) (a) of
the LOSC, and the violation of under keel clearance limits is deemed a violation of Article
233.163
From the wording of Malaysia’s letter, it seems that the understanding was only intended to be
effective in relation to the navigational safety measures of that time. For instance, the
understanding refers to laws and regulations under Article 42(1) (a) on TSS and the
determination of under keel clearance and do not refer to prospective measures on the safety of
navigation and marine environmental protection such as the ongoing development of the Marine
Electronic Highway (MEH) project, the potential designation of all or part of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) and as a Special Area under
MARPOL 73/78.164 Could States bordering straits intercept the transit of vessels violating these
subsequently introduced navigation safety measures? This remains open to question until these
future measures are fully implemented in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and they have
been considered by member States of the IMO.
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George contends that the legal validity of the letter from the Malaysian representative to
UNCLOS III may be questioned.165 It is not an amendment to Article 233 as it was only a letter
written by the representative of Malaysia to the President of the Conference.166 She argues that
the statement has very limited legal significance for the user States.167 However, this may not be
entirely true. In 1977, the IMO came up with Resolution A.375(X) that set out the provisions
pertaining to the TSS designation and the minimum under keel clearance requirement of 3.5
metres.168 Therefore, the letter, which was issued later in 1982, indeed had legal significance as it
had the effect of reiterating the application of TSS and the minimum under keel clearance
requirement in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore that, thus far, have been strictly followed by
ships plying the Straits.

6.3.6.2.1

The Application of Article 233 in State Practices

The application of Article 233 can be seen in State practice in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore themselves. Statistics show that between the 19-year period of 1975–2000, there were
six casualties that took place in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore which have caused major
damage to the marine environment of the Straits.169 Those that took place after 1994, the year
when the LOSC came into force, include the grounding of the MT Natuna Sea in 2000, the
collision of the MV Ostende Max with the MT Formosa Product Brick in 2009 as well as the
collision between the MV Waily and MT Bunga Kelana 3 in 2010. These incidents are good
examples of the application of Article 233 by littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.
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The grounding of the MT Natuna Sea took place on 3 October 2000 in an area near the Sambu
Islands in Indonesian territory.170 The Sambu Islands are located in the Strait of Singapore
between Singapore and Batam Island. The tanker, carrying about 523,088 barrels of crude oil
struck a reef in Batam waters, spilling approximately 20 per cent of its total cargo.171 The
grounding resulted in major pollution to Indonesian waters, causing the Indonesian authorities to
suspend the passage of the vessel and to detain it in Batam.172 Subsequently, the Batam local
government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the London Steam Ship Owners
Mutual Insurance Association Ltd, the insurer of the vessel, to release the vessel with a
guaranteed bond for it to sail to Singapore for dry docking.173

In 2009, a British registered tanker, MV Ostende Max, collided with the MT Formosa Product
Brick, a Liberian-flagged tanker, causing minor naphtha spills in the Strait of Malacca off the
coast of Port Dickson.174 The collision set the MT Formosa Product Brick ablaze.175 Even though
the spill was minor, due to the fact that the collision had damaged both tankers, resulting in them
being rendered unfit for navigation, with both tankers remaining at sea and thus at risk of causing
or threatening to cause major damage to the marine environment of the Strait, the passages of
both vessels were suspended and they were anchored off Port Dickson’s port limit. 176

The application of Article 233 of the LOSC can also be illustrated in the 2010 collision between
the MV Waily and MT Bunga Kelana 3 in the TSS area within the Strait of Singapore. 177 As a
result of the collision, both vessels sustained damage and the MT Bunga Kelana 3 spilled about
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2,000 tonnes of light crude oil into the sea.178 Subsequently, the passage rights of both vessels
were suspended and they were anchored in the Port of Singapore.179

6.3.6.2.2

Defining ‘Major Damage’

Despite there not being a proper definition of the meaning of ‘major damage’ in the LOSC, State
practice as described in these three instances demonstrates that the term is being interpreted
consistently with the combined views of Koh and Nordquist on this matter; that is to say. the
meaning ‘major damage’ refers to oil spill incidents that have devastating effects such as those of
the Exxon Valdez or Amoco Cadiz and where such incidents may cause or are likely to cause
environmental harm to the coastal population.180 As far as the enforcement powers of States
bordering straits are concerned, this definition seems to be the most feasible and based on the
examples given above, has virtually been adopted into practice. These instances of State practice
tend to show that States bordering straits have the power to suspend vessels exercising transit
passage should they cause major damage to the Straits. Therefore, Kindt’s view that the LOSC
favours transit passage over the protection of the marine environment is accurate, but this may
only be the case as long as ships in transit do not cause major pollution of the marine
environment of the straits. However these relatively few instances of State practice do not
entirely clarify the term ‘major damage’ and the meaning of the term could still be debated.
George has argued that ‘so-called’ unimpeded transit passage for all ships should be equitably
adjusted to logically enable States bordering straits to properly exercise their regulatory and
enforcement powers against recalcitrant ships.181 The lack of a precise definition of ‘major
damage’ in the LOSC results in transiting vessels being permitted to pollute the marine
environment of the straits without enforcement consequences if the damage caused is relatively
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minor. If the term ‘major damage in Article 233’ is interpreted in a restrictive way, this could be
viewed as a violation of Article 192, which is the general obligation in Part XII that requires
States to protect and preserve the marine environment. Undeniably, the core difficulty is that
there is no definition for major or minor damage provided in the LOSC. 182 Article 233 needs
further interpretation to be effective.183 It could be argued that Article 233 is contrary to one of
the key objectives of the preamble of the LOSC, which is to promote ‘a legal order for the seas
and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the…protection
and preservation of the marine environment’. To remedy this inconsistency, Article 233 could be
amended taking into considerations the following matters:

(a)

There could be a clear nexus between Part III of the LOSC and Article 233;184

(b)

Since Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Part XII are not applicable in so far as Article 233 is
concerned, specific provisions on procedural and enforcement guidelines could be
articulated in relation to marine pollution in straits used for international navigation. In
other words, Article 233 could clarify whether the States bordering straits have the right
to suspend the transit of vessels should they violate or abuse their transit passage rights
by polluting the marine environment of the strait;185

(c)

The phrase ‘major damage’ in Article 233 should be adequately defined;186

(d)

The application of Articles 42(2) and 44 on non-suspension of transit passage could be
qualified to take into account instances of major pollution by transiting vessels;

(e)

Like the regime of innocent passage where the LOSC explains the circumstances of
which the passage is deemed to be no longer innocent, the LOSC could also clearly
enunciate when and how transiting ships and vessels cease to exercise the right of transit
passage and what are the rights of littoral States to prevent passage which breaches other
provisions of the LOSC relating to marine pollution;
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(f)

Since Article 233 excludes the application of Section 5 of Part XII, the article could
stipulate the types of pollution it deals with;187

(g)

Given that Article 233 does not stipulate any links with Part III of the LOSC, there
should be an explanation on how it is to be applied; does it apply to all straits used for
international navigation or only is restricted to straits where transit passage is applicable?
This would take into account the fact that not all straits used for international navigation
are subjected to the regime of transit passage.

As earlier explained in Chapter 4, there are two types of straits used for international navigation;
namely, straits where transit passage applies and straits where transit passage does not apply.
Since there is no nexus between Article 233 and Part III of the LOSC, it is unclear which type of
straits it applies to. Article 233 of the LOSC mentions specifically that States bordering straits
may take action against any ships that have breached their marine pollution laws enacted based
on the provision of Article 42(1) of the LOSC. Article 42(1) states that:

Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits
may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage through
straits…
It is clear from the wordings of Article 42(1) that it is explicitly related to transit passage. Hence,
from this explanation, it could be understood that Article 233 of the LOSC may apply only to
straits used for international navigation where transit passage is applicable. This is further
discussed and deliberated in Chapter 9 of this Thesis.

As global shipping has steadily risen, the LOSC and the related IMO conventions have been
significant in curtailing the risk of marine pollution generated from vessels and ships and
ensuring safe navigation at sea. Singapore and Port Klang are among the busiest ports in the
world situated along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.188 It is therefore crucial to briefly
examine the incorporation of the international law provisions on protection of the marine
environment of straits into the littoral States’ domestic applications.
187
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6.4

THE INCORPORATION OF
DOMESTIC APPLICATIONS

INTERNATIONAL

REGULATIONS

INTO

Treaties are made to be upheld or performed in good faith.189 Pacta sund servanda is the
fundamental principle of customary international law and it has been crystallised in Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties 1969 (Vienna Convention), which reads ‘Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith’.
International law, including the law of treaties, applies to States as the integral actors in
international law.190

Each State has its own ways of incorporating international treaties into its domestic law. As a
member of the Commonwealth that follows the British system, the legislative power in Malaysia
is vested in the Parliament.191 Therefore, any international treaties, conventions or pacts will only
become part of Malaysian law when the Parliament passes a statute, giving legal effect to the
treaty in Malaysia.192

Indonesia has its own procedures for ratifying international treaties. The government of the
Republic of Indonesia has issued Law No. 24 Year 2000 (Law 24/2000) that deals with this
matter.193 Article 3 of Law 24/2000 provides that Indonesia may bind itself to international
treaties by signature, accession, exchange of documents and any other means agreed by the
contracting parties. Article 10 of Law 24/2000 reads:
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An international treaty shall be incorporated by way of a
law when it involves these following matters:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

politics, peace, defence and internal security;
alterations or delimitations of the territory of Indonesia;
sovereignty or sovereign rights of the nation;
human rights and the environment;
the formation of a new legal norm;
foreign loans and/or grant-aid.194

Article 11 of Law No. 24/2000 elucidates that treatises that do not involve matters stipulated in
Article 10 of Law No. 24/2000 would be ratified by way of a presidential decree.195 Therefore, as
far as treaties or conventions on maritime and navigational matters are concerned, they would be
ratified by way of a law as they fall under the category of State security, sovereignty and the
environment. Article 13 of Law 24/2000 further provides that every law or presidential decree
concerning the ratification of a treaty shall be published in the State Gazette.196

Like Malaysia, Singapore follows the British system of allowing the executive to act as the main
institution in treaty-making.197 The Singaporean practice generally requires that an international
treaty be first incorporated into Singaporean law before it takes effect in the national system. 198
In other words, international treaties cannot be incorporated into national law without
corresponding national laws.199 Table 6-2 below summarises the maritime-related conventions
ratified by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore:

194

Ibid.

195

Ibid.

196

Ibid.

197

Simon SC Tay, ‘The Singapore Legal System and International Law: Influence or Interference’ in Kevin YL Tan
(ed), The Singapore Legal System (Singapore University Press, 1989) , 471-473.
198

Ibid.

199

Ibid.
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Name of Convention
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Convention 1948
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974
(SOLAS)
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs)
International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW)
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating
thereto (MARPOL 73/78) Annex I & II
MARPOL 73/78 Annex III
MARPOL 73/78 Annex IV
MARPOL 73/78 Annex V
MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
(LOSC)
Anti-Fouling Convention 2001
Ballast Water & Sediments Convention

Malaysia
Ratified

Singapore
Ratified

Indonesia
Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified

Ratified
Ratified
Ratified
Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified

Ratified
Has yet to enter into force

Table 6-2: Maritime-Related Conventions Ratified by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia
(Source: Rusli (2010))200
This table shows that the littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have signed and
ratified the main IMO Conventions on control of vessel-source marine pollution and safety of
navigation. This is a good initiative, as it ensures that the laws of the littoral States on
environmental management of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are up to international
standards. Based on earlier discussion, given that most of these IMO Conventions are primarily
enforced through the powers of either the flag and/or port States, this effort may not be entirely
sufficient to ensure that the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is
effectively protected. More than half of the vessels transiting the Straits do not call at any of the
ports of the littoral States along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and most vessels that
transit the Straits do not fly the flags of the littoral States.201
200

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Incorporation of International Law Rules in Regulating Shipping in Straits of
Malacca and Singapore: A Study of the Littoral States’ National Laws and Policies’ (Paper presented at the Third
International Conference on International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 2010).
201

Joshua H. Ho, ‘Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore: The Co-operative Mechanism’ (2009) 40(2) Ocean Development and International Law, 242-243; Mohd
Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for International Navigation: A
Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper presented at the 4th Oceanic Conference on International
Studies, Auckland, 2010); Mark J. Valencia, Co-operation in the Malacca and Singapore Straits:
A
Glass
Half-Full
(2010)
Nautilus
Institute
for
Security
and
Sustainability
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Even if the littoral States have properly incorporated these international regulations into domestic
applications, their powers still remain limited as these States may only formulate laws by giving
effect to accepted international regulations as provided for by Part III of the LOSC. This
restriction, stipulated under international law, would affect the operations of the domestic
legislations, which are devised based on accepted international standards. International law,
through the LOSC, does not confer enforcement powers upon States bordering straits to hamper
or impede vessels exercising the right of transit passage.

Not all provisions of the conventions ratified by the littoral States have been incorporated into
the domestic legislation of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. A good example is on Part III of
the LOSC governing the passage of vessels transiting straits used for international navigation.
Indonesia is the only littoral State that has enacted laws on the application of transit passage
through the Indonesian side of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.202 However, there is no
domestic provision in Indonesia that covers the application of Article 233 of the LOSC on
environmental safeguards in straits used for international navigation. Malaysian and Singaporean
domestic law is silent on transit passage, as well as on Article 233 of the LOSC. 203 This would
create a situation which may be described as a lacuna within a lacuna.
<http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/security/06103Valencia.html/>; Table 2-7 of Chapter 2
of this Thesis shows that in 2007, most vessels that navigated the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were either
Panamanian or Liberian-flagged vessels.
202

Article 13(1) of the Government Regulation No. 36 Year 2002 on the Rights and Duties of Foreign Vessels in
Exercising Innocent Passage through Indonesian waters provides for the application of transit passage through
Indonesian waters forming straits used for international navigation namely the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. See
Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pembangunan, Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 36 Tahun 2002 Tentang Hak dan
Kewajiban Kapal Asing Dalam Melaksanakan Lintas Damai Melalui Perairan Indonesia (2002) Badan Pengawasan
Keuangan dan Pembangunan <http://www.bpkp.go.id/unit/hukum/pp/2002/036-02.pdf>.
203

Even though Singaporean laws are silent on transit passage, Singapore has issued a number of Port Marine
Circulars enforced under the Maritime and Port Authority Act on navigation through Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. For example, Port Marine Circular No. 65 of 1998 provides for the application of the mandatory ship
reporting system in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In addition, Port Marine Circular No. 20 of 2006 stipulates
the rules on safety of navigation in the Singapore Strait while Port Marine Circular No. 13 of 1999 governs the
navigation in the Singapore Strait TSS. See Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), Port marine circulars
(2009) MPA <http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/port_and_shipping/circulars_and_notices/port_marine_circulars.page>.
Like Singapore, Malaysian law has no provisions on the transit passage regime. Malaysia has a regulation namely
the Merchant Shipping (Collision Regulations) (Rules for Vessels Navigating through the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore) Order which regulates vessels transiting the Malaysian side of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. This
regulation incorporated the IMO Resolution A. 375(X) on Navigation through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
into the Malaysian domestic application. See Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Incorporation of International Law
Rules in Regulating Shipping in Straits of Malacca and Singapore: A Study of the Littoral States’ National Laws and
Policies’ (Paper presented at the Third International Conference on International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 2010).
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It is an established fact that the application of the transit passage regime has placed the littoral
States in a disadvantaged position, where these States have no power to impede or hamper the
passage of transiting ships.204 The littoral States can detain vessels that do not comply with the
laws and regulations on marine pollution only if these vessels enter or call at any of their ports.205
The failure of the littoral States to enact domestic laws on transit passage complicates this
situation. This is based on the fact that there are no domestic laws governing transit passage
while this is the navigational regime exercised by the approximately 399 vessels passing the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore every day.206

Should an offending vessel violate any rules of transit passage as stipulated in Article 233 of the
LOSC, it would thus be difficult for the littoral States to take action against the offending vessel
as there are no domestic provisions on the application of the transit passage regime to be referred
to. The already limited powers conferred by the LOSC through the regime of transit passage are
rendered even more limited by the absence of domestic provisions governing the passage of
vessels through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Ultimately, the littoral States may have to
directly refer to the provisions of the LOSC and not their domestic provision governing the
transit passage regime.

6.5

CONCLUSION

Following the introductory section, the second part of this Chapter examined and analysed the
key conventions relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment of straits
used for international navigation. The LOSC is now regarded as the constitution that governs the
laws on the protection and preservation of the marine environment. It acknowledges and
recognises the operations of many important international conventions; namely, MARPOL
73/78, COLREGs and SOLAS, all of which were created by the IMO. Part XII of the LOSC

204

Article 44 of the LOSC stipulates that ‘States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage…There shall be
no suspension of transit passage’.
205

Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008), 284.

206

Shigeki Sakamoto, ‘Non-State Actors’ Role in the Co-operative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore- Seeking to Substantiate UNCLOS Article 43’ (Paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety
and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008), 2.
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confers an obligation on all States to devise and formulate international regulations to protect and
preserve the marine environment.

The issue raised in the third part of this Chapter is on the nexus between Part III and Article 233
of Part XII of the LOSC, which is unclear. The language used in Article 233 is ambiguous, to the
extent that it can cause confusion in its implementation. Article 233 only allows the littoral States
to take appropriate measures against vessels transiting straits used for international navigation if
they have caused ‘major damage’ to the marine environment of the strait. As a result of the
uncertainty in the interpretation of the term ‘major damage’, it is arguable that transiting vessels
may indirectly be permitted to pollute the strait if the pollution is minor.
The fourth part of this Chapter briefly discussed the status of the littoral States’ ratification of the
related IMO conventions on safety of navigation and the control of vessel-source pollution. The
key point drawn here is that the LOSC has placed limitations on the littoral States, to the extent
that they may only formulate laws by giving effect to the accepted international regulations. The
limitations stipulated under international law affect the operations of the domestic legislation that
are formulated based on the accepted international standards.

Based on these findings, this Chapter concludes firstly that Article 233 of the LOSC is not
effective in assisting the States bordering straits to protect and preserve the marine environment
of their territorial straits. Second, it is not too simplistic to contend that the LOSC favours
shipping over the protection of the marine environment of straits.

In order to remedy the limited enforcement powers of States bordering straits, the LOSC has
recommended that voluntary co-operation should be fostered between States bordering straits
and the user States to protect and preserve the marine environment of straits. The co-operative
mechanisms operating in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are discussed further in Chapter 7
of this Thesis.
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CHAPTER 7.
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CO-OPERATION FRAMEWORKS
7.1

INTRODUCTION

The LOSC has provided the international legal framework on environmental safeguards with
respect to the protection of straits from vessel-source marine pollution. However, the current
legal framework confers limited enforcement powers on States bordering straits as transit
passage is a navigational right that could not be suspended.1 Therefore, Article 43 was inserted in
the LOSC with the objective of encouraging States bordering straits, as well as the user States, to
work together and co-operate in managing the marine environment of straits.2

This Chapter is structured into four parts. The first part discusses the application of Article 43 of
the LOSC on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The second part focuses on the global level
co-operation between the littoral States and the user States. The third part elaborates on the cooperation forged between the littoral States at the regional level under the Tripartite Technical
Experts Group (TTEG). The fourth part of the Chapter concludes that the current co-operation
frameworks have not been effective in protecting the marine environment of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore from the effects of heavy shipping activities.

* This Chapter has been published (wholly or in part) in the following peer-reviewed journals:
(a) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Legal Feasibility of the Imposition of a Traffic Limitation Scheme
in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011)
1(6) International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 122-130;
(b) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for
International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 3(4) Asian Politics
& Policy, 501-526;
(c) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Legal Feasibility of Imposing Shipping Controls in Straits Used
for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 2(9) OIDA
International Journal of Sustainable Development, 69-82;
(d) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Protecting Vital Sea Lines of Communication: A Study of the Proposed
Designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area’ (2012) 57
Ocean & Coastal Management, 79-94.
1

Article 44 of the LOSC stipulates that ‘States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage…There shall be no
suspension of transit passage’.
2

Satya N. Nandan, ‘The Management of Straits used for International Navigation: International Cooperation in
Malacca and Singapore Straits’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 433-436.
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7.2

ARTICLE 43 OF THE LOSC

Most straits around the world, such as the Strait of Dover, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore are busy international maritime chokepoints and therefore they are
likely to be highly exposed to the threats of marine pollution.3 The issue relating to compensation
to States bordering straits was discussed by the Sea-Bed Committee during UNCLOS III.4
Considering the significant duties of States bordering straits to maintain and facilitate safe
passage, which could be expensive, Malta proposed the establishment of a charging mechanism
scheme to impose equitable charges without discrimination that would be payable by all vessels
using the straits.5

Malaysia also submitted an informal proposal on provisions for levying charges on foreign
ships.6 Nevertheless, these proposals did not receive sufficient support from UNCLOS III
delegates.7 In attempting to balance the needs of the maritime States as well as States bordering
straits, the UK proposed to include a provision that may allow both to co-operate in safeguarding
the marine environment of straits.8 This proposal from the UK was supported and was inserted
into the LOSC as Article 43, which reads:

User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement cooperate:
(a)
in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of
necessary navigational and safety aids or other
improvements in aid of international navigation; and;
(b)
for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from
ships.

3

See Section 5.2.2 of Chapter 5 of this Thesis.

4

Myron H. Nordquist (ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (Volume II),
Second Committee: Articles 1 to 85, Annexes I and II and Final Act, Annex II (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 380-383;
See Section 3.3.1.3 of Chapter 3 of this Thesis.
5

Myron H. Nordquist (ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (Volume II),
Second Committee: Articles 1 to 85, Annexes I and II and Final Act, Annex II (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 380-383.
6

Ibid.

7

Ibid.

8

S.N. Nandan and D.H. Anderson, ‘Straits Used for International Navigation: A Commentary on Part III of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982’ in Hugo Caminos (ed), Law of the Sea (Dartmouth, 2001),
101-102.
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As earlier discussed in Chapter 3, Malaysia and Indonesia were among the States bordering
straits that were adamant in contending that innocent passage should be the regime governing the
passage of all vessels through straits used for international navigation. 9 Article 43 was adopted as
an inducement to States bordering straits to accept the regime of transit passage through straits
used for international navigation, as they would only do so if assurance could be provided on
improvements to the safety of navigation and on the protection of the environment from vesselsource pollution.10 The provisions of Article 43 seem to provide a framework of promoting
sustainable development in straits used for international navigation.

Article 43 seeks to promote the establishment of co-operative measures between user States and
States bordering straits in controlling vessel-source pollution and in maintaining the well-being
of the marine environment of straits used for international navigation. 11 It is left to the littoral
States, user States and other stakeholders to establish the mode and mechanisms of cooperation.12 Based on the wording of Article 43, it could be understood that it only mandates cooperation if there is some form of arrangement by virtue of agreement between States bordering
straits and the user States.13 Since Article 26(1) of the LOSC has confined the coastal State’s
regulatory powers in regulating shipping traffic to its territorial strait, the most appropriate way
to compensate this situation may be through fostering bilateral or multilateral co-operation
between States bordering straits and the user States.14
Instead of using the mandatory word ‘shall’, Article 43 of the LOSC employed the word ‘should’
indicating that co-operation is not mandatory and is more of a declaration of intention rather than
9

See Section 3.3.1.3 of Chapter 3 of this Thesis.

10

Hasjim Djalal, ‘Funding and Managing International Partnership for the Malacca and Singapore Straits Consonant
with Article 43 of the UNCLOS 1982’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 457.
11

S.N. Nandan and D.H. Anderson, ‘Straits Used for International Navigation: A Commentary on Part III of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982’ in Hugo Caminos (ed), Law of the Sea (Dartmouth, 2001),
101.
12

S. Tiwari, ‘Legal Mechanisms for Establishing a Fund’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International &
Comparative Laws, 470-474.
13

Bernard H. Oxman, ‘Observations on the Interpretation and Application of Article 43 of UNCLOS with Particular
Reference to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (1998) 2 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative
Laws, 409-410.
14

Jose A. de Yturriaga, Straits Used For International Navigation: A Spanish Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff, 1991),
201.
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a source of real obligation for both users and States bordering straits.15 Although the term
‘should’ may connote that co-operation under Article 43 is ‘recommendatory’ in nature, it
nevertheless does imply a measure of obligation for co-operation between the user States and the
littoral States.16 Nonetheless, such assistance is not a condition of passage.17 Should a user state
refuse to co-operate, Article 43 does not provide the States bordering straits any powers to
impede the passage of ships flying the flag of that State, as Article 38 of the LOSC has
specifically stipulated that transit passage is a right that is not subject to suspension.18
Article 43 uses the term ‘user States’ rather than ‘users’, which as far as terminology is
concerned, may have a narrower meaning than the term ‘user’. Anderson opined that although
the concept of ‘user States’ is not defined, it nevertheless includes port States (whether of
departure or destination) and the flag States of ships passing through a strait or any States which
benefit directly or indirectly from navigation through a strait.19 Van Dyke shared the same view
by reiterating that the term ‘user States’ must include all States that benefit from using the straits,
which includes exporting States, receiving States and States of ship-owners, insurers of ships and
cargoes, and major oil corporations whose global trade is facilitated by using the straits.20

From its wording, it is clear that Article 43 does not contemplate the idea put forward by Malta
on a system of tolls or user charges as co-operation is voluntary in nature and this can only be
achieved if there is an agreement between States bordering straits and the users on toll

15

Ibid.

16

Satya N. Nandan, ‘The Management of Straits used for International Navigation: International Cooperation in
Malacca and Singapore Straits’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 429-433; Hasjim
Djalal, ‘Funding and Managing International Partnership for the Malacca and Singapore Straits Consonant with
Article 43 of the UNCLOS 1982’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 466-468.
17

Satya N. Nandan, ‘The Management of Straits used for International Navigation: International Cooperation in
Malacca and Singapore Straits’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 432-433.
18

Article 38(1) of the LOSC reads ‘…all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, which shall not be
impeded…’.
19

David H. Anderson, ‘Funding and Managing International Partnerships for the Malacca and Singapore Straits,
Consonant with Article 43 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of
International & Comparative Laws, 447.
20

Jon M. Van Dyke, ‘Transit Passage Through International Straits’ in Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman and Susan
J. Rolston (eds), The Future of Ocean Regime-Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2009), 193-194.
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imposition.21 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, it is generally recognised that Article 43 signifies a
measure of obligation on user States to co-operate with States bordering straits.22 However, the
States bordering straits are the parties that must take the leading role to decide on the nature and
extent of assistance they seek in such a co-operative scheme.23

Not much emphasis was given to Article 43 of the LOSC in the first 20 years since the LOSC
came into force in 1982.24 However, given the increase in shipping traffic which has caused
problems of vessel-source pollution and maritime security, co-operation has taken place between
the littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore with the users of the Straits both at the
regional and international levels, executed in accordance with the provisions of Article 43 of the
LOSC.25 It is therefore imperative to examine and observe the effectiveness of the co-operation
schemes advocated by Article 43 of the LOSC in promoting sustainable development in these
two critical sea lines of communication.

7.3

CO-OPERATION MECHANISMS

For the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, co-operation on the safety of navigation and protection
of the marine environment has occurred at both global and regional levels. Global level cooperation mechanisms include those between the littoral States and the IMO and those between
the littoral States and certain user States. At the regional level, these co-operation mechanisms
include the co-operation forged between the littoral States themselves under the TTEG. There is
ongoing co-operation between the littoral States and the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) on the protection on the environment. Nevertheless the co-operation between the

21

Myron H. Nordquist (ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary (Volume II),
Second Committee: Articles 1 to 85, Annexes I and II and Final Act, Annex II (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 380-383.
22

United Nations (UN), ‘Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General (Fifty-fifth Session)’ (UN,
2000), 17-18.
23

S. Tiwari, ‘Legal Mechanisms for Establishing a Fund’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International &
Comparative Laws, 471-472.
24

Hasjim Djalal, ‘The Regime of Managing Safety and Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper
presented at the Sixth MIMA Conference of the Straits of Malacca: Charting the Future, Kuala Lumpur, 2009), 131136.
25

Ibid.
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littoral States and ASEAN is not the one promoted by Article 43 of the LOSC and does not focus
specifically on the protection of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
As such, matters relating to the existing co-operation between the littoral States and ASEAN are
not discussed in this Chapter.

7.3.1 Efforts to Ensure Safe Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

The earliest efforts to manage the administration of the Straits at the global level were initiated
well before the LOSC entered into force, with the establishment of the Malacca Straits Council
(MSC), a co-operative arrangement between the three littoral States and Japan.26 With its initial
capital of US $8 million injected by Japan, the MSC, together with the littoral States, has carried
out works such as surveys, dredging activities, removal of wrecks and installing aids to
navigation devices along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.27 Through the MSC, Japan
contributed a total of US $113 million for the maintenance of navigational aids from 1968–2005
and a total of US $13 million for environmental protection from the period of 1973–2005.28

In 1981, the MSC (for and on behalf of the Japanese Non-Governmental Associations) and the
Governments of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with Japan to create a Revolving Fund to combat oil pollution from ships in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore with initial contributions amounting to ¥ 400 million.29 The Fund was
used by Malaysia and Indonesia in combating the oil spill from the Nagasaki Spirit in 1992 and
26

Nippon Maritime Center (NMC), Malacca Straits Council: Towards Enhancing the Navigational Safety and
Preserving the Marine Environment in the Straits (2005) NMC <http://www.nmc.com.sg/MSC.pdf>; Abdul Aziz
bin Abdullah and Rakish Suppiah, ‘Safety of Navigation and Institutional Framework in the Straits of Malacca’ in
H.M. Ibrahim and Hairul Anuar Husin (eds), Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective (Maritime
Institute of Malaysia, 2008), 177-178.
27

Nippon Maritime Center (NMC), Malacca Straits Council: Towards Enhancing the Navigational Safety and
Preserving the Marine Environment in the Straits (2005) NMC <http://www.nmc.com.sg/MSC.pdf>.
28

Joshua H. Ho, ‘Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:
The Co-operative Mechanism’ (2009) 40(2) Ocean Development and International Law, 237-240.
29

Amelia Emran, The Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Master of
Maritime Studies (Research) Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2007), 157-158; Teh Kong Leong, ‘The Revolving
Fund: A Unique Facility’ in Hamzah Ahmad (ed), The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade,
Funding & Navigational Safety (Pelanduk, 1997), 247-250; Jalila Abdul Jalil, ‘Policies and Legislative Practices in
the Straits of Malacca’ in H.M Ibrahim and Hairul Anuar Husin (eds), Profile of the Strait of Malacca: Malaysia’s
Perspective (Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2008), 169.
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by the Indonesian government in 2000 in handling the oil spill caused by the Natuna Sea
grounding.30 In the former case, Malaysia used US $580,000 and Indonesia withdrew US
$660,000 from the Fund. In the latter case, Indonesia accessed US $500,260 from the Revolving
Fund.31 Between the years 1969–2003, the MSC engaged in the following activities (see Table 71):

Activities
Hydrographic survey and production of navigational charts
Installation and maintenance of aids to navigation
Clearance of navigable channels
Donation of an oil skimming vessel and buoy tenders
Tide and current observation
Donation of Revolving Fund for combating oil spills from ships
and to Aids to Navigation Fund

Periods
1969–1975
1969–1975
1973–1981
1975–1976
2002–2003
1976–1979
1981–2010

Table 7-1: Principal Activities Performed by the MSC
(Source: Nippon Maritime Centre)32
Co-operation between Japan and the littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
continued after the LOSC came into force in 1994. Since 1969, Japan has been a user State that
has consistently assisted the littoral States in maintaining the marine environment and promoting
safe navigation in the Straits through financial means or via technological assistance. 33 The
TTEG34 and the MSC, with the assistance of the Japanese government and other Japanese bodies

30

Teh Kong Leong, ‘The Revolving Fund: A Unique Facility’ in Hamzah Ahmad (ed), The Straits of Malacca:
International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety (Pelanduk, 1997), 247-250.
31

Ibid.

32

Nippon Maritime Center (NMC), Malacca Straits Council: Towards Enhancing the Navigational Safety and
Preserving the Marine Environment in the Straits (2005) NMC <http://www.nmc.com.sg/MSC.pdf>.
33

Tommy Koh, ‘New Milestone in Better Straits Cooperation: Article 43 of UNCLOS Helps Keep Malacca,
Singapore Straits Safe, Secure and Clean’, Business Times (Singapore), 2007; Andrin Raj, ‘Japan’s Initiatives in
Security Cooperation in the Straits of Malacca on Maritime Security and in Southeast Asia: Piracy and Maritime
Terrorism’ (The Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), 2009), 34-39.
34

The TTEG had its roots in 1975 when the three littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, in view that
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are to be treated as a single strait in matters pertaining to navigation, have
decided to co-operate in the enhancement of navigational safety in the Straits. See S. Jayakumar, ‘Straits of Malacca
and Singapore: Meeting the Challenges Ahead’ (1998) 2 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws,
429-430. Further discussion on the formation of the TTEG is elaborated in Section 7.3.4 of this Chapter.
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such as the Nippon Foundation, have implemented various safety of navigation measures in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore, including:

(a)

The establishment and implementation of the Routeing System in the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, which incorporates the Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS);35

(b)

The imposition of a 3.5 metre minimum under keel clearance. The under keel clearance
refers to the distance between a ship’s keel and the seabed;36

(c)

The introduction and implementation of the mandatory ship reporting system, the
STRAITREP;37

(d)

The installation of modern and reliable navigational aids along the Straits.38

The northern part of the Strait of Malacca has deep water but the shallower southern part has a
two-lane ship routeing system or TSS.39 The first TSS was introduced in 1977 and was adopted
by the IMO through an Assembly Resolution A.375(X) 1977. It involved areas including One
Fathom Bank, the Strait of Singapore and the Horsburgh Lighthouse Area.40 The water depths on
the eastbound and westbound lanes within the TSS are 23.0 metres and 16.0 metres respectively.
The TSS was amended in 198141 and was again adjusted and extended in 1998 to accommodate
the increased shipping traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.42 It is the longest stretch of
such a TSS in the world and extends up to 265 nautical miles from both ends.43 Once a vessel has
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entered the TSS from the west, the vessel is committed to completing the passage. 44 In
accordance with Article 41(7) of the LOSC, vessels traversing the straits are bound to follow the
prescribed TSS.45
Due to the pressing need to promote safe navigation in two of the world’s shallowest straits that
carry the largest volume of maritime traffic in the Asia Pacific,46 the minimum under keel
clearance requirement was endorsed by the IMO in 1977 in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.47 The TTEG on Safety of Navigation also discussed the minimum under keel
clearance required for vessels transiting the Straits. It became a contentious issue given that the
waters of the Straits are relatively shallow making them environmentally and navigationally
dangerous for large tankers of over 200,000 Dead Weight Tonnes (DWT).48 Malaysia initially
proposed a 4.5 metre under keel clearance, Indonesia 4.4 metres and Singapore 2.5 metres.49 As
a compromise, the TTEG on maritime safety agreed on an under keel clearance of 3.5 metres and
this was endorsed by the IMO through the Assembly Resolution A 375(X).50 To further enhance
the navigational safety of vessels plying the Straits, the littoral States, through Resolution A
375(X), have also introduced the designated deep water route by deep draught vessels.
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addition, very large crude carriers and deep draught vessels are also required not to navigate at a
speed of more than 12 knots over the ground.52

Besides the TSS and under keel clearance requirements, the littoral States, with the assistance of
the members of the international community, have implemented various navigational safety
measures in the Straits such as the Vessel Traffic Management System (VTS) in 1997 and the
Mandatory Ship Reporting System (STRAITREP) in 1998.53 STRAITREP came into force
through IMO Resolution MSC.73 (69) following the recommendation of the three littoral
States.54 All tankers that transit the Straits which are of 300 Gross Registered Tonnage and above
and those that are 50 metres or more in length are required to report to STRAITREP. 55 The
Masters of these vessels must report to the VTS Control Centres providing details including the
name of their ship, their call sign, IMO identification number, position, hazardous cargo and
deficiencies affecting the ship that may interrupt navigation. 56 The Strait of Malacca is equipped
with state-of-the art VTS Control Centres established in Port Klang and Tanjung Piai, with 7
sectors of monitoring stations, starting from the northern part of the Strait and extending to the
entrance to the Strait of Singapore at Tanjung Piai.57

In 2004, the safety of navigation in the Strait of Malacca was further enhanced with the
installation of 7 Automatic Identification System (AIS) bases in One Fathom Bank, Bukit Jugra,
Tanjung Tuan, Pulau Undan, Bukit Segenting, Mudah Selatan and Tanjung Piai which together
cover an area of approximately 180 nautical miles in that particular segment of the Strait of
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Malacca.58 The control centre of the AIS is in Port Klang.59 The AIS enables the exchange of
data between the control centre and the ship. Ships may obtain details on sailing conditions in the
Strait, the wind velocity and direction, air temperature, current sea levels and directions as well
as tidal height and the control centre may request vessel information including identification,
destination, estimated time of arrival and type of cargo carried.60 With the increasing volume of
shipping traffic in the Straits, especially over the last decade, efforts have been made to increase
the co-operation between user States and the littoral States under Article 43 of the LOSC.

7.3.2 Towards the Creation of a Co-operative Mechanism

The 2005 IMO Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety,
Security and Environmental Protection (Jakarta Meeting) between the littoral States, user States
and the IMO was one of the products of Protection of Vital Shipping Lanes Initiative of the IMO
in 2004.61 This meeting was a milestone in fostering better co-operation between these entities in
managing the safety of navigation and the protection of the marine environment of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore.62 The Jakarta Meeting led to the endorsement of the Jakarta Statement
on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore which established a mechanism through which the three littoral States could meet with
the users to discuss matters relating to maritime safety and security as well as the environmental
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protection of the Straits.63 This included the possibility of fostering more comprehensive burden
sharing between the littoral States and the user States.64 The developments achieved in Jakarta
were further discussed at the 2006 Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection (Kuala Lumpur Meeting).
The Kuala Lumpur Meeting led to the adoption of the Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement
of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which
included agreement on the following matters:

(a)

Support for the work of the TTEG on Safety of Navigation, in enhancing the safety of
navigation and in protecting the marine environment in the Straits,65

(b)

Support for the continuous efforts of the littoral States and the proposed co-operative
mechanism as presented by the littoral States on safety of navigation and environmental
protection, which will promote dialogue and facilitate close co-operation between the
littoral States, user States, shipping industry and other stakeholders;66

(c)

Support for the projects presented at the Kuala Lumpur Meeting for enhancing the safety
of navigation and environmental protection;67

(d)

That the littoral States, user States, the shipping industry and other stakeholders should
co-operate towards the establishment of a mechanism for voluntary funding of the above
projects and the maintenance and renewal of the aids to navigation in the Straits;68
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(e)

That the littoral States should continue their efforts towards enhancing maritime security
in the Straits.69

During the Kuala Lumpur Meeting, Japan indicated that it may have to reduce its funding for
maintenance activities in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 70 This was due to a more
competitive business environment as well as the fact that Japan’s usage of the Straits had
decreased over the 10-year period from 1994–2004.71 Following these setbacks at the Kuala
Lumpur Meeting, the Nippon Foundation, together with MIMA, the Centre for Southeast Asian
Studies, Indonesia and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore
organised a Symposium on the Enhancement of Safety of Navigation and the Environmental
Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (2007 Symposium) in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia. This Symposium produced a consensus document which concluded that:

(a)

The enhancement of safety of navigation and environmental protection of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore should be based on these points:
i.

The Straits would continue to be important for shipping in prospective years. Hence,
with more transiting ships, the pollution risks to the biodiversity of the marine
environment would also increase;72

ii.

The increasing density of navigational traffic means that the cost of providing stateof-the-art aids to navigation facilities would also soar;73

iii.

The application of Article 43 should be reinforced; considering that shipping
industries and other users gain direct benefit from using the Straits, the burden of
maintaining the Straits should not rest solely on the shoulders of the littoral States;74
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(b)

The burden sharing regime should be based on the principle of Article 43, respecting the
sovereignty of the littoral States;75

(c)

A fund for safety of navigation and environmental protection, like the one discussed in
the Kuala Lumpur Meeting, should be established to provide a channel for shipping
companies and other users to voluntarily provide financial support to maintain the aids to
navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The fund is described as the Aids to
Navigation Fund;76

(d)

The 2007 Symposium welcomes any support and interest shown from various parties
namely the Nippon Foundation, the Japanese Shipowner’s Association, the International
Chamber of Shipping and INTERTANKO;77

(e)

The 2007 Symposium supports the work towards strengthening co-operation between the
littoral States and the users.78

The developments achieved in both the Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta Meetings were affirmed and
continued in the 2007 IMO Singapore Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:
Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection (Singapore Meeting). Although this
meeting did not introduce any new measures,79 it did issue the Singapore Statement on
Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore where the littoral States, user States and the IMO agreed on the following matters:

(a)

The work of the TTEG on Safety of Navigation, in enhancing the safety of navigation
and in protecting the marine environment in the Straits, should continue to be supported
and encouraged;80
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(b)

The Co-operative Mechanism should be supported and encouraged;81

(c)

User States, the shipping industry and other stakeholders should seek to participate in and
endeavour to contribute, on a voluntary basis, to the work of the Co-operative
Mechanism;82

(d)

The projects presented at the Kuala Lumpur Meeting or parts thereof which have not yet
attracted sponsors should be supported;83 and

(e)

The littoral States should continue their efforts towards enhancing maritime security in
the Straits and such efforts should be supported and encouraged.84

7.3.2.1

The Co-operative Mechanism

The idea of forming a Co-operative Mechanism was put forward in the Kuala Lumpur Meeting
in 2006 and was fully endorsed at the Singapore Meeting a year later.85 The Co-operative
Mechanism was formally accepted by the Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian Governments
and was recognised as a permanent agenda item of the TTEG on the Safety of Navigation in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore at its 32nd meeting in Manado, Indonesia, in October 2007.86
The Co-operative Mechanism reflects the success in enhancing co-operation between the littoral
States and the user States supported by the LOSC itself in Article 43.87 In fact, this co-operative
mechanism is the first attempt by the international community to put Article 43 of the LOSC into
application.88 The scope of the Co-operative Mechanism focuses on three components:
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(i)

A Co-operation Forum for dialogue and discussion;89

(ii)

A Project Co-ordination Committee (PCC) on the implementation of projects in cooperation with sponsoring users/stakeholders;90 and

(iii)

The Aids to Navigation Fund (the Fund) to receive direct financial contributions for
renewal and maintenance of aids to navigation.91

7.3.2.1.1

The Co-operation Forum

Kuala Lumpur hosted the first Co-operation Forum (the Forum) on 27 and 28 May 2009, which
was attended by about 90 participants from the littoral States, 17 user States and nine
organisations.92 The Forum explored possible areas of co-operation under the Co-operative
Mechanism and the participants of the Forum were updated on the state of preparedness to
respond to oil spill incidents in the Straits as well as the status and conditions of aids to
navigation and traffic in the Straits.93 In other words, the Forum acts as the main avenue for
interested user States and other interested parties to meet and co-operate with the littoral States,
and any outcomes of the Forum should then be communicated to the TTEG and subsequently to
the IMO if necessary.94
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The second Co-operation Forum was held in Singapore in concurrence with the TTEG of Safety
of Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore from 12–13 of October 2009.95 This
meeting was mainly focused on the issue of the shipping traffic carrying capacity of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore.96

The third Co-operation Forum was held in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, in October 2010, and a
number of projects relating to the safety of navigation and marine environmental protection were
discussed.97 The IMO representatives to the Forum presented updates on the IMO Straits Trust
Fund and other ongoing projects including the Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) Project,98
which was reported to have undergone positive progress.99 Besides the MEH, the IMO also
introduced e-Navigation, a navigational technology that will harmonise the collection,
integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of marine information on board and ashore by
electronic means, which will then improve navigational safety of plying vessels.100
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At the same forum, Singapore raised the issue of criss-crossing traffic through the TSS along the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore.101 As discussed in Chapter 5, this has been one of the main
navigational hazards for ships transiting the Straits.102 The Malaysian delegation presented
updates of the two projects led by Malaysia under the Project Co-ordination Committee
(PCC).103 Overall, like the first and the second Co-operation Forums, the 2010 Co-operation
Forum in Yogyakarta demonstrated close co-operation and positive commitments from both
users and littoral States to ensure safe navigation and marine environmental protection are
promoted in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.104 Based on these positive developments, the
Co-operation Forum will continue to play its role in promoting future co-operative ventures in
due course. Recently, the fourth Co-operation Forum was successfully held in Melaka, Malaysia
in October 2011, and many issues relating to the enhancement of the protection of the marine
environment of Straits of Malacca and Singapore were discussed.105

7.3.2.1.2

The Project Co-ordination Committee

The first Meeting of the PCC was held in Kuala Lumpur on 29 May 2008, and was attended by
the littoral States, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea and the US, and included interested
organisations such as the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and the IMO.106
The PCC Meeting discussed the status of seven projects proposed at the Kuala Lumpur and
Singapore Meetings.107 Table 7-2 shows the status of these projects:
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Projects
Project 1:
Removal of wrecks in the TSS in the Straits

Project 2:
Co-operation and capacity building on
hazardous and noxious substance (HNS)
preparedness and response in the Straits

Status
The US has indicated its willingness to explore the
possibility of participating in this project.
India agreed to share its expertise in conducting a
hydrographic survey in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.
Australia has assisted in the establishment of an HNS
databank and the methodology to develop computerbased risk assessment.
The US has agreed to explore the possibility of
developing a Joint Standard Operating Procedure for
HNS response in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Project 3:
Demonstration project of Class B Automatic
Identification System (AIS) transponder on
small ships

Japan and South Korea agreed to provide transponder
hardware in the form of ship-based AIS Class B
transponders.
Australia has indicated its intention to provide
technical expertise towards the AIS design.

Project 4:
Setting up of a tide, current and wind
measurement system for the Straits

China is interested in providing technical expertise for
the implementation of this project by conducting an
on-site survey to determine the exact project scope.
The US is prepared to share its expertise particularly in
implementing the system currently in operation in the
US to be used in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Project 5:
Replacement and maintenance of aids to
navigation in the Straits

Japan and South Korea reiterated their commitments to
assist in replacing the damaged and defunct aids to
navigation under this project.

Project 6:
Replacement of aids to navigation destroyed or
damaged by tsunami in December 2004
Project 7:
Feasibility Study on the Establishment of
Emergency Towing Vessel service in the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore

China and Indonesia will undertake jointly to replace 7
aids to navigation on the northern part of the province
of Aceh, Indonesia.
This project is the newest inclusion to the PCC and is
sponsored by the IMO and Australia.

Table 7-2: The Status of the Six Projects under the Co-operative Mechanism in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore (Source: Marine Department of Malaysia)108
Each littoral State has agreed to lead two of these projects with Malaysia co-ordinating Projects 1
and 2, Singapore to manage Projects 3, 4 and 7 while Indonesia will run Projects 5 and 6.109
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During the Third Co-operation Forum held in 2008, Malaysia updated the developments of
Project 1 and reported that there are currently approximately 11 identified wrecks within the
TSS.110 These wrecks may cause a bottleneck effect as some of them are located at the narrow
bend of the TSS.111 Therefore, Malaysia has proposed to call for more potential contributors to
participate in areas to be explored, which include hydrographic surveying, capacity building and
wreck monitoring.112 India has shown interest by organising a Truncated Course Bathymetric
Survey and Wreck Investigation early in March 2010 in which the littoral States participated.113
Germany has consulted with Malaysia to explore possible areas in which Germany may be able
co-operate in the future.114

With regard to Project 2, Malaysia reiterated that once this project is up and running, it will
enhance the preparedness and response capability of the littoral States to manage any shipsourced pollution incidents involving HNS.115 Malaysia noted that the estimated cost for the
entire Project 2 were around US $3.5 million.116 China and the US assisted Malaysia in
conducting the assessment study for this Project in 2007.117 In 2008, Australia contributed its
technical expertise towards the realisation of Project 2 in establishing an HNS Databank and
developing a computer-based risk assessment to combat HNS spill incidents.118 Malaysia is
currently in consultation with the IMO and has submitted a proposal to apply for the utilisation
of the IMO Straits Trust Fund.119 to finance this project.120 The European Commission (EC)
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concluded a Grant Agreement with the Secretariat of the IMO Straits Trust Fund in December
2010 for the contribution of € 500,000 to the Co-operative Mechanism for Project 2;121 hence the
future development of this project looks promising.122

As the co-ordinator of Projects 3 and 4, Singapore reported that Project 3 has been successfully
completed and Project 4 is still ongoing.123 Project 4 has the objective of enhancing safety of
navigation by providing real-time tidal information for vessels transiting in shallow waters and
accurate tide, current and wind data to promote an efficient response to any pollution incidents
occurring in the Straits.124 Project 4 has received support from China and India, which have been
participating since 2007 and 2008 respectively.125 The Fund currently holds US $1,021,032.22
contributed by China and India for the implementation of Stage 1 of Project 4.126 The Emergency
Towing Vessel service is the newest inclusion in the PCC, and Singapore is the leader of this
project. During the 4th Co-operation Forum held in October 2011 it was reported that this project
is still undergoing an assessment study sponsored by the IMO and Australia.127

This IMO Straits Trust Fund is different with that of Aids to Navigation Fund established under the Co-operation
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Projects 5 and 6 on the replacement and maintenance of aids to navigation in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are led by Indonesia. With regard to Project 5, at the 4th Cooperation
Forum it was reported that the 2010 maintenance work programme had been completed and the
2011 work programme was underway.128 Project 6 involves the replacement of aids to navigation
that were destroyed or damaged by the tsunami in December 2004.129 Indonesia and China are
currently co-operating on the replacement of two of seven identified aids to navigation; namely,
Ule Lhuee and the Malahayati Light Beacon in Aceh.130

The support and encouraging responses given by various user States including the US, Australia,
China, India, Japan and South Korea towards these projects are positive developments towards
promoting more voluntary participation and contribution to the seven projects of the PCC which
currently are still at their initial stages of implementation.131

7.3.2.1.3

The Aids to Navigation Fund

The littoral States have consistently asserted that the burden of maintaining aids to navigation in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore should not be exclusively placed upon the littoral States of
the Straits.132 Given the sheer volume of shipping and traffic, it has been a constant challenge to
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the littoral States to ensure that navigational safety, environmental protection and maritime
security are guaranteed for mariners in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 133 There are
currently about 51 aid to navigation instruments along the waters of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore with 18 in Malaysian waters, 28 in Indonesian waters and 5 in Singaporean waters.134

Two of the littoral States are developing economies and as such they do not have the financial
means available to their developed counterparts which are major users of the Straits.135 For
instance, over the years Malaysia has spent more than US $60 million to install, maintain and
upgrade various navigational aids in the Strait of Malacca, a considerable sum to be borne by a
developing country which has limited resources and other more pressing needs. 136 For these
reasons, the Aids to Navigation Fund (the Fund) was established in 2007 under the umbrella of
the Co-operative Mechanism. The Fund may accept direct financial contributions for the renewal
and maintenance of aids to navigation from any State or interested organisation.137 This Aids to
Navigation Fund is different to that of Projects 5 and 6 led by Indonesia on the maintenance of
aids to navigation, as the Fund is not a project created under the PCC.

At present, only Malaysia and Indonesia are utilising the Fund as Singapore has indicated that it
will manage the maintenance of five aids to navigation facilities within its territorial waters
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itself.138 In realising the ten-year Plan Maintenance Programme (PMP) for aids to navigation in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Marine Department of Malaysia, which acted as the
Secretariat to the Fund, conducted an assessment survey in 2008. This survey showed that the
maintenance and replacement costs of aids to navigation under the PMP for Malaysia and
Indonesia is estimated to be around US $54,823,998 as shown in Table 7-3:

Cost Year 1–Year 10 (US $)
Indonesia
Maintenance
Operational
Replacement
Total

8,538,871
6,512,500
16,986,842
32,038,213

Malaysia
Maintenance
Operational
Replacement
Total

9,890,374
4,094,523
8,800,888
22,785,785

TOTAL (MALAYSIA+INDONESIA)

54,823,998

Table 7-3: PMP on the Operations and Maintenance of Aids to Navigation: 10 Year Budget
Estimation (Source: TTEG)139
Based on these figures, the average maintenance cost would be US $5,482,399.80 or
approximately around US $5.5 million per year.

Malaysia was the first host of the Aids to Navigation Fund (the Fund) for a period of three years
until 31 December 2010, and the official currency for the Fund is the American dollar.140
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Malaysia’s tenure as host and Chairman of the Fund ended on 31 December 2010. However,
during the 5th Aids to Navigation Fund Committee Meeting in Langkawi, Malaysia proposed that
its tenure as a host or chairman of the Fund should be extended for another two years until the
end of 2012.141 Malaysia argued that without the distraction of the change in the fund’s
administration in such a short time, it would be more feasible for Malaysia and its littoral
counterparts to focus on promoting and encouraging more user States to make contributions.142
The proposal was granted and Malaysia is now the Chairman of the Fund until 2012.143
The Marine Department of Malaysia was appointed to manage the Fund. 144 To put the Fund into
operation, a trust account in the name of the ‘Aids to Navigation Fund’ was opened with a local
bank in Malaysia.145 The Director General of the Marine Department was the Chairman of the
Fund Committee and a Secretariat was formed to manage the daily operations of the Fund during
the Fund Committee Meetings.146 The Fund Committee met four times between the years 2008–
2009, in Penang, Kuching, Malacca and Johor Bahru, and these meetings were attended by
representatives from China, Greece, Japan, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the
Nippon Foundation, the MSC, the Middle East Navigation Aids Service (MENAS) and the
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IMO.147 So far, Japan and the UAE have consistently contributed to the Fund and hence, in 2008,
a sum of almost US $1.31 million was raised.

In 2009, the UAE and MENAS contributed another US $100,000 and US $1 million respectively
to the Fund.148 The same year, Japan, through MSC, agreed to donate US $500,000 to the
Fund.149 South Korea too, has shown their readiness to contribute in US dollars a sum valued at
100 million Korean Won.150 With increasing numbers of parties showing interest in participating
and making contributions, it is expected that the Fund will receive more contributions in the
future. If the Fund continues to receive more financial assistance over the coming years, this will
help to realise an active co-operative mechanism that may benefit both the littoral States and the
users. Table 7-4 summarises the contributions from 2008–2010.

Year
Contribution (US $)

2008
1,451,000

2009
5,007,532

2010
3,228,235

2011
2,934,500

Table 7-4: Total Contributions to the Aids to Navigation Fund (2008–2011)
(Source: MIMA & Marine Department of Peninsular Malaysia) 151
As shown in Table 7-4, contributions have decreased since 2009, with only approximately US
$2.94 million contributed by the end of 2011. In contrast, the average cost for maintaining the
aid to navigation facilities has increased from approximately US $1.4 million to US $5.5 million,
as shown in Table 7-5:
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Year
2008
2009
2010
2011

Contribution (US $)
1,451,000
5,007,532
3,228,235
2,934,500

Annual Average Cost (US $)
1,354,000
5,500,000
5,500,000
5,500,000

Table 7-5: Contributions versus Annual Cost of Maintenance of Aid to Navigation Facilities
(Source: MIMA and TTEG)152
Based on the data shown in Table 7-4 and Table 7-5, it is clear that the support given to the Fund
has been inadequate to cope with with the rising costs of the maintenance of the existing aid to
navigation facilities.153 Undeniably, the funds collected are not sufficient to maintain the existing
facilities and in some cases, the littoral States themselves have had to bear these costs.154

7.3.3 Developments after the Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore Meetings

Following the Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore Meetings, the Nippon Foundation and the
Round Table of International Shipping Associations (RTisa) organised the International
Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore, held on 24 November 2008 (2008 Symposium) in Kuala Lumpur. The purpose of the
2008 Symposium was to share updated information and exchange views among the littoral
States, user States and users of the Straits, along with the Nippon Foundation and RTisa, on the
latest developments following the launch of the Co-operative Mechanism at the 2007 IMO
Singapore Meeting and to discuss the various contributions by stakeholders, including the
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shipping industry, under the framework of the Co-operative Mechanism to ensure the safety and
protection of the marine environment.155 The 2008 Symposium acknowledged the importance of
the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) that holds that private stakeholders should
consider, and as a result, make further voluntary contributions to maintain safe navigation in the
Straits.156 CSR can be described as:

Action taken in all business processes that contributes to the
betterment of society at large…in social responsibility, the
stakeholders to whom a company bears a measure of responsibility
have extended beyond the conventional framework of
stakeholders, consumers, employees and other parties relevant to
business transactions to include international and local
communities, the environment (both global and regional),
governments, non profit and nongovernmental organisations, and
all other segments of society that are affected markedly by the
company’s business activities.157
CSR is a concept that encourages shipping companies and other business entities that benefit
from the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to contribute towards the management of the
Straits.158 This may include contributions in the form of financial aid, or any other projects that
help the littoral States to protect the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
that may have been affected by the use of the Straits for international shipping activity. Within
the topic of CSR, the matters discussed in the 2008 Symposium included the burden sharing
mechanism to maintain the aid to navigation facilities along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
and the significance of these facilities in assisting vessels to navigate the Straits, particularly
within the TSS region.159 The high cost of maintaining aid to navigation infrastructure and
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facilities was also addressed.160 In summary, the 2008 Symposium did not introduce any new
developments and primarily discussed matters that had been discussed in previous symposia and
meetings. As with the 2007 Symposium, the 2008 Symposium also aimed to establish a better
co-operative mechanism between the littoral States and the users of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.

The 2008 Symposium was followed by the Sixth MIMA Conference on the Straits of Malacca:
Charting the Future (the 2009 Conference) on 23 June 2009 in Kuala Lumpur. The 2009
Conference discussed the matters already mentioned in previous Symposia, including the Cooperative Mechanism, issues of maritime security and safety of navigation in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. Other matters discussed were the potential designation of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore as a ‘Particularly Sensitive Sea Area’ (PSSA),161 the ongoing TransPeninsula Pipeline Project to divert traffic away from the Straits as well as the shipping traffic
carrying capacity of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.162

The user States of Japan, China, India and the US participated actively in the 2009 Conference
by reiterating their stand that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore should always be open for
navigation.163 Any attempts to impede the free flow of shipping transit would be detrimental to
the global economy.164 The littoral States, particularly Malaysia, stressed that any plan of action
involving the Straits must always consider the need to respect the sovereignty of nations.165
Indonesia expressed its concern over the increasing number of vessels plying the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore and put forward the idea of developing a Straits of Malacca Transit
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Corridor (SMTC) to further enhance navigational safety and maritime security in the Straits.166
At the 2009 Conference, Singapore asserted that as the Straits are indispensible to international
shipping, it is crucial that adequate aid to navigation facilities are provided to minimise the risks
of maritime accidents.167 Singapore has also pledged to work towards ensuring safe shipping and
promoting marine environmental protection in these critical waterways. 168

Overall, the Co-operative Mechanism established in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
between the user States and States bordering straits is seen as a historic breakthrough, since it
represents the first implementation of the provisions of Article 43 of the LOSC world-wide.169
The Co-operative Mechanism has been regarded as a successful forum for encouraging burden
sharing within the ambit of the LOSC without jeopardising the sovereignty of the littoral
States.170

7.3.4 The Co-operative Mechanism at the Regional Level

The earliest initiative to co-operate at the regional level occurred in a Joint Statement of the
Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on Malacca Strait, issued on 16 November
1971 (Joint Statement) which provided that:
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(a)

The three governments agree that the safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore is the responsibility of the coastal States concerned;171

(b)

The three governments agree on the need for tripartite co-operation on the safety of
navigation in the two Straits;172

(c)

The three governments agree that a body for co-operation to coordinate efforts towards
safe navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore be established as soon as possible
and that such body be composed of only the three coastal States concerned;173

(d)

The three governments also agree that the problem of the safety of navigation and the
question of internationalisation of the Straits are two separate issues;174

(e)

The governments of the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia agree that the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are not international straits while fully recognising their use for
international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocent passage. The
Government of Singapore takes note of the position of the Governments of the Republic
of Indonesia and Malaysia on this point;175

(f)

On the basis of this understanding the three governments approve the continuation of the
hydrographic survey.176

By virtue of this Joint Statement, the three littoral States have agreed that for the purposes of
safety of navigation and marine environmental protection, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
should be treated as one strait.177 The littoral States have also agreed to leave the question of the
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‘The 1971 Joint Statement of the Government of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on the Malacca Strait’ as
quoted in Michael Leifer, ‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of
the World (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 204.
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Hasjim Djalal, ‘Funding and Managing International Partnership for the Malacca and Singapore Straits
Consonant with Article 43 of the UNCLOS 1982’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative
Laws, 459-462; Satya N. Nandan, ‘The Management of Straits used for International Navigation: International
Cooperation in Malacca and Singapore Straits’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws,
431-432.
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legal status of the Straits to the ongoing UNCLOS III.178 This Joint Statement symbolised the
agreement achieved between the three littoral States as an initial step towards further cooperation.179 From the Joint Statement, it can be understood that at that time Indonesia and
Malaysia were adamant in rejecting any proposition which intended to internationalise the Straits
while Singapore had a more liberal viewpoint on this, as it did not share the same position as its
littoral neighbours on this issue.180

The 1971 Statement was followed by the Joint Statement on Safety of Navigation in the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore in 1977 (1977 Joint Statement) which reiterated the measures on the
safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, including the minimum under keel
clearance of 3.5 metres, the delineation of TSS lanes and the establishment of a joint policy to
deal with marine pollution.181 Most of the recommendations in the 1977 Joint Statement have
been implemented.182 As planned in the 1971 Joint Statement, particularly in its Paragraph (c), a
TTEG on the safety of navigation was established in 1975. The TTEG, comprising officials from
the three littoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, has taken major steps towards
enhancing navigational safety in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.183 The TTEG is a body
that is responsible for matters concerning the improvement of safety of navigation in the Straits
178

Hasjim Djalal, ‘Funding and Managing International Partnership for the Malacca and Singapore Straits
Consonant with Article 43 of the UNCLOS 1982’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative
Laws, 461.
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Satya N. Nandan, ‘The Management of Straits used for International Navigation: International Cooperation in
Malacca and Singapore Straits’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 430-432.
180

Hashim Djalal, ‘The Malacca-Singapore Straits Issue’ (Paper presented at the Building A Comprehensive
Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur), 273-274.
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‘The 1977 Joint Statement on Safety of Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’, as quoted in
Michael Leifer, ‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 205.
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The IMO Resolution A.375(X) which set up the Rules for Navigating the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is
based on the 1977 Statement. In 1981, the IMO Resolution A.375(X) has been replaced with Resolution A.476(XII)
that has made certain amendments to the earlier Resolution. See Resolution A.476(XII) 1981, Navigation Through
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Res. A.476(XII), International Maritime Organization, 1981); Amelia Emran,
The Regulation of Vessel-Source Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Master of Maritime Studies
(Research) Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2007), 163.
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Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), Work and Close Co-operation of the Tripartite Technical
Experts Group (Tteg) Have Contributed Significantly To The Safety of Navigation in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore- MPA Hosts 25th Anniversary Celebration of Tteg (2009) MPA
<http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/global_navigation/news_center/mpa_news/mpa_news_detail.page?filename=000509.
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through the promotion of co-operation and co-ordination on anti-pollution policies and measures
as well as fostering consultation between the littoral States, the IMO and the users.184 Safety of
navigation measures in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore including the TSS and STRAITREP
would not have been successful without the involvement of the TTEG.185

Almost 40 years since the 1971 Joint Statement was made, co-operation among the littoral States
appears to be strengthening. In 2005, the littoral States convened the Fourth Tripartite Meeting of
Foreign Ministers of the Littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (2005 Meeting)
which discussed the safety of navigation, environmental protection and maritime security in the
Straits. The 2005 Meeting endorsed the Batam Joint Statement in which the littoral States agreed
on the following matters:

(a)

The Ministers of the littoral States reaffirmed the sovereignty of the littoral States over
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and therefore the primary responsibility for safety
of navigation, environmental protection and maritime security lies with the littoral
States;186

(b)

Measures taken in respect of the Straits must be based on the LOSC;187

(c)

The Ministers recognised the importance of fostering co-operation and continued
discussion with States bordering the funnels leading to the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore, the major users of the Straits, as well as with ASEAN on matters relating to
the safety of navigation, protection of the marine environment and maritime security; 188
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International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), INTERTANKO Participates in TTEG
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Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), Work and Close Co-operation of the Tripartite Technical
Experts Group (Tteg) Have Contributed Significantly To The Safety of Navigation in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore- MPA Hosts 25th Anniversary Celebration of Tteg (2009) MPA
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xml>.
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the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (2005) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore
<http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/press/view_press.asp?post_id=1406>.
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(d)

Co-operation between the littoral States and the IMO is encouraged;189

(e)

The Ministers agreed to establish a TTEG on Maritime Security to complement the
TTEG on Safety of Navigation and the Revolving Fund Committee.190

With the establishment of the Co-operative Mechanism in 2007, Article 43 of the LOSC has
been successfully implemented in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The littoral States have
now worked not only between themselves but have also co-operated with the users of the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore. These initiatives demonstrate that ongoing co-operation is
progressively ensuring that the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is
protected and preserved.

Almost all projects under the Co-operation Mechanism are aimed at providing safety of
navigation rather than focusing on the protection and preservation of the marine environment of
the Straits. The general perception is that accidents can be avoided if there is a regime to promote
safer shipping in the Straits. If accidents can be avoided, the marine environment of the Straits
can be spared from unwarranted oil and other noxious substances spills. This perception may
have been accurate one or two decades ago when the volume of shipping traffic was not as high.
With the projected steady increase in maritime traffic in the Straits over the next decade, the
importance of environmental protection and preservation schemes beyond the perspective of the
enhancement of the safety of navigation in the Straits will become apparent to the littoral States.
Eventually, there will be a need not only to control vessel movements in the Straits through the
usage of a state-of-the-art ship routeing system, but also a need to control the traffic volume of
ships sailing through the Straits. Logic dictates that the Straits have a maximum carrying
capacity to safely accommodate shipping traffic and if the density of shipping traffic goes
beyond that carrying capacity, the consequent effects on the marine environment of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore could be disastrous.
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7.4

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has discussed the application of Article 43 of the LOSC in forging co-operation
between the littoral States and the user States of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. These cooperations have been fostered at the regional and global levels. Co-operation at the regional level
refers to partnership forged among the littoral States themselves, while co-operation at the global
level involves collaboration between the littoral States and the IMO as well as the users of the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

It is true that the Co-operation Mechanism is receiving positive feedback from the user States
and other interested organisations and stakeholders. Conversely, it can also be argued that the
development of this co-operation has not been consistent with the increasing volume of shipping
traffic each year. Even though more States have shown interest in projects organised by the PCC,
the voluntary monetary contributions received by the Aids to Navigation Fund have not been
encouraging. This is justified by the figures shown in Table 7-4 and Table 7-5, which
demonstrate that the contributions received have not been sufficient to cover the expenses
necessary for the maintenance of the aid to navigation facilities installed along the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore.

Given the predicted steady increase in shipping traffic in the years to come, this Chapter
concludes that if the present Co-operation Mechanism could no longer sustain and promote
sustainable utilisation of the Straits, there may be a future need for the littoral States to impose or
implement other prospective measures that go beyond the scope of the international legal
framework laid down in the LOSC. This could be done either through IMO-endorsed measures
or any other potential unilateral measures that the littoral States may consider. Chapter 8
discusses the proposed designations of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Special Area
under MARPOL as well as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area.
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CHAPTER 8.
POTENTIAL FUTURE IMO MEASURES ON SAFETY OF NAVIGATION AND THE
CONTROL OF VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION
8.1

INTRODUCTION

Since the introduction of the LOSC, international law on the protection of the marine
environment has developed enormously through various conventions and treaties. This
development can be categorised into four levels,1 each representing different types of degree of
environmental protection under international law.2 As discussed earlier in Chapter 6, it can be
* This Chapter has been published (wholly or in part) in the following peer-reviewed journals:
(a) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Legal Feasibility of the Imposition of a Traffic Limitation Scheme
in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011)
1(6) International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 122-130;
(b) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Balancing the Tensions between Shipping and Marine Environmental
Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Have the Straits Reached an Environmental
Tipping Point’ (2011) 7(2) The International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and
Social Sustainability, 39-50;
(c) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for
International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 3(4) Asian Politics
& Policy, 501-526;
(d) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Protecting Vital Sea Lines of Communication: A Study of the Proposed
Designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area’ (2012) 57
Ocean & Coastal Management, 79-94.
1

Aldo Chircop, ‘The Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas: A New Layer in the Regime for Marine
Environmental Protection From International Shipping’ in Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman and Susan J. Rolston
(eds), The Future of Ocean Regime-Building-Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009),
573-608.
2

Level 1 consists of general obligations for States to protect the marine environment from vessel-source pollution,
as found in the LOSC and other international conventions. Level 2 provides a higher degree of protection including
specific measures such as vessel source discharge restrictions under the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78). Level 3 involves an even
more specific type of protection through IMO guidelines such as those concerning the designation of ‘Particularly
Sensitive Sea Areas’ (PSSA) and its entailing associate protective measures. Level 4 concerns an extraordinary
situation where coastal States in particular regions, motivated by serious concerns over the environment and due to
imminent danger of marine pollution, are empowered to intervene in relation to shipping casualties. See Ibid. The
1969 maritime tragedy of Torrey Canyon was a clear example on this point. The Liberian-flagged Torrey Canyon
was a supertanker capable of carrying a cargo of 120, 000 tonnes of crude oil, was navigating near the waters off the
English Channel when it struck Pollard’s Rock on Seven Stones reef between Cornwall on mainland Britain and the
Scilly Isles off the western tip of Cornish Peninsula on 18 March 1967. The vessel spilled 119, 000 tonnes of oil into
the sea, contaminating 80km of French coast and 120 km of Cornish Coast on the British mainland. Due to the huge
impact of this incident which could pose imminent danger to the coastal States of Britain and France, both States
worked together to contain the oil slicks from spreading to other areas within that region that may endanger the
marine environment and the well-being of the coastal population. See Patrick Barkham, Oil spills: Legacy of the
Torrey Canyon (2010) The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/24/torrey-canyon-oil-spilldeepwater-bp>. Examples could also be drawn from incidents that have taken place in the Straits of Malacca and
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said that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore enjoy the first level of environmental protection.3
The littoral States and the users of the Straits have a general obligation to protect and preserve
the marine environment of the Straits, as provided under international law. 4 Even though the
littoral States are State-parties to most of these conventions, nevertheless, their powers to
regulate shipping in their territorial Straits are limited by the application of Parts III and XII of
the LOSC. The provisions of these IMO conventions can only be effectively carried out via the
flag State or port State jurisdictions and not through the coastal State jurisdiction.5

To remedy this incapacity, the LOSC has encouraged the formation of co-operation between
States bordering straits and the user States, as stipulated in its Article 43.6 Chapter 7 revealed that
the Co-operative Mechanism is still developing, with more user States now willing to contribute,
particularly to projects undertaken by the Project Co-ordination Committee.7 Nonetheless,
voluntary contribution to the Aids to Navigation Fund has been disappointing, with the
contributions raised to date not being able to fully cover the cost of maintenance and replacement
of navigational aid facilities.8

Singapore. The Evoikos and Orapin Global collision in 1997 has spilled 29, 000 tonnes of crude oil into the Strait of
Singapore which then flowed into the Malaysian side of the Strait of Malacca, polluting the coastal areas as far north
as Selangor threatening the livelihood of local fishermen. Realising the imminent danger of this incident to the
marine environment, the coastal States of Malaysia and Singapore intervened and worked together in the clean up
operations. In 2010, the collision between the vessel MV Waily and MT Bunga Kelana 3 spilled 2, 000 tonnes of
light crude oil into the Strait of Singapore. The passage of both vessels was suspended and the local authorities cooperate to contain the oil from drifting to the shores. See Section 5.2.2.2 of Chapter 5 of this Thesis.
3

This general obligation to protect the marine environment of the Straits from vessel-source pollution is spelled out
in the LOSC and IMO conventions on vessel-source pollution such as the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78)
and its six technical Annexes as well as the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling
Systems on Ships (BWM). See Section 6.3.4 of Chapter 6 of this Thesis.
4

As safe navigation would minimise the risk of maritime casualties which would ultimately protect the marine
environment from vessel-source pollution, the IMO has also introduced international rules and regulations as
embodied in the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs), as
amended and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS). See Section 6.3.5 of Chapter
6 of this Thesis.
5

See Sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 of Chapter 6 of this Thesis.

6

Article 43 of the LOSC reads ‘User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement cooperate: (a) in the
establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary navigational and safety aids or other improvements in aid of
international navigation; and (b) for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships’.
7

See Section 7.3.2.1.2 of Chapter 7 of this Thesis.

8

See Section 7.3.2.1.3 of Chapter 7 of this Thesis.
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Shipping traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is projected to increase up to 150,000
vessels per annum by 2020.9 As a result, the application of Level 1 category environmental
protection measures in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may not be entirely sufficient to
effectively protect and preserve the marine environment of the Straits from vessel-source
pollution. Given that transiting shipping accounts for over 80 per cent of the overall traffic in the
Straits and brings with it the principal risks of navigational and pollution hazards, 10 this Chapter
discusses the potential designation of the Straits as a ‘Special Area’ under MARPOL 73/78 and
as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) under the IMO Guidelines. The legal implications
arising from such designations are analysed and appraised. This Chapter concludes by suggesting
the best IMO measure to be utilised in protecting the marine environment of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore.

8.2

‘SPECIAL AREAS’ UNDER MARPOL 73/78

The first potential IMO tool available to protect the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore specifically from operational vessel-source pollution is by the proposed
designation of the Straits as a Special Area. Resolution A. 927(22) on ‘Guidelines for the
Designation of “Special Areas” under MARPOL 73/78 and Guidelines for the Identification and
Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas’ of 29 November 2001 described a Special Area
as:

...a sea area where for recognised technical reasons in relation to its
oceanographical and ecological conditions and to the particular
character of its traffic, the adoption of special mandatory methods
for the prevention of sea pollution by oil, noxious liquid
substances, or garbage, as applicable, is required’.11

9

H.M. Ibrahim, ‘Straits Safety Not Just Littoral States’ Burden’, New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), 25 November
2008.
10

Peter B. Marlow and Bernard M. Gardner, ‘The Marine Electronic Highway in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore - An Assessment of Costs and Key Benefits’ (2006) 33(2) Maritime Policy & Management, 188.
11

International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Resolution A.927 (22): Guidelines for the Designation of Special
Areas Under MARPOL 73/78 and Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea
Areas’ (A 22/Res. 927, IMO, 2002), 1-22.
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The terms ‘oceanographical’,12 ‘ecological conditions’13 and ‘particular character of its traffic’14
are defined in Resolution A. 927(22). Any States proposing to designate a given area within their
territorial Sea or EEZ as a Special Area must submit a proposal, containing the definition of the
proposed area for designation, including its precise geographical co-ordinates, to the Marine
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) for its consideration. 15 The proposal should also
include details and information of the eligibility of the proposed area to be designated as a
Special Area based on its oceanographic and ecological characteristics and also the existing
environmental pressures from ship-generated pollution.16 Under MARPOL 73/78, Special Areas
are provided with a higher level of protection against operational vessel-source pollution than
other areas of the sea.17 At the moment, there are seven sea areas that have been designated as
Special Areas under Annex I.18 These maritime areas are designated as Special Areas for the
following reasons:

12

Article 2.4 of Resolution A. 927 (22) mentions that consideration for the designation of a ‘Special Area’ would be
given to areas having oceanographic conditions which may cause the concentration or retention of harmful
substances in the waters or sediments of the area, including conditions of extreme ice state and adverse winds. See
International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Resolution A.927 (22): Guidelines for the Designation of Special
Areas under MARPOL 73/78 and Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea
Areas’ (A 22/Res. 927, IMO, 2002).
13

Article 2.5 of Resolution A. 927 (22) explains on the ecological conditions to be fulfilled for a sea area to be
considered for a ‘Special Area’ designation. The sea area should inter alia contain depleted, threatened or
endangered marine species, possess high natural productivity as well as having rare or fragile ecosystems such as
coral reefs, mangroves, seagrass beds and wetlands. It should also be an important spawning and breeding ground
for marine species and represent important migratory routes for sea-birds and marine mammals. In addition, it
should be a critical habitat for marine resources and supports large marine ecosystems. See Ibid.
14

In determining the requirements for the fulfillment of vessel traffic characteristics to support a ‘Special Area’
designation, Article 2.6 of Resolution A. 927(22) stipulates that the sea area should be an area used for shipping
activities to an extent that the operational discharge of vessel-source harmful substances within the requirements of
MARPOL 73/78 would be unacceptable in the light of the existing oceanographic and ecological conditions in that
area. See Ibid.
15

Ibid.

16

Markus J. Kachel, Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas: The IMO’s Role in Protecting Vulnerable Marine Areas
(Springer-Verlag, 2008), 96-98.
17

International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Resolution A.927 (22): Guidelines for the Designation of Special
Areas Under MARPOL 73/78 and Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea
Areas’ (A 22/Res. 927, IMO, 2002), 1-22.
18

Among the areas that have been designated as Special Areas under Annex I of MARPOL are the Mediterranean
Sea, Baltic Sea, Red Sea, Gulfs Area, Gulf of Aden and Oman area of the Arabian Sea.
See International Maritime Organization (IMO), Special Areas under MARPOL (2010) IMO
<http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/SpecialAreasUnderMARPOL/Pages/Default.aspx
>.
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(a)

Areas such as the Baltic and the Red Seas are enclosed bodies of maritime space, which
are exposed to high risks of pollution;19

(b)

Some of the areas listed as Special Areas, such as the Baltic Sea, experience cold
temperatures all year long. This may slow down the chemical and biological degradation
process of certain pollutants;20

(c)

The Baltic region, for example, has many complex archipelagos and deeply cut and
indented coastlines, such as areas around the Finnish Aaland Islands and the Ostrobothnia
region. This may result in difficulties in carrying out clean-up operations should an oil or
other chemical spill take place in that area;21

(d)

These areas have a high concentration of certain pollutants. For example, there are large
oil slicks in the Gulfs Areas;22

(e)

Some of the designated areas are important chokepoints for oil transportation and possess
high navigational traffic, such as the Red Sea and the Gulfs Areas;23

(f)

The areas need to be protected as they are scientifically and socio-economically
important for the coastal population. For instance, the Red Sea and the Gulf Areas are
rich in marine biodiversity and the coastal populations depend on them to carry out
fishing activities.24

The Revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 imposes stricter conditions on oil tankers discharging
oil or oily mixtures both in Special Areas and non-Special Areas, shown in Table 8-1:

19

GR. J Timagenis, International Control of Marine Pollution: Volume 1 (Oceana, 1980), 350-363; Helsinki
Commission, The nature of the Baltic Sea (2011) Helsinki Commission: Baltic Marine Environment Protection
Commission <http://www.helcom.fi/environment2/nature/en_GB/nature/>.
20

GR. J Timagenis, International Control of Marine Pollution: Volume 1 (Oceana, 1980), 350-363.

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid.

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid.
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Non-Special Areas
(Regulation 34(A) of Resolution MEPC 117(52))

Special Areas
(Regulation 34 (B) of
Resolution MEPC 117(52))

The tanker may discharge oil or oily mixtures if it is more than 50
nautical miles from the nearest land
The tanker is proceeding en route
The instantaneous rate of discharge of oil content does not exceed
30 litres per nautical mile
The total quantity of oil discharged into the sea does not exceed
for tankers delivered on or before 31 December 1979, 1/15000 of
the total quantity of the particular cargo of which the residue
formed a part, and for tankers delivered after 31 December 1979,
1/30,000 of the total quantity of the particular cargo of which the
residue formed a part
The tanker has in operation an oil discharge monitoring and
control system and a slop tank arrangement

Any discharge into the sea
of oil or oily mixture from
the cargo area of an oil
tanker shall be prohibited
while in a special area.
Nevertheless, the
prohibition does not apply
to the discharge of clean or
segregated ballast into the
sea

Table 8-1: The Differences between the Permissible Discharge of Oil by Oil Tankers in Special
Areas and Non-Special Areas (Source: IMO)25
Table 8-1 shows that there are major differences between the oil discharge prohibitions in
Special Areas and non-Special Areas. As waterways that are burdened with heavy navigational
activities, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are potential candidates for designation as
Special Areas under MARPOL 73/78.26 However, it is important to examine whether the Straits
fulfil the criteria prescribed in the IMO Guidelines for designation as Special Areas and what
would be the political issues surrounding such a designation.

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are comparable to the Red Sea and the Gulfs Area, which
are also among the world’s most significant sea routes for oil transportation and which have been
designated as Special Areas. Like the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Red Sea and the
Gulfs Area are not exposed to icy conditions as these marine areas are located in a tropical
climate zone where the weather is hot and humid with air temperatures ranging from 22ºC to
25

International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Annex 2 Resolution MEPC. 117(52): Amendments to the Annex of
the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973’
(MEPC 52/24/Add.2, IMO, 2004), 62-63.
26

Alan Tan Khee-Jin, ‘Control of Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Modalities of Co-operationRapporteur’s Report’ (1998) 2 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 278; Mohd Hazmi bin
Mohd Rusli, ‘Balancing Navigational Rights and Marine Environmental Protection in Straits Used for International
Navigation: A Study on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper presented at the 3rd International Conference
on Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, 2009).
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30ºC.27 The Strait of Hormuz in the Gulfs Area is an important waterway for oil transportation,
accounting for about 40 per cent of the world traded oil.28 The Strait is deep and wide enough to
accommodate the world’s largest crude oil tankers and two-thirds of oil shipments carried by
tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz are in excess of 150,000 deadweight tonnes (DWT).29

Similarly, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are important maritime highways for oil
transportation, particularly for transporting oil between the Middle East and the Far East,
specifically to Japan, which in 2006 depended on the Middle East and Africa for 84.7 per cent of
its crude oil supply and 25.9 per cent of its liquefied natural gas supply.30 In 2007, oil was the
most shipped commodity travelling eastbound via the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and
amounted to 679 million tonnes in weight.31 In the same year, approximately 14 million barrels
per day (bpd) was transported via the Straits.32 Due to the economic downturn in 2008, this
figure fell to 13.6 million bpd in 2009.33
The Persian Gulf is rich in marine biodiversity. 34 A wide variety of marine life is found in the
Gulf, including sea turtles, marine birds, dugongs, whales, dolphins and over 500 fish species.35

27

C Hase et al, ‘A System in Balance? - Implications of Deep Vertical Mixing for the Nitrogen Budget in the
Northern Red Sea, Including the Gulf of Aqaba (Eilat)’ (2006) 3 Biogeosciences Discuss, 383-388; Ruth LapidothEschelbacher, ‘The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) vol 5, 6-7.
28

Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Iran, Oil and the Strait of Hormuz’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2007), 2-3.
29

US Energy Information Administration, ‘World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Background’ (US Energy Information
Administration, 2011), 2.
30

Shigeki Sakamoto, ‘Non-State Actors’ Role in the Co-operative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore- Seeking to Substantiate UNCLOS Article 43’ (Paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety
and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008), 2.
31

See Table 2-8 of Chapter 2 of this Thesis.
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US Energy Information Administration, ‘World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Background’ (US Energy Information
Administration, 2011), 2-3.
33
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Francesco Pietra, Biodiversity and Natural Product Diversity (Elsevier Science, 2002), 35-41.
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<http://www.emecs.or.jp/eMenu/M1.cgi?M2=englishver2/whatemecs/what_er.html>.
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These animals are endemic to the Gulf and rely heavily on its environment for their survival.36
The fishing industry in the Persian Gulf has been important to the coastal population for
centuries, but the per capita fish catch has been slowly dwindling. 37 This is due to adverse
climatic and ecological conditions and unsustainable fishing practices.38 The abundance of major
target species like shrimp, Spanish mackerel and various other fish stocks is declining.39

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are also rich in marine
biodiversity.40 Certain areas in the Straits are high in coral reef concentration with a total
assessed value of US $563 million for tourism, shoreline protection, fisheries and scientific
research potential.41 The coastal areas along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have abundant
mangrove forests, seagrass beds, coastal peat swamps, mudflats and sandy beaches, which are
home to various species of flora and fauna.42 Fisheries industries are also important in the Straits,
particularly in the Strait of Malacca. Almost 44 per cent of fish landings in Malaysia came from
the Strait of Malacca in 2007.43
The Red Sea contributes significantly to Egypt’s marine tourism industries. The rich
concentration of coral reefs has lured 1.2 million tourists annually, generating US $1.2 billion in
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foreign exchange and creating more than 275,000 jobs.44 Similar circumstances apply in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The marine tourism industries of the littoral States depend on
the appealing beaches and islands located along the length of the Straits. 45 Unlike the coastal
areas along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore which are highly urbanised, the coastal area
along the Red Sea is not intensively urbanised.46 One of the main sources of pollution in the Red
Sea comes from shipping activities, as it is a main route connecting Europe and Asia, particularly
after the opening of the Suez Canal.47 Any ship-sourced pollution incidents would adversely
affect the well-being of the littoral States’ economies.48

Based on these facts, it is arguable that not only do the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
potentially fit the requirements for the designation of a Special Area set by Resolution A. 927
(22), they also have similar attributes to other sea areas that have been designated as Special
Areas under MARPOL 73/78, particularly the Gulfs Area and the Red Sea. A case could be
mounted for their designation as a Special Area under the IMO Guidelines to further protect the
marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore from vessel-source pollution.49 A
study on the need for, and feasibility of, designating the Strait of Malacca as a Special Area
under MARPOL 73/78 was undertaken jointly by the Global Environment Facility (GEF),
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the IMO in 1997. This study made the
following recommendations:

(a)

That the littoral States of the Strait of Malacca prepare proposals to designate the Strait as
Special Areas under Annexes I and V;50
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(b)

That a proposal not be prepared to designate the Strait as a Special Area under Annex II
at present;51 The study conducted by the GEF/UNDP/IMO found that the worst pollution
caused by operational discharges from ships sailing through the Strait of Malacca is
restricted to oil, and not so much with regard to noxious liquid substances and garbage.52

(c)

That further studies on oceanographic conditions of the Strait of Malacca should be
undertaken as information on this is limited;53

(d)

That a discussion should be held between the littoral States and the maritime States in
relation to the proposal on the Strait of Malacca Special Areas;54

(e)

Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 prohibits oil tankers discharging oil or oily waste in areas
within 50 nautical miles from the nearest land. Nevertheless, they are allowed to do so in
areas more than 50 nautical miles from the shore, but only in certain quantified amounts
as explained in Table 8-1. Most southern parts of the Strait of Malacca, including the
whole stretch of the Strait of Singapore, are no more than 50 nautical miles to the nearest
land.55 Therefore, it would be of no consequence if the southern portion of the Strait were
to be designated as a Special Area under Annex I as oil tankers are already prohibited
from discharging oil and oily waste in that area. Nevertheless, for reasons of clarity, it is
recommended that the definition of the Strait of Malacca Annex I Special Area include
those parts of the Strait that are within 50 nautical miles from the nearest land;56

(f)

In addition to the defined Strait of Malacca Special Area, the special discharge standards
with regard to oil should also apply in neighbouring areas such as the Andaman Sea, the
South China Sea and the Indian Ocean off Sumatra. It was also recommended that a study

MARPOL 73/78’ (MPP-EAS/Info/99/194, GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional Programme for the Prevention and
Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 1997), xvii-xxi.
51

Ibid.

52

Ibid.

53

Ibid.

54

Ibid.

55

See Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 of this Thesis; I M. Andi Arsana and Farid Yuniar Sumaryo, ‘Geospatial Aspects of
Maritime Boundary Delimitations in the Singapore Strait involving Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore’ (Paper
presented at the FIG Congress 2010: Facing the Challenges - Building the Capacity, Sydney, 2010), 8.
56

Global Environment Facility/United Nations Development Programme/International Maritime Organization,
‘Malacca Straits: Special Area? The Need and Feasibility of Designating the Malacca Straits as a Special Area under
MARPOL 73/78’ (MPP-EAS/Info/99/194, GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional Programme for the Prevention and
Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas, 1997), xvii-xxi.

231

be carried out to determine the feasibility of designating these areas as Special Areas so
that they could act as an environmental buffer zone to the Strait of Malacca; 57
(g)

The littoral States of both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore should ratify MARPOL
73/78 and its annexes and implement these provisions in their legislation and provide
enough port reception facilities to make the Strait of Malacca a successful Special Area.
One of the reasons why the Red Sea Special Area Annex I has yet to come into force
despite having been designated is because the coastal States have not made proper
arrangements to ensure that there are enough reception facilities for ships that call at ports
in the Red Sea;58

(h)

The littoral States should also develop a strategy on how to effectively enforce the Strait
of Malacca Special Area under Annex I, in particular by considering the use of aerial
surveillance.59

If a proposal to designate the Strait of Malacca as a Special Area under Annex I was to be
submitted to the IMO, arguments for and against the proposal would be expected. Firstly, it may
be argued that it is not necessary to designate the Straits as Special Areas under MARPOL.
Given the fact that the entire length of the Strait’s most critical areas, namely from One Fathom
Bank to Horsburgh Lighthouse at the eastern end of the Strait of Singapore, have breadths of less
than 50 nautical miles from the nearest land, the designation of Special Areas under Annex I is
not necessary, as Annex I to MARPOL 73/78 already stipulates that oil tankers are forbidden to
discharge oil or oily waste in these areas. This is however, is not entirely true. The northern parts
of the Strait of Malacca, especially in areas north of One Fathom Bank to its western entrance to
the Andaman Sea, are considerably wider in breadth. As shipping traffic will increase in future
years, it is essential to designate the whole Strait of Malacca, including its southern portion and
the Strait of Singapore, as Special Areas under Annex I.

Secondly, it may be argued that there are insufficient reception facilities in ports along the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore for these Straits to be designated as a Special Area. This contention
57
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was supported by the study undertaken by GEF, UNDP and IMO in 1997.60 However, this study
was made in 1997 and port facilities have improved since then. Between the years 2001–2004,
reception facilities in Malaysian ports increased from 22 to 27 respectively. 61

As a party to MARPOL 73/78 and all of its Annexes, Singapore has adequate reception facilities
and hosts ASEAN’s largest port reception facilities for the collection, treatment and disposal of
oil slop and sludge and other hazardous waste streams, in Pulau Sebarok.62 Singapore has
legislated for port reception facilities as embodied in the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
(Reception Facilities and Garbage Facilities) Regulation. 63 The Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea (Reception Facilities and Garbage Facilities) Regulation is a subsidiary legislation of
Singapore’s Prevention of Pollution of the Sea Act governing matters on port reception facilities
for vessels calling at the Port of Singapore.64

Indonesia has domestic legislation on port reception facilities as enforced in the Decree of the
Minister for Communication 215 Year 1987 (Decree 215/1987).65 Articles 2 and 3 of Decree
215/1987 ensure the availability of port waste reception facilities in Indonesian major ports;
namely, Belawan in Sumatra, Tanjung Priuk in Jakarta, Tanjung Perak in Surabaya and
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Makassar.66 For example, the Belawan Port has a waste water treatment facility covering an area
of 80 square metres and a solid waste collection facility covering 200 square metres.67

Indonesian ports that are situated in other sea areas leading towards the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore like Tanjung Priok and Tanjung Perak in the Java Sea have also been equipped with
waste reception facilities.68 The Obligatory Notification UK 112/40/18/AD.TPK issued in
December 2009 prohibits every ship that stops by or moors in Tanjung Priok Port in Jakarta from
throwing any waste or garbage into the water and surrounding areas.69 These materials can only
be discharged using waste reception facilities provided by the port authorities.70 These facts
show that the main ports along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and those in sea areas
leading to the Straits have sufficient port reception facility infrastructure for the potential
designation of a Special Area under MARPOL 73/78.

In any case, the lack of port reception facilities in ports in the Strait of Malacca is not as
significant as in other sea areas, as most of the shipping traffic transiting the Straits is classified
as ‘long-haul through traffic’, that is, most vessels do not call at any ports situated along the
Straits,71 with the exception of the port of Singapore.72 Taking this into consideration, it is
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arguable that the available port reception facilities would satisfy the requirements of MARPOL
73/78 and would be sufficient if the Strait of Malacca were to be designated as a Special Area.73

The three littoral States that border the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are parties to MARPOL
73/78 but collectively they have only ratified two Annexes, i.e. Annex I and Annex II. Therefore
it is not viable to designate the Strait of Malacca as a Special Area under Annex V, as Indonesia
is not a party to this annex.74 It may also be argued that it would not be possible to designate the
whole of the Strait of Malacca as a Special Area because Thailand, a country that borders the
Strait at its northern part, is not a party to MARPOL 73/78 or any of its Annexes. However this
argument would not prevent the designation of a Strait of Malacca Special Area as Thailand
borders only a very small portion of the northern part of the Strait. As Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore have all ratified Annex I and most of the vessels that ply the Strait are oil tankers,
designation of the Strait as a Special Area under Annex I would appear to be most appropriate.
Statistics have shown that in 2010, oil tankers made up 22 per cent of transits in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore,75 second only to container ships.

These arguments reinforce the case for designating the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, or the
Strait of Malacca itself, as a Special Area under MARPOL 73/78 particularly under Annex I. Oil
pollution is a significant challenge in the Strait as it is an important waterway for Japanese,
Chinese and South Korean vessels with cargoes of oil. To support such a case, however, an indepth study on the oceanographic characteristics of the Strait needs to be undertaken as this
information is lacking.76 There is no doubt that such a designation would enhance the protection
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and preservation of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as vesselsource pollution could be better controlled and monitored.77

8.3

PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SEA AREAS

Another potential IMO tool available is through the proposed designation of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA). The concept of PSSA has
its origins in Resolution 9 adopted at the International Conference on Tanker Safety and
Pollution Prevention, held in London in February 1978 following tanker accidents in 1976 and
1977.78 Currently, there are 12 PSSAs world-wide that have been designated as a PSSA by the
IMO.79 The Guidelines for both Special Areas and PSSA were formerly the same document,
Resolution A. 927 (22), before it was replaced by Resolution A.982 (24), Revised Guidelines for
the Identification and Designation of PSSAs (PSSA Revised Guidelines),80 adopted by the IMO
in December 2005.81

Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the PSSA Revised Guidelines clarify that in addition to meeting at least
one criterion in relation to ecological, social, cultural and economic aspects, the proposed area
for PSSA designation should also be an area which is at risk from international shipping
activities.82 This involves considerations related to two factors: vessel traffic characteristics and
77
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natural factors. Consideration would also be given to areas having hydrographical,
meteorological and oceanographic characteristics that may pose dangers to mariners.

8.3.1 The Proposed Straits of Malacca and Singapore PSSA
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are collectively considered as an ancient trading route.83
The trading activities that went through the Straits have attracted traders from all around the
world to this region. The rich cultures brought to the two dominant ports along the Strait of
Malacca, Penang and Malacca, by innumerable travellers and traders over the centuries have
intermingled and created a beautiful harmonious society of different races, each with its own
distinct and unique features.84 As a result, both Malacca and Georgetown, Penang, were declared
World Heritage Sites by the UNESCO in 2008.85

The Strait of Malacca is also located within a zone of megadiversity encompassing a variety of
habitats and productive marine and coastal ecosystems that include mangrove forests, extensive
seagrass beds, mudflats and coral reefs that support a numerous species of flora and fauna.86 The
includes the following: (1) any evidence that international shipping activities are causing or may cause damage to
the attributes of the proposed area…(2) any history of groundings, collisions, or spills in the area and any
consequences of such incidents…(4) stresses from other environmental effect.’ See International Maritime
Organization (IMO), ‘Revised Guidelines For the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas’
(A 24/Res.982, IMO, 2006), 7-8; Markus J. Kachel, Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas: The IMO’s Role in Protecting
Vulnerable Marine Areas (Springer-Verlag, 2008), 163-167.
83
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Straits of Malacca and Singapore are important fishing grounds for their coastal population. 87
Furthermore, the coastal areas on both Straits of Malacca and Singapore are also renowned for
their many white sandy beaches, coral reef concentrations, getaway islands and many other
natural attractions, either on the Sumatra side, or the western coast of Peninsular Malaysia and
the Riau Islands to the south.88

In addition, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are also important for the oil and gas industry.
There are a few oil and gas mining sites in central and northern regions of Sumatra and there are
also a number of oil refineries located in major urban centres along the coast, particularly in
Malacca, Port Dickson and Singapore.89 As a result of their socio-economic importance, the
coastal areas facing the Straits of Malacca and Singapore support a relatively high population
density, with many cities or urban metropolitan areas concentrated towards the coast such as the
cities of Georgetown, Malacca Johor Bahru, and the Klang Valley conurbation in Malaysia,
Medan, Dumai and Pekanbaru in Indonesia, as well as the city-State of Singapore.90

Tanjung Piai. Mudflats form natural habitats for shellfishes, residential and migratory waterbirds and also act as
important cockle breeding grounds. See Siti Nazatul Izura Mohamed Ishak and Tan Kim Hooi, ‘Shaping the Future
of the Cockle Industry in Malaysia’ (2008) 15(3) MIMA Bulletin, 18-20. The designation of Tanjung Piai, Pulau
Kukup and Sungai Pulai as RAMSAR sites shows that the coastal environment along the Strait of Malacca is
important in wetlands conservation. See The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, The Annotated Ramsar List:
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(2008)
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The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are indubitably crucial for international shipping activities.
These heavy shipping movements have increased the risks of maritime accidents, which take
place in the Straits every year and result in oil and HNS spills, coastal soil erosion and low coral
reef population development.91 As such, the Straits may fulfil the criteria needed for designation
as a PSSA, namely:

(a)

Ecological criteria [Articles 4.4.1–4.11 of Resolution A.982 (24)]92

(b)

Social, cultural and economic criteria [Articles 4.4.12–4.4.14 of Resolution A.982
(24)];93

(c)

Vulnerability to impacts from international shipping activities [Article 5 of Resolution
A.982 (24)].94

As these waterways may potentially fulfil the criteria given in Resolution A.982 (24), some
commentators have expressed views that the Strait of Malacca may be a logical candidate to be
designated as a PSSA.95 Based on the criteria which must be fulfilled for designation as a PSSA,
it would not be impossible for both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to qualify as a PSSA. 96
91
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argument that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have rich ecological value and characteristics.
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In comparison with the Torres Strait, there are parallels with the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore as both are waterways with many navigational hazards,97 both are rich in the
concentration of biodiversity98 and are important fishing grounds,99 and both possess historical
and cultural significance100. Most importantly, both waterways are straits used for international
navigation as defined in Part III of the LOSC. 101 Nevertheless, in terms of traffic characteristics,
the navigational traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is approximately 25 times higher
than the Torres Strait. In addition, unlike the Torres Strait, which has had only one accidental oil
spill incident so far, accidental oil and HNS spills have occurred repeatedly in different areas of

‘The Malacca Strait might be a logical candidate to be designated by the IMO as a particularly sensitive sea area
because of the human and economic dependency on this Strait.’ See Jon M. Van Dyke, ‘Transit Passage Through
International Straits’ in Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman and Susan J. Rolston (eds), The Future of Ocean RegimeBuilding: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 193.
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Centre (2011) UNESCO <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/154>; Simon Woodley et al, World Heritage Research:
Making a Difference (CRC Reef Research Centre, 2006), 8.
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the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.102 Congestion in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has
been identified as one of the causes of these maritime accidents. Therefore, if the Torres Strait
could be designated as a PSSA, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may also be proposed to be
similarly designated.103

8.3.2 Associated Protective Measures
As PSSA designation is not a ‘stand alone’ regime.104 States that wish to have marine areas
under their jurisdiction designated as PSSAs must submit their proposals to the IMO with the
proposed Associated Protective Measures (APMs) to be considered by the IMO’s MEPC. 105 The
MEPC should not designate a PSSA until after the APMs are considered and approved by the
relevant Sub-Committee, Committee or Assembly within the IMO mechanism.106 If the APMs
are not approved, the MEPC may reject the PSSA application entirely or request that the
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proposing member States submit new proposals for APMs.107 With regard to the APMs to be
introduced in the designated PSSAs, Article 6.1 of the PSSA Revised Guidelines states that:
…associated protective measures for PSSAs are limited to actions
that are to be, or have been, approved or adopted by IMO… 108
(Emphasis added)
The APMs may also be new measures that have never been introduced by the IMO.109 If the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore are to be designated as PSSAs, it is therefore crucial to
examine the potential APMs that could be implemented, as well as the anticipated political and
legal implications arising from such a designation.

8.3.2.1

The Proposed Traffic Limitations on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

A potential APM which might be imposed in any proposed Straits of Malacca and Singapore
PSSA is a limitation on shipping traffic through the Straits. A plan to cap shipping movement in
the Straits was suggested by the Malaysian government in 2008. 110 Nevertheless, under
customary and conventional international law, straits have always been deemed to be open to
maritime traffic. Even before the LOSC came into force, conventions and other agreements
regarding straits contained provisions that ensured the freedom of navigation for vessels
transiting straits.111
107
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The Montreux Convention 1936 (Montreux Convention) which governs navigation in the
Turkish Straits, comprising the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, has
different provisions from other treatises and conventions regarding straits. The Convention
guarantees freedom of navigation to all ships to ply the Turkish Straits, however, it imposes
some limitations and conditions on both merchant and naval vessels transiting the straits,
depending on the prevailing political situation. Article 6 of the Montreux Convention provides:

Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent
danger of war, the provisions of Article 2 shall nevertheless
continue to be applied except that vessels must enter the Straits by
day and their transit must be effected by the route which shall, in
each case be indicated by the Turkish authorities. (Emphasis
added)
The Montreux Convention also imposes limitations on the aggregate tonnage of naval vessels
that are transiting or are present in the Turkish Straits.112 Article 18(1) (a), (b) and (c) of the
Montreux Convention further explains the limitations on the aggregate tonnage of shipping
which non-Black Sea Powers may have while present in the Turkish Straits.113 Although
customary international law and the LOSC dictate that straits shall always be open for
navigation, the State practice disclosed in the Montreux Convention is a historical exception to

as Torres Strait, and Related Matters (1985) Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1985/4.html>. Article V of the 1881 Boundary Treaty between
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this general rule.114 The limitations prescribed by the Montreux Convention upon merchant
vessels in Turkish Straits are only applicable in war and the limitations on average aggregate
tonnage only apply to naval ships. This instance of divergent State practice shows that putting
limitations or conditions on vessels transiting straits, although rare, is not entirely
unprecedented.115

Even though the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not governed by a long-standing
international convention like the Turkish Straits, this may not preclude the littoral States from
placing certain limitations for environmental protection purposes on ships transiting the straits.116
A potential justification for such limitations, which could be argued in a submission to the IMO,
is that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have only a certain carrying capacity for shipping
traffic.117 If shipping traffic exceeds certain limits, it may adversely impact the well-being of the
marine environment to the extent of causing irreparable damage.118

The reasons why the Montreux Convention imposed limitations on shipping traffic in the
Turkish Straits (depending on the prevailing political situation) was associated with Turkey’s
security. Therefore, in the case of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore the reasons for imposing
such limitations would be to enable the littoral States to protect and preserve the integrity of the
marine environment of the Straits from being degraded by heavy shipping activities. The PSSA
Revised Guidelines provide that the APMs for PSSAs must be those that ‘are to be’ or ‘have
been’ approved by the IMO such as routeing systems. A traffic limitation scheme could be
114
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characterised as a routeing system in that it helps to regulate traffic, especially in narrow, busy
and constricted waters such as those of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Undoubtedly, if traffic limitations were proposed as an APM in a submission made to the IMO
on the designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a PSSA, member States would
question the import and content of this measure as well as its legality. 119 Would it involve only
certain types of vessels such as giant megatankers? What would be the maximum limit on
shipping movements through the straits daily, monthly or even yearly? Who would have the
authority to decide the maximum volume of shipping traffic to traverse the Straits? Will the
limitation relate to the maximum gross tonnage of vessels? If so, what will be the maximum
gross tonnage per ship per day allowed to traverse the Straits? Would a vessel be penalised if it
violated the limitation regulations? Maritime States are likely to argue that any such measure
would be inconsistent with the LOSC, particularly Articles 38(1) and 44.

Some maritime States may also contend that this proposed APM would create an undesirable
precedent that could be followed by other States bordering straits elsewhere in the world. In
addition, it could be argued that this proposed APM would cause undue delays in maritime
shipments and unwarrantedly disrupt the free flow of international trade. A study has estimated
that the cost of rerouting tankers to Japan away from the Straits of Malacca and Singapore route
would increase the cost of doing business by US $88 million.120 Certainly, it should be
anticipated that this form of APM would not be favoured by major maritime States that depend
on the Straits for the survival of their economies.

Putting this potential opposition aside, in relation to implementation of such a measure,
discussions could be convened between the littoral States, the user States, private stakeholders
and the IMO in order to determine the best method of limiting shipping traffic so as to protect the
marine environment of the Straits without substantial disruption to global trade. Further research
119
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would also be needed to determine the sustainable traffic carrying capacity of the Straits, taking
into consideration their biodiversity and their socio-economic and scientific importance.

A preliminary study conducted by the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) and
released in November 2009 revealed that the Strait of Malacca can sustain traffic up to five times
the current level.121 It also noted that the Strait of Singapore could safely accommodate a
doubling or more of vessel traffic in the future, up to an increase of 75 per cent without needing
any changes to its infrastructure or operations.122 The study pointed out that in 2007, there were
257,000 vessel movements in the Strait of Singapore based on actual vessel reports to the Vessel
Traffic Services (VTS) in Singapore.123 Furthermore, the study indicated that the number of
accidents and collisions in the Strait of Singapore has remained constant over the three-year
period from 2006 despite the steady increase in shipping traffic, demonstrating that an increase
in traffic volume may not directly affect the safety of navigation in the Strait of Singapore. 124
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The second phase of this study by the MPA will venture into possible traffic management
measures to ensure that smooth and safe navigation in the Strait of Singapore is guaranteed.125
The results of the second part of the study have yet to be revealed as this research is ongoing.126

In contrast, a similar study conducted by Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) claimed that
the maximum carrying capacity of the Strait of Malacca is 122,640 vessels, which was predicted
to happen in 2024.127 This study applied queuing theory as a methodology and projected carrying
capacity based on traffic data generated by the STRAITREP system. 128 MIMA has also
conducted another study into carrying capacity from the perspective of domains or the areas
generated around a vessel. As the domains of ships decrease, the carrying capacity of a waterway
or strait would increase and vice versa.129 As shown in Figure 8-1, larger domains would reduce
the risk of the occurrence of maritime accidents.
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Figure 8-1: The concept of safe distance and separation
(Source: Redrawn after Shahryari and Mohamad, 2011)130
A safe distance, ranging from 2–0.2 nautical miles, and safe separation, ranging from 5–0.5
nautical miles, are recommended by shippers and mariners in establishing the safe domain of a
ship.131 Using the domain of a safe separation of 5 nautical miles and a safe distance of 2 nautical
miles as the benchmark, it is said that the Strait of Malacca could accommodate up to 119,159
vessel movements by the year 2020.132

Similarly, a study conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in
conjunction with the Nippon Foundation in 2007 predicted that the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore will accommodate more shipping traffic in the future, with a projected volume of
141,000 vessel transits annually by 2020.133 Although these separate studies differ in their
methodologies and conclusions as to the precise carrying capacity of the Straits, the general
agreement is that problems of traffic congestion in the Straits are inevitable.134 Indeed, if
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RSIS

shipping traffic is not kept to its sustainable limit, a normal voyage through the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore will obviously be longer than usual and congestion may complicate safe
navigation.135

In advancing their submission in the IMO, the littoral States could contend that the proposed
traffic limitation is critical to enhancing navigational safety by ensuring that the traffic in the
straits does not escalate to such a degree that it causes danger to mariners. 136 They could also
contend that this protective measure does not contravene the LOSC as the Convention provides
that States have an overarching obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment. 137
Further research must be undertaken to ascertain the sustainable limit of shipping in the Straits. If
shipping traffic is not capped and it goes beyond the carrying capacity of the Strait, the marine
environment of these waterways will ultimately suffer undesirable consequences.138

8.3.2.2

The Proposed Cost-Recovery Mechanism in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

The proposed cost-recovery mechanism may also be a suitable APM for the proposed Straits of
Malacca and Singapore PSSA. This could be in the form of a toll or levy imposition. 139 The idea
of toll imposition in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore goes back to 1972 but has never been
implemented.140 After the dramatic increase in marine casualties in 1992, this idea was again
135

The research conducted by the MPA on carriage capacity of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore revealed that
when traffic reaches 140 ,000 transits per year (twice the amount the Straits are accommodating at present), the
travel time through the Strait of Singapore will increase by 13 per cent, from a seven-hour transit to nearly eight
hour. See Yee Cheok Hong, ‘Carriage Capacity of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Maritime Challenges and
Priorities in Asia: Report of a Conference Organised by S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore’ (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
Technological University, 2010), 5-6.
136

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Laws, Regulations and Measures on Protection of the Marine Environment of
Straits used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper presented at the
2011 International Law Association Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, 2011).
137

Article 192 of the LOSC reads ‘States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment’.

138

H.M. Ibrahim and Mansoureh Shahryari, ‘The Ship Carrying Capacity of the Malacca Straits’ (2008) 15(4)
MIMA Bulletin, 15-16.
139

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Impacts of Shipping on the Marine Environment of Critical Maritime
Chokepoints: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper presented at the 2nd World Biodiversity
Congress, Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia, 2011).
140

The user States, in this context were viewed as ‘free riders’, and thus, Malaysia suggested that a MalaysiaIndonesia corporation be set up to levy tolls on ships plying the Straits. Singapore and the user States, on the other

249

mooted to reduce the risks of collisions in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 141 Levying a toll
on vessels transiting the Straits raises questions of inconsistency with LOSC provisions. As
discussed in Chapter 4, Article 26(1) of the LOSC prescribes that coastal States should not levy
foreign ships that are merely passing through their territorial seas.142 States bordering straits are
primarily responsible for maintaining the safety of navigation facilities in their straits no matter
how busy the traffic is.143 As one of the States bordering the Dover Strait, which has the
reputation as the busiest global choke point, the UK submitted an information paper to the IMO
entitled ‘Developing Principles for Charging Users the Cost of Maritime Infrastructure’. 144 This
was based on the fact that the increasing cost of navigational aids and facilities would eventually
be a burden on the coastal state. In order to foster a more equitable situation, the UK suggested
that the IMO should develop fair principles to govern the establishment of a non-discriminatory
charging system.145 This would be a non-profit regime where ships are charged to gain funds for
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recovery of costs, capital investment and improvements. This regime was designed to reduce the
burden of maintaining the aids to navigation facilities on coastal States, especially those that
border busy waterways like the Dover Strait and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Due to
the complex legal issues associated with this proposition, particularly on the concept of
unimpeded transit passage rights through straits, no further action has been taken on the UK’s
proposal.146

There have also been periodic calls to attract more parties to participate in co-managing the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore; however, the support given, especially by private sector
companies and other stakeholders, has been very disappointing.147 Differences have arisen
between prospective donor States and the littoral States over project funding, and ship owners
have shown hesitation in contributing to the Aids to Navigation Fund. 148 Although ships calling
at ports along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore pay port dues and part of these dues have
been used to maintain aids to navigation in the Straits, more than half of the transiting ships do
not call at these local ports and hence are considered free riders, taking advantage of the existing
aid to navigation facilities that are primarily provided and funded by the littoral States.149
Therefore, to ensure more effective co-operation and participation from user States and
stakeholders in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, a cost-recovery mechanism could be a
potential APM proposed by the littoral States. If the littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore were able to impose this on ships transiting the Straits, the revenue collected could be
used to improve and to establish more aid to navigation facilities and infrastructure along the
length of the Straits.
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Denmark previously imposed charges on ships plying the Danish Straits, which comprise three
channels connecting the North and Baltic Seas through the Kattegat and Skagerrak. 150 No foreign
trading ships could pass through the Danish Straits without paying the transit dues.151
Nevertheless, beginning in 1857, the payment of Sound Dues was discontinued.152 In exchange
for transit rights for vessels of these States, Denmark received an indemnity corresponding to an
annual income capitalised to the current value from the signatory States.153

This previous practice by Denmark shows that a toll regime imposed upon navigating vessels is
not something that is entirely unprecedented, although it is now over 150 years since this regime
was discontinued and it has not subsequently been replicated in any other part of the world. The
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willingness of the maritime powers at that time to pay hefty compensation to Denmark in return
for free navigation represented an acknowledgement of the rights of a coastal State to impose a
toll, however wide acceptance by States of relevant provisions of the LOSC such as Articles
26(1), 38(1) and 44 would generally be considered as overriding this earlier acknowledgement.

There are a number of obstacles to introducing a cost-recovery mechanism in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. Firstly, toll-levying is inconsistent with the exercise of unimpeded
transit passage as provided for in Articles 38(1) and 44 of the LOSC. Maritime nations such as
the US would undoubtedly oppose this proposal as the US has always been vigorous in airing its
opposition to toll-type charges in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.154 During the 2006 Kuala
Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and
Environmental Protection (Kuala Lumpur Meeting), the US, together with representatives of the
shipping industry at the meeting invoked the application of Article 38 of the LOSC to ensure that
the shipping of goods, raw material and energy remained unimpeded and maintained that they
were ready to oppose any attempt for the imposition of compulsory toll charges in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore.155 A year later, during the 2007 Singapore Meeting on the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection (Singapore
Meeting), the US expressed concerns about the possible imposition of compulsory tolls via the
Co-operative Mechanism and was happy that the idea of toll implementation was not discussed
in the Co-operative Mechanism’s agenda.156

Secondly, a further practical concern is that unless some pre-paid electronic form of payment is
devised, this mechanism may create long queues for ships passing through the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, causing undue delays in the voyage of vessels which would ultimately result in
economic losses for many companies that rely on shipping for their trading activities.157 As a
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result, the littoral States may be liable to pay compensation for the economic losses suffered by
such ships and their crew, the cargo importers and perhaps even consumers.158 Thirdly, in terms
of political implications, this cost-recovery mechanism is likely to be challenged by many
maritime States and those dependent on global imports and exports as it would create an
undesirable precedent for similar impositions elsewhere on global shipping routes.159 Fourthly, it
would be difficult to devise the criteria for determining the payment under this proposed costrecovery mechanism, in particular, whether it should be based on the size of the ship, the cargo it
is carrying or the potential of the vessel to pollute the seas.160

The littoral States could counter-argue that the cost-recovery mechanism is not contrary to the
right of transit passage through Straits. This mechanism would actually facilitate shipping as
navigation through the Straits would be safer for international maritime traffic with installation
of state-of-the-art aids to navigation. Such an imposition would not generate extra or excessive
income for the littoral States, as the money raised would be used to fund the maintenance of the
Straits. In addition a cost-recovery mechanism would not necessarily create an undesirable
precedent for other littoral States to follow because each strait has different characteristics. Such
a mechanism would only be imposed in a strait that is heavily burdened with navigational traffic
that has reached a level sufficiently detrimental to the integrity of its marine environment that
drastic measures must be taken.

The method of payment under such a cost-recovery mechanism could be discussed between the
littoral States, the users, the IMO and other stakeholders in order to determine the most viable
procedures so that these would neither impair nor hamper smooth navigation and would not
unreasonably affect shipping costs. A possible way forward is to integrate such payments into
the IMO Straits Trust Fund or the Aids to Navigation Fund introduced at the Kuala Lumpur
Meeting in 2006 and to establish a special Committee comprising the littoral States, the IMO and
the users to manage such a fund. This would not involve the Revolving Fund established by the
158
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Malacca Strait Council (MSC) as this is a separate co-operation between the littoral States and
Japan. It is more feasible and acceptable that such a fund to be internationally managed to ensure
accountability, transparency and to avoid corruption. As Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are
littoral States that possess sovereignty over the Straits, it would also be appropriate that the
Committee be chaired by these States.
It is estimated that more than 4.0 billion DWT of ships transit the Straits annually. 161 If every
transiting ship contributed only one cent per DWT to the Aids to Navigation Fund, it would
generate approximately US $40 million to the Fund.162 The monetary amount per DWT to be
contributed is negligible, so much so that it would not impact freight rates.163 Therefore, it could
be proposed that under this scheme, payment should be made directly to the Aids to Navigation
Fund with users required to pay one cent per DWT. This would be a non-discriminatory regime;
the greater the usage, the greater the payment to be imposed. In fact, to a certain extent this kind
of co-operation is supported by the LOSC itself.164 Having said this, this proposed cost-recovery
mechanism would have the potential to realise the creation of the more effective co-operative
161
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burden sharing mechanism that the littoral States, the user States and the IMO have been
working towards for some time.165

8.3.2.3

Proposed Compulsory Pilotage in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Compulsory pilotage could be another potential APM in the proposed Straits of Malacca and
Singapore PSSA. Before examining the potential legal, political and practical implications that
may arise out from the imposition of compulsory pilotage as a proposed APM in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, it is relevant to examine its application in the Torres Strait.

8.3.2.3.1

The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in the Torres Strait

The Torres Strait is a navigationally difficult shipping way. As such, Australia has a long history
of providing pilotage in the Torres Strait, going back to the 19th century.166 There are two routes
in the Torres Strait; vessels that wish to call at any East Australian ports must navigate through
the Inner Route of the Great Barrier Reef, while those that intend to travel to any other South
Pacific ports must sail via the Great North East Channel and enter the Outer Route of the Great
Barrier Reef at the Coral Sea from Bramble Cay, as shown in Map 8-1:
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Map 8-1: Compulsory Pilotage Area of the Torres Strait167
(Modified from Google Maps)
As far as international navigation is concerned, transit passage only applies to the route from the
Arafura Sea through the Torres Strait via the Great North East Channel to the Coral Sea, as this
part of the Strait connects one part of an EEZ or high sea to another part of an EEZ or high
sea.168

Prior to the imposition of compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait, there had been a decrease in
the number of vessels that engaged pilots when navigating through this waterway.169 Australia
was concerned that if a maritime casualty occurred in the Torres Strait, the environmental
implications would be disastrous.170 Successive governments have been concerned to ensure that
the tragic grounding of the Oceanic Grandeur in the Torres Strait in March 1970171 and the
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Bunga Teratai Satu on Sudbury Reef in the Great Barrier Reef region in 2001172 should not
happen again. Fortunately, the grounding of the latter vessel did not result in any discharges of
oil or pollutants from the vessel into Queensland’s waters.173 Two more recent damaging
pollution incidents in the Great Barrier Reef region are the 2009 Pacific Adventurer spill 174 and
the 2010 Shen Neng 1 grounding.175

Before compulsory pilotage was introduced in the Torres Strait, a study conducted by Det
Norske Veritas (DNV) showed that the imposition of such a regime would decrease the risk of a
collision by 30 per cent and of a powered grounding by about 32 per cent.176 In 2004, Australia
commenced a study to analyse the level of risk to the environment and the risk of collision in the
Torres Strait. It discovered that the imposition of compulsory pilotage could reduce the risk of
grounding in the Torres Strait by 45 per cent and that of a collision by 57 per cent, and would
reduce the possibility of groundings by 54 per cent and collisions by 67 per cent in the Prince of
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Wales Channel.177 In 2003, Australia and PNG submitted a proposal to the IMO to extend the
Great Barrier Reef Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) to the Torres Strait.178

The IMO approved the extension of the Great Barrier Reef PSSA to the Torres Strait in MEPC
Resolution 133(53) on 22 July 2005.179 Following approval by the IMO Assembly in Resolution
MEPC 133(53), which revoked Resolution MEPC 45(30)180, Australia issued its Marine Notice
8/2006 advising all vessels of 70 metres or greater in length, and all loaded tankers and liquefied
gas carriers, to engage a pilot while navigating through the pilotage area of the Torres Strait.181
As a vessel approaches the Torres Strait, it will be interrogated by the Australian Automatic
Identification System (AIS) shore stations.182 These AIS stations identify passing vessels and if
the vessel ignores the requirement to take on a pilot, it will be identified and subject to legal
proceedings when it enters any Australian port in the future.183
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Since the imposition of the compulsory pilotage regime in the Torres Strait, the number of
casualties has been kept to a minimum. This regime is achieving its objective of improved
protection for the sensitive and pristine marine habitats of the Torres Strait region. 184 Australia
has been criticised by some States for imposing compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait.185
However, Australia has rebutted these criticisms by contending that compulsory pilotage is
needed to improve the safety of navigation in the Strait,186 and despite the criticisms Australia
has retained compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait.

8.3.2.3.2

Possible Legal and Political Implications

Currently, pilotage services are available and offered by major ports along the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore. They are compulsory when ships are leaving and entering port limits,187 however,
pilotage has never been compulsory for ships navigating the Straits. Nevertheless, since 1977,
vessels are recommended to take on a pilot when navigating through critical areas within the
Straits.188 Due to fear of future shipping casualties, there have been suggestions that a
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compulsory pilotage system should be introduced in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.189
This issue was discussed at the Singapore Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in
2007.190 During the meeting, consideration was given to establishing a Pilotage User Group for
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.191 Such groups has been established in other parts of the
world; for example, a Pilotage User Group was formed in Denmark with the aim of finding ways
of further enhancing the safety of navigation through the entrances to the Baltic Sea.192 The
Danish Pilotage User Group attempts to create an open and transparent dialogue between
pilotage service providers and users, in order to ensure optimal pilotage services in general and
to encourage the use of pilots for ships navigating through the entrances to the Baltic Sea.193

The issue of pilotage was highlighted at the International Symposium of Safety and Protection of
the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (the Symposium) in Kuala
Lumpur and at the 33rd TTEG meeting in Kuching, Malaysia, both held in 2008.194 It was further
discussed at the subsequent TTEG meetings in Singapore and Yogyakarta in 2009 and 2010
respectively.195 During the 34th TTEG meeting in Singapore in 2009, the littoral States agreed on
the proposed application of voluntary pilotage services for vessels navigating the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore.196 The littoral States also decided to prepare draft revised guidelines for
the voluntary pilotage services that would subsequently be circulated between the littoral States

189

Tim Wilkins, ‘Considerations From Owners Operating Tankers in the Straits’ (Paper presented at the Singapore
Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection,
Singapore, 2007).
190

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Protecting Vital Sea Lines of Communication: A Study of the Proposed
Designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area’ (2011) Ocean and Coastal
Management, 11-14.
191

Ibid.

192

International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), Danish Pilotage User Group-Update
(2007) INTERTANKO <http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=43246>.
193

Ibid.

194

Hasjim Djalal, ‘The Development of Cooperation on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper presented at
the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008).
195

Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG), ‘The 35th Meeting of the Tripartite Technical Experts Group on
Safety of Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Report of the Drafting Group on Voluntary Pilotage
Services (VPS) in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (TTEG, 2010), 1-3.
196

Ibid.

261

and the IMO for comments and amendments.197 Malaysia circulated the revised guidelines in
November 2009.198
The issue of voluntary pilotage was discussed at the 35th TTEG meeting in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia, where Indonesia pointed out that in view of the increasing number of vessels
transiting the Straits every year, there is a need to synchronise the standard guidelines to the
existing littoral States’ references on the qualifications of Straits Pilot to ensure sustainable
implementation of this regime in the future.199 It was also agreed that more time be given to
finalise the revised guidelines for the application of voluntary pilotage and that a joint paper on
this would be drafted and sent to the IMO after the littoral States reach an agreement on the
revised guidelines.200

As the proposed voluntary pilotage services are not compulsory, they may be implemented
outside the regime of the PSSA.201 Nevertheless, given that the predicted traffic congestion in the
Straits is likely to complicate navigation in future years, it may be entirely feasible for the littoral
States of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia to consider following in the footsteps of Australia
and PNG in imposing a compulsory pilotage system in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. It is
therefore crucial to examine the potential legal and political implications that may arise out of
such an implementation.

Should Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, as the three littoral States of the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, agree to submit a PSSA proposal to the IMO, as required by Resolution A.982
(24), the submission is likely to contain proposed measures for the application of compulsory
pilotage, which in this case, is the suggested APM for the Straits. This APM would fulfil the
requirement of Resolution A.982 (24) as it is an APM that has been previously approved by the
197
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IMO in its application to the Torres Strait PSSA. Prior to submission of such a proposal, it would
also be prudent to carry out a preliminary study on the feasibility of the application of
compulsory pilotage in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.202 Based on the Australian and
Papua New Guinean experience in 2003, when the proposal is submitted to the IMO, this
application is likely to be considered by three committees of the IMO: the MEPC, the Legal
Committee and the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV Sub Committee) of the
MSC.203 The practice of the MEPC when dealing with the Torres Strait PSSA was that the
MEPC would only recommend the APM without stating whether it is mandatory or advisory
only. As contended by Bateman:
…it is NOT in the nature of the IMO to formally approve traffic
management schemes but rather to recommend their acceptance.204
(Emphasis added)
Theoretically, based on these facts, it is possible that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could
be designated as a PSSA or that a number of PSSAs could be designated within the Straits.
However, the application of proposed APMs, particularly a compulsory pilotage scheme, is
likely to be contentious and there would be many controversial legal and political implications
associated with such an application.
Singapore and the US are among the States that have consistently protested Australia’s
implementation of compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait, contending that it has undermined
the transit passage regime under the LOSC and is inconsistent with the decisions reached by the
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IMO.205 Singapore has indicated its intention to bring Australia to international dispute
resolution over this issue but this has not occurred as yet.206 The fundamental position taken by
Singapore is that it is against any acts that could jeopardise, hamper or impede the freedom of
navigation. Based on Singapore’s clearly articulated position in relation to the issue of
compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait, it is unlikely that Singapore would agree that both the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be designated as PSSAs with compulsory pilotage as the
APM.207 If the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are treated separately rather than as one
waterway then the scenario may be different.

As far as the Strait of Malacca is concerned, Malaysia and Indonesia are littoral States of the
Strait. Both countries have been steadfast in declaring that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
are significant for international navigation and not international straits, while Singapore merely
acknowledged the 1971 Joint Statement on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore without
articulating its own view on this issue.208 This was because these countries had different national
interests; Malaysia and Indonesia were more focused on insular interests and sovereignty over
the Strait of Malacca while Singapore, as a bustling international port, was more focused on
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ensuring freedom of navigation for merchant vessels.209 With the conclusion of the Third United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III) and the adoption of the LOSC in 1982,
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia ultimately agreed with the provisions on transit passage for
all vessels in straits used for international navigation in Part III of the LOSC.

In recent times, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have continued to articulate their positions
on environmental issues relating to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. 210 Singapore expressed
its concern over the protection and preservation of the marine environment of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore but at the same time acknowledged that navigation through the Straits
cannot be hampered.211 Singapore, together with Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to enhance the
existing co-operative mechanism to further protect and preserve the marine environment of the
Straits and to promote safe navigation for transiting vessels.212

Singapore is focused on providing better aids to navigational infrastructure to promote safer
shipping for transiting vessels.213 As an entrepot State, liberal navigational regimes such as
transit passage are imperative for Singapore’s economic interests and survival.214 Malaysia and
Indonesia, on the other hand, apart from acknowledging the importance of safe navigation, have
taken other positions which to a certain extent may place constraints on navigation through the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore in the interests of environmental protection. These include
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support for the imposition of tolls on transiting ships,215 capping the number of vessels transiting
the Strait216 and proposals for the application of compulsory pilotage to transiting vessels.217

Based on these facts, it is clear that Malaysia and Indonesia, as compared to Singapore, have a
longer and more positive history of supporting measures to protect and preserve the marine
environment of the Straits, notwithstanding the fact that such attempts may indirectly constrain
passage rights.218 Considering the likelihood that Singapore may not support an application for
the designation of the Strait of Singapore as a PSSA, it would nevertheless be open to Malaysia
and Indonesia to submit a proposal to the IMO with a view to designation of the Strait of
Malacca as a PSSA with compulsory pilotage as a proposed APM.

As with the Torres Strait, where compulsory pilotage only applies in the most critical area of the
waterway, Malaysia and Indonesia could also propose the application of pilotage in the busiest
part of the Strait, particularly between One Fathom Bank and Tanjung Piai.219 The type and size
of vessels that are subjected to the compulsory pilotage regime could also be defined in the
215

J.N. Mak, ‘Unilateralism and Regionalism: Working Together and Alone in the Malacca Straits’ in Graham
Gerard Ong-Webb (ed), Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits (Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2006), 146-151.
216

H.M. Ibrahim and Mansoureh Shahryari, ‘The Ship Carrying Capacity of the Malacca Straits’ (2008) 15(4)
MIMA Bulletin, 15-16; Teh Eng Hock, ‘Malaysia Seeks to Limit Maritime Traffic in Straits of Malacca’ (2008) The
Star Online <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?sec=nation&file=/2008/10/22/nation/2335917>.
217

Hasjim Djalal, ‘The Development of Cooperation on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper presented at
the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008).
218

It is true that the littoral States have in the 1971 Joint Statement agreed to treat the two Straits as a single strait. In
fact, until today, co-operations between the littoral States, the users and the IMO have worked out based on this
agreement. Nevertheless, the 1971 Statement was never meant to be a treaty but it was a joint statement of
agreement made by the littoral States at the time when the density of shipping traffic was not as high as it is now. It
has now been forty years since the 1971 Statement was made and considering the fact that the number of shipping
traffic is going to increase, it may not be legally unfeasible to amend the agreement to the 1971 Statement in treating
both Straits as separate straits as far as PSSA designation is concerned. If the fifth agreement of the 1971 Joint
Statement (see 1971 Joint Statement, Note 208) on the application of innocent passage in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore could be changed and replaced with the transit passage regime when the LOSC came into force, the
general agreement that the Straits are to be treated as a single strait could also be changed under the pretext of the
proposed PSSA designation. See Michael Leifer, ‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed),
International Straits of the World (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 204; Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The
Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore’ (2011) 3(4) Asian Politics & Policy, 501-526.
219

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for International
Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper presented at the 4th Oceanic Conference on
International Studies, Auckland, 2010).

266

PSSA proposal to the IMO. Both countries could justify the imposition of compulsory pilotage
based on a number of grounds; one of which is the existence of navigational hazards, as
explained in Chapter 5, along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.220 If the IMO were to
endorse the proposal, Malaysia and Indonesia could also consider following Australia’s domestic
initiative of imposing penalties on any ships that failed to engage a pilot while transiting the
Straits should such ships subsequently enter either Malaysian or Indonesian ports, rather than
obstructing the passage of such ships as they transits the Strait of Malacca.221

In view of the critical nature of the Strait of Malacca and the volume of shipping traffic passing
through it, there is likely to be considerable controversy over the proposed plan to introduce
compulsory pilotage in the Strait.222 Firstly, nations that are against such a plan would contend
that Malaysia and Indonesia have breached the provisions of the LOSC which allows for
unimpeded transit passage in straits used for international navigation as provided for in Articles
38(1) and 44 of the LOSC. Secondly, they would assert that since the Strait of Malacca is
indispensable in regulating global trade, the imposition of compulsory pilotage would not only
impede passage, but it would also unreasonably increase shipping costs, as vessels and ships
would have to employ pilots while transiting the Strait. 223 Table 8-2 shows the average operating
costs of a very large crude carrier (VLCC):
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Elements
Running Cost (USD)
Manning, including victualling
892,000
Lubes and stores
386,000
Spares, R & M
263,000
Dry docking (annualised cost)
688,000
Insurance
582,000
Administration
110,000
Miscellaneous
65,000
Total
2,986,000
Running costs per annum=US $2,986,000
Capital costs per annum=US $4,825,000 (Calculated on a 5 per cent rate of return over 25 years
on an initial cost of US $68 million)
Total operating cost per annum=US $7,811,000
Table 8-2: VLCC Operating Costs based on a vessel with a capital cost of US $68 million and a
life of 25 years (Source: Marlow & Gardner, 2006)224
Although a rigorous study has yet to be conducted to determine the impacts of the introduction of
compulsory pilotage in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore on freight rates, data from Table 8-2
shows that any such application would add more expense to the average operating costs of a
VLCC and this would ultimately affect the global international trade that moves through the
Straits.

Thirdly, from a practical perspective, in terms of navigational importance the Strait of Malacca is
more critical for international shipping than the Torres Strait, given the fact that it supports more
than 74,000 vessel movements each year as compared to 3,000 in the Torres Strait.225 Could
Malaysia and Indonesia provide a guarantee that the number of pilots would be sufficient for the
busy waterway of the Strait of Malacca? It would be unreasonable to expect the voyages of
international shipping through the Strait to be impeded because pilots could not be made
available; this would clearly be inconsistent with the LOSC.
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Fourthly, in justifying its imposition of compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait, Australia argued
that no other strait routinely used in the world has a long history of pilotage as that of the Torres
Strait. The Strait of Malacca does not have a history of pilotage since this was only seriously
discussed as a potential ship routeing and safety measure in 1977.226 Therefore, user States may
argue that compulsory pilotage should neither be introduced nor imposed on ships that transit the
Strait of Malacca.

Fifthly, co-operative mechanisms in both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are doing well,
with more States other than Japan agreeing to share the burden of protecting and preserving the
marine environment of both Straits.227 These developments show that as far as the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are concerned, compulsory pilotage is likely to face political opposition
and may not be the ultimate solution to the littoral States environmental protection dilemma.228

8.3.2.3.3

Possible Rebuttals by the Littoral States

Malaysia and Indonesia may nevertheless have arguments to rebut these potential criticisms and
the opposition to a compulsory pilotage plan by user States.229 They may assert that the
imposition of compulsory pilotage in the Strait of Malacca would not impede transit passage, but
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rather would facilitate safe and environmentally responsible passage of the Strait. For narrow
parts of the Strait that are burdened with high navigational traffic, compulsory pilotage could be
necessary to prevent future mishaps and casualties. Taking the Torres Strait example, there are
parallels with some parts of the Strait of Malacca as both are waterways with many navigational
hazards.230

It is true that co-operative mechanisms between the littoral States and the user States have seen
positive developments in recent years. Nevertheless, these developments have been moving
rather slowly and have not kept pace with the increasing number of ships that transit the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore each year.231 As such, compulsory pilotage, given its success in the
Torres Strait, may be seen by the littoral States as a better solution to further preserve and protect
the marine environment of the Strait of Malacca.232 There is relatively little doubt that efficient
pilotage services would help to increase safety of passage. 233 In a study conducted on pilotage,
only around 18 per cent of mariners responded with the opinion that pilotage would not make
much difference in contributing to the improvement of safety in the Straits.234

It is more difficult for Malaysia and Indonesia to rebut the other opposing arguments. In
comparison with the Torres Strait, the Strait of Malacca is heavily relied upon to link the East
and the West. The annual volume of shipping traffic is approximately 25 times higher than that
of the Torres Strait. The imposition of compulsory pilotage would inevitably increase global
shipping costs. The Strait of Malacca does not have a long history of pilotage. Certain analysts
have claimed that even though the exercise of pilotage may increase the safety of navigation, it
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would raise major problems in matters of the funding of, and jurisdiction over, pilotage.235 With
the high number of ships passing through the Strait, would Malaysia and Indonesia be able to
provide enough pilots? This difficulty would need to be resolved prior to preparing the Strait of
Malacca for the imposition of compulsory pilotage, with both littoral States of the Strait needing
to make appropriate arrangements to meet the future demand for pilots.

8.3.3 Ship Routeing Measures Outside The PSSA

Should the PSSA proposal be unsuccessful, the littoral States could also attempt to introduce and
develop their own ship routeing system, based on any of the three proposed APMs, outside the
PSSA scheme by making such an application to the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee. To date,
the only ship routeing systems that have been introduced in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
are the TSS and the minimum under keel clearance. The imposition of the TSS is clearly
supported by the LOSC in Article 41, while there is no provision in the LOSC that supports the
imposition of a minimum under keel clearance of 3.5 metres for ships sailing the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. The minimum under keel clearance requirement in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, however, was endorsed by the IMO in 1977. Following this precedent,
the littoral States could also attempt to introduce the three APMs; namely, the traffic limitation
scheme, the cost-recovery mechanism and the compulsory pilotage regime, outside Special
Areas or PSSA with the aim of promoting safe and convenient navigation in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. However, these proposals are likely to be resisted by maritime States.

Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 6, the reason behind the adoption of the minimum under keel
clearance requirement of 3.5 meters was the understanding reached between the littoral States
and the maritime States during UNCLOS III on the application of Article 233 of the LOSC in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore.236 This understanding required that any violation of the TSS
and under keel clearance regulations in the Straits would be deemed as a violation of Article 233.
There have never been any similar understandings between the littoral States and the maritime
235

Mark Cleary and Goh Kim Chuan, Environment and Development in the Straits of Malacca, Routledge Studies in
Development and Society (Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2000), 147.
236

See Section 6.3.6 of Chapter 6 of this Thesis.
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States pertaining to the imposition of compulsory pilotage, cost-recovery schemes or traffic
limitation regimes in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as far as Article 233 of the LOSC is
concerned. Secondly, such measures would be resisted by maritime States as they could be seen
as attempts to compromise the unimpeded right of transit passage of all vessels through these
crucial waterways. In view of these issues, the littoral States may have to conduct in-depth
research to gather more data on the viability of the implementation of these potential measures
before proposing their introduction in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

In justifying their arguments, the littoral States may rely on Articles 192, 194 and 197 of the
LOSC. Collectively, these Articles provide that all States have the duty to protect and preserve
the marine environment by individually and co-operatively working towards preventing,
reducing and controlling pollution of the marine environment. In addition, with the relatively
slow development of the co-operative mechanism, the littoral States may argue that it would be
reasonable to implement additional environmental protection measures in the Straits in order to
ensure that the marine environment does not suffer further degradation.

8.4.

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has analysed potential future measures to protect and preserve the marine
environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. This could be achieved through the
proposed designations of the Straits as a Special Area under MARPOL 73/78 and a PSSA.

The discharge of operational oil and pollutants from ships would be better managed if the Straits
were designated as Special Areas under MARPOL; however, a key problem would be whether or
not the littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have the infrastructure and
facilities needed for such a designation. Over the years, Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian
ports have developed their reception facilities’ infrastructure and this should suffice, at least on
an interim basis, as not all ships transiting the Straits would initially call at ports along the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore.
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There are a number of potential APMs which could be considered for the proposed Straits of
Malacca and Singapore PSSA. These APMs include the cost-recovery mechanism and the
introduction of a traffic limitation regime or through the implementation of compulsory pilotage.
Some user States may argue that these measures are inconsistent with the LOSC and these APMs
could only be implemented and enforced with the agreement of the IMO. Taking the adverse
reactions of some user States to implementation of compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait into
account, it is likely that a proposal for imposing this measure in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore would be followed by similar reactions. In addition, unlike the designation of the
Torres Strait as a PSSA, which was endorsed by the IMO as an extension of the Great Barrier
Reef PSSA, the proposed designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a PSSA would
be a new proposal and thus is likely to have a more difficult passage through the IMO.

Assuming that an application for the designation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a
PSSA was successful, this Chapter submits that the proposed traffic limitation regime is the most
desirable and practically feasible measure for protecting and preserving the marine environment
of the Straits. The guidelines for the proposed traffic limitation scheme could be jointly
developed by the littoral States, the IMO and the user States. The traffic limitation scheme could
be formulated in such a way as to allow a more equitable balance between transiting shipping
and the control of vessel-source pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, without
significantly restricting the flow of global trade through the Straits. Nonetheless, given the fact
that these measures are likely to draw strong protests from various States, it is crucial to venture
into the potential unilateral measures that the littoral States could consider resorting to without
having to impose them through the mechanisms of the IMO. These potential unilateral measures
are discussed in Chapter 9 of this Thesis.
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CHAPTER 9.
POTENTIAL FUTURE UNILATERAL MEASURES ON SAFETY OF NAVIGATION
AND THE CONTROL OF VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION
9.1

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 8 has suggested the potential IMO measures that the littoral States could consider
resorting to in protecting the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore from
vessel-source pollution. As the proposed measures may impede the right of transit passage, these
proposals may face complications at the IMO level. Nevertheless, the littoral States are not left
without other possible options. This Chapter will discuss the two potential unilateral measures
that might be implemented by the littoral States specifically Malaysia and Indonesia. The first
part of this Chapter will focus on the first unilateral measure; namely, the proposed application
of non-suspendable innocent passage in the Strait of Malacca. The second part of this Chapter
will discuss the other potential unilateral measure; the proposed reversion of territorial sea claims
in the Strait of Malacca from twelve nautical miles to three nautical miles. This Chapter will also
examine and appraise the potential legal implications arising from such implementations before
concluding whether or not these potential measures may be legally practical for imposition in the
Strait of Malacca.

9.2

POSSIBLE UNILATERAL MEASURES BY LITTORAL STATES

The first proposed measure is to invoke the application of non-suspendable innocent passage in
the Strait of Malacca. The following section critically examines the viability and practicability of
such an imposition.

9.2.1 The Application of Non-Suspendable Innocent Passage in the Strait of Malacca

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are located between two main oceans; the Indian Ocean to
the west via the Andaman Sea, and the Pacific Ocean to the east via the South China Sea.1 The
* This Chapter has been published (wholly or in part) in the following peer-reviewed journals:
(a) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Balancing the Tensions between Shipping and Marine Environmental
Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Have the Straits Reached an Environmental
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Straits form a waterway linking these two regions of the world together.2 In terms of maritime
navigation, the Straits have always been regarded as a single strait, even though the waterway is
formed by two different straits: the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Singapore.3 The Straits of
Malacca and Singapore therefore fit the definition of a strait used for international navigation in
Articles 374 and 38(1)5 of the LOSC. Hence, the transit passage regime is applicable in these
straits and inevitably opens them to international shipping traffic, with the burden of

Tipping Point’ (2011) 7(2) The International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and
Social Sustainability, 39-51;
(b) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Legal Feasibility of Imposing Shipping Controls in Straits Used
for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 2(9) OIDA
International Journal of Sustainable Development, 69-82;
(c) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Transit Passage Regime in Straits Used for
International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2012) Asian Politics &
Policy (imprint).
1

See Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4 of this Thesis.

2

Mokhzani
Zubir,
‘The
Strategic
Value
of
the
Strait
of
Malacca’
(2005)
<http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/mokhzani/strategic-value.pdf>; S. Tiwari, ‘Legal Mechanisms
for Establishing a Fund’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 470-471; Catherine
Zara Raymond, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait’ (2009) 62(3) Naval War College Review, 31-32;
Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008), 5-8.
3

Tommy Koh stated that ‘The Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which are interconnected…should be treated as
one watercourse’. See Tommy Koh, ‘Opening Remarks by Prof Tommy Koh, Chair of the IMO-IPS Conference on
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore; Ambassador-At-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore’ (1999) 3
Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 295. This view is also shared by Beckman, which
contended that ‘The Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait are connected. They are treated by the three littoral
States of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and by the IMO, as a single strait, which is referred to as the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore’. See Robert Beckman, ‘Singapore Strives to Enhance Safety, Security, and Environmental
Protection in its Port and in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2009) 14(2) Ocean and Coastal Law Journal,
167-169. There is also a view that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are actually one watercourse with the Strait
of Singapore forming the narrowest part of the waterway, which represents the real choke point. See Abdul Ghafur
Hamid @ Khin Maung Sein, ‘Maritime Terrorism, the Straits of Malacca and the Issue of State Responsibility’
(2006) 15(1) Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 155-179. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore
connect to each other making one single stretch of navigational channel extending approximately 521.39 nautical
miles in length. Therefore, these straits should be regarded as together in terms of maritime navigation. See Raja
Malik Kamaruzaman, ‘Navigational Safety in the Strait of Malacca’ (1998) 2(2) Singapore Journal of International
& Comparative Laws, 469-470.
4

Article 37 of the LOSC mentions that transit passage applies to ‘straits which are used for international navigation
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive
economic zone’.
5

Article 38 (1) of the LOSC reads ‘In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit
passage, which shall not be impeded…’.
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accommodating unlimited shipping traffic falling on the littoral States.6 This is the case if the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore are considered as one entity. 7

Map 9-1: The Straits of Malacca and Singapore
(Modified from Google Maps)
However, the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) considers the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore as two separate straits and defines the limits of these straits differently, illustrated
in Map 9-2 and Map 9-3.8

6

Naoya Okuwaki, ‘Improving Navigational Safety Governance in Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper
presented at the International Symposium on Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2007), 17-21; Jon M. Van Dyke, ‘Legal and Practical Problems Governing
International Straits’ in Hamzah Ahmad (ed), The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding
and Navigational Safety (Pelanduk, 1997), 319-321; Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Legal Feasibility of the
Imposition of a Traffic Limitation Scheme in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 1(6) International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 122-130; Article 44 of
the LOSC provides that ‘States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage and shall give appropriate publicity
to any danger to navigation…There shall be no suspension of transit passage’.
7

Satya N. Nandan, ‘The Management of Straits used for International Navigation: International Cooperation in
Malacca and Singapore Straits’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 430-432.
8

International Hydrographic Organization, ‘Limits of Oceans and Seas’ (150-XII-1971, International Hydrographic
Organization, 1953), 23.
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Map 9-2: Limits of the Strait of Malacca
(Modified from Google Maps)

Map 9-3: Limits of the Strait of Singapore
(Modified from Google Maps)
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If the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not treated as one single strait the transit passage
regime would no longer apply to foreign vessels plying the Strait of Malacca.9 If considered
separately from the Strait of Singapore, the Malaysian side of the Strait of Malacca would fulfil
the requirements needed for non-suspendable innocent passage to apply as provided in Article
45(2) of the LOSC.10 Similarly, the Indonesian side of the Strait of Malacca, if considered
separately from the Strait of Singapore, would be a strait that connects one part of the high seas
or EEZ to the territorial sea of Singapore.11 It could also be argued that the Indonesian side of the
Strait of Malacca, if it is not presumed to form one single strait with its Singaporean counterpart,
would be a strait that connects one part of high seas or EEZ to the territorial seas of both
Singapore and Indonesia as well as to the archipelagic waters of Indonesia.12 The LOSC is silent
on the navigational regime applicable in a strait that connects a part of an EEZ to the
archipelagic waters of another State.

Under this new interpretation, the Strait of Singapore would be considered a strait that connects
the South China Sea, which forms one part of the high seas/EEZ to the territorial sea of Malaysia
and Indonesia in the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, non-suspendable innocent passage would
likely be the navigational regime applicable in the Strait of Singapore. Nevertheless, it may also
be asserted that since there is an EEZ area in the Strait of Malacca, transit passage would still be
the navigational regime applicable in the Strait of Singapore as it is still legally a strait that
connects one part of the high seas/EEZ of the South China Sea to another part of the high
seas/EEZ of the Strait of Malacca.13
9

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Balancing the Tensions between Shipping and Marine Environmental Protection in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Have the Straits Reached an Environmental Tipping Point’ (2011) 7(2) The
International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability, 45-46.
10

Article 45(1) (b) of the LOSC reads ‘The regime of innocent passage, in accordance with Part II, section 3, shall
apply in straits used for international navigation between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and
the territorial sea of a foreign State’. The difference between this navigational regime and that of innocent passage in
Part II of the LOSC is that this regime is non-suspendable. See Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4 of this Thesis.
11

Vivian Louis Forbes and Mohd Nizam Basiron, Defining Maritime Limits: Western Approaches to the Strait of
Singapore, Malaysia's Maritime Space: An Analytical Atlas of Environments and Resources (Maritime Institute of
Malaysia, 1998), 13.
12

Ibid.

13

The Strait of Singapore is collectively bordered by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Unlike Malaysia and
Indonesia, since UNCLOS III, Singapore has always been a keen supporter of freedom of navigation for vessels
navigating through straits used for international navigation. As an important international maritime hub, the transit
passage regime is crucial for the well-being of Singapore’s thriving shipping industry. Looking from this
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Map 9-4: The Strait of Malacca Treated Separately from the Strait of Singapore
(Modified from Google Maps)
Putting this assertion aside, it could rightly be argued that if the Strait of Malacca and the Strait
of Singapore are considered as separate straits, the Strait of Malacca may be seen as a strait that
connects one part of the high seas or EEZ to the territorial sea of a foreign State, and therefore,
non-suspendable innocent passage would apply in the Strait of Malacca instead of transit
passage.14

9.2.1.1

Political and Legal Implications

If Malaysia and Indonesia, as States bordering the Strait of Malacca, supported such an
interpretation of the Strait’s status, the navigational regime in the Strait of Malacca would be

perspective, it is likely that Singapore and other maritime States would not support any attempts to re-interpret the
legal status of the Strait of Singapore. See Section 3.3.1.3 of Chapter 3 of this Thesis.
14

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Balancing the Tensions between Shipping and Marine Environmental Protection
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Have the Straits Reached an Environmental Tipping Point’ (2011) 7(2) The
International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability, 45-46; Mohd Hazmi bin
Mohd Rusli, ‘Laws, Regulations and Measures on Protection of the Marine Environment of Straits used for
International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper presented at the 2011
International Law Association Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, 2011).
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viewed differently by these States, who would contend that foreign vessels would cease to have
the right to exercise transit passage in the Strait.15 The application of non-suspendable innocent
passage would allow both Malaysia and Indonesia to impose more shipping control mechanisms
on ships and aircraft transiting the Strait.16 Under the non-suspendable innocent passage regime,
submarines are required to travel on the surface while exercising innocent passage 17 and foreign
aircraft would have no freedom of overflight over the Strait of Malacca.18
Article 23319 of the LOSC contains a provision relating to the enforcement jurisdiction of States
bordering straits on environmental safeguards with respect to straits used for international
navigation.20 Under Article 233, States bordering straits are entitled to take enforcement
measures against ships in transit passage only provided if such ships have committed a violation
of the laws and regulations stipulated in Articles 42(1) (a) and (b)21 of the LOSC which
thereafter may threaten or cause major damage to the marine environment of the straits.22
15

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Balancing the Tensions Between Shipping and Marine Environmental Protection
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Have the Straits Reached an Environmental Tipping Point?’ (Paper
presented at the Seventh International Conference on Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability,
Hamilton, New Zealand, 2011).
16

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Balancing the Tensions between Shipping and Marine Environmental Protection
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Have the Straits Reached an Environmental Tipping Point’ (2011) 7(2) The
International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability, 39-48; Mohd Hazmi bin
Mohd Rusli, ‘Shipping Controls in the Malacca Strait: Has the Strait Reached an Environmental Tipping Point’
(Paper presented at the 7th Asian Law Institute Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2010).
17

Article 20 of the LOSC reads ‘In the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to
navigate on the surface and to show their flag.’; Bernard H Oxman, ‘The New Law of the Sea’ (1983) 69 American
Bar Association Journal, 156-158.
18

Unlike transit passage, innocent passage regime only confers passage rights to ships and not aircrafts. See
Boleslaw A. Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary (Scarecrow Press, 2005), 313-314; Robin Rolf Churchill and
Alan Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 1988), 105; Bernard H Oxman, ‘The New
Law of the Sea’ (1983) 69 American Bar Association Journal, 156-160.
19

The first part of Article 233 of the LOSC reads ‘Nothing in sections 5, 6 and 7 affects the legal regime of straits
used for international navigation’.
20

Erik Jaap Molenaar, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis,
Utrecht University, 1965), 295-298.
21

Article 42(1) of the LOSC reads ‘Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may adopt laws
and regulations relating to transit passage through straits, in respect of all or any of the following: (a) the safety of
navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, as provided in article 41; (b) the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution, by giving effect to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and
other noxious substances in the strait.’
22

International Maritime Organization (IMO), ‘Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea for the International Maritime Organization’ (LEG/MISC.6, IMO, 2008), 64.
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As explained earlier in Chapter 4, it is to be noted that there are two types of straits used for
international navigation; namely, straits where transit passage applies and straits where transit
passage does not apply.23 However, the LOSC does not explicitly specify the types of straits used
for international navigation that are subjected to the wording of Article 233.24 There is also no
clear nexus that links both Article 233 and Part III of the LOSC. 25 The LOSC is silent on this
interpretation.

The second part of Article 233 reads:
…However, if a foreign ship…has committed a violation of the
laws and regulations referred to in Article 42, Paragraph 1(a) and
(b), causing or threatening major damage to the marine
environment of the straits, the States bordering the straits may take
appropriate enforcement measures…
From the wording of the second part of Article 233, it could be said that there is, however, a
relation between Article 233 and Part III of the LOSC. Article 233 expressly mentions on the
application of Article 42(1), which forms one of the legal provisions of Part III. Article 42(1)
provides that:

Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits
may adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage through
straits…
Article 42(1), as cited above, specifically provides that it applies in straits used for international
navigation where transit passage is applicable. For that reason, it may also be contended that
neither Article 42(1) nor Article 233 applies to straits where non-suspendable innocent passage is
exercisable by foreign vessels. Assuming that Article 233 only applies to straits used for
international navigation that are subjected to the transit passage regime, the littoral States of the
Strait of Malacca supporting a non-suspendable innocent passage regime in the Strait would not
consider themselves bound by the enforcement limitations on marine pollution incidents
23

See Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 of Chapter 4 of this Thesis.

24

See Section 6.3.6 of Chapter 6 of this Thesis.

25

Mary George, Legal Regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008), 73-77.
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particularly as embodied in Article 233 of Part XII of the LOSC. 26 This is because in straits used
for international navigation where non-suspendable innocent passage applies, the navigational
regime in that strait would be governed by the regime of innocent passage in accordance with
Part II, Section 3 of the LOSC.27 The littoral States could also apply Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Part
XII of the LOSC on enforcement and procedural powers in cases where they have evidence that
ships have breached their marine pollution laws.28

With Article 42(1) of the LOSC no longer binding upon the littoral States of the Strait of
Malacca, they may then employ laws and regulations outside the scope permitted by Article
42(1). Both Malaysia and Indonesia may formulate laws and regulations on the protection of the
marine environment of the Strait which are not restricted only to matters pertaining to safety of
navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic.29 Furthermore, the littoral States may also no
longer need to enact laws and regulations by giving effect to applicable international regulations
regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the Strait.30 Under the
transit passage regime, States bordering straits are conferred with limited enforcement powers, as
reiterated by Beckman:

If a vessel exercising the right of transit passage violates
obligations under Article 39(2), but the vessel in question does not
come into port, and the violation in question does not cause or
threaten major damage to the marine environment of the straits, the
rights of the littoral State are more limited.31
26

As stated earlier in Section 6.3.6.2 of Chapter 6 of this Thesis, Article 233 does not make any reference to Part III
of the LOSC. Therefore, it is not clear whether it only applies to straits used for international navigation where
transit passage is exercisable or otherwise.
27

See LOSC Art 45(1) (b).

28

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Balancing the Tensions between Shipping and Marine Environmental Protection
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Have the Straits Reached an Environmental Tipping Point’ (2011) 7(2) The
International Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability, 45-46.
29

Article 42(1) stipulates that ‘Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may adopt laws and
regulations relating to transit passage through straits, in respect of all or any of the following (a) the safety of
navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic…’.
30

Article 42(1(b) allows States bordering straits to adopt laws and regulations relating to ‘the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution, by giving effect to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily
wastes and other noxious substances in the strait’.
31

Robert Beckman, ‘Transit Passage Regime in the Straits of Malacca: Issues for Consideration’ (Paper presented
at the Building A Comprehensive Security Environment in the Straits of Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, 2004), 249-250.
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The replacement of transit passage with the non-suspendable innocent passage regime means that
the littoral States of Malaysia and Indonesia may take appropriate enforcement measures against
any ships that have violated their marine pollution laws without having to wait for an actual
incident that may cause or may threaten to cause major damage to the marine environment of the
Strait. Moreover, in straits where transit passage is applicable, States bordering straits are
permitted to enact laws and regulations governing marine pollution based on the requirements set
in Articles 42(1) (a) and (b) as well as Article 42(2) of the LOSC. Article 42(2) reads:

Such laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact
among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect
of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage...
Therefore, given that the transit passage regime may no longer be applicable for foreign vessels
in the Strait of Malacca under this new legal interpretation, the littoral States may consequently
formulate laws and regulations outside the guidelines stipulated in Article 42(2). Nevertheless, as
the LOSC has provided that the non-suspendable innocent passage regime is not suspendable, it
would not be too simplistic to state that the littoral States are not permitted under the LOSC to
exercise the same degree of regulatory powers they possess within their territorial seas in
regulating shipping in the Strait of Malacca.32 To a certain extent, it is undeniable that the
application of a non-suspendable innocent passage regime would ultimately strengthen the
regulatory powers of the littoral States, which are more limited under the transit passage regime.
However, this does not in any way mean that the littoral States could suspend the passage of
vessels plying the Strait of Malacca without any valid or compelling reason to do so.

This interpretation of the navigational regime applicable in the Strait would be highly
contentious among other States. Given the fact that the non-suspendable innocent passage regime
is less liberal than that of transit passage this may incite various mixed reactions, particularly
32

As elaborated in Chapter 4, the right of innocent passage is the strictest type of navigational regime. Under the
regime of innocent passage, the coastal State may suspend temporarily the passage of a foreign vessel under the
pretext of upholding the security of the coastal State, as provided in Article 25(3) of the LOSC. This is a right not
possessed by a State bordering a strait as the navigational regimes applicable in straits used for international
navigation are different from that of territorial sea. See Donat Pharand, ‘The Northwest Passage in International
Law’ in Charles B. Bourne (ed), The Canadian Yearbook of International Law/ Annuaire canadien de Droit
international (The University of British Columbia, 1980) vol XVII, 114-115; See Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of
Chapter 4 of this Thesis.
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among the States which are heavily dependent on the Strait of Malacca. In rejecting this new
interpretation of the legal status of the Strait, the opposing States may contend that the Strait of
Malacca is used for international navigation of global standing and that the littoral States have
over the years acquiesced in the application of transit passage to the Strait. 33 This supports the
view that the customary international law position is that transit passage applies in both the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Conversely, based on the earlier discussion in Chapter 3, the
littoral States may also contend that, being a relatively new regime, there is no general consensus
that transit passage has been accepted as part of customary international law. 34

Moreover, separation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore will not change the status of the
Strait of Malacca as it is inseparable from that of the Strait of Singapore. It is not possible for a
vessel to pass through the Strait of Malacca without having to transit the Strait of Singapore to
navigate to the east or west. This is the reason why academic commentators such as Koh,
Beckman and Kamaruzzaman regarded the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a single
waterway.35

33

The Strait of Malacca has not only been regarded as one of the world’s great international sea ways, it is also an
international strait of global standing. See Vivian Louis Forbes, ‘Managing Marine Environment, Resources and
Space in the Torres Strait: The Future Charted’ (Paper presented at the Sixth MIMA Conference on the Straits of
Malacca: Charting the Future, Kuala Lumpur, 2009), 92-110. Most maritime States namely China, Japan, the US
and shipping organisations like INTERTANKO have considered that transit passage as the most appropriate regime
to be applicable in the Strait of Malacca. See Joshua H. Ho, ‘Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental
Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: The Co-operative Mechanism’ (2009) 40(2) Ocean Development
and International Law, 233-247. One of the reasons of the introduction of Article 43 of the LOSC on voluntary cooperation between States bordering straits and the user States was as an inducement for States bordering straits to
accept transit passage as the applicable navigational regime in straits used for international navigation. Currently,
there is a co-operation mechanism developing under the ambit of Article 43 as far as the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore are concerned. Therefore, this ongoing co-operation directly or indirectly shows that the littoral States
have accepted the status of both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as straits which are subjected to the transit
passage regime. See Hasjim Djalal, ‘Funding and Managing International Partnership for the Malacca and Singapore
Straits Consonant with Article 43 of the UNCLOS 1982’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International &
Comparative Laws, 457-469.
34

This view should be considered by looking at the status of the transit passage regime itself. There are conflicting
views on whether or not transit passage has become part of the customary international law. The littoral States may,
on the other hand contend that since the transit passage regime was a creation of UNCLOS III, therefore, it is a new
navigational regime and has yet to achieve such a status. For further discussion, see Section 3.2.1.4 of Chapter 3 of
this Thesis.
35

See Note 3.
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The proposed new interpretation of the legal status of the Strait of Malacca may also be seen as
violating the earlier acknowledgement declared in the 1971 Joint Statement of the Governments
of Malaysia Indonesia and Singapore on the Malacca Straits (1971 Joint Statement). 36 In the
1971 Joint Statement, the three littoral States agreed that:

(1)

The safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is the responsibility of
the coastal States concerned;

(2)

A tripartite co-operation on the safety of navigation in the two straits is to be established;

(3)

A body of co-operation to co-ordinate efforts for the safety of navigation in the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore be established as soon as possible and that such body should be
composed of only the three coastal States concerned;

(4)

The problem of the safety of navigation and the question of internationalisation of the
straits are two separate issues;

(5)

The Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia agreed that the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore are not international straits, while fully recognising their use for
international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocent passage. The
Government of Singapore takes note of the position of the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia and of Malaysia on this point.

(6)

On the basis of this understanding, the three Governments approved the continuation of
the hydrographic survey conducted on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.37

During the ministerial meeting that led to the issue of the 1971 Joint Statement, the three littoral
States agreed, for the purposes of safety of navigation and the protection of the environment of
the Straits, to treat the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as one single strait.38 As discussed
earlier in Chapter 7, the agreement achieved in the 1971 Joint Statement formed the basis of the
36

‘The Joint Statement of the Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore’ as quoted in Michael Leifer,
‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World (Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1978), 204.
37

Ibid.

38

Hasjim Djalal, ‘Funding and Managing International Partnership for the Malacca and Singapore Straits Consonant
with Article 43 of the UNCLOS 1982’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 459-463;
Satya N. Nandan, ‘The Management of Straits used for International Navigation: International Cooperation in
Malacca and Singapore Straits’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Laws, 431.
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establishment of the TTEG in 1977 that to date has worked together for more than four decades
to maintain the well-being of the Straits.39 Japan has assisted the littoral States by promoting cooperation between the Malacca Straits Council (MSC) and the Nippon Foundation with the
TTEG.40 In fact, the subsequent co-operation scheme that exists between the littoral States and
other user States and organisations including the US, South Korea, Australia, China and
Germany, as well as INTERTANKO and MENAS was officially formalised through the recently
established Co-operative Mechanism, a mechanism that has been developed largely through the
TTEG with the assistance of the IMO, as provided by Article 43 of the LOSC. 41 If Malaysia and
Indonesia went ahead with their plan to reinterpret the legal status of the Straits by separating
them, the existing co-operation mechanism may end through frustration, with user States likely
to be reluctant to participate as they could no longer enjoy the unimpeded right of transit passage
through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Furthermore, this re-interpretation of the legal
status of the Strait of Malacca may also be seen as defeating the purpose of Article 43 of the
LOSC.

However, in response, the littoral States could argue that though it is true that the governments of
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have previously agreed to treat both Straits as one entity, this
was essentially simply an agreement. The 1971 Joint Statement was agreed upon 40 years ago, at
a time when the volume of shipping traffic transiting the Strait of Malacca was not as great as it
is now. From 1970 until 1986, the average number of shipping transits did not exceed 50,000 per
year.42 Currently, there are approximately 74,000 transits per year, an increase of about 34.21 per
cent from the number of transits the Straits accommodated nearly four decades ago.43 This figure

39

See Section 7.3.4 of Chapter 7 of this Thesis.

40

See Section 7.3.1 of Chapter 7 of this Thesis.

41

Article 43 of the LOSC reads ‘User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement cooperate (a) in the
establishment and maintenance in a straits of necessary navigational and safety aids or other improvements in aid of
international navigation; and (b) for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships’.
42

Muhammad Razif bin Ahmad, ‘The Financial Cost of Risk Management in the Straits of Malacca’ in Hamzah
Ahmad (ed), The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation In Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety
(Pelanduk, 1997), 187-188; G. Naidu, ‘The Straits of Malacca In The Malaysian Economy’ in Hamzah Ahmad (ed),
The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation In Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety (Pelanduk, 1997), 3334.
43

See Tables 2-5 of Chapter 2 of this Thesis.
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is anticipated to increase up to 150,000 transits per year by the year 2020.44 Indeed, the
agreement made via the 1971 Joint Statement was never intended to be a treaty and therefore,
given the increasing volume of shipping traffic, the littoral States have the option to consider
reviewing this previous agreement.45

The contention that the replacement of the transit passage regime with non-suspendable innocent
passage would impede the free flow of international trade passing through the Straits is in fact
not entirely accurate.46 This is because vessels and ships would continue to enjoy nonsuspendable innocent passage through the Strait of Malacca. As mentioned earlier, the
application of this navigational regime would neither impede nor hamper free passage of
shipping because there is no right of suspension, even for security purposes, on the part of the
littoral States.47 While ships comply with accepted international rules and do not commit any
acts in violation of the marine pollution laws of the littoral States, then these States would not
interrupt their passage. With user States enjoying non-suspendable passage through the Strait of
Malacca, the development of the co-operation mechanism existing between the littoral States and
the users of the Straits would unlikely to be inhibited. Unlike Iran, which has in the past closed
the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, the littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore do not have this reputation.48 In fact, the three littoral States have worked together,

44

Robert Beckman, ‘The Establishment of Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore under
Article 43 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ in Aldo Chircop, Ted L. McDorman and Susan
J. Rolston (eds), The Future of Ocean Regime-Building-Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2009), 234-235; Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for
International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 3(4) Asian Politics & Policy,
506; Vijay Sakhuja, Malacca: Who’s to Pay for Smooth Sailing? (2007) Asia Times Online
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IE16Ae01.html>.
45

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for International
Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 3(4) Asian Politics & Policy, 501-526.
46

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Legal Feasibility of Imposing Shipping Controls in Straits Used for
International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (2011) 2(9) OIDA International Journal
of Sustainable Development, 74-75.
47

Donat Pharand, ‘The Northwest Passage in International Law’ in Charles B. Bourne (ed), The Canadian Yearbook
of International Law/ Annuaire canadien de Droit international (The University of British Columbia, 1980) vol
XVII, 114-115.
48

Sabahat Khan, ‘Iranian Mining of the Strait of Hormuz- Plausibility and Key Considerations’ (Institute for Near
East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), 2009), 1-11; Leighton G. Luke, ‘Closing the Strait of Hormuz - An Ace
up the Sleeve or an Own Goal’ (Future Directions International-Strategic Analysis Paper, Independent Strategic
Analysis of Australia’s Global Interest, 10 February 2010), 1-5.
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particularly through the TTEG, to ensure that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are always
open and safe for international shipping activity.49

The question of the validity of the replacement of transit passage with non-suspendable innocent
passage in the Strait of Malacca may still be arguable by observing the conduct of the littoral
States during UNCLOS III. Article 233 of the LOSC was drafted to satisfy the needs of States
bordering straits in terms of the safeguarding of the marine environment of their territorial straits.
As discussed earlier in Chapter 6, Article 233 has been regarded by many as Malaysia’s
brainchild.50 During the negotiation process at UNCLOS III, Malaysia sent a letter to the
President of UNCLOS III containing a statement on how Article 233 should take effect in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Malaysia contended that the littoral States may take
enforcement measures as provided in Article 233 against offending vessels that have violated its
laws on the TSS and the minimum under keel clearance of 3.5 metres.51 This statement was
subsequently supported and corroborated by letters sent by the Singaporean and Indonesian
delegations.52 This conduct signifies that Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have acknowledged
and acquiesced to the application of transit passage in both Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
Based on this fact, if Malaysia and Indonesia, as the littoral States of the Strait of Malacca, went
ahead with the proposed measure to reinterpret the legal status of the Strait, the reaction and
responses anticipated from other States, particularly major maritime States that possess interests
in the Straits, is unlikely to be a positive one.

49

Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), Work and Close Co-operation of the Tripartite Technical
Experts Group (Tteg) Have Contributed Significantly To The Safety of Navigation in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore- MPA Hosts 25th Anniversary Celebrration of Tteg (2009) MPA
<http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/global_navigation/news_center/mpa_news/mpa_news_detail.page?filename=000509.
xml>; International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), Straits of Malacca and
Singapore Tripartite Technical Experts Group’s (TTEG) 25th Anniversary (2000) INTERTANKO
<http://www.intertanko.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=33614>; See Section 7.3 of Chapter 7 of this Thesis.
50

Raj Sativale, ‘Transit Passage in the Straits of Malacca’ (2003) MIMA Bulletin, 1-14; Mary George, Legal Regime
of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (LexisNexis, 2008).
51

United Nations, ‘DOCUMENT A/CONF.62/L.145: Letter dated 28 April from the representative of Malaysia to
the President of the Conference’ (A/CONF.62/L.145, United Nations, 1982), 250-251.
52

United Nations, DOCUMENT A/CONF.62/L.145/ADD.2, United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea:
Official Records (William S. Hein & Co., 2000); United Nations, DOCUMENT A/CONF.62/L.145/ADD.1, United
Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea Official Records (William S.Hein & Co., 2000); See Section 3.3.1.3 and
Section 6.3.6 of Chapter 6 of this Thesis.
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On this, the littoral States, principally Malaysia and Indonesia may conversely assert that they
have supported the application of innocent passage and not the transit passage regime in straits
used for international navigation since before UNCLOS III was convened. Statement 4 of the
1971 Joint Statement reads:
…the Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia
agreed that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not
international straits, while fully recognising their use for
international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocent
passage...53
In fact, during UNCLOS III, Malaysia and Indonesia, along with other States bordering straits;
namely, Spain, Yemen, the Philippines and Greece have always acknowledged and supported the
idea that straits be dealt with as one entity with their territorial seas.54 Nevertheless, the
acceptance of transit passage regime via the letters sent by the delegations of the littoral States to
the President of UNCLOS III and through the current practice of the exercise of the transit
passage regime by both the littoral States and user States in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
would generally be considered as overriding that earlier acknowledgement.

In addition, opposing States may also contend that Articles 45(1) (b) and 45(2) of the LOSC are
only applicable to a strait that connects one part of the high seas or EEZ to territorial sea of a
foreign State in an enclosed sea area such as the Strait of Tiran55 and the Strait of Georgia (‘dead

53

‘The Joint Statement of the Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore’, as quoted in Michael Leifer,
‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World (Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1978), 204.
54

United Nations (UN), The Law of the Sea: Straits Used for International Navigation: Legislative History of Part
III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Volume I (United Nations, 1992), 75-76; Shekhar Ghosh,
‘The Legal Regime of Innocent Passage Through the Territorial Sea’ in Hugo Caminos (ed), Law of the Sea
(Dartmouth, 2001), 51-56; S.N. Nandan and D.H. Anderson, ‘Straits Used for International Navigation: A
Commentary on Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982’ in Hugo Caminos (ed), Law
of the Sea (Dartmouth, 2001), 70-73.
55

Besides the LOSC, the navigational regime through the Strait of Tiran is also governed by the Egyptian-Israeli
Peace Treaty of 26 March 1979. Article V (2) of the Treaty reads ‘The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the
Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of
navigation and over-flight. The Parties will respect each other’s right to navigation and overflight for access to either
country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba’. This treaty is not a ‘long-standing international
convention’ and therefore the passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba is governed mainly by
Article 45 (1) (b) and Article 45 (2) of the LOSC. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, Peace Treaty Between
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end’ straits).56 The Strait of Tiran links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba, an enclosed maritime
passageway of considerable importance in the Middle East which is jointly bordered by Egypt,
Jordan, Israel and Saudi Arabia.57 The location of the Strait of Tiran is shown in Map 9-5:

Map 9-5: Strait of Tiran
(Modified from Google Maps)
This contention was confirmed by Rozakis and Stagos:
…the regime of innocent passage applies where a part of the high
seas or exclusive economic zone is linked to the territorial sea of a
foreign State, such as the Strait of Tiran connecting the Red Sea
and the Gulf of Aqaba (Rozakis & Stagos, 1987, pp. 72–77).58

Israel
and
Egypt
(1979)
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs,
Israel
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-Egypt+Peace+Treaty.htm>.
56

Ana G. Lopez Martin, International Straits: Concept, Classification and Rules of Passage (Springer-Verlag,
2010), 80-81.
57

Leo Gross, ‘Passage Through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba’ (1968) 33(1) Law and Contemporary
Problems, 125-146.
58

Christos L Rozakis and Petros N. Stagos, ‘The Turkish Straits’ in Gerard J Mangone (ed), International Straits of
the World (Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) vol 9, 72-77.
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The Strait of Georgia is also a ‘dead end’ strait as it connects the Pacific Ocean to the territorial
sea of Canada in an enclosed maritime area as shown in the following Map 9-6:

Map 9-6: Strait of Georgia
(Modified from Google Maps)
Consequently, even though the Strait of Malacca connects the Indian Ocean to the territorial sea
of Singapore, the Strait could not be considered as falling under the same category as the Strait
of Tiran and the Strait of Georgia, as the Strait of Malacca connects one part of the high seas or
EEZ to another part of the high seas or EEZ via the Strait of Singapore. Most importantly, the
Strait of Malacca is not a ‘dead end’ strait.

Nevertheless, Malaysia and Indonesia could rebut this argument by stating that Part III of the
LOSC does not specifically state that it applies to a strait that connects one part of the high seas
or EEZ to the territorial sea of a foreign State in an enclosed sea. Articles 45(1) (b) and 45(2) of
the LOSC stipulate:
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Article 45
(1)

(2)

The regime of innocent passage…shall apply in straits used
for international navigation: (b) between a part of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea
of a foreign State.
There shall be no suspension of innocent passage through
such straits.

There is nothing in the wordings of Article 45(1) (b) or Article 45(2) of the LOSC indicating that
they apply only to ‘dead end’ straits. As such, the new legal assertion that the Strait of Malacca is
a strait that falls under the same category as the Strait of Tiran and the Strait of Georgia is not in
contravention of the provisions of the LOSC. In addition, given that the application of nonsuspendable innocent passage would not be likely to impede navigation, it is not too simplistic to
contend that the proposed separation of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is in fact legally
viable for implementation.

Even though this measure seems to be appealing, particularly in terms of enhancing the
regulatory powers of the littoral States, this proposed measure may also be likely to be seen as
highly contentious, particularly among the other users of the Strait of Malacca. Considering the
current political and world trade situation, there is little prospect that this argument would be
acceptable to the majority of the international community given the fact that the Strait of
Malacca now has become indispensable to global shipping and trade.59

9.2.2 The Reversion of Territorial Sea Claims in the Strait of Malacca

The second suggested unilateral measure is the reversion of territorial sea claims in the Strait of
Malacca from twelve nautical miles to three nautical miles. Japan and South Korea have retained
their three nautical mile territorial sea claims in the Korea Strait. This part of the Chapter

59

Jose L. Tongzon, ‘Whither the Malacca Straits: The Rise of New Hub Ports in Asia’ in Graham Gerard OngWebb (ed), Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2006), 202; H.M. Ibrahim, Hairil Anuar Husin and Deneswari Sivaguru, ‘The Straits of Malacca: Setting The Scene’
in H.M. Ibrahim and Hairil Anuar Husin (eds), Profile of the Straits of Malacca: Malaysia’s Perspective (Maritime
Institute of Malaysia, 2008), 34-35; Sam Bateman, ‘Regime building in the Malacca and Singapore Straits: Two
Steps Forward, One Step Back’ (2009) 4(2) The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 45-50.
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examines and analyses this measure by looking at State practice with special reference to that of
the Korea Strait.

9.2.2.1

The Korea Strait

The extension of the maximum territorial sea limit from three nautical miles to twelve nautical
miles led to the introduction of the transit passage regime in straits used for international
navigation in order to ensure the smooth flow of maritime traffic through straits.60 As discussed
in Chapter 3, for straits that are wide enough and possess a convenient high seas or EEZ corridor,
transit passage would not be applicable; instead, freedom of navigation in the high seas or EEZ
corridor would apply along such routes. Article 36 specifies that transit passage:
…does not apply to a strait used for international navigation if
there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or
through an EEZ of similar convenience with respect to
navigational and hydrographical characteristics...
When the LOSC extended the maximum territorial sea limit from three nautical miles to twelve
nautical miles, some States were reluctant to do so with regard to particular straits lying within
their territorial seas.61 Japan and South Korea were among the States that did not extend their
territorial sea limits up to the maximum twelve nautical miles in their maritime areas in the
Korea Strait.62

60

Sam Bateman, ‘The Regime of Straits Transit Passage in the Asia Pacific: Political and Strategic Issues’ in
Donald R. Rothwell and Sam Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea
(Kluwer, 2000), 94-98; Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘The Application of Compulsory Pilotage in Straits Used for
International Navigation: A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper presented at the 4th Oceanic
Conference on International Studies, Auckland, 2010); Said Mahmoudi, ‘Customary International Law and Transit
Passage’ (1989) 20(2) Ocean Development and International Law, 163-168; Rakish Suppiah and Thulasi
Kamalanathan, ‘Straits Used for International Navigation: Requirements of International Law’ (2009) 16(1) MIMA
Bulletin, 4.
61

Luke T. Lee, ‘Book Reviews and Notes: The Korean Straits’ (1990) 84(1) The American Journal of International
Law, 328-340.
62

Mark J. Valencia, ‘The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions’ (2007) 31(1)
Asian Perspective, 127-167; Zou Keyuan, ‘Implementing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in
East Asia: Issues and Trends’ (2005) 9 Singapore Year Book of International Law and Contributors, 1-4.
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The Korea Strait is a body of water that forms a sea passage between South Korea and Japan,
situated off the south-eastern tip of the Korean Peninsula, linking the Sea of Japan and East
China Sea in the north-west region of the Pacific Ocean.63 Tsushima Island straddles the middle
of the Strait, creating smaller tributary channels in the waterway; the Western Channel and the
Eastern Channel (Tsushima Strait).64 The Strait is approximately 131.22 nautical miles long,
with the narrowest point of the Western Channel measuring 20.16 nautical miles in width and
23.11 nautical miles at its widest point.65 The narrowest segment of the Eastern Channel is
approximately 21.72 nautical miles wide, and is located between the north-western coast of
Kyushu Island and the southern tip of the Tsushima islands.66

Map 9-7: The Korea Strait and its Tributary Channels
(Modified from Google Maps)

63

Office of Naval Research, ‘Sea of Japan - Korea Strait: An Atlas of Oceanic Internal Solitary Waves’ (Code 322
PO, Global Ocean Associates, 2004), 345-356.
64

Ibid.

65

Linda M. B. Paul, ‘A Vessel Traffic System Analysis for the Korea/Tsushima Strait’ (Paper presented at the
ESENA Workshop: Energy-Related Marine Issues in the Regional Seas of Northeast Asia, Berkeley, California,
1997), 1.
66

Ibid.
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The Korea Strait, together with the Tsugaru Strait, located between the Japanese islands of
Hokkaido and Honshu and the Soya (La Pérouse) Strait that lies between Sakhalin Island and
Hokkaido form the three major routes that connect the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean.67 Due
to its location, the Korea Strait has been a crucial seaway linking the East China Sea with
Vladivostok, a major East Asian naval base for the United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR).68
The closure of the Korea Strait would force Soviet naval vessels travelling to Vladivostok from
the East China Sea to transit via the Soya Strait route, a journey of twice the distance of the
Korea Strait route.69 The Strait was considered by the US as one of the most crucial waterways in
protecting the American sea lane communications, particularly during the US-USSR rivalry
during the Cold War.70

Besides being a crucial waterway, the Korea Strait is also important for fisheries and oil
exploration activities. The Strait, on both the Eastern and Western channels, is rich in fishery
resources that include pompano, mackerel and squid.71 Efforts have also been made by both
South Korea and Japan in conducting exploration works focused on oil and gas on the
continental shelf at the entrance to the Korea Strait.72
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Chi Young Pak, ‘The Korean Straits’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World (Martinus
Nijhoff, 1988), 58-64.
68

Ibid.
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Robert E. Osgood, ‘US Security Interests in Ocean Law’ (1974) 2(1) Ocean Development and International Law,
12-13.
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The Cold War was the continuing state of political conflict, military tension, proxy wars and economic
competition between two blocs of the world namely, the Communist Bloc led by the USSR and the powers of the
Western world, led by the US and its allies. The Korea Strait was an important waterway for the strategic
calculations for both the USSR and American military interests, particularly in the East Asian region. The Cold War
ended after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, leaving the US as the leading military power until now. See Elmer
Belmont Potter and Henry Hitch Adams, Sea Power: A Naval History (United States Naval Institute, 1981), 354362; John Mueller, ‘When did the Cold War End?’ (Paper presented at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American
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Nijhoff, 1988), 3-12.
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Masahiro Miyoshi, Maritime Briefing: The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to Maritime
Boundary Delimitation (International Boundaries Research Unit, 1999), 11-13.
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Map 9-8: The Japan-Korea Joint Development Zone in the Korea Strait
(Source: Miyoshi, 1999)73
As the two littoral States that jointly border the Korea Strait, South Korea and Japan have
entered a Joint Development Zone Agreement in 1974 to co-exploit and co-develop the
overlapping areas in the Strait, as shown in Map 9-8.74

9.2.2.2

The Territorial Claims of Japan and South Korea in the Korea Strait

Japan extended its territorial sea limits from three nautical miles to twelve nautical miles as
promulgated by its domestic law, the Law on the Territorial Sea (Law No. 30/1997).75 Article 1
of Law No. 30/1997 states ‘the territorial Sea of Japan comprises the areas of the sea extending
from the baseline to the line twelve nautical miles seaward thereof’. However, the application of
the twelve nautical mile limit was exempted for five straits lying within the Japanese territorial
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Perspective’ (2007) 29(2) Houston Journal of International Law, 400-402.
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‘Law on the Territorial Sea ‘ (Law No. 30 of 2 May 1977, Government of Japan, 1977); Yutaka Kawasaki-Urabe
and Vivian L. Forbes, ‘Japan’s Ratification of UN Law of the Sea Convention and Its New Legislation on the Law
of the Sea’ (1997) 1996-1997 IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, 92-100.
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sea, as stipulated in Article 2 of the Supplementary Provisions on the extent of the territorial sea
pertaining to the designated areas, which reads:

For the time being, the provisions of Article 1 shall not apply to
Soya Strait, the Tsugaru Strait, the Eastern Channel of the
Tsushima Strait, the Western Channel of the Tsushima Strait and
the Osumi Strait…hereinafter referred to as ‘designated areas’. The
territorial sea pertaining to the designated areas shall be
respectively the areas of the sea extending from the baseline to the
line three nautical miles seaward thereof...76 (Emphasis added).
South Korea shares the Western Channel of the Korea Strait with Japan, and also did not extend
its territorial sea more than three nautical miles in some parts of the Strait, as regulated by Article
3 of Annex II of the Enforcement Decree of Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Act 1977 (TSC
1977).77 The TSC 1977 was amended in 1977 and entered into force on 1 August 1996.78 The
reasons given by South Korea for deciding not to extend its territorial limits from three nautical
miles to twelve nautical miles in these designated areas were:

(a)

The narrowest area of the Western Channel of the Korea Strait is only 20.16 miles wide
between Namhyongche-do on the Korean side and Saozaki on the Tsushima Islands. If
South Korea extends its territorial sea limit to twelve nautical miles, its territorial sea will
overlap with that of Japan in some areas in the Western Channel.79 By continuing to
adopt a three nautical mile limit, a high seas corridor of 11.8 nautical miles wide will be
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‘Law on the Territorial Sea ‘ (Law No. 30 of 2 May 1977, Government of Japan, 1977).

77
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created in the Strait in which vessels belonging to maritime States can continue to transit
freely;80
(b)

Should South Korea extend its territorial sea to the twelve nautical mile limit, this would
have been followed by political problems pertaining to the long-recognised Soviet right
of free passage through the Strait.81 Even if the LOSC (which was still in negotiation at
that time) would provide the right of transit passage for Soviet vessels, the twelve
nautical mile limit would cause complications for Korea as it would have to monitor the
movements of Soviet warships through its territorial Strait.82 Therefore, the continuation
of the application of the three nautical mile territorial sea limit regime in the Korea Strait
spared South Korea certain potential problems that may have arisen from the passage of
Soviet warships in the Strait;83

(c)

Such an extension would pose the problem of joint management of the Western Channel
by the two countries;84

(d)

The adoption of a twelve nautical mile territorial sea limit in South Korea’s part of the
Western Channel in the Korea Strait would be inconsistent with its stance of supporting
freedom of navigation through straits used for international navigation. South Korea did
not want the freedom of navigation regime practised in the Korea Strait to be replaced
with the right of transit passage.85
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Map 9-9: The South Korean and Japanese Territorial Sea Claims in the Korea Strait86
(Modified from Google Maps)
Japan retained a three nautical mile territorial sea limit in the Korea Strait and other straits within
its territorial sea. These are collectively known as the ‘designated areas’.87 This policy was
justified based on the following issues:

(a)

At the time when Japan decided to apply three nautical mile territorial sea limits in the
designated areas, there was no consensus on the exact regime of passage in straits used
for international navigation. The navigational regime to be applied in such straits was still
being negotiated by at UNCLOS III and due to this uncertainty, Japan decided to retain
three nautical mile territorial sea limits in the designated areas;88

(b)

The application of a twelve nautical mile territorial sea limit would contradict Japan’s
stance in supporting freedom of passage through straits used for international
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navigation.89 Should Japan extend its territorial sea limits from three nautical miles to
twelve nautical miles in the designated areas, straits that are located within its waters
would be incorporated as territorial Straits. Hence, freedom of navigation within those
waterways would be replaced with the transit passage regime;90
(c)

Japan was of the opinion that the transit passage regime would be difficult to apply due to
ambiguities in the language used to describe it. The regime did not clearly spell out the
extent of the power of coastal States to regulate transit passage of foreign vessels through
their waters;91

(d)

At the time, the Japanese government had declared the non-nuclear policy to be in effect
within Japanese territory.92 The three principles of this policy include not possessing,
manufacturing or bringing nuclear weapons into Japan.93 Japanese straits, particularly
those of the ‘designated areas’ are vital waterways for Russian warships with nuclear
weapons to travel from Vladivostok to Petropavlovsk. 94 Therefore, the application of a
three nautical mile territorial sea limit would leave a high seas corridor within its straits
and there would be no reason for foreign ships to invoke transit passage when navigating
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that area.95 With Soviet nuclear warships transiting within the high seas corridor of the
straits, Japan would be able to relinquish its responsibility for regulating the passage of
such vessels and at the same time uphold the non-nuclear principles proclaimed by the
Japanese government.96

As yet, Japan and South Korea have not announced any plans to extend their territorial sea
claims up to twelve nautical miles in the Korea Strait. In summary, by retaining the three nautical
mile territorial sea limits in these designated areas, Japan and South Korea would be able to fully
exercise their regulatory powers within the three nautical mile limit in the Strait, which both
States regard as essential for their security. Hence, their powers to regulate shipping through
their waters would not be constrained by the existence of a transit passage regime in these
straits.97 Foreign vessels would still continue to enjoy freedom of navigation in the high seas
corridors within those Straits and would be subjected to the more stringent right of innocent
passage if they approach areas that are three nautical miles from the coast.98 Based on the legal
feasibility of the implementation of this measure in the Korea Strait for the purpose of upholding
the security of Japan and South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia could also consider adopting this
State practice as a unilateral measure in enhancing their regulatory powers to regulate shipping
under the pretext of the protection of the marine environment of the Strait of Malacca.

9.2.2.3

Political and Legal Implications

The introduction of a twelve nautical mile territorial sea limit in the Strait of Malacca by
Malaysia and Indonesia has resulted in some parts of the Strait becoming integrated in totality as
a territorial Strait, particularly in areas having breadths of 24 nautical miles or less. Malaysia and
Indonesia have full sovereignty over the territorial sea of the Strait, however, as far as regulating
95
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shipping traffic is concerned, their powers are limited. Should both nations revert to their former
territorial sea limits of three nautical miles in the Strait of Malacca, there would be a highseas/EEZ corridor running through the Strait, as illustrated in Map 9-10. This would nullify the
application of transit passage in the Strait of Malacca.99

Map 9-10: The Proposed Reversion of Territorial Sea Claims in the Strait of Malacca
(Modified from Google Maps)
With transit passage ceasing to be applied, ships and vessels would have freedom of navigation
in the high seas or EEZ corridor within the Strait of Malacca. They would be bound by the more
restricted innocent passage regime if they entered areas of the Strait within the three nautical
mile limit from the coastlines of the two littoral States.100 Hence, a ‘marine environmental
protection buffer zone’ or ‘pollution free bubble’ could be created within the Strait where the
99
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littoral States are given more powers by international law to regulate ship movements and
traffic.101 This would place the littoral States in a better position to monitor pollution from
vessels as well as enhancing security in areas of the Strait which are closest to the shore, as
shown in Map 9-11.102 There are no provisions in the LOSC and customary international law that
prevent a State from reverting to its former territorial sea limits. 103

Map 9-11: The Effect of the Reversion of Territorial Sea Claims
(Modified from Google Maps)
The Strait of Malacca is quite wide at its north-western entrance, where it is approximately 200
nautical miles from one coast to the other.104 However, the narrowest point of the Strait of
Malacca is between Tanjung Piai, located at the south-western tip of Peninsular Malaysia to
Pulau Kerimon Kecil in Indonesia, which measures around 8.4 nautical miles. If the littoral
States of the Strait of Malacca reverted to a three nautical mile territorial sea limit on the entire
length of the Strait, it would leave a high seas/EEZ corridor of approximately 2.4 nautical miles
101
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at the narrowest point. It is true that Malaysia and Indonesia would sustain some significant
territorial losses if they applied a three nautical mile territorial sea limit at the northern part of the
Strait. These States would lose nine nautical miles of their territorial seas; however, they would
still have sovereign rights to exploit the fishery resources in the Strait of Malacca.105
Nevertheless, to avoid these territorial losses, one solution could be for both Malaysia and
Indonesia to adopt both twelve nautical mile and three nautical mile limits in claiming their
territorial sea in the Strait.106 In areas where the breadths of the Strait are wide, the littoral States
may apply the twelve nautical mile territorial sea limit.107

Map 9-12: The Malaysia-Indonesia Territorial Sea and EEZ
Boundary Demarcation Line in the Strait of Malacca
(Modified from Google Maps)
The EEZ maritime area in the Strait of Malacca diminishes near One Fathom Bank, where the
breadth of the Strait narrows down to less than 24 nautical miles, as shown in Map 9-12.
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Therefore, it is suggested that in maritime areas south of One Fathom Bank, the littoral States
may consider beginning to revert their territorial sea claims back to three nautical miles, as
illustrated in Map 9-13:

Map 9-13: The Adoption of Both Three Nautical Mile and Twelve
Nautical Mile Territorial Sea Claims in the Strait of Malacca.108
(Modified from Google Maps)
By adopting this approach, the littoral States would not lose out on territorial sea and EEZ limit
claims. As the Strait narrows in breadth as it flows south, there would be smaller EEZ areas that
could be claimed by the littoral States. In addition, there would be sufficient area within the
Strait that to be maintained as a high seas/EEZ corridor in which maritime traffic could exercise
freedom of navigation. The littoral States would then possess a three nautical mile territorial sea
buffer zone in which they could exercise more power to control marine pollution and maritime
security.109 It is not without precedent to apply both three nautical mile and twelve nautical mile
territorial sea limits, as this has already been practiced by South Korea in relation to the Korea
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Strait as shown in Map 9-9. Given the success of this regime as implemented by Japan and Korea
in some parts of their straits, this proposal may be a viable option for the Strait of Malacca.110

The reversion of the territorial sea claims from twelve nautical miles to three nautical miles by
the littoral States of the Strait of Malacca obviously would not the interrupt freedom of
navigation of foreign vessels plying the Strait. Under this new regime, the Strait of Malacca
would have a high seas/EEZ corridor running through it. Transit passage would still apply in the
Strait of Singapore as it is a strait that connects one part of the high seas/EEZ, the Strait of
Malacca, to another part of the high seas/EEZ, the South China Sea. In short, should this
proposal be adopted, foreign vessels may exercise freedom of navigation in the Strait of
Malacca, unless they enter the three nautical mile buffer zone of the Strait of Malacca, in which
the innocent passage regime would apply. Transit passage would be deemed to begin when
vessels navigate into the limits of the Strait of Singapore as defined by the IHO.

Notwithstanding the attraction of this approach for the littoral States, the proposal may have
some disadvantages. A critical question to be considered is whether the reversion to a three
nautical mile territorial sea in the Strait of Malacca would create a navigationally convenient
high seas/EEZ corridor within the Strait. Even though it is theoretically correct that there would
be 2.4 nautical miles of high seas/EEZ corridor at the narrowest point of the Strait should the
three nautical miles territorial sea limit apply, this may not be entirely accurate in reality.

As stated earlier, the narrowest point of the Korea Strait at its Western Channel is approximately
20.16 nautical miles while its Eastern Channel is about 21.72 nautical miles. Unlike the Korea
Strait, which is relatively wide at both of its narrowest points, this is not the case for the Strait of
Malacca. Leifer comments that although the breadth of the Strait of Malacca at its narrowest
point is around 8.4 nautical miles, this figure does not indicate the precise extent of the navigable
channel which, for deep draught vessels, is much less.111 Therefore, if the 2.4 nautical mile high
110
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seas/EEZ corridor is not navigationally viable as it may be dotted with hazards such as sand
banks, shoals, reefs and wrecks, then the transit passage regime would still continue to apply
under the LOSC even though the breadth of the Strait is more than six nautical miles from either
shore. Some States, such as the UK, have also argued that even if a strait is wide enough to have
a high seas/EEZ but the corridor is too narrow to transit without accidentally swerving into the
territorial sea of the littoral States, the entire strait should be treated as a territorial strait subject
to the regime of transit passage.112

Second, the application of freedom of navigation in the high seas/EEZ in the Strait of Malacca
would probably permit vessels to ply the Strait without having to abide by established rules on
safety of navigation and the control of vessel-source pollution such as the TSS and the under keel
clearance requirements as prescribed by Article 233 and Articles 42(1) (a) and (b) of the LOSC.
This is based on the fact that under this new interpretation the Strait of Malacca would no longer
be a strait that is governed by the transit passage regime. As such, the littoral States would not
have the jurisdiction to impose these rules upon navigating vessels as the strip of high seas/EEZ
corridor is not within their territorial sea or straits.113 Nevertheless, due to the fact that the Strait
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is navigationally difficult and challenging for mariners,114 vessels would probably comply with
those rules for safety purposes.

Third, even though this proposed measure may be seen as allowing the users of the Strait to sail
freely through the Strait of Malacca, this may not be entirely true. The fact that the littoral States
may exercise greater control in maritime areas nearest to the coast would likely generate protests,
particularly among the key users of the Strait. They may object to this proposed measure on the
basis that it has been customary practice to regard the Strait of Malacca, regardless of its size or
width, as a strait that is subject to the application of the transit passage regime and that the
littoral States have acquiesced in this position. As is the case for other important straits around
the world, including the Dover Strait, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Strait of Hormuz, transit
passage is applicable in the Strait of Malacca. Notwithstanding the adoption of a three nautical
mile limit in the Strait of Malacca by the littoral States, user States may still view transit passage
as being applicable in the Strait under international law.115

The re-adoption of three nautical mile territorial sea limits in some parts of the Strait of Malacca
would also enable foreign military powers to station their warships or conduct military exercises
in the high seas/EEZ parts of the Strait, as the waters of the Strait would not be totally integrated
into the territorial seas of the littoral States.116 This may create a perception on the part of the
littoral States that their security is threatened.117 For a considerable period of time Malaysia and
Indonesia have reiterated that their sovereignty over the Strait of Malacca must not be eroded,
and that any military use of the waterway by foreign States other than continuous and
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expeditious transit must have the prior sanction of the two littoral States.118 If extra-regional
countries were to be involved in activities in the Strait, it was to be strictly limited to capacity
building, information exchange and the provisions of training.119

Both Malaysia and Indonesia have been firm on the issue of sovereignty and this can be observed
in their efforts towards combating piracy and sea robberies in the Strait.120 The Strait of Malacca
was declared a war risk area back in July 2005 by the JWC of Lloyd’s Market Association due to
the active piratical and sea robbery activities threatening safe navigation of mariners in the
Strait.121 At the time, Japan and the US indicated a desire to participate in enhancing security in
the Strait. Singapore welcomed this proposed participation by stressing the need for the
participation of maritime powers such as Japan, South Korea and the US, which are the main
users of the Strait.122 Unlike Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia on the other hand were adamant
that the Strait of Malacca is within their territorial sea and EEZ and therefore rejected any
proposals to involve extra-regional powers and stressed that the presence of foreign troops in
local waters would trigger public anger and intensify acts of terror.123
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Malaysia’s stance on this can also be seen in its declaration upon ratifying the LOSC in 1996
that:

The Malaysian Government also understands that the provisions of
the Convention do not authorise other States to carry out military
exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the use of
weapons or explosives in the exclusive economic zone without the
consent of the coastal State.124
Like Malaysia, Indonesia has never permitted the presence of any foreign or extra-regional
powers within its EEZ. Article 14(1) of Law Number 5 Year 1983 on Indonesian Exclusive
Economic Zone charges the Indonesian Navy for the responsibility of law enforcement in the
EEZ.125 These instances clearly show that Malaysia and Indonesia have always been consistent
in matters pertaining to sovereignty. Therefore, even if both States revert their territorial claims
from twelve nautical miles to three nautical miles, leaving a strip of high seas/EEZ corridor
running within the Strait, foreign troops would possibly not be permitted to carry out military
exercises or manoeuvres within that EEZ corridor.

As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4, as long as Malaysia has yet to finalise its straight baselines in
the Strait of Malacca, and while both Malaysia and Indonesia have yet to clearly delimit their
EEZ boundary line in the Strait, it will be difficult to determine precisely where in the Strait a
high seas or EEZ corridor exists.126 In addition, should a three nautical mile territorial sea limit
be applied in some parts of the Strait of Malacca, Malaysia and Indonesia would have to redetermine their maritime boundary delimitation in the Strait. They may have to revise or revoke
their earlier territorial sea agreement on the Strait of Malacca, concluded in 1970.127 The biggest
124

United Nations, Declarations and Statements upon UNCLOS Ratification: Malaysia (2010)
Oceans and Law of the Sea Divisions for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#Malaysia%20Upon%20ratifica
tion>.
125

Hasjim
Djalal,
‘EEZ
and
Indonesian
Perspective’
(2004)
<http://bulletin.penataanruang.net/upload/data_artikel/edisi%202g%20pdf.pdf>, 1-4; ‘Undang-undang Republik
Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 1983 Tentang Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif Indonesia’ (UU 5/83, Republik Indonesia, 1983).
126

See Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 and Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4 of this Thesis.
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Choon-Ho Park, ‘Indonesia-Malaysia (Territorial Sea)’ in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander (eds),
International Maritime Boundaries: The American Society of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) vol 1,
1029-1038; See Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 of this Thesis.
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setback of this proposed plan is obviously that of territorial losses. As the two littoral States that
have been consistently unyielding in matters pertaining to territorial sovereignty, this proposed
measure, to a certain extent, might not even be considered an option. The fact that these States
would have to relinquish their sovereignty over some parts of the Strait in order to obtain more
regulatory powers to control shipping in the Strait would lessen the attractiveness of this
proposal to the littoral States.

9.3

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has discussed the two proposed unilateral measures outside the IMO mechanism
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore from vessel-source pollution. The first part of this Chapter has examined the proposed
application of the non-suspendable innocent passage regime in the Strait of Malacca as a
replacement for the transit passage regime. In geographical terms, without its Singaporean
counterpart, the Strait of Malacca could be viewed as a strait that connects one part of the high
seas or an EEZ to a territorial sea of a third state. This would fit the definition under Article 45 of
the LOSC of a strait in which non-suspendable innocent passage applies. Should Malaysia, alone
or collectively with Indonesia, declare that the status of the Strait had changed these States could
contend that the stricter navigational regime of non-suspendable innocent passage would apply in
the Strait of Malacca. It is submitted that such a declaration would be rejected by the majority of
maritime States, who would argue that the regime of transit passage in the Strait of Malacca had
achieved the status of customary international law.

The second part of this Chapter analysed the second proposed measure, namely the territorial sea
reversion in the Strait of Malacca. In theory, the reversion of territorial sea claims in the Strait of
Malacca from twelve nautical miles to three nautical miles would create a high seas or an EEZ
corridor. This would nullify the application of the transit passage regime in the Strait of Malacca.
The littoral States would then be able to exercise their full regulatory and prescriptive powers
within their three nautical mile territorial sea limits without being constrained by the provisions
of Part III of the LOSC. These areas of territorial sea could be turned into ‘environmental buffer
zones’ to protect the marine environment of the Strait of Malacca from further degradation.
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However, this proposed plan would require in-depth research and consideration prior to
implementation as it involves the renunciation of sovereignty over some sea areas and may not
benefit both States. As the Strait of Malacca is indispensable for global shipping and world trade,
this Chapter contends that such a measure would inevitably draw protest from many countries.

This Chapter concludes that any proposed measures that may possibly impede or hamper free
passage through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore would spark various reactions from
numerous States, particularly the maritime powers. Considering present global economic
development, it is an inevitable fact that shipping traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
will experience steady growth in future years. Should maritime traffic incessantly increase and
eventually cause unacceptable adverse impacts on the marine environment, the littoral States
would be the parties that suffer the most.

However, if there are viable alternative routes to the Straits, the degree of dependency of the
international trade on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore would not be as overwhelming and
hence lessen the controversy that may arise from the implementation of these proposed
measures. The subsequent Chapter discusses the alternative routes to the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.
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CHAPTER 10.
ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE
10.1

INTRODUCTION

In view of the inevitable adverse impact of heavy shipping activities on the marine environment
of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, it is worthwhile to examine some options to divert
traffic from the busy, constricted and navigationally difficult waters of these Straits. This
Chapter will examine the viability of four alternative or future alternative routes to the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. They include routes through the Indonesian archipelago, the Northeast
Arctic Passage, the proposed Thai Canal Plan and the proposed Trans-Peninsula Pipeline Project.
This Chapter concludes by reiterating that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore will remain the
main maritime superhighway in the Asia-Pacific region if viable alternatives are not made
available to shippers.

10.2

ROUTES THROUGH THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO

As the largest archipelagic State in the world, Indonesia has many islands separated by
interconnecting waterways. These waterways have been described as international straits in the
past, and with the implementation of the LOSC in 1994, these straits are now incorporated as
part of Indonesian archipelagic waters. Vessels may sail through the interconnecting waterways
of the Indonesian archipelago under the regime of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage as these
routes have already been designated by Indonesia as archipelagic sea lanes, or Alur Laut
Kepulauan Indonesia (ALKI).1 Table 10-1 lists five ALKIs that have been designated through
Indonesian archipelagic waters.
* This Chapter has been published (wholly or in part) in the following peer-reviewed journals:
(a) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Attempts to Seek Alternative Routes to the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore’ (2010) 1(1) Journal of Maritime Geopolitics and Culture, 1-22;
(b) Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits’ (2012)
(24/2012) RSIS Commentaries, 1-2.
1

The navigational regime of foreign vessels through archipelagic waters is governed by Part IV of the LOSC. An
archipelagic State may designate ‘archipelagic sea lanes’ within its archipelagic waters.
Foreign vessels may exercise the ‘archipelagic sea lanes passage’ within these archipelagic sea lanes,
a navigational regime that allows for an unobstructed passage through archipelagic waters. See Part IV,
United Nations (UN), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) UN
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ALKI
ALKI I
ALKI II
ALKI III-A
ALKI III-B
ALKI III-C

Route
Sunda Strait–Karimata Strait–Natuna Sea–South China Sea
Lombok Strait–Makassar Strait–Sulawesi Sea
Sawu Sea–Ombai Strait–Banda Sea (western part of Burn Island)–Seram Sea (eastern part of
Monole Island)–Maluku Sea–Pacific Ocean
Timor Sea–Leti Strait–Banda Sea (western part of Burn Island)–Seram Sea (eastern part of
Mongole Island)–Maluku Sea–Pacific Ocean
Arafura Sea–Banda Sea (western part of Buru Island)–Seram Sea (eastern part of Mongole
Island)–Maluku Sea–Pacific Ocean

Table 10-1: Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes
(Source: Indonesian Diplomatic Handbook)2
These routes are illustrated in Map 10-1:

Map 10-1: Illustration of the Designated ALKIs within Indonesian Archipelagic Waters
(Source: BAKOSURTANAL)
Among these archipelagic sea lanes, the Sunda, Lombok–Makassar and Ombai–Wetar routes are
important alternative sea lines of communication to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The
Sunda Strait is a passageway located between the Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Java. It has
been used as a maritime corridor since the Dutch colonisation of the Indonesian Archipelago.

<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf>; B.A.
Archipelagic Regime: Implications for Malaysia’ (1984) 8(1) Marine Policy, 30-43.
2

Hamzah,

‘Indonesia’s

International Business Publications, Indonesian Diplomatic Handbook (International Business, 2008), 137.
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Prior to the opening of the Suez Canal, the Sunda Strait served as the principal corridor for direct
access between Europe and East Asia.3

Currently, the Sunda Strait remains an important waterway for ships travelling from the Cape
route to East Asia, as well as for vessels sailing from Australian ports to Southeast Asian or East
Asian destinations.4 The Sunda Strait is quite deep at its western entrance, but its depth decreases
towards its eastern exit, with an irregular bottom topography.5 Unlike the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore, which are approximately 1.296 nautical miles wide at their narrowest point at the
Philips Channel,6 the Sunda Strait is much wider; it is 12.959 nautical miles wide at its narrowest
section.7 However, the Sunda Strait is less navigationally convenient than the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore as it contains many hazards, including strong tidal flows which vary according to
time and season, sandbank formations along the waterway, a live volcano, poor visibility during
squalls and the existence of numerous oil drilling platforms and small islands and reefs which
may disrupt safe navigation.8 Due to these factors, deep draught ships of over 100,000 DWT do
not transit the Sunda Strait route and it is not as heavily used as the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.9 Yearly, about 1,320 passages were made by 2,278 ships transiting the Sunda Strait,
carrying in total 111 million tonnes of cargo valued at US $5 billion.10 Ships that transit the

3

Michael Leifer, ‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 76-78.
4

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits’ (2012) (24/2012) RSIS
Commentaries, 1-2.
5

Chia Lin Sien, ‘Alternative Routes for Oil Tankers: A Financial, Technical and Economic Analysis’ in Hamzah
Ahmad (ed), The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety
(Pelanduk, 1998), 103.
6

Shigeki Sakamoto, ‘Non-State Actors’ Role in the Co-operative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore- Seeking to Substantiate UNCLOS Article 43’ (Paper presented at the International Symposium on Safety
and Protection of the Marine Environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 2008), 1.
7

Chia Lin Sien, ‘Alternative Routes for Oil Tankers: A Financial, Technical and Economic Analysis’ in Hamzah
Ahmad (ed), The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety
(Pelanduk, 1998), 106.
8

Donald B. Freeman, The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet? (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 1718.
9

Joshua
Ho,
Maritime
Security
and
<http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS332005.pdf>.
10

International

Cooperation

(2005)

Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Jane Chan, ‘Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia’ (S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological Studies, 2009), 11-14.
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Sunda Strait must travel from the Indian Ocean through the Java Sea, which is linked with the
South China Sea via the Bangka Strait.11

Currently, there is a plan being contemplated by the Indonesian government to build a bridge
across the Sunda Strait to connect the islands of Java and Sumatra. A pre-feasibility study
conducted by construction firm PT Bangungraha Sejahtera Mulia, a subsidiary of the Artha
Graha Network, found that the 29 kilometre bridge would cost up to Rp 100 trillion, which
translates into US $10.75 billion.12 Once operational in 2025, the bridge would stretch from
Anyer in Banten to Bakauheni in Lampung and pass over the Sanghiyang, Prajurit and Ular
Islands in the Sunda Strait.13 This plan resembles the proposed Strait of Malacca Bridge
discussed in Chapter 5.14 In terms of international shipping, if this project does proceed, it will
directly or indirectly affect maritime traffic in the already navigationally difficult Sunda Strait.

The other important sea lines of communication that are alternatives to the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore are the Lombok and Makassar Straits. The Lombok Strait is located between the
islands of Bali and Lombok in Indonesia.15 An islet named Nusa Penida sits between the islands
of Bali and Lombok within the Lombok Strait, creating the Badung Strait, which separates Nusa
Penida and the island of Bali.16 The Lombok Strait is wider and deeper than the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. As its depths are greater than 150 metres, it is not draught-limited, and
its minimum passage width is 11.5 miles. It is therefore used by the largest ships of over 100,000
DWT.17 Tankers over 230,000 DWT must use the deeper Lombok–Makassar route due to the

11

Michael Leifer, ‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 76-79.
12

The Jakarta Post, Govt Steams Ahead with Sunda Bridge Railway Plans (2010) The Jakarta Post
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/02/16/govt-steams-ahead-with-sunda-strait-bridge-railway-plans.html>.
13

Jimmy
Hitipeuw,
Indonesia
to
Prioritize
Sunda
Strait
Bridge
(2011)
Kompas.com
<http://english.kompas.com/read/2010/12/21/14305586/Indonesia.to.Prioritize.Sunda.Strait.Bridge-5>.
14

See Section 5.2.2.1.3 of Chapter 5 of this Thesis.

15

Michael Leifer, ‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 79-80.
16

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits’ (2012) (24/2012) RSIS
Commentaries, 1-2.
17

Ji Guoxing, SLOC Security in the Asia Pacific (2000) Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
<http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Ji%20Guoxing-SLOC%20Security%20in%20the%20Asia%20Pacific.htm>.
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under keel clearance limit of 3.5 metres, since the minimum depth of the Starts of Malacca and
Singapore is 23 metres.18

The Lombok Strait provides a shipping route connecting the Indian Ocean to the Makassar Strait
via the western part of the Flores Sea, and to East Asia via the Celebes Sea.19 The Makassar
Strait stretches about 400 nautical miles from its northern gateway to its southern access. 20 While
little east-west traffic transits Lombok–Makassar, it is still an important route for Australian
north-south trade.21 Annually, some 604 passages are made via the Lombok–Makassar Strait by
418 ships, carrying a total of 36 million tonnes of cargo worth US $40 billion in resources.22

Even though the Lombok–Makassar route is much safer, since it is relatively wide and deep and
does not possess significant navigational hazards,23 it is not as navigationally convenient as the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore because passage along this route takes longer;24 a typical
voyage from an Arabian Gulf port, Rastanurah, to Yokohama, Japan, is 6,590 nautical miles via
the Malacca–Singapore route. However the journey would be 7,580 nautical miles if the
Lombok–Makassar Straits passage is followed instead.25 The route through the Lombok–
Makassar Straits would incur an additional shipping cost between US $84 billion and US $250
18

Lee Jae-hyung, China and the Asia-Pacific Region (iUniverse, 2003), 115-117.

19

Joshua Ho, ‘The Importance and Security of Regional Sea Lanes’ in Chong Guan Kwa and John Kristen Skogan
(eds), Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge, 2007), 21-33.
20

Chia Lin Sien, ‘Alternative Routes for Oil Tankers: A Financial, Technical and Economic Analysis’ in Hamzah
Ahmad (ed), The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety
(Pelanduk, 1998), 110.
21

John H. Noer and David Gregory, ‘Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia’ (National
Defense University & Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996), 1-30.
22

Joshua
Ho,
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Security
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International
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(2005)
<http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/IDSS332005.pdf>; Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Jane Chan,
‘Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia’ (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological
Studies, 2009), 11-14.
23

Jon M. Van Dyke, ‘Legal and Practical Problems Governing International Straits’ in Hamzah Ahmad (ed), The
Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding and Navigational Safety (Pelanduk, 1997), 321324.
24

MEH Demonstration Project, The Maritime Importance of the Straits (2009) MEH Demonstration Project Website
<http://www.meh-project.com/setting/maritime-importance>.
25

Chia Lin Sien, ‘Alternative Routes for Oil Tankers: A Financial, Technical and Economic Analysis’ in Hamzah
Ahmad (ed), The Straits of Malacca: International Co-operation in Trade, Funding & Navigational Safety
(Pelanduk, 1998), 114-115.
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billion per year, a cost that can be avoided if shippers choose to take the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore route.26 As a result, in comparison to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore route, both
the Sunda and Lombok–Makassar passageways are not widely used by international traffic.27

In the past, the Indonesian authorities have closed their archipelagic straits to international
shipping activities several times: in 1958, 1964, 1978 and 1988.28 Indonesia justified the 48-hour
closure of the Sunda and Lombok Straits in 1988 by stating that it was exercising its sovereign
right to conduct naval gunnery drills and exercises within its own waters.29 The closure of these
straits in 1988 provoked protests from maritime nations including West Germany, the US and
Australia.30 These protests demonstrated that despite not being as navigationally strategic as the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore, these straits are still important maritime chokepoints for
shipping traffic. Any disruption in traffic flow through these chokepoints would badly affect the
global trade and the economy, especially in this part of the world.31 It is unlikely, however, that
this kind of incident would occur now as Indonesia has ratified the LOSC and is obliged under
international law to keep its designated archipelagic sea lanes and other routes normally used for
international navigation open to international shipping. 32 Table 10-2 summarises details of the
navigational traffic in three different important sea lines of communications in South East Asia:

26

Lee Jae-hyung, China and the Asia-Pacific Region (iUniverse, 2003), 115-117.

27

John H. Noer and David Gregory, ‘Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia’ (National
Defense University & Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996), 1-30.
28

Euan Graham, Japan’s Sea Lane Security, 1940-2004: A Matter of Life and Death (Nissan Institute, Routledge
Japanese Studies Series, 2006), 168-169.
29

Ivan Shearer, ‘Navigation Issues in the Asian Pacific Region’ in James Crawford and Donald Rothwell (eds), The
Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region: Developments and Prospects (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), 217-219.
30

Euan Graham, Japan’s Sea Lane Security, 1940-2004: A Matter of Life and Death (Nissan Institute, Routledge
Japanese Studies Series, 2006), 168-169.
31

Cdr. P. K. Ghosh, ‘Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia and the Indian Ocean: Response Strategies’
(Paper presented at the American-Pacific Sealanes Security Institute Conference on Maritime Security in Asia,
Honolulu, 2004), 1-13.
32

Article 53(1) of the LOSC states ‘An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes…suitable for the continuous and
expeditious passage of foreign ships…over its archipelagic waters’. Article 53(3) of the LOSC defines the
application of an archipelagic sea lanes passage as ‘the rights of navigation…solely for the purpose of continuous,
expeditious and unobstructed transit…’. If the archipelagic State has yet to designate archipelagic sea lanes, the right
of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised through routes normally used for international navigation as
stipulated in Article 53(12) of the LOSC.
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the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the Sunda Strait and the Straits of Lombok and Makassar,
based on data gathered in 2009.
Straits/Descriptions
Tonnage carried (yearly)
No. of approximate shipping
passages (yearly)
Under Keel Clearance (m)
Annual Total Value of Cargo
(USD)

Straits of Malacca and
Singapore
3,000,000,000

111,000,000

Straits of Lombok and
Makassar
36,000,000

75,510

1,320

604

3.5

Unlimited

Unlimited

390 billion

5 billion

40 billion

Sunda Strait

Table 10-2: Brief Description of Important Sea Lines of Communications in South East Asia
(Source: RSIS)33
The Ombai–Wetar Straits route is another alternative shipping route situated within Indonesian
archipelagic waters. This route is used generally by local shipping, including vessels travelling
between Australia and the Java Sea.34 The Ombai Strait is located between the islands of Alor
and Timor, and its counterpart, the Wetar Strait, is located between the northern coast of Timor
and the southern coast of Wetar.35 Ombai–Wetar is not a preferred route as an alternative for the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore, as this route is longer for vessels to sail from west to east and
vice versa.36 Nevertheless, the extremely deep channels of the Ombai–Wetar Straits provide
undetected access routes for submarines between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean,
making them the second-most important straits route after the Gibraltar Strait in the world for
American defense interests.37

Based on their geographical inconvenience, it is reasonable to conclude that these routes through
the Indonesian archipelago, though vital for international shipping, can only be considered as
33

Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Jane Chan, ‘Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia’ (S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological Studies, 2009), 11-14.
34

Lee Jae-hyung, China and the Asia-Pacific Region (iUniverse, 2003), 116-117.

35

Michael Leifer, ‘Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World
(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 83-85.
36

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Maritime Highways of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits’ (2012) (24/2012) RSIS
Commentaries, 1-2.
37

Jerry K. Sweeney, ‘A Matter of Small Consequence: US Foreign Policy and the Tragedy of East Timor’ (2002)
7(1) Independent Review, 95-97; Robert E. Osgood, ‘US Security Interests in Ocean Law’ (1974) 2(1) Ocean
Development and International Law, 1-36.
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secondary routes to the primary marine highway of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.38
However, these archipelagic straits nevertheless play a critical role in the flow of the world’s
shipping. Any disruption of shipping traffic through these straits would compromise sea-borne
global trade and the world economy.39 If the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the
Indonesian straits were to be closed to international shipping, the impact on the flow of
international trade would be disastrous; the short distance of 6,755 nautical miles for shipping
travelling via the Straits of Malacca and Singapore between Kuwait and Yokohama would
increase to 11,800 nautical miles as ships would be left with no other choice but to travel around
Australia.40

10.3

THE NORTHEAST ARCTIC PASSAGE

The second potential alternative for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is the route through
Northeast Arctic Passage (NAP). The Eurasian continental landmass sprawls from Europe in the
west to Asia in the east. For centuries, trade has flowed from Europe to India and the East Asian
nations. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, ships from Europe travelled to the Indian
Ocean through the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal and linked with the East Asian ports via
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as well as through the Indonesian archipelagic straits.41
Like the Suez–Malacca route, the NAP, or as it is popularly known in Russia, the Northern Sea
Route, is also a passage that connects Europe and East Asia using the route on the Arctic coast of
Russia.42 From as early as the 18th century, ships plying this route would travel from St.
Petersburg in Russia through the Barents, Kara, Laptev, Chukchi and East Siberian Seas,

38

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Attempts to Seek Alternative Routes to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’
(2010) 1(1) Journal of Maritime Geopolitics and Culture, 2-3; Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Maritime Highways
of Southeast Asia: Alternative Straits’ (2012) (24/2012) RSIS Commentaries, 1-2.
39

Milan N. Vego, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (Frank Cass, 2003), 88-90.

40

Joshua Ho, ‘The Importance and Security of Regional Sea Lanes’ in Chong Guan Kwa and John Kristen Skogan
(eds), Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge, 2007), 120-25.
41

Rakish Suppiah, ‘The Northeast Arctic Passage: Possibilities and Economic Considerations’ (2006) 151 Maritime
Studies, 12-13.
42

Claes Lykke Ragner, ‘The Northern Sea Route’ (2008) Norden Association’s Yearbook, 114.
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ultimately making their way to the Bering Strait on the eastern side of the Eurasian mainland,
connecting Europe to the ports of East Asia.43 Map 10-2 shows the seas within the NAP.

Map 10-2: The Seas within the NAP
(Modified from Google Maps)
The NAP is not thought of as a clearly defined linear route, but is instead perceived as the whole
sea area north of Russia.44 The environmental condition of waters in the NAP is invariably
hostile, with extreme winters, icy waters and unpredictable weather.45 The English and Dutch
explorers also contributed towards the discovery of the NAP46 in their attempts to find alternative
routes to the east to escape the Spanish and Portuguese dominion over the southern seas.47
Russian vessels have used this route for hundreds of years, establishing a shipping route from
43

William E. Butler, ‘Northeast Arctic Passage’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World
(Sitjhoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 1-4.
44

Claes Lykke Ragner, ‘The Northern Sea Route’ (2008) Norden Association’s Yearbook, 114.

45

William E. Butler, ‘Northeast Arctic Passage’ in Gerard J. Mangone (ed), International Straits of the World
(Sitjhoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 5-8.
46

Ibid., 42-45.

47
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321

Vladivostok on the Asian side of the country to the counterpart port of St. Petersburg on the
European side of Russia.48 For a considerable period of time, Russia has used its northern coast
for shipping oil and gas, ores, processed materials, building materials, foodstuffs and other goods
to its remote Arctic settlements,49 though funding for such shipments dwindled after the collapse
of the Soviet regime.50 As Ragner comments:

At its peak in 1987, almost 7 million tonnes of cargo was moved
along the northern sea route, most of it goods transported to or
from Russian Arctic ports. After the Soviet Union’s disintegration,
volumes gradually fell, before having come to a relatively stable
level of 1.5–2.0 million tonnes per year since 1996.51
The Arctic region is managed by a high level intergovernmental regional co-operation forum
called the Arctic Council (the Council), established by the Declaration on the Establishment of
the Council, otherwise known as the Ottawa Declaration of 1996.52 The member States of the
Council are Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden and the US53 There are six Working Groups that are
attached to the Council. Each of these has a specific mandate with that related to shipping being
the Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME).54 Established
in 1991 and incorporated into the Arctic Council in 1996, the focal point of PAME is on the
protection and sustainable use of the Arctic marine environment.55 Under the patronage of the
Council, PAME has conducted an assessment to evaluate the future of shipping in the Arctic

48
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region.56 The focal points of the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 (AMSA 2009) are the
potential effect of shipping on humans and the Arctic marine environment, and marine
infrastructure requirements for shipping in the Arctic region. 57 As reported in the 2009 AMSA
Report, the volume of shipping traffic going through the NAP in 2004 was as shown in Table 103:

Sea
Barents Sea
Kara Sea
Laptev Sea
East Siberian Sea
Bering Strait

Average Shipping Traffic (per day)
21–50
51–100
11–20
1–10
11–20

Table 10-3: Average Shipping Traffic in Sea Areas within the NAP in 2004
(Source: AMSA 2009)58

In 1991, the Russian government (then the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR])
formally opened the passage for international shipping to vessels of all nationalities without
discrimination when it issued the 1991 Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the
Northern Sea Route (1991 Regulations),59 based on the provisions of Article 234 of the LOSC on
navigation through ice-covered areas. Article 234 of the LOSC provides:
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Arctic Marine Navigation in 2050’ (The Arctic Council, Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment, Protection of the
Arctic Marine Environment, Institute of the North, 2004), 1-4.
57
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bound for destinations within Russia and/or Scandinavia. This explains the higher shipping traffic in the Kara and
Barents Seas as compared with the Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea and the Bering Strait. See Ibid., 189.
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further information on the 1991 Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route, see The
Russian Government, ‘Rules of Navigation: Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route’
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Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction
and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas
within the limits of the EEZ…Such laws and regulations shall have
due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the
marine environment based on the best available scientific
evidence.
The 1991 Regulations established certain requirements for vessels seeking passage through the
NAP, including:

(a)

A vessel navigating the NAP shall satisfy special technical and operational requirements,
while the Master or the person that performs his duties shall be experienced in operating
the vessel in ice-stricken waters. In cases where those persons have no such experience, a
pilot must be engaged to assist in manoeuvring the vessel;60

(b)

A vessel intending to navigate the NAP must produce a certificate of due financial
security with respect to the civil liability of the owner for damage inflicted by polluting
the marine environment;61

(c)

Shipping traffic through the Passage is monitored by the Marine Operations Headquarters
(MOHs) and all vessels are subject to its constant control;62

(d)

Vessels wishing to sail the NAP must notify their intention to MOHs and apply for an
icebreaker escort.63

In view of the increasing importance of the NAP to the international shipping industry, Russia,
or the then USSR, took affirmative measures to improve the environmental protection of its
marine Arctic areas through the promulgation of the 1990 Decree of the Council of Ministers of

60
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61
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the USSR.64 This Decree proclaimed Russia’s initiative to protect the sensitive marine
environment of its waters within the NAP route.65 Following this, Article 9 of the 1991
Regulations allowed MOHs to suspend the navigation of vessels that either caused damage or
that posed a threat to the marine environment of the NAP and its surrounding areas. Article 9 of
the 1991 Regulations stipulates:
In cases where an obvious necessity of environment protection оr
safe navigation dictates so, the Administration, or Marine
Operations Headquarters, can suspend navigation of vessels on
specific parts of the Northern Sea Route for the period during
which there exist the circumstances that have caused such а
measure.66
On this issue, the IMO has recently adopted Resolution A.1024 (26) on Guidelines for Ships
Operating in Polar Waters (IMO Polar Waters Guidelines) on 2 December 2009. 67 The IMO
Polar Water Guidelines are recommendatory and their wording should be interpreted as
providing recommendations rather than mandatory directions for ensuring safety of navigation
and preventing pollution from shipping operations in polar waters.68 Due to the increasing
importance of the polar regions to international shipping activity, there have been calls to make
the IMO Polar Waters Guidelines mandatory for all ships and mariners plying these waters.69
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Despite being the shortest route connecting Europe and the East Asia, the NAP is a perilous
route as the waters within the passage are ice-stricken.70 Global warming may be seen as a threat
by many, but, as far as the shipping industry is concerned, it is viewed as an advantage. The
rapid melting of the Arctic ice cap due to global warming means that within the next 15 years,
the NAP, which is now open only two months of the year may eventually be accessible for
navigation throughout the year.71 In other words, international shipping traffic in the NAP will
increase as the floating icebergs in these waters begin to disintegrate.72 In September 2009,
German ships transited the NAP from the South Korean port of Ulsan to Yamburg in Siberia.73 A
year later, in July 2010, two Russian oil tankers, the Varzuga and Indiga, plied the NAP sailing
from Murmansk to Chukotka in Russia’s far eastern corner.74 In August 2010, Russia’s largest
independent gas producer, Novatek, completed its tanker delivery to the Asia-Pacific region via
the NAP.75 These navigational successes reveal that navigation through this passage is far from
impossible. Utilising the NAP would cut the navigational distance from Europe to East Asia
significantly as compared to a similar voyage via the Suez Canal and the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.76
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Ports
Rotterdam–Yokohama
Rotterdam–Shanghai

Suez–Malacca
(nautical miles)
11,205
10,521

NAP
(nautical miles)
7,345
8,079

Distance saved
(per cent)
34.45
23.2

Table 10-4: The Length of a Voyage to Rotterdam from Different Ports by the Routes of
Malacca–Singapore and the NAP77
Based on Table 10-4, the voyage from Rotterdam to Yokohama via the Suez–Malacca route is
around 11,205 nautical miles. By travelling northward and using the NAP, the distance between
these two ports would be approximately 3,345 nautical miles, cutting approximately 34.45 per
cent the distance off the conventional Suez–Malacca route, which would translate into lower fuel
costs.78

Research has discovered that the Arctic is rich in oil and gas reserves, with the US Geological
Survey estimating that up to 25 per cent of the world’s remaining oil and gas lie beneath the icy
seabed of the Arctic Ocean.79 This survey also reported that the Arctic may contain as much as
one-fifth of the world’s unexplored oil and natural gas, potentially containing 90 billion barrels
of undiscovered oil and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered gas.80 These resources are
primarily located in three areas within the Arctic; namely, the West Siberian Basin, the East
Barents Basin and the Alaska Arctic,81 also believed to contain significant mineral resources.82
With the depletion of oil reserves in the Middle East, the developed economies of East Asia,
including Japan, China and South Korea, may seek to import oil from the Arctic region if this
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research by the US Geological Survey is validated.83 Japan has been looking for alternatives for
its sources of oil supply in view of the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East.84 It fears that its
industries will be affected if there are changes in production policies by Middle East oil
producers, or embargoes and unpredictable events such as wars, coups and revolutions.85

All these factors show that the NAP and the Arctic Region may in the future become maritime
superhighways as well as being the location of significant global oil and gas reserves. As
shipping activity in the Arctic region is expected to grow, the Arctic is likely to experience an
extraordinary transformation; natural resource development, governance challenges, climate
change and marine infrastructure issues will continue to influence the future marine uses of the
Arctic.86 The increasing shipping volume that plies the NAP will have a significant impact on the
marine environment of that region of the Arctic.87 AMSA 2009 also reported that there is a lack
of Arctic marine infrastructure, such as adequate aids to navigation, limitations to radio and
satellite communications and proper vessel traffic systems in the Arctic.88 Therefore, there is
much to be done to improve navigational facilities along the NAP in order to make it safer and
more viable for future shipping activity.89

10.3.1 The NAP Versus the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

There are a variety of advantages and disadvantages for ships travelling via the NAP and the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are considered as
83
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important Asia-Pacific maritime shipping highways. They are equipped with numerous aids to
navigation and considerable marine infrastructure and are reasonably safe for international
shipping.90 There are many ports along the Straits for vessels to call at, such as Dumai, Port
Klang, Penang, Tanjung Pelepas and the Port of Singapore. Piracy and other maritime crimes
have posed a threat in the past, but these incidents have been dramatically reduced in recent
years due to the improved security measures introduced by the littoral States to safeguard the
Straits.91 The shortcomings of navigation through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore include
that they are constricted and shallow, forcing ships to slow down, especially in the TSS areas and
the eastern exit of the Strait of Singapore to the South China Sea.92 The Straits are also exposed
to harsh weather during the monsoon season93 and voyages from Europe to East Asia take a
longer time using the Straits of Malacca and Singapore route than compared to the NAP,94 and
longer journeys mean more expensive shipping costs.

Voyages through the NAP has also have advantages and disadvantages to be considered by
shipping companies. Ships may save on operational costs if they choose to use this route.95
Another advantage is that the Russian government consistently monitors the passage of ships and
provides adequate navigational aids such as pilotage and icebreakers for transiting vessels.96 Due
to its harsh conditions and sparse population, especially in the Siberian region, piracy is not a
threat for ships traversing the NAP.97
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Despite the shorter duration of passage through the NAP, ships are likely to incur additional
costs such as dues payable to MOHs and payments for services such as pilotage and escort
icebreakers.98 Sea ice and water depths are the two main impediments to navigation in the
NAP,99 and voyages through the NAP may be frustrated should the route be closed due to ice
accumulation during winter.100 Even though the NAP has calmer waters, ships using this route
would have to reduce speed to ensure their propellers are not damaged by the layers of ice.101
There are serious limitations to radio and satellite communications in certain areas of the NAP,
making it difficult to mount an effective emergency response should a maritime casualty or other
emergency occur on this route.102 In addition, the sensitive marine environment of the Arctic
could also be threatened should a maritime accident takes place, causing serious environmental
damage in this part of the world.103

10.3.2 The Future of the NAP
The NAP is seen as a potential new global maritime highway of the future. 104 Some
commentators anticipate that the importance of NAP as an important shipping route will
continue to grow when oil and gas industries begin to develop extensively in the Russian Arctic
region.105 In fact, research has revealed that by the year 2020, 70 per cent of the overall cargo
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transported via the NAP will be oil and gas.106 Nevertheless, so long as the East Asian nations
continue to turn to the Middle East for their supplies of oil and gas, the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore will remain as busy as they are today. 107 Maritime voyages from the Middle East to
East Asian nations would obviously take longer via the NAP route, hence it may not be a viable
option for many shipping owners, as shown in Map 10-3.

Map 10-3: Routes via the Suez–Malacca and NAP (Aden-Yokohama)
(Modified from Google Maps)
In the long term, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may ultimately be preferred and the NAP
may only ever be a secondary, but less navigationally convenient, alternative route to the more
important Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
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10.4

THE THAI CANAL PLAN

Since ancient times, the Malay Peninsula has been perceived as a barrier by traders wishing to
gain direct access from the Indian Ocean to the Chinese Seas or vice versa.108 Early traders
would opt to use the Strait of Malacca (then known as the Sea of Melayu) or travel via the
Transpeninsular route located within the territory of the old Malay Kingdom of Kedah.109
Traders would have to sail the Indian Ocean to Ko Kho Khao, located on the west coast of the
Malay Peninsula and travel inland towards Laem Pho in the east to gain access to the Gulf of
Siam.110 Both these settlements are now within the modern day territory of Thailand. This fact
shows that the effort to discover the easiest route linking the east and the west without having to
sail down the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has a very long history. In recent decades, there
have been two proposals in South Thailand to divert traffic from the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.

Initially, in 1993 the Thai government approved a project to construct a land bridge consisting of
a highway, railway and oil pipeline from Krabi to Khanom.111 In contrast to the proposed Thai
Canal plan, this proposed land bridge would not require any physical land division. 112 Once in
operation, the proposed land bridge was to link the Andaman Sea with the Gulf of Thailand,
shortening the journey from the Middle East to the East Asian nations.113 Although this project
was planned for, it has now been completely suspended for environmental reasons. 114 A further
project is the Isthmus of Kra Canal Plan, now known as the Thai Canal Plan, an unfulfilled
legacy that goes back to the time of ancient Siam.
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The Thai Canal Plan has been contemplated for hundreds of years, from as early as 1677. 115 This
plan has an ambitious vision: to shorten the travelling distance from the east to the west. It was
first proposed during the reign of King Narai the Great in the 17th century when Siam, or
Ayutthaya as it was then known, initially opened its doors to European trade.116 The plan was
abandoned and subsequently reactivated several times for numerous reasons. The rulers of Siam
understood that this plan would bring prosperity to the nation but at the same time feared that it
would affect the security of their kingdom.117 The plan was also too expensive and not
economically viable.118 The British were not in favour of the plan, fearing that their maritime
base in Singapore would ultimately suffer adverse economic consequences as a result of the plan.
Following the end of the Second World War in 1945, Siam, which at that time was in a state of
war with the UK, signed an agreement to terminate the war between the two nations. 119 Article 7
of the agreement prohibited Siam from digging a canal through its territory to link the Andaman
Sea to the Gulf of Siam.120 This agreement was aimed, among other things, at securing Britain’s
interests in Singapore; however, this treaty was cancelled in 1954.

The Canal Plan has been mooted several times in modern day Thailand: in the early 1970s,
1990s and 2000s.121 It has been reactivated and then abandoned several times for various
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political, economic and security reasons.122 Bangkok feared that the canal would physically
isolate the five Southern Muslim majority districts and thus fuel secessionism, an unacceptable
situation for the Thai authorities.123 If Thailand is eventually physically divided by the Thai
Canal, it may have adverse effects on the political situation between the separatists and the
central government in Bangkok. Thai hesitation to construct the Thai Canal finally came to an
end when the Thai House of Senators reached a consensus to move ahead with the Canal Plan in
2005.124

The proposed canal, measuring approximately 120 kilometres from one end to the other through
the Kra Isthmus would cost US $23 billion.125 The proposed canal would be about 25 metres
deep and 400 metres wide.126 The funding for this project is intended to come from maritime
nations such as Japan, China, the US and other interested States, including Malaysia and
Indonesia.127 However, the main financial contributor would be the government of Thailand
itself. The position of the canal line has been proposed and modified a number of times. There
are 12 potential canal lines that appear to be feasible, with the final selection to be based on
factors such as environmental and societal impacts, engineering feasibility as well as economic
and security considerations.128 Among the 12 options, the 120 kilometre A9 route is regarded as
the most feasible, cutting through the provinces of Krabi, Phatthalung, Nakhon Si Thammarat,
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Songkhla and Trang.129 These areas of Thailand are sparsely populated and far from the
Malaysian and Burmese borders.130

The proposed canal is wide enough to accommodate two ships and will require a construction
period of around 5–10 years.131 It will allow ships to move between Europe, the Middle East,
India and China without passing through the already busy and constricted Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.132 The project is anticipated to employ a work force of 30,000 people if it proceeds.133
There are several advantages of the canal for shipping. These can be summarised as follows:

(a)

It will generate an annual trade turnover of some US $280 billion, and provide better
access to about 1.2 billion consumers that straddle the region within a radius of 2,400
kilometres;134

(b)

It will trim 593.592 nautical miles from the conventional route from the Indian to the
Pacific Oceans via the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, saving approximately US
$300,000 in transportation costs per tanker, and reducing the voyage by 2–5 days.135 This
is illustrated in Map 10-4. It has been argued that the financial savings, relative to the cost
of passage through the Malacca and Lombok Straits, will range from US $37,000 to US
$120,000 per voyage.136

129

Kavi Chongkittavorn, Regional Perspective: Thai Sea Power and the Kra Isthmus Canal Project (2006) The
Nation <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/08/14/opinion/opinion_30011008.php>.
130
131

Ibid.

Thai-canal.org, Thai Canal
canal.com/answer01E.htm#ans3E>.

Frequently

Asked Questions

(2009)

Thai-canal.org

<http://www.thai-

132

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Attempts to Seek Alternative Routes to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’
(Paper presented at the 3rd International Seminar on Maritime Culture and Geopolitics, Kuala Lumpur, 2010).
133

Franz Schurmann, China’s Demand for Oil May Make Thailand Canal a Reality (2003) News America Media
<http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=101ae63ff6a8d30bad62a31cf1624d27>.
134

2point6billion.com, Region Calls on Thailand to Reactivate Kra Canal Project (2009) Asia Briefing Ltd.
<http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2009/06/18/region-calls-on-thailand-to-reactivate-kra-canal-project1441.html>.
135

Julien Levesque, Bypassing the Malacca Straits (2008) Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
<http://ipcs.org/article/southeast-asia/bypassing-the-malacca-straits-2561.html>; Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli,
‘Attempts to Seek Alternative Routes to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ (Paper presented at the 3rd
International Seminar on Maritime Culture and Geopolitics, Kuala Lumpur, 2010).
136

Euan Graham, Japan’s Sea Lane Security, 1940-2004: A Matter of Life and Death (Nissan Institute, Routledge
Japanese Studies Series, 2006), 164-166; Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd Rusli, ‘Attempts to Seek Alternative Routes to the

335

(c)

Shipping traffic that goes through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be diverted
and reduced, hence alleviating their current accommodation of unlimited shipping traffic.
Less shipping traffic would reduce the current spending of the littoral States on
maintaining navigational aids and infrastructure along the Straits;137

(d)

The health of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be
better managed as the existence of the Thai Canal is likely to make the Straits less
significant for international shipping. Maritime States and user nations may divert their
interests to the Canal instead of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. If the Straits
become less important shipping lanes, the littoral States many find it more acceptable to
propose additional environmental protective measures in the Straits, such as Special
Areas under MARPOL and/or designating them as PSSAs in the IMO, conceivably with
fewer objections from the user States;138

(e)

With fewer transiting ships, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be further
developed as a fishing hub for the region;139

(f)

With shorter shipping voyages via the Canal, atmospheric pollution from ships would be
reduced, thus helping the shipping industry to lessen the adverse impacts of greenhouse
gas emissions;140

(g)

Remote and less developed areas of northern Sumatra, the northern states of Peninsular
Malaysia and the southern provinces of Thailand located close to the Canal could be
developed as shipping ports and hubs of the region;141

(h)

The reduced number of ships may also result in a reduction of the risks of piracy and
other maritime crime in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.142
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Map 10-4: Route through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore versus the Thai Canal
(Modified from GoogleMaps).
Potential negative consequences from the usage of the Thai Canal include:

(a)

The numbers of ships calling at ports along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore region
such as Dumai, Port Klang, the Port of Singapore and the Port of Tanjung Priok would
decrease.143 The Straits would diminish as critical global chokepoints for shipping
transport. However, certain commentators have speculated that the Canal would only
attract large oil tankers and not container ships. Speedy container ships may opt to use the
Straits instead.144

(b)

Vessels sailing from Europe to East Asia would have to pay double transit dues if they
chose not to transit the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Indeed, navigation via both the
Suez and Thai Canals would attract transit fees;145
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(c)

The guaranteed access provided by the transit passage regime does not apply to shipping
traffic using the Thai Canal. As canals are not subject to the provisions of the LOSC
transit through the canal could be suspended;146

(d)

Ships would have to considerably reduce their speed while navigating the Canal;147

(e)

Unlike passage through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore where the regulatory
powers of the littoral States are limited, navigation through the Canal would be subject to
the laws of Thailand;148

(f)

The well-being of the physical environment of the areas where the Canal is constructed is
likely to be adversely affected;149

(g)

With more ships using the Canal, the security of vessels navigating the Canal would
become more contentious, as the risks of the occurrence of piracy and other maritime
crime may increase;150

(h)

A 1973 survey report, based on a 12-year construction time frame for this canal,
estimated that the project would take more than 50 years to recoup its start-up costs;151

(i)

User States and many stakeholders may be less attracted to investing in co-operative
mechanisms to protect and preserve the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore if the Straits are no longer vital to their economic needs.152

Putting all these shortcomings aside, once open for navigation, the Thai Canal would represent a
quantum leap for the shipping industry, as did its counterparts, the Suez and Panama Canals
when they were constructed. The Suez Canal was envisioned by the Egyptians and the Romans
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but was only completed in the 18th century, centuries after the fall of both Empires.153 It
shortened the navigational distance between Europe and Asia by linking the Red and
Mediterranean Seas. As a result, ships could avoid sailing around the Cape of Good Hope at the
bottom of the African continent.154

The 80 kilometre Panama Canal is a crucial waterway that links the Atlantic to the Pacific
Ocean, meaning that ships no longer have to sail to Cape Horn at the bottom tip of the South
American Continent to sail between these oceans.155 Opened for traffic in 1914, the project was
regarded at the time as one of man’s greatest engineering achievements. 156 The dream of digging
a water passage across the tiny strip of land of the Isthmus of Panama can be traced to the 1513
Isthmian crossing of Vasco Nunez de Balboa.157 In 1848, gold was discovered in California and
this led to an increasing volume of trans-isthmian business.158 The US involvement in the
construction of Panama Canal began in 1899 when the US Isthmian Canal Commission of 1899–
1901, otherwise known as the second Walker Commission, was set up to study all routes feasible
for the construction of a water route between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.159

Many routes were chosen and among them were Nicaraguan and Panamanian routes. Ultimately,
the Isthmus of Panama, despite being characterised by mountains, lush tropical rainforest and
possessing some of the most geologically complex land formations in the world, was chosen as a
site for the Canal.160 The Isthmus of Panama is only about 50 miles wide at its narrowest point.
The construction of the Panama Canal employed a work force of 40,000 and it took slightly more
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than 10 years to complete. The Panama Canal was the single most expensive construction project
in the history of the US at that time, amounting to a cost of US $42.5 million.161

The accomplishment of these two Canals demonstrates the potential of the Thai Canal as a viable
alternative route to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, at least for some shipping. 162 Such a
project could ease the continuous burden that the Straits must bear in accommodating unlimited
shipping traffic.163 However, due to environmental reasons and the effects of the recent global
economic crisis, the Thai Canal plan does not appear to be close to materialising, and is still at its
preliminary stage of planning.

10.5

THE TRANS PENINSULAR PIPELINE PROJECT

The other potential alternative route is the Trans Peninsular Pipeline Project, which was designed
to transport oil via Peninsular Malaysia without having to pass the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. The Malaysian Trans Peninsular Pipeline Project (TPP) or the Yan-Bachok Pipeline
Plan was initially proposed in 1994 when the economic viability of the project was announced by
the Malaysian Business Times.164 The main driving force of this project is the rapid growth in
demand for crude oil from East Asian nations, which is expected to double from its current level
by the year 2020.165 The Malaysian government has made a plan to build pipelines across the
peninsula, cutting through the Titiwangsa Range, with a distance of 310 kilometres (190 miles)
from the west coast station of Yan, in Kedah, to the South China Sea station of Bachok in
Kelantan, at a cost of approximately US $23 million, as illustrated in Map 10-5.166
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Map 10-5: Illustration of the Transpeninsula Pipeline Project
(Modified from GoogleMaps)
When this project is complete, vessels that sail from the Middle East will be able to unload their
oil cargoes at the Yan Station. There, the oil would be refined and subsequently transported
through the Malaysian hinterland to the other side of the peninsula.167 When the cargoes reach
the east coast station of Bachok, they would then be loaded into another vessel or aframax
waiting there.168

This plan is expected to divert about 20 per cent of shipping traffic and eventually reduce the
burden of accommodating increasing shipping traffic upon the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.169 Hence, shipping volumes in the Straits could be better monitored and controlled.
Port Klang VTS reported that between the years of 2005-2010, oil tankers and VLCC
collectively make up an average of 27.7 per cent of the total shipping transits in the Straits of
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Malacca and Singapore.170 With fewer oil tankers and VLCC navigating the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, congestion in the Straits could be reduced and commodities such as crude oil that
pose a threat to the pristine marine environment of these waterways would no longer be ferried in
large amounts through the Straits.171

It has also been contended that using the TPP would reduce the time needed to transport oil
compared to the normal voyage of a vessel through the Strait of Malacca.172 Once fully
operational, this project is expected to be able to save up to three days transit time and is
anticipated to lessen the cost of shipments of crude oil by US $1.50 per barrel.173 Ships would
also escape the risk of piracy and other maritime crime present in the Straits. 174 The TPP project
is also expected to boost economic development and create employment for Malaysia’s less
developed northern states of Kedah, Perak and Kelantan, the three states crossed by the
pipeline.175 For example, it is projected to generate an annual revenue of US $80 million for the
state of Kedah alone.176

Transportation of oil via pipelines is not unusual in the petroleum industry. The concept of the
TPP is similar to the SUMED Pipeline in Egypt that transports oil from the Gulf of Suez to the
Mediterranean Sea. The construction of these 320 kilometre parallel twin pipelines began in
1974 and was completed in December 1976.177 Since the first shipment of oil in 1977, over 18.6
billion barrels of oil have been transported by the SUMED Pipeline.178 Oil from the Gulf of Suez
170
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is loaded at the Ain Sukhna Terminal, then transported inland to the Dahshour Boosting
Terminal, and finally channelled to the Mediterranean Terminal of Sidi Kerir near the city of
Alexandria.179 These terminals have state-of-the-art oil storage facilities. Transportation of oil
through the SUMED pipeline allows shipping companies to save time and costs, as they do not
need to travel around the Cape of Good Hope from Europe to obtain their fossil fuel supplies
from the Middle East.180

Pipelines have also been built to transport oil in the Persian Gulf. The Hormuz Strait, major parts
of which are within Iranian territory, is also an important seaway for oil transportation. 181 Iran
shares the Hormuz Strait with Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Like the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, the Hormuz Strait has been subject to threats of piracy. 182 Iran has long
engaged in disputes with its neighbours over control of islands in the Persian Gulf and offshore
oil and natural gas resources. As a result, maritime user States of the Gulf and the Gulf Cooperation Council nations183 fear that their petroleum industries may be compromised should
Iran, for reasons associated with security or war, close the Hormuz Strait to international
shipping.184 In view of this, the Gulf Co-operation Council nations are considering a series of
179
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options for oil pipelines to bypass the Iranian-dominated Strait of Hormuz.185 A report by the
Dubai-based Gulf Research Center said that these pipelines could extend from Iraq through
several Gulf Co-operation Council States to the Arabian Sea. One option called for a 2,500
kilometre pipeline that would cross Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
to the Omani capital of Muscat on the Arabian Sea.186

Currently, the UAE is also constructing another pipeline to avoid transportation of crude oil via
the Strait of Hormuz.187 The 370 kilometre Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline will provide the UAE
with its first direct outlet for oil exports outside the Gulf and is expected to be operational by
January 2011.188 Nevertheless, this project is now facing a six-month delay due to design
changes and is expected to be up and running by the second or third quarter of 2011. 189 By
connecting Abu Dhabi’s biggest onshore oilfields at Habshan to oil storage and export facilities
on Fujairah’s coast, the pipeline will allow up to 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd) of UAE crude
exports, more than half the nation’s 2.8 million bpd production capacity, to detour the Strait of
Hormuz.190

An existing and operational pipeline in the Gulf region is the 745 mile long Petroline, also
known as the East-West Pipeline.191 It was built across Saudi Arabia from Abqaiq to the Red Sea
port of Yanbu to divert oil transportation from the Hormuz Strait and has the capacity to ship
five million bpd.192 Other alternative routes could include the deactivated 1.65 million bpd Iraqi
185

World Tribune, Gulf State Pipelines Would Bypass Iran’s Straits of Hormuz (2007) World Tribune.com
<http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/07/front2454181.002083333.html>.
186

Ibid.

187

Tamsin Carlisle, Abu Dhabi to Fujairah Pipeline to be Completed Next Year (2009) The National
<http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090505/BUSINESS/705059789/1050/rss>.
188

Ibid.

189

Stanley Carvalho and Amena Bakr, UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah Pipeline Faces Delay-sources (2011) Reuters
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/07/ipic-emirates-pipeline-idUSLDE6961HK20101007>.
190

Tamsin Carlisle, Abu Dhabi to Fujairah Pipeline to be Completed Next Year (2009) The National
<http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090505/BUSINESS/705059789/1050/rss>.
191

Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Iran, Oil and the Strait of Hormuz’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2007), 1-7; US Energy Information Administration, Saudi Arabia: Oil Exports and Shipping (2009) US Energy
Information Administration <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Saudi_Arabia/OilExports.html>.
192

Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Iran, Oil and the Strait of Hormuz’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2007), 1-7.

344

Pipeline across Saudi Arabia and the 0.5 million bpd tapline to Lebanon.193 Oil could also be
pumped north to Ceyhan in Turkey from Iraq.194 Nevertheless, despite these pipeline
alternatives, the bulk of oil from the Persian Gulf is still being transported through the Hormuz
Strait.

These current practices of transporting oil via pipelines show that this method is economically
and technologically feasible.195 Although the TPP is viewed as a viable option, it has been
criticised by some commentators. Firstly, it has been pointed out that coastal waters are generally
shallow near Peninsular Malaysia, making it difficult for large tankers to dock. 196 Even worse,
monsoon rains degrade the sea conditions along the Kelantan coast where Bachok is located.
Secondly, unlike the terrain in the Middle East which mostly consists of desert lowlands, the
northern parts of Peninsular Malaysia that the pipelines will cross are covered with thick jungle
in the midst of highlands.197 Therefore, the construction of the pipeline would be more intricate.
Oil would have to be pumped up the 2,000 metre high Titiwangsa Mountains using a part of the
transported oil to supply the necessary power for pumping. 198 Thirdly, the TPP project could
have an adverse environmental impact should there be a leakage of oil at any part of the line.
This would then affect Malaysian groundwater and worse, fire could occur along the length of
the pipeline should such leakages occur.199 Fourthly, the TPP could directly and indirectly pose a
threat to the security of the nation should there be sabotage or a terrorist attack on the pipeline.200
Other challenges in realising the TPP include:
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(a)

Difficulties in attracting investment for the project. With the ongoing fluctuations in
global oil prices, it may be be difficult to attract investors, such as the shippers and oil
companies, to participate in financing the project.201 Nevertheless, the interest of China is
especially noteworthy. China’s emergence as an economic giant has made it a keen
supporter of this project.202 The creation of an alternative east-west energy route to the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore would be in China’s economic and strategic interest as
a nation which is dependent on imported oil.203 Similarly, Japan and South Korea’s
support of the project would be in keeping with their strategic interest in securing the
passage of their oil imports.204

(b)

Uncertainties in the current global oil prices. The current uncertainty over global oil
prices is likely to affect the demand for oil from East Asian nations.205 The price of oil
dropped from US $147.27 per barrel on 11 July 2008 to US $30 per barrel in early
2009,206 and is predicted to rebound to US $100.00 per barrel by the end of 2011.207
Demand has declined in major export-driven East Asian economies such as Japan, China,
Korea and Taiwan, where manufacturers are scaling back production as global demand
for their products slumps, and consumers are suffering a recession.208 With less demand
coming from East Asia, the TPP would likely no longer be a viable project.

(c)

Lack of an economic justification to bypass the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to ship
oil to the east. While logic would dictate that the TPP could reduce the volume of

201

Ibid., 82-87.

202

Ibid.

203

Ibid.

204

Ibid.

205

Ibid.

206

Ibid.

207

Rowena Mason, Oil Hits Two Year High as Analysts Predict $100 a Barrel in 2011 (2011) The Telegraph
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/8113846/Oil-hits-two-year-high-as-analysts-predict-100-a-barrel-in2011.html>.
208

Nazery Khalid, ‘The Trans-Peninsula Pipeline Project: Prospects and Potential Effects on the Straits of Malacca’
(Paper presented at the 6th MIMA Conference on the Straits of Malacca: Charting the Future, Kuala Lumpur, 2009),
82-87.

346

shipping traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, there are still a number of factors
that demonstrate that there is actually no need to bypass the Straits. Firstly, in the event of
a blockade of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, either due to accidents involving
tankers or other reasons, the Sunda and Lombok–Makassar Straits routes would be
available as more expensive, but reliable, alternatives.209 Secondly, although traffic
congestion in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is increasing, the existence of state-ofthe-art navigational safety facilities along the Straits would ensure the safe passage of
vessels plying the waterways. Thirdly, recent records have shown that piracy activities
have dropped significantly in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Therefore, there
would be no need to transport oil via the pipeline to avoid pirate attacks. Fourthly, it is
not entirely clear whether oil shipment using the TPP would be cheaper than shipping via
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.210 Certain commentators argue that voyage times
and shipping costs could be reduced if oil companies opted to use the TPP once it is
ready.211 Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that plying the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore does not incur transit fees for mariners, while shipment fees will be imposed
should they choose to use the TPP. Until the costs and benefits of using the TPP are
completely evaluated, the economic justification to bypass the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore to ship oil via the TPP cannot be finally established.

Nevertheless, a preliminary cost-benefit analysis has predicted that the TPP would certainly
reduce oil transportation costs from the Middle East to China. 212 Chinese oil tankers need 21
days to travel from China to the Middle Eastern oil terminals. 213 When the pipeline is fully
operational, these vessels will only need to sail to Kelantan in Malaysia to collect their crude oil
needs,214 a journey of approximately 7 days as compared to 21 days to the Middle East.215 The
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cost of using the TPP would therefore be much cheaper, and this could reduce shipping costs up
to US $1.35 per barrel.216

Putting all these criticisms aside, if the TPP does become a reality, the littoral States, particularly
those of the Strait of Malacca, may have strong reasons to limit the traffic that goes through this
waterway as there is now an alternative route. The littoral States of the Strait of Malacca,
Malaysia and Indonesia, could discuss the issue of traffic limitation with relevant stakeholders
and interested users of the Strait of Malacca and reach agreements with them that should they opt
to use the TTP, the Strait would be off-limits to their vessels, particularly oil tankers and
VLCC.217 One argument might be that this would not be against the spirit and intent of the LOSC
as Article 311(3) allows two or more State parties to modify or suspend the operation of
provisions of the LOSC, solely between themselves. Article 311(3) provides:

Two or more State Parties may conclude agreements modifying or
suspending the operation of provisions of the Convention,
applicable solely to the relations between them, provided that such
agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from which is
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose
of this Convention, and provided that such agreements shall not
affect the application of the basic principles embodied herein, and
that the provisions of such agreements do not affect the enjoyment
by other parties of their rights or the performance of their
obligations under this Convention.
Therefore, the littoral States and the interested States and stakeholders could enter into an
agreement or agreements to suspend the application of Part III of the LOSC to their oil tankers
and VLCC as far as the Strait of Malacca is concerned, should they opt to use the pipeline.218
However, it is anticipated that such agreements would be criticised by States that champion the
concept of free transit in straits used for international navigation. They may contend that this
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would be against the spirit of the LOSC that prescribes the application of transit passage regime
in almost all straits in the world. They may also assert that arrangements of this nature are likely
to violate the basic principle embodied in the LOSC relating to the right of unimpeded passage
through straits used for international navigation.

Launched in 2007, the TPP project was initially expected to be fully operational by the end of
2012.219 Nevertheless, it has experienced many challenges and difficulties in realisation owing to
the recent global economic crisis and internal conflicts within the promoter company, the TransPeninsula Petroleum Sdn. Bhd.220 In 2010, the Malaysian government cancelled the approval in
principle that it had awarded to Trans-Peninsula Petroleum Sdn. Bhd. due to the internal conflicts
within the company that had delayed the development of the project. 221 Currently, TransPeninsula Petroleum Sdn. Bhd. is no longer heading the TPP project.222 The contractors of the
TPP, Ranhill Engineers and Constructors Sdn. Bhd. are waiting for further development of the
proposed project given that the Master Alliance Agreement between the contractors of the
project has lapsed.223 Following these difficulties, the Malaysian government is reviewing the
TPP224 but has not declared any intention to cancel the project.225

In relation to the TPP project, China has also planned to build an oil pipeline from Maday Island
in Myanmar to Rulli in Yunnan, China, to reduce its vulnerability due to imported oil shipped via
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the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.226 The project is constructed and managed by the China
National Petroleum Company.227 The cost of the construction of the 793 kilometre pipeline is
estimated to be around US $2 billion, and once in operation, it is expected to carry 12 million
tonnes of oil per annum.228 Like the TPP, this project is still in the early stages of construction
and is scheduled for completion by March 2013.229 As long as these projects have yet to be
realised, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore will continue to be indispensable oil arteries for
East Asian economic giants.

10.6

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has analysed the viability of the current and future alternatives to the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. The Indonesian archipelagic routes of the Straits of Sunda, Lombok and
Makassar have been identified as viable alternatives to that of the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. However, the Sunda Strait is not preferred by huge tankers because of its uneven
depths, while the Lombok and Makassar route, despite being relatively easy to navigate, requires
longer voyage times. Another potential route has been revealed by the likely impact of global
warming, which could transform the NAP from an ice-covered and perilous waterway to a
lucrative shipping route of the future. The NAP is seen as the shortest route linking Europe and
East Asia. However, as far as transporting oil from the Middle East to the East Asian nations is
concerned, the NAP is unlikely be a viable route for shipments compared to the existing Straits
of Malacca and Singapore route.

The proposed Thai Canal is considered to be one of the best solutions to reduce the heavy
maritime traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The Canal, which will cut through the
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Malay Peninsula, could provide the shortest route from the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of
Thailand. However, this project is still in its initial stages of implementation. Furthermore, the
Malaysian government has its own plan to divert traffic from the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore. The TPP project, which was approved in 2007, requires oil pipelines to be
constructed across the jungles of Kedah, Perak and Kelantan in northern Malaysia. Although it is
thought to be economically feasible, this project has been criticised for its impracticalities and is
currently at a standstill. Both the Thai Canal and the TPP, if realised, appear to be the best
alternatives for diverting shipping traffic away from the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

This Chapter submits that at the moment, among the alternatives discussed, only the Indonesian
archipelagic straits are available for ships sailing from the west to the east and vice versa.
However, shipping companies may still favour the Straits of Malacca and Singapore over the
Indonesian archipelagic straits due to the shorter navigation time required via this route. In
conclusion, as long as the other alternatives are pending, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
will continue to be navigated by a steadily increasing volume of shipping traffic in the years to
come. Without viable alternatives, the proposed implementation of the future environmental
measures elucidated in Chapters 8 and 9 will remain contentious.
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CHAPTER 11.
CONCLUSION
11.1

INTRODUCTION

This Thesis has the primary objective of showing that the current international legal framework
on marine environmental protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has placed the
littoral States in a disadvantaged position as far as enforcement jurisdiction is concerned. The
second objective of this research is to propose potential legal and policy measures to improve the
protection of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Structured into
eleven chapters, this Thesis has attempted to fulfil these objectives, as elaborated in the
following sections of this chapter.

11.2

NAVIGATIONAL REGIMES IN
SINGAPORE

THE

STRAITS OF MALACCA AND

Chapter 2 of this Thesis began its discussion with a brief historical, demographic and economic
profile of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Besides being rich in biodiversity, the
importance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to the well-being of the economies of the
littoral States is overwhelming, particularly for their fishing, marine tourism and shipping
industries. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore have served as two of the most important
shipping routes in the world for at least a millennium and they continue to enjoy this reputation
until the present day. With the developing economies of Southeast and East Asian nations,
shipping traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is anticipated to steadily increase in
future years.

Chapters 3 and 4 of this Thesis dealt with issues pertaining to the legal status of straits used for
international navigation. Chapter 3 focused on historical developments in defining the legal
status of straits used for international navigation, while Chapter 4 described the application of the
transit passage regime. Chapter 4 established that the transit passage regime ensures that foreign
vessels enjoy the right to unimpeded transit passage and not freedom of navigation when sailing
via Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

352

11.3

POLLUTION ISSUES

The key issue examined in Chapter 5 is the pollution problem faced by the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore. Currently, the Straits are pressured by pollution problems primarily caused by
land-based sources of pollution as well as vessel-source discharges of oil and wastes. As two of
the busiest shipping chokepoints world-wide, the issue of vessel-source pollution is endemic in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The presence of many navigational hazards has made it
difficult for mariners to navigate through these waterways, hence increasing the risks of
accidents.

The high population density in areas situated along the coasts bordering the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore further aggravates this situation. The intense human activity in these areas has an
adverse impact on the well-being of the marine environment of the Straits. Section 5.2.1 of
Chapter 5 elucidated that certain rivers feeding into the Strait of Malacca, especially those that
originate from the Malaysian states and Indonesian provinces that border the Straits, are badly
polluted. Research has proven that the effect of land-based pollution on the marine environment
is much greater than that of vessel-source pollution. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the World
Wildlife Fund (WWF) stipulated that 80 per cent of global marine pollution comes from landbased activities. Therefore, it is arguable that shipping activities cannot be totally blamed for the
deterioration in the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. However, this
assertion may not be entirely true when viewed from an enforcement standpoint.

The littoral States of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have full powers to regulate land-based
sources of marine pollution as they possess full sovereignty over their respective land territories.
The littoral States may pass laws and regulations and introduce measures to deal with land-based
sources of marine pollution without having to adhere to generally accepted laws and regulations
prescribed by international law. For example, Singapore has successfully managed to develop a
modern waste management and disposal system that is effective in decreasing the discharge of
land-based sources of pollution into the sea within that city-State. Malaysia and Indonesia are
following in Singapore’s footsteps by developing modern and effective waste disposal systems in
order to tackle the land-based pollution problems in their respective countries. Unlike the
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management of land-based sources of marine pollution, the littoral States have no absolute
powers when it comes to regulating vessel-source pollution, especially in their respective
territorial seas within the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Their legislative powers in this
regard are constrained by the application of Parts III and XII of the LOSC, which provide that
they may only pass laws and regulations that are consistent with generally accepted international
laws and regulations. Therefore, Chapter 5 of this Thesis has established the fact that vesselsource pollution cannot be strictly regulated and continues to be an issue of concern, along with
land-based sources of marine pollution.

11.4

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Due to the pressures of pollution, it is important to examine the international legal framework on
the protection of the marine environment of straits used for international navigation from vesselsource pollution. Chapter 6 focused on this matter. The LOSC is the main body of law
constituting the international legal framework for safety of navigation and the control of vesselsource pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The LOSC is supplemented by a
variety of IMO-sponsored conventions.

Part III of the LOSC describes the application of transit passage, whilst Article 233 of Part XII of
the LOSC provides safeguards concerning the marine environment applicable to straits used for
international navigation. The already limited regulatory powers conferred by Article 42(1) (a) &
(b) of the LOSC are made even more limited by the application of Article 233 of the LOSC.
Article 233 not only leaves States bordering straits without any precise procedural and
enforcement measures to be followed in cases of marine pollution, but most importantly, is silent
on the question of whether or not States bordering straits may detain and institute proceedings
against foreign non-sovereign immune vessels suspected causing major pollution in their
territorial straits. As a result, the application of the provisions of the LOSC and the related IMOsponsored conventions can only be effective through the port or flag States’ jurisdiction as the
regulatory powers of States bordering straits have been restricted. The littoral States of the Straits
of Malacca and Singapore have limited powers in regulating shipping through their territorial
Straits since more than half of transiting traffic does not even call at local ports.
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In ensuring that their maritime-related laws are compatible with global standards, the littoral
States of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have largely signed and ratified these IMOsponsored conventions. Section 6.4 explained that even if the littoral States had properly
incorporated these international regulations into their domestic applications, the powers of the
littoral States would still remain limited as these States could only formulate laws by giving
effect to accepted international regulations as provided for by Part III of the LOSC. The
restriction stipulated under international law would affect the operations of the domestic
legislation which are devised based on accepted international standards. Unlike the innocent
passage regime, which is subject to suspension, the main restriction imposed by international law
is that the littoral States have no powers to suspend or impede the passage of ships navigating
through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Based on these arguments, Chapter 6 concluded
that the current international legal framework on the protection of the marine environment of the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore has placed the littoral States in a disadvantaged position as far
as enforcement jurisdiction is concerned.

11.5

THE CO-OPERATION MECHANISM

Due to the limitations imposed by international law, Article 43 of the LOSC has provided a
certain amount of latitude for States bordering straits in compensating their disadvantaged
positions. Among the provisions of the LOSC, Article 43 is unique in the way that it encourages
States bordering straits to co-operate with user States in working towards ensuring safety of
navigation and the protection of the marine environment. As discussed in Chapter 7, Article 43
has also been responsible for the establishment of co-operation mechanisms between the littoral
States and user States to ensure that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are safer for
international shipping activities.

Chapter 7 explains that the littoral States have worked closely through the TTEG, the IMO and
Japan to promote a safer shipping environment in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In 2007,
the Co-operative Mechanism was officially established, comprising three bodies, the Cooperation Forum, the PCC and the Aids to Navigation Fund. This framework for co-operation
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was a historic advance on the regime for the management of the Straits which, for the first time,
put Article 43 of the LOSC into practical application.

Since 2009, other user States including China, South Korea, Australia, the US, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and India have indicated their intention to participate in the Cooperative Mechanism. Other relevant organisations and stakeholders, such as RTisa,
INTERTANKO and MENAS have also indicated their interest in participating in the Cooperation Mechanism. This is a positive development towards realising a sustainable burden
sharing mechanism between the user States and the littoral States. Nevertheless, as pointed in
Section 7.3.2.1.3, contributions to the Aids to Navigation Fund have been somewhat
disappointing, with the amounts collected in 2009, 2010 and 2011 being insufficient to cover the
expenses incurred for the maintenance and replacement of aids to navigation in the Straits.

Almost all projects under the Co-operation Mechanism are aimed at providing safe navigation
rather than focusing on the protection and preservation of the marine environment of the Straits.
The general perception is that accidents can be avoided if there is a regime to promote safer
shipping in the Straits. If accidents can be avoided, the marine environment of the Straits can be
spared from unwarranted oil and other noxious substances spills. This perception may have been
accurate one or two decades ago when the volume of shipping traffic was not as high. With the
projected steady increase in maritime traffic in the Straits over the next decade, the importance of
environmental protection and preservation schemes, beyond the perspective of the enhancement
of safety of navigation in the Straits, will become apparent to the littoral States. Chapter 7
concluded by stipulating that there may be a need at some point in the future for the littoral
States to impose or implement other protective measures beyond the scope of the international
legal framework as established in Parts III and XII of the LOSC, either through IMO-endorsed
measures or other potential unilateral measures.

11.6

POTENTIAL FUTURE MEASURES UNDER THE IMO MECHANISM

As discussed in Chapter 8 of this Thesis (Sections 8.2 and 8.3), two options that could be
examined are the submission of applications for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to be
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designated as a Special Area under MARPOL and/or as a PSSA. The Straits of Malacca and
Singapore potentially fit the requirements for the designation of a Special Area or a PSSA, since
they fulfil the criteria needed for such a designation.

Given the fact that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are waterways that are predominantly
used to ferry oil, it has been proposed that the Straits be designated as a Special Area under
Annex I of MARPOL. Such a designation would further protect the marine environment of the
Straits from operational discharges of oil and oily wastes without having to control or put a cap
on the number of vessels sailing these waterways. Opposition to such a proposal could be
anticipated on the basis that ports along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore do not have
sufficient reception facilities to qualify them for such a designation. Nevertheless, this is not
entirely true as most ports along the Straits, particularly the Port of Singapore and ports along the
western coast of Peninsular Malaysia, have improved considerably in terms of the availability of
port reception facilities. Furthermore, given the fact that more than half of the vessels that sail
the Straits do not even call at local ports, it is contended that the existing port reception facilities
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are adequate to support their designation as a Special
Area under MARPOL.

The Torres Strait was the first strait used for international navigation to be assigned the status of
a PSSA. This provides a precedent for designating straits that are important maritime
chokepoints, such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, as a PSSA. As discussed in the
second part of Chapter 8, the fact that certain marine and coastal areas along the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore have been designated as either UNESCO GEOPARKs, RAMSAR Sites
or UNESCO World Heritage Areas would be a positive aspect in any proposal made by the
littoral States to the IMO for designation of the Straits as a PSSA. Nevertheless, such a proposal
may face opposition from States including the US, the UK, France, Japan and China who are
heavy users of the Straits of Malacca and other straits used for international navigation. Some of
these States have been, and are likely to continue to be, keen supporters of liberal navigation
rights. In view of this, the littoral States would need to prepare a solid proposal incorporating
cogent reasons for proposing the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a PSSA and introducing
practical APMs. Assuming that the littoral States are successful in establishing their case, there
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are a number of potential APMs that they could contemplate proposing to the IMO, including a
cost-recovery mechanism, a traffic limitation scheme and the imposition of compulsory pilotage
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

The Revised PSSA Guidelines stipulate that the proposed APMs to be imposed in a PSSA are
limited to actions that either are to be, or have been approved or adopted by the IMO, and ‘any
development and adoption of other measures aimed at protecting specific sea areas against
environmental damage from ships, provided that they have an identified legal basis’. The APMs
must also be within the competence of IMO to prevent, reduce or eliminate risks from these
shipping activities. APMs may also include any measures that are yet to exist but could become
available through the amendment of an IMO instrument or by the adoption of a new IMO
instrument. Among these APMs, the compulsory pilotage regime is the only one that has
previously been adopted by the IMO in a strait used for international navigation; the Torres
Strait. As with its implementation in the Torres Strait, any proposed imposition of compulsory
pilotage in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore would be aimed at promoting safer navigation in
these narrow, congested shipping routes.

The two other proposed APMs, a cost-recovery mechanism and limitations on shipping numbers,
have never been endorsed by the IMO for a PSSA; however, Resolution A.982 (24) provides that
proposed APMs may include any measures that have yet to exist as long as they are aimed at
protecting specific areas against environmental damage from ships.

The proposed cost-recovery mechanism could be promoted on the basis that a more effective cooperation scheme between the littoral States and the user States is needed as the present scheme
under the Co-operative Mechanism seems to be developing slowly, particularly in relation to
contributions made to the Fund. The funds collected via the cost-recovery mechanism could be
used to improve navigational safety by installing state-of-the-art aids to navigation as well as
undertaking projects proposed by the PCC. They could also be used to finance the Marine
Electronic Highway Project, where progress has been delayed due to the global economic
slowdown. These projects are aimed at promoting a safer navigational environment for ships,
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which in turn helps to prevent casualties that could compromise the well-being of the marine
environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

It has been predicted that shipping traffic in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore will double by
2020. Increased shipping activities will not only cause further congestion in the Straits but may
also increase the risks of maritime casualties and their associated pollution. The rationale behind
the proposed traffic limitation scheme as an APM is to overcome the anticipated problem of
over-congestion which may further degrade the marine environment of these waterways. The
safety of navigation of vessels transiting the Straits may be jeopardised if the narrow Straits must
accommodate shipping traffic beyond their maximum carrying capacity. Indeed, the aims of the
proposed traffic limitation scheme as an APM are two-fold; in that this would provide a safer
shipping environment for mariners as well as protecting and preserving the marine environment
of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore from vessel-source pollution. As this APM may be seen
by some States as impeding the free navigation of vessels through the Straits, it may be seen as a
measure that is more focused towards the protection of the marine environment of the Straits
rather than a measure that relates specifically to improving the safe navigation of transiting
vessels.

Chapter 8 of this Thesis also discussed the possible legal and political ramifications should these
APMs be introduced in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In view of protests from maritime
States such as the US and Singapore relating to Australia’s imposition of compulsory pilotage in
the Torres Strait, the same reaction may occur should these proposed APMs be introduced in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore. States opposed to these APMs in the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore are also likely to allege that the littoral States have violated their duties under the
LOSC and that the proposed APMs would unwarrantedly increase the costs of shipping.

Given the fact that it may be difficult for the littoral States to convince the IMO to designate the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a PSSA, the littoral States could also propose that the IMO
endorse these APMs as measures in a ship routeing system outside the scope of a PSSA, as
allowed under the LOSC through Articles 42(1) (a) and 233. However, this would also invite
legal and political criticism, as the only environmental protection measures in the Straits of
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Malacca and Singapore that currently fall within the scope of Articles 42(1) (a) and 233 are the
TSS and the minimum under keel clearance requirements, already implemented in the Straits. In
order to ensure the effective implementation of these proposed APMs, Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore would have to develop strategies to convince the IMO and the maritime States that
these new APMs should be endorsed within the scope of Articles 42(1) (a) and 233 of the LOSC
as well. They would need to justify their assertions that heavy shipping activities have
undermined the well-being of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore
with established fact and scientific evidence.

11.7

POTENTIAL UNILATERAL MEASURES

Chapter 9 of this Thesis has evaluated the potential unilateral measures that the littoral States
could consider should the littoral States find it difficult to obtain operate through the IMO. The
reason why transit passage is exercised in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is because the
Straits are considered as one waterway. If they were to be considered as separate waterways, the
Strait of Malacca would no longer be a Strait that connects one part of the high seas or an EEZ to
another part of the high seas or an EEZ. Instead, it would be considered a Strait that connects one
part of the high seas or EEZ to a territorial sea of a third State; that is, the territorial sea of
Singapore. In legal terms, this would automatically deny the application of transit passage
regime in the Strait of Malacca. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this Thesis, before the introduction
of the LOSC, Singapore had consistently supported the concept of free navigation of foreign
vessels through the Straits, while Malaysia and Indonesia were concerned with the issue of
sovereignty and not as favourable as Singapore in supporting freedom of navigation. Hence, if
Malaysia and Indonesia jointly made a declaration that the Strait of Malacca was separate from
the Strait of Singapore, from their point of view the regime of non-suspendable passage would
replace the transit passage regime in the Strait of Malacca. This is a stricter regime than that of
transit passage, and gives the littoral States more power to regulate shipping traffic transiting the
Straits.

In addition to this measure, Malaysia and Indonesia could also consider re-adopting the three
nautical mile limit for their territorial seas in the Strait of Malacca. Some parts of the Strait of
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Malacca are as wide as 200 nautical miles, although it narrows to 8 nautical miles towards its
southern end. In legal terms, the re-adoption of the three nautical mile limit in the Strait of
Malacca would leave an EEZ or a high sea corridor in the centre of this waterway. As such,
transit passage regime would not be applicable for foreign vessels in the Strait since they have
the right to exercise freedom of navigation within the EEZ or high sea corridor of this waterway.
Within the three nautical mile limits of each side of the Strait of Malacca, the Malaysian and
Indonesian authorities could then exercise greater power in the regulation of shipping under the
regime of innocent passage and thus create an environmental buffer zone within these limits.
These two possible unilateral measures could be imposed by the littoral States of the Strait of
Malacca; however, both potential measures have certain shortcomings.

With respect to the first measure, the declaration of the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of
Singapore as separate waterways, it is highly likely that this declaration would be opposed and
not observed by most maritime States as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have for many
years been accepted by both their littoral States and maritime States as straits used for
international navigation where the transit passage regime applies. Furthermore, this fact is
reiterated by the agreement made via the Joint Statement of 1971 by the three littoral States that
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are to be considered as one as far as maritime navigation is
concerned. Hence, this can be seen as the basis of the acceptance of the littoral States to be
bound by the provisions of Part III of the LOSC.

On the second measure, the re-adoption of the three nautical mile territorial sea limit, the
governments of both Malaysia and Indonesia would not necessarily be in favour of this option
since it involves renunciation of their sovereignty over a considerable area within the Straits;
which may be seen as too excessive a measure to undertake in order to obtain greater regulatory
power over ships sailing the Strait of Malacca. This potential measure may also be strongly
condemned by maritime State, which may accuse Malaysia and Indonesia of attempting to
impede the right of transit passage of foreign vessels via both the Strait of Malacca and the Strait
of Singapore. Chapter 9 concluded by reiterating that unless and until viable alternative shipping
routes to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore can be determined, the proposed implementation
of the future measures discussed in Chapters 8 and 9 will face considerable controversy.
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11.8

CONCLUSION

It is an indisputable fact that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are important waterways for
shipping activities as well as many other industries. However, despite their importance, there are
many weaknesses in the current legal framework for regulating the safety of navigation and the
control of vessel-source pollution in these crucial waterways. Part III and Part XII of the LOSC
have put their littoral States in a disadvantaged position, by favouring shipping over the
protection of the marine environment of the Straits. As far as straits used for international
navigation are concerned, the implementation of international IMO conventions on the control of
vessel-source pollution can only be effectively regulated through port or flag State jurisdiction.

This Thesis, through Chapters 8 and 9, has attained its second objective by proposing several
solutions to this problem, particularly in terms of enhancing the enforcement powers of the
littoral States to enable them to protect and preserve the marine environment of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore from vessel-source pollution. These solutions include the proposals to
designate the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a Special Area under MARPOL 73/78 and a
PSSA, as well two unilateral measures that the littoral States could consider adopting. In further
protecting the marine environment of the Straits from vessel-source pollution, the littoral States
should seriously consider proposing the Straits as a Special Area.

Furthermore, this Thesis submits that the traffic limitation scheme under the proposed PSSA
regime would be the most appropriate measure to govern the current and future traffic situations
in the Straits. The littoral States may need to undertake in-depth research into this matter, as this
measure could directly or indirectly impede the right of free transit of foreign vessels in the
Straits. As far as the unilateral measures are concerned, it is submitted that the re-interpretation
of the Straits as two separate straits is more legally and practically feasible over the re-adoption
of the three nautical mile limit. The latter would involve the renunciation of territorial sea limits,
which would not be seen as an ideal measure. The proposed application of the non-suspendable
innocent passage regime will not only guarantee non-suspendable passage for foreign vessels,
but at the same time will strengthen the regulatory powers of the littoral States to regulate
shipping transit within the Strait of Malacca.
362

In order to lessen traffic pressure on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, mariners and shippers
should be provided with viable alternatives to these critical waterways. Among the most viable
alternatives are routes through the Indonesian archipelagic straits, namely the Sunda, LombokMakassar and Ombai-Wetar Straits. Nevertheless, due to their unfavourable geographic
locations, sailing via these Indonesian straits would translate into large increases in the costs of
shipping and hence, this is a less preferred option.

As discussed in Chapter 10 of this Thesis, there are also future alternative routes such as the
Northeast Arctic Passage (NAP), the proposed Thai Canal Project and the proposed Transpeninsula Pipeline Project (TPP). Even though the NAP may be a viable future maritime
highway linking Europe and East Asia, it is however, not an economically viable route for the
transport of oil between the Middle East and East Asia. The Thai Canal and the TPP, on the other
hand, are among the projects aiming towards diverting traffic away from the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore.

Once these projects are operative, the shipping scenario in the Straits will inevitably change;
ships will continue to navigate the Straits but their numbers are expected to decrease from the
current high volume of traffic. The proposed implementation of the future environmental
protection measures discussed in Chapters 8 and 9 would likely be less contentious if these
alternative routes were available. Until then, the most practical way to balance the interests of
shipping and the protection of the marine environment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is
by promoting support of the existing Co-operative Mechanism. Undeniably, if equitable balance
between the needs of shipping and those of environmental protection could be attained, it would
ultimately be more feasible to realise the vision of promoting sustainable development in the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore; two of the most significant global shipping arteries, priceless
maritime heritage of the world.
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